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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political and socioeconomic consequences of Israeli policies 
of resettlement on the Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip. It does so by arguing 
that the resettlement schemes undertaken by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip 
are part of a continuous policy to further disperse the Palestinian refugees. This 
policy has its roots in Herzl's early call to expel Palestinians from Palestine, and 
materializes in the 1948 exodus. 
The thesis argues that political, military and socioeconomic measures undertaken by 
the Israeli authorities do not conform with their humanitarian claims -to improve the 
living conditions of Gaza Strip refugees. Israeli measures can instead be seen to 
conform to a type of modern counter-insurgency doctrine, promoted by security 
forces, in response to revolutionary guerrilla warfare or insurgency. The concept 
of resettlement, it is suggested, is an integral part of this doctrine. 
The primary research findings demonstrate that the "civic action" projects, ostensibly 
designed to improve the living conditions of Gaza Strip refugees, have not succeeded 
in meeting their real purpose, that of pacification. Instead, the repressive military 
and political measures used by the Israeli military authorities have sharpened the 
military and political consciousness of all Gaza refugees. Indeed, by maintaining the 
cohesive cultural and political identity, the refugees relocated to the housing projects 
have thwarted the Israeli policy of divide and rule, contributing as much to the 
strength of the Palestinian national movement as their compatriots remaining in the 
refugee camps. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study on the resettlement of refugees from the Gaza Strip (GS) fills a gap in 
the literature on Palestinian refugees (PRs). It brings to light an undocumented, 
unresearched and important side of the PRs; it is the first study to focus on the proposals 
for resettlement, some of which have been implemented partially by the Israeli state in an 
attempt to break the Palestinian socio-political fabric. It is also the first work to examine 
how refugees' continuous rejection of resettlement has been strengthened through solidarity 
and collective consciousness of this stateless group. This thesis demonstrates how opposition 
to resettlement helps galvanise and promote Palestinian national struggle for statehood. 
Indeed, resettlement has to be perceived as a major issue in itself, offering a deep insight 
into the formation of national struggle, against the counter-insurgency strategies employed 
by the Israeli authorities to quell resistance and undermine the solidarity of the Strip's 
refugees. 
Gam Refugees: A Unique Case 
The Israeli sponsored housing projects which the authorities had started constructing 
in the early 'seventies in the GS have raised a lot of controversy among both the PRs and 
the Israeli authorities. One source of that conflict relates to the aims and objectives behind 
plans for resettlement. The Israeli authorities claim the aim is mainly humanitarian - to 
provide better housing conditions for the PRs in the congested camps of GS -. Yet, there 
have also been other Israeli statements regarding the objectives of such projects, such as 
"to normalize the dream of return" of the refugees, and to reduce their national struggle 
in the GS. Issues of demography, resistance and security are what really lie behind the 
construction of the Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS, together with a hope that 
they can be used as propaganda to improve Israel's world image. When it became clear in 
the late 1970s that these projects and their inhabitants failed to live up to Israel's 
expectations, their construction was halted. Indeed the strong militancy of Palestinians in 
Gaza is seen by Israeli officials as gallant, heroic and the "most sensitive symbol of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute." 
There has been a continuous debate about the future of the GS in Israeli circles , 
which started in 1949 and was revived in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The roots of 
Gaza's problems' lie in the combined issues of demography and security. The Strip is 
inhabited by the highest percentage (87.2 %) of refugees, divided between 8 camps, with a 
very high birth rate which reached 53.8 per 1000 population in the year 1990. The 
population is condensed into an area of only 360 square kilometres, giving a population 
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density of over 1,944 people per square kilometre, the highest in the world. 
An examination of the history of the PRs in Gaza reveals that they have resisted 
every attempt to resettle them, in a way that no other Palestinian refugees in other locations 
have done. This raises the question as to what distinguishes them from their compatriots 
elsewhere. In attempting to answer this, many stages of resistance by the Gaza refugees are 
examined, since. "the first Intifada" of 1955, which erupted in response to the Egyptian-
UNRWA plan to resettle GS refugees in Sinai. Yet, a better understanding of Gaza 
refugee militancy has to be perceived in the context of the nineteen years of the Egyptian 
rule over the GS from 1948-1967, and its consequences, in terms of the political, military, 
and socio-economic processes attacking refugees. This offers some insight into the military 
training that the refugees got under the Nasserist regime and the revolutionary ideology that 
they were taught in schools. We will also tackle here the impact of the Israeli raids in Gaza 
in the 1950s, and the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1956/1957. Added to this the high 
rate of unemployment among the refugee popUlation; and the banning of immigration 
outside the Strip by the Egyptian Administration, suggest a uniqueness to GS refugees which 
ultimately provides a logical explanation as to why they are different from other Palestinians, 
and why their resistance and provocative opposition to Israeli forces sets them apart from 
refugees in other parts of the world. 
This thesis, therefore, examines the scale of resistance of the GS refugees since the 
Israeli occupation in 1967. It examines the Israeli assumption that the resettling of the P.Rs 
in the GS would weaken or dismantle their collective consciousness, national identity and 
resistance, which they have managed to build through the past four decades. In fact, their 
political assertiveness has been growing rapidly in the post-1967 era, in terms of their 
demand for political rights as refugees and the right to self-determination and sovereignty 
as a people and a nation. This has made of the Palestinian refugee "problem" a unique case 
among international refugee issues, since it has moved from being primarily a humanitarian 
problem to a primarily political issue, and has occupied a central position in regional and 
world affairs. It is the combination of the cultural and the political factors which facilitate 
the consolidation of the Palestinian national movement (PNM) and the collective political 
consciousness and identity of the Palestinians; this is despite the multiplicity of internal and 
external forces of oppression which have been used to try to undermine Palestinian 
nationhood. 
The importance of the refugee "problem" was underlined by the plight of 350 000 
Palestinians who fled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) during and in the 
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aftermath of the 1967 war, about half of them for the second time in 20 years. The early 
years of occupation and the Israeli demolitions in the camps in GS, ostensibly to quell 
resistance, present a watershed in Israeli policies towards Gaza refugees, together with the 
Israeli measures against the camps and the refugees since the Intifada (Uprising) began. 
The camps also have been targets of conflicting Palestinian political forces, more so in 
refugee camps in the host countries than in the WBGS camps, where solidarity has been 
maintained in the face of one foe. Yet, PRs in the host countries, and especially in Jordan 
and Lebanon, did not escape the Israeli/Jordanian!Lebanese attacks, either through military 
raids by Israel on Palestinian camps in Lebanon, or by massacres committed through 
collaboration of the three of them (Chomsky,1983:20-3). 
Israel ~ Only Solution 
The resettling of refugees cannot be discussed in isolation from Israeli measures 
against the Palestinian people in general, and the refugees in GS in particular. Of course, 
none of these measures employed by the Israeli authorities, whether harrassment of the 
P.Rs or attempts to resettle as many of them as possible, can be explained in isolation 
either from Zionist\ Israeli ideology, policy and planning. This began to manifest itself in 
various forms at the beginning of the century. While that ideology may not always have 
been unified, it did lead to political and military action of occupation and Israeli statehood 
which resulted in the 1948 exodus of Palestinians from Palestine. Zionist ideology and 
policy found support from the imperialist powers - Britain and then the US - who had 
vested strategic and economic interests in the area, and completely disregarded the demands 
of the Arabs of Palestine. The alliance between Zionism and the West found its roots in 
the age-old conflict between the Occident and the Orient, where Islam prevails. Zionism 
manipulated this idea to achieve its goal in Palestine, promoting "racial distinctiveness" or 
"racial superiority" and thus permitting discrimination by the Jews against the non-Jews. 
This was further developed in creating a dehumanized image of the Palestinians. This 
contempt for the East was even extended to the Oriental Jews, a fact which is clear in 
Israeli society today in terms of the differential treatment of Western and Oriental Jews in 
many respects. This contempt springs from the desire to see in Israel a modern European 
society, which the presence of Oriental Jews - with their Arab culture - adulterates. The 
implementation of such racially motivated policies has created a human tragedy for P.Rs, 
who have been paying a high price for it since 1948. 
Anxious to block the return of the PRs to their homeland in the aftermath of the 
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1948 exodus, the Israeli authorities refused to acknowledge any right to return. This is 
despite the UN Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, which recommends their return 
or payment of compensation to those who do not wish to return. Israel's refusal to allow 
a return has been based on a number of explanations and measures. They include: Israel's 
version of the exodus; patterns of exodus and the continuous expulsion of Palestinians even 
after the establishment of the state of Israel; creating a new category of "internal" refugees; 
destruction of Arab villages; the Law of Return for Jews; and Israel's unwillingness to pay 
compensation for PRs, partly based on the pretext that the property of Iraqi Jews left in 
Iraq after their immigration to Israel compensate for the property left by Palestinians in 
Palestine after their flight in 1948. This thesis examines these explanations to provide a 
background of the Israeli position regarding the return of refugees. It will be argued that 
this position cannot be understood solely in terms of justice, but that it also has practical 
implications. If Israel does not allow any refugees to return, it has to choose whether to live 
alongside a Palestinian polity, or at least abolish the many restrictions imposed on the 
camps, which include, for instance, building restrictions, thus allowing refugees the right to 
improve their housing conditions. The only solution that Israel has and does envisage for 
the refugee problem is their resettlement or integration in other Arab countries. This 
proposal is echoed in others made by various Western states and bodies as a solution to a 
problem which they perceive as economic. As such, they argue that it could be solved 
through the establishment of development projects and the provision of employment for 
refugees. However, it is actually a political problem, requiring that political rights be 
restored for those who were dispossessed. There have been various economic development 
programmes envisaged and some partially implemented for refugees in the host countries. 
However, as we will discuss below, projects such as irrigation have been unsuccessful, mainly 
because of the refugees' resistance to resettlement, detecting in such projects an attempt 
to negate their political Right to Return (RR) to their homeland.q 
UNRWA and Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees 
The refugees consider their life in the camps as a temporary settlement only. 
Indeed, notions underlying the planning and organisation of the camps by bodies such as 
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNR W A) reveal that they also perceive them to be temporary, reSUlting in minimum 
standards in practically every aspect of life. UNRWA's policy has repeatedly been hindered 
in their view by "lack of funds." UNR W A's pre - 1967 efforts and plans to resettle the PRs 
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were fruitless, due to the strong rejection by refugees. Since 1967, UNRWA's position 
towards the Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS has not been clear; while 
condemning the demolition of camp shelter (an Israeli precondition for relocation), their 
general stand remains neutral. The question to be asked, is whether UNRWA's stand 
regarding PRs resettlement in GS is compatible with its relationship with: the PRs; the 
Israeli authorities; and its contributors, especially the latter (mainly the United States) who 
have been dictating the Agency's policies and operations since its inception. The sample 
survey included a question about the refugees' attitudes towards UNRWA's position 
regarding resettlement in GS. 
Facets of Refugee Resettlement 
The PRs insistence on return, and rejection of any attempt to resettle them, stems 
from a deep conviction of their rights and the righteousness of their cause. Where they 
agree to move out of the camps to the Israeli housing projects in the GS, they perceive this 
as Ta 'ahil (rehabilitation) rather than Tawtin (resettlement). Moreover, resettlement is 
taking place on Palestinian soil, in contrast to all the resettlement proposals outside 
Palestine which they rejected previously. 
This thesis examines the pros and cons of the Israeli sponsored housing projects in 
the GS, in terms of their existence on the Palestinian soil and their importance in keeping 
Palestinians on the land. It will be argued that the expropriation of Palestinian land for 
military or Israeli settlement purposes serves to enhance the sumud (steadfastness) of 
Palestinians in seeking to remain on the land. The Israeli authorities have developed and 
implemented a wide range of policies to force the Palestinians to cede land in targetted 
areas, which are reviewed in full. For example, Israeli town planning schemes are 
documented, which were intended to move all camps away from urban areas to rural 
enclaves. These operate in conjunction with Israeli Military Orders inhibiting building in 
camps, as well as restrictions on building permits in towns, and the demolition of Arab 
houses under the pretext of unlicensed buildings or for punitive reasons. Such policies serve 
to obstruct development in the occupied territories (OTs), and help to explain why their 
infrastructural base is so weak, and why in particular the refugee camps are characterized 
by a high density of population per house, poor facilities, and a housing shortage for low 
income groups. 
Despite the PRs' awareness of the political motives of the Israeli resettlement 
schemes in the GS, it is evident from the empirical data that their relocation has not altered 
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their adherence to their refugee identity, their role in the national struggle, and demands 
for political rights. In fact, the relocated refugees showed even more assertiveness than 
some refugees in the camp. Their resistance to the occupation has been as strong as those 
in the camps, especially since the Intifada began. Where resistance is somewhat diminished, 
respondents in both the camp and the housing project explained this in terms of a variety 
of physical factors, and did not think that it reflected a diminution of the struggle. 
This thesis also examines the socio-economic and psychological impact on refugees 
in the SR housing project. It reveals the unforeseen fragmentation of extended kinship ties, 
brought about by the initial dispersal strategy of the Israeli authorities, which caused 
problems for family reunification. Social 'stratification has been exacerbated between the 
refugees in camps and those in the housing projects, and even between refugees in the same 
housing project. Some "depeasantization" of a traditional sector of the community has been 
fostered, through the incentives offered by the authorities in the form of business grants to 
encourage others to move out of camps. 
The particular procedures of resettlement and its various stages will be discussed, 
and compared with the experiences of other refugee experiences in third world countries. 
This raises more general questions about the concept of resettlement, what goals, motives 
and strategies are involved; what advantages and disadvantages does it offer to refugees; and 
what difficulties are encountered by refugees in terms of adjustment and assimilation? 
Any solution of the refugee problem is fraught with difficulty. The Refugees' 
Committee of the Middle East Peace Talks demonstrates Israel's hard-line position on this 
issue. Following a refusal to attend the first three meetings, Israel has now participated, 
but is adamant that there should be no return of any kind. 
The DijJiculties of Refugee Research 
There are many difficulties encountered by researchers into the issue of refugees. 
This, as Baker explains, is due to a serious neglect of such a major international problem, 
and, 
The absence of systematic and cumulative research into the refugee 
experience, and the effectiveness of programmes created for refugees, 
(which) represents a crucial gap in our knowledge about what works, with 
whom and why, and what has proved unsuccessful. Responsibility for this 
lack of 'institutionalised memory' must rest with a wide range of people : 
policy makers, social planners, politicians, social scientists, administrators, 
agency directors (statutory and voluntary) and workers in the field 
(Baker,1985:9-10). 
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Stein further described the difficulties faced in refugee research, by writing : 
Refugee research extends across many disciplinary lines. The lack of an easy 
disciplinary fit combined with the common view that refugee problems are 
unique, atypical, and nonrecurring has produced both a scholarly neglect of 
refugee research possibilities and special research difficulties when one does 
undertake a project (Stein,1981:331). 
The overall importance of this research should be understood in relation to many 
crucial factors, which include the following: 
1) The impact of Israeli policies on the conduct of academic research in the OTs. The 
endeavour of researchers in the OTs has never been easy, and since the Intifada their work 
has been even more severely hampered. The Israeli authorities have imposed a number of 
restrictions on researchers in the territories. Palestinians conducting research risk arrest 
for an indeterminate period of time if their research becomes known to the authorities. On 
a day-to-day basis, Israeli measures can seriously affect the research process. Curfews, road-
blocks, checkpoints, and the Israeli military troops' prolonged presence -especially in camps-
stifle freedom, including the freedom to move and to collect data. This places the 
researcher in an unenviable position, and raises serious questions about research under 
occupation and its role. The particular influence of these measures on the conduct of my 
work will be apparent in the main text. 
2) There has been an absence of studies on the PRs, in terms of conditions of life in the 
camps. There are particularly significant gaps in studies about the experience of those 
relocated to Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS - their new life conditions, and the 
political, psychological, and socio-economic effects of relocation. A survey of the ASLIB 
Index for doctoral dissertations from 1981-1991 elicits only five theses on the PRs. It is 
important to study the PRs because they differ from the non-refugee population and other 
refugee experiences (except Armenians) in four vital respects. First, the nature of their 
uprootedness when the majority of Palestinians became refugees, which Weinstock described 
as, "a deviant pattern of colonization" (Weinstock, 1973:50), and which Sir John Glubb 
considered "bears no resemblance to any other war [1948] in modern history" 
(Glubb,1967:41). Second, their insistence on return which gave them a unique posture, 
since they saw themselves not as refugees but as very temporary absentees, whose situation 
could be rectified not through resettlement but only through restitution (UNRWA,1986:6). 
Third, their unique collectivity which they have managed to maintain, evolving around the 
Palestinian idea - culturally and politically. Fourth, through their struggle and persistence 
they fueled Palestinian nationalism by asserting the broad collective will of an entire people 
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for independence (Migdal & Kimmerling,1993:278). This unique character of the PRs thus 
requires a new approach for studying their conditions, other than the the descriptive studies 
already done. In this respect, field study could be considered to be the most appropriate 
method to understand the refugees' background, experiences and attitudes. 
3) There is a neccessity to record the Palestinian experience in its various aspects and stages. 
As Migdal noted, " Despite the impact they (the Palestinians) have had on current world 
events, (they) remain a relatively "understudied" group; ... (of which) " ... a neglected subject 
has been Palestinian society itself, its interaction with the regimes under which the 
Palestinians have lived, and the impact of social change on their politics" (Migdal,1977:329-
330). The most effective way of redressing the balance is by collecting personal oral 
evidences from the Palestinians themselves. Such evidence is an important documentation 
of Palestinian history in the long run, by being based on live sources rather than written 
sources. As Samuel and Thompson write: 
For every life story is a potential evidence for the subjective, and even the 
unconscious... Oral memory offers a double validity in understanding the 
past, in which, as still today, myth was embedded in real experience: both 
growing from it, and helpnig to shape its perception " (Samuel & 
Thompson, 1990:6). 
Given this background, it is of importance to explain thereafter the phases of the 
fieldwork I conducted in the GS during the period from 28 March - 30 July, 1991. 
Methodology and Information 
The bulk of this research was first hand, done through personal interviews in the 
two-case study areas: the Shati camp (SC) and the Sheikh Radwan Israeli sponsored housing 
project (SR), both located in Gaza city (See Appendix 1). The SC is considered the largest 
in population size (47,160 persons) after Jabalya (59,795) and Rafah (56,264) camps in the 
GS (See Appendix 1). It lies on the Strip's coast just north of Gaza city, from which it has 
derived its name, and was established by UNRWA in 1951. Its area is about 519 dunums 
(one dunum = 0.22 acres) and the camp is divided into 12 residential blocks. 
The location for the other sample survey was the SR project which is adjacent to 
the SC. Almost all residents in this project come from the SC. This sample provides a 
comparison between the former pattern of life of ex-residents of the SC and the current 
one. The SR commenced in March 1973 and is considered the second largest rehousing 
project for the resettlement of camp refugees in the Strip. The project covers an area of 
about 622 dunums, and was populated by some 12,279 inhabitants at the end of March 1991 
, 
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as given by UNR W AJGaza. The project is divided into five blocks, with a total number of 
houses 2,008. 
The Sample Coverage and Selection 
The sample in SC covered 142 households chosen randomly from the 12 residential 
blocks which accommodate a total of 1428 units. The number of units in each residential 
block varies, ranging from 202 in Block L to 26 in Block F (See Appendix 2). In the SR 
a total of 90 households were randomly sampled from the five residential blocks, and there 
the number of the houses in each Block varies, from 302 in Block 66 to 596 in Block 69 
(See Appendix 3). For the purpose of interviewing, households were selected by using a 
systematic method to cover the number of households required in every residential block 
in both locations. The systematic sample allowed a more even spread of the sample over 
the population in the camp/project, according to the number of households in each 
residential block. 
The questionnaires in both locations were addressed to one of three categories of 
the household population. These were: the head of household, or the eldest son (in 
absence of head), or the housewife. It can be seen from the sample surveyed that 
housewives interviewed comprised 45.8% of the SC sample survey, and 50.1 in the SR. This 
is attributed to the timing of the interviews, held during day, when heads of households are 
usually absent. It was impossible to conduct any interviews after 7 p.m., due to the 
imposition of night curfew throughout the Strip from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m. 
It was hoped that the sample would allow some assessment of the linkages between 
residential histories in and out of the camp, housing conditions, attitudes towards 
resettlement and aspirations. It was also hoped that information from the questionnaire 
about residents' housing histories might indicate the size of the housing problem in GS 
refugee camps, and what impact future Palestinian rule and UNRWA policies for low-
income groups might have in the camps and the poor quarters of Gaza town. 
The Questionnaire 
The structured questionnaire comprised 62 questions for SC refugees and 87 
questions for SR refugees. It included open and closed questions, and was preceded by 
three pilot studies (See Appendices 6 and 7). The questionnaires' main focus was to gauge: 
a) The socio-economic conditions of camp residents and any changes that might have 
occurred due to relocation. 
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b) To derive the attitude of the camp's and project's population towards the subject of the 
Israeli resettlement policy and procedures. 
c) To examine the magnitude of the political awareness & mobility among camp and 
housing project residents. 
d) To derive the attitude of refugees to a range of proposed solutions to the Palestinian 
question in general, and the refugee issue in particular. 
In the Field/Interviewing 
Since the subject under research was sensitive and controversial, a face to face 
approach was deemed to be preferable, and was conducted by the author only. The author 
was nevertheless accompanied after the first week of interviewing in the SC by an escort 
from the camp, this was necessary, in order to gain entry into houses, to avoid suspicion on 
the part of the interviewees that the author was working in favour of one side or the other, 
and to prevent being mistaken for a government representative whose mission was to collect 
private information. In spite of such precautions, however, many problems relating to 
culture and police/ military presence in the two locations were encountered. 
In addition to field data collected from the sample survey, the thesis is based on 
detailed interviews with some of the national leadership in GS and of UNRWA officials, and 
a review of archival material in Palestine, and UK. 
In undertaking this work, the reader must remain aware that even though this thesis 
is concerned with the evolution of refugee resettlement between 1967 and 1991, it is 
unavoidable to talk briefly about the current developments with regard to PRs situation in 
general and the OTs' refugees in particular. By the same token, the PRs question could not 
have been tackled without setting it in the historical - political context of the Palestinian 
national movement and society as a whole. Thus, the essence of such link and continuity led 
Strauss to write that: "in the development of nationalistic movements, and in the nationalism 
of nations, the past may be recreated in the image of the desired present and future." He 
continued to write that " .... personal identity is meshed with group identity, which itself rests 
upon an historical past" (Strauss,1969: 167, 173). 
The Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into the following sequence of Parts and Chapters: Part One 
provides an introductory background to the thesis. It contains two Chapters. The first 
Chapter provides factual and historical information; it illustrates through numbers, 
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destinations, and distribution of PRs in camps the immensity of the problem. This Chapter 
also discusses the importance of a definition of a refugee, given the multiplicity of 
definitions provided by organizations involved in this field. Focus in this Chapter is on the 
GS camps and refugees, their growth and distribution, given that the demography issue in 
this area had become so politicized, and the weight of numbers came to play a dominant 
role throughout the period following the 1949 exodus. Chapter two is central to 
understanding the roots of the PRs problem. The context for the emergence of the PRs 
cannot be understood in isolation from external influences which Palestinians came under 
during the British mandate and the Zionist settlement in Palestine pre - 1948. Political 
Zionism's ideology, policies and plans backed by Britain's discriminatory policies will form 
an integral and underlying part of this Chapter as these forces had deepened the cleavage 
between the Palestine Arabs on one side and the Zionist-British on the other. It thus 
concludes that while these conditions posed tremendous political challenges and pressures 
for the Palestinians; the understanding of their source should be perceived within the 
framework of the Zionists' ideology, methods and tactics which facilitated the exodus; in 
which the majority were uprooted by the minority (the Jews), and the creation of the state 
of Israel. 
Part Two focuses on the policies and proposals drawn by the various parties, and 
Israel in particular, for resettlement of refugees during the period from 1948-1967. Chapter 
three demonstrates with regard to Israeli policies a permanent position of 'no return' of 
PRs. It prepares the way by explaining why Israel advocated resettlement rather than any 
other solution, and indicates how this position was joined by practical measures and political 
intrigues to block return. It examines the PRs stand and reasons for rejection of all 
proposals for resettlement in this period. It thus focuses on the GS refugees' position and 
strong rejection to UNRWA and Egyptian plans to resettle them in Sinai, their "first 
Intifada" of 1955 thwarting such a solution. At the same time the Chapter examines the 
roots of GS refugees' militancy, which began in the mid 1950s in reaction to the Israeli raids 
and occupation of GS. 
The common theme of Part Three, containing Chapters, 4, 5, and 6, is an assessment 
of Israeli policies and proposals for resettling PRs of the OTs following the 1967 war. 
Chapter 5 deals with the resettlement process and procedures as implemented in the GS. 
It is primarily focussed around discussion of new field-data from the two case study areas, 
the SC and the SR Israeli sponsored housing project. GS refugees' understanding of 
resettlement and the Israeli objectives are assessed, together with criteria and reasons for 
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relocation. 
Chapter six assesses UNRWA's position towards GS resettlement schemes. It does 
so by examining UNRWA's policies and budget for improving camps shelters. It also 
examines the Agency's relationship with its contributors; with PRs; and finally with the 
Israeli occupying authorities. 
Chapter seven and eight focus on the impact of resettlement on refugees. The 
survey findings in both locations provide the substance for such assessment. Yet, this has 
to be examined within the socioeconomic and political context of life under Israeli 
occupation, and the authorities apparatus of control - formal and informal -, in both 
economic and political spheres. Chapter seven deals with the socieconomic impact in 
comparison with previous life in the SC. It further examines the dialectic relationship 
between resettlement and economic development which the Israelis initially linked together 
when the resettlement schemes were started in GS. 
Chapter eight focuses on the political impact of resettlement. This is gauged in 
terms of the scale of resistance in both locations and the Israeli reaction to it. The reasons 
behind the strong militancy of Gaza refugees is examined fully in this Chapter, for it will 
provide an insight as to why the authorities embarked on such schemes in Gaza first as a 
measure of counter-insurgency, and not out of concern to improve living conditions for 
refugees. It finally explains the reasons behind Israeli violations of human rights in the GS 
within the framework of maintaining its own nationalism,- supported by its American patron 
and inside agents-, while at the same time denying the Palestinians theirs. The conclusion 
assesses refugees' perception of their political role in resisting resettlement and promoting 
a national identity for Palestinians. The Epilogue concludes the thesis. It assesses briefly 
the impact of the new developments on the future of PRs following the "Gaza-lericho First" 
Deal of September 13, 1993. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE POPULATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the Zionist movement has been led by two streams of thought with 
regard to the Palestinian Arabs living in Palestine. These are, first, that there are no 
Palestinians, they do not exist as a nation, and secondly, if facts indicate and the assertion is 
made that Palestinians do exist, then they should be transferred to the neighbouring Arab 
countries or "resettled elsewhere in order to liberate the land for Jewish nationalisation" 
(Waines,1977:62). These two streams cannot be discussed in isolation of other factors in the 
Palestine-Israeli Conflict, which make of this conflict a unique phenomenon in the world history 
of colonialism. 
To solve the Jewish question of ingathering the exiles in one state, another was created, 
that of the PRs. Hannah Arendt has portrayed this as follows: 
After the Second World War it turned out that the Jewish question, which was 
considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved - namely, by means of a 
colonized and then conquered territory - but this solved neither the problem of 
minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other events of 
our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new 
category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the stateless 
by another 700,000 to 800,000 people (Arendt, 1973:290). 
The proper context for dealing with the emergence of the Palestine "refugee problem" 
is the study of Zionist thought both on a cultural and a political level, which paved the way for 
Jewish colonization and the establishment of the Jewish state. Chapter two examines the 
policies and the practices which the Zionist movement has used, to promote the goals which 
where set out in Herzl's book, The Jewish State, published in 1896. Herzl called for the 
expulsion of the existing population across the borders, a policy which continued into the 90s 
when the Israeli state has continued to expel and deport the young Palestinian leadership from 
the OTs. Land and the people of Palestine were the core targets of the Zionist movement 
endlessly. This Chapter examines the conditions of the Palestinian Arabs who later became 
refugees; where they came from; where they went and how? The focus is on GS refugees, 
their distribution, numbers and growth; particular attention is given to refugees in the SC and 
the SR housing project, where the fieldwork was undertaken. 
The Chapter outlines the various definitions of a refugee, in general, and the Palestinian 
refugee in particular. In the Palestinian context, the importance of a definition has to be linked 
to two aspects: of repatriation and of protection. These two aspects have conferred the Prs' 
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case a unique position compared to other refugees elsewhere. 
The Chapter examines also the existing literature regarding the issue of resettlement of 
Prs in general and GS refugees in particular. This brief examination enables us to assess the 
importance of studying the issue of Prs resettlement and highlights therefore, the contribution 
that this thesis is making to Palestinian refugee research. It is hoped that this new study will 
provide a foundation for further research to be carried out in the future in this area. 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the establishment of the state of Israel numerous studies have been published on 
the Palestine-Israeli conflict. However, these have often tended to either neglect or under 
research important areas of the plight of the PRs. In particular, their political, socioeconomic 
and psychological conditions. 
Much existing work on the effect of the creation of the state of Israel has not focused 
on the PRs. While, UNRWA has created an extensive body of statistics and operational 
literature on PRs, most of these data are unsystematic and therefore difficult to use. The 
absence of a base for research is problematic for researchers who embark on studies about PRs. 
This is especially because there are considerable difficulties of access and security to collecting 
new data. 
There are significant gaps in the existing literature on the PRs in terms of analytical 
studies, and the experiences of the refugees, both in Palestine and in other Arab countries. 
There is particularly a striking gap as regards the issue of resettlement especially in the period 
after 1967. 
Between 1948 and 1967, a few authors did publish studies on the resettlement proposals, 
suggested mainly by British and American official and non-official bodies. Studies and reports 
in this period tend to fall into three main groups. First, there are those which focus on the 
nature of the proposals themselves, who generated them, where and how they were to be carried 
out and the costs involved (fhicknesse,1949; Schechtman,1952; Gneim,n.d.). Israel's Knesset 
debates during this period emphasized resettlement as a solution to the Palestinian 'problem' and 
could also be classified here, however, very few of these are yet available in English 
(Lorch, 1993). 
Second, there are a few studies offering a critical perspective on the resettlement 
proposals, of which Fayez Sayigh's work of 1959 on the Hammarskjold's resettlement proposal 
is prominent. It provides an analytical picture of the latter proposal, including statements iSSued 
by all the refugee conferences held to condemn this scheme and insist on the right of PRs to be 
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repatriated or compensated. During this period the Arab Higher Committee's journal Filastin 
(palestine) reflected the Palestinians' voice in rejecting resettlement in the Arab countries as a 
proposed solution to the PRs question. Other work all emphasized the role played by the 
refugees in as (who were affiliated with a number of Arab political parties) to thwart the Sinai 
resettlement scheme approved by the Egyptian government and UNRWA in 1955 (Abu al-
Namel, 1979;Basisu, 1980;Abu Amru,1987) 
Third there are, UNRWA studies which deal with proposals for the integration and 
resettlement of refugees, available for the period 1948-1967. That series of studies 
demonstrated that UNRWA's initial planning in dealing with the PRs was in terms of their 
rehabilitation by means of long-term settlement projects aimed at integrating them into the host 
cOuntries (UNRWA,1986). In 1959, that policy changed (as a result of refugee resistance to 
resettlement) and the emphasis became more oriented towards a mixture of relief and long-term 
support programmes: health; education; self-support programmes; and vocational training 
(UNRWA, 1986). 
This thesis is a contribution to begin to fill many of the gaps in the literature on PRs. 
Very little has been written on the issue of resettling the PRs of the WBaS. A recent article 
by Marx (1992) discussed briefly the issue of resettlement of GS refugees and emphasized the 
fact that through resettlement the refugee identity has been enhanced. Wiegert (1975), in his 
small study of the relocated refugees in the GS, briefly described their new life in the projects 
briefly and expressed his belief that the refugees "will never look back." 
Most information about the Israeli sponsored housing projects in the as tends to be 
brief and descriptive in nature. Such as the work published by Locke and Stewart,1985, and 
those in The New York TImes, The Guardian, The Independent, the East Jerusalem Press and 
the Israeli Press covering the early stages (1970s) of the establishment of these projects. 
Another source in this respect is the Israeli reports on Judea-Samaria and the as iSSued by the 
Ministry of Defence. 
UNRWA quarterly reports include statistical data on refugees relocating to the projects, 
but, such data is limited in that it does not include all refugees who moved out of the camps, 
and there is a lack of access to data from the Israeli Housing Department in the Strip. The 
General-Commissioner annual reports (especially during the 1970s) reported on the conditions 
of the relocated refugees, thus, stressing in every report that Israel has to desist from resettling 
refugees and the demolition of their camp shelters. UNRWA's position on the Israeli 
resettlement policy is tackled briefly by Viorst in his work on UNRWA of 1989. 
Despite such limitations, UNRWA data is used by researchers. For example, a 
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Palestinian writer (Subani,1991) used it to give figures on refugees in the existing housing 
projects in GS. In fact, this thesis also relies heavily for background material about the housing 
projects in GS on UNRWA data. Use was made of data on relocated refugees from UNRWA 
files in the Accommodation Office in UNRWA /Gaza, for the period from the early 1970s to 
1991. 
This thesis now seeks to fill some of the gaps in knowledge about the resettlement 
schemes and relocated refugees in GS. The sample survey conducted in the SC and the SR 
project is the first study which compared the conditions of refugees in both locations on the 
political and socioeconomic issues. It is also the first study to measure the attitudes of GS 
refugees mainly in respect of the intertwined relation between resettlement and the RRC and 
other political rights. It is also the first study to document the actual living conditions in both 
locations and the effects of Israeli policies on refugees. 
This research situates the issue of resettlement into a new political and socioeconomic 
context. Conducting the research with these issues in mind have enabled me to illuminate, for 
the first time, the fact that the resettlement of as refugees, is one part of a policy to control 
Palestinians by the state of Israel and to prevent Palestinian struggle and to impede a sound 
socioeconomic development in the OTs. 
1.3 THE SCALE OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES "PROBLEM" 
By the end of the British Mandate, the Jews were able to possess only 5.76% of the 
whole area of Palestine (Hadawi,1963:25). The largest part of these acquisitions were sold to 
Jews by non-Palestinian landlords. This fact was confirmed in the Shaw Commission Report 
in 1930, where it was stated that only 10% of land purchased by Jews was sold by the 
Palestinian peasants, while the rest was purchased from landlords living outside Palestine 
(RUedy, 1971: 134). Possession of land by Jews, had nevertheless reached 80% by the end of 
the 1948 War, and exceeded the area that was allocated to them in the Partition Plan proposal 
by the United Nations in its Resolution 181(11) of 29 November 1947 (Cattan, 1973:37). 
That plan proposed Palestine to be divided into an Arab State and a Jewish State. 
Cattan assesses the Plan and the form of injustice it entailed to the Arabs: 
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What did the Partition Plan do? It attributed to Jews - who were less than one-
third of the population, largely foreigners, and owned less than six per cent of 
the land - an area exceeding 14,500 square kilometres and representing 57 per 
cent of the area of Palestine. This meant that the Jews were given a territory 
which was ten times the area owned by them in the whole of Palestine. 
Moreover, the territory allocated to the Jewish state included the coastal plain 
extending from Acre to Isdud and other fertile lands, while the Palestinians 
were left with mountainous and sterile regions. In other words, this was not 
a partition, but a spoilation. Its iniquity is obvious (Cattan, 1973:55). 
Estimates of the population in Palestine were based on the 1931 British Mandate 
census. 1 This recorded a total population of 1,908,775 of whom 1,157,423 were Muslim; 
589,341 were Jewish; 146,162 were Christian; and 15,849 were "other" (Abu-
Lughod,1971:155). Other estimates for the population of Palestine were given by various 
writers and bodies, as shown below in Table 1.1. 
TABLE 1.1 Various Estimates of Population of Palestine in 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1948 
(numbers and percentages) 
Estimates Totals Jews Arabs 
a. Government of 1,908,775 589,341 1,319,434 
Palestine, 1947 (100%) (30.9) (69.1) 
b. Rowly, 1947 1,933,673 614,239 1,319,434 
(100%) (31.8) (68.2) 
c. Jewish Agency, 1,840,000 592,000 1,248,000 
1945 (100%) (32.0) (68.0) 
d. Anglo-American 1,743,000 554,274 1,188,726 
Committee of (100%) (31.8) (68.2) 
Inquiry, 1946 
Sources: 
a. Government of Palestine, 1947 b. Rowley, 1947 c. Jewish Agency 
d. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, A Survey of Palestine, 1946. 
Table 1.1 indicates that the Arabs of Palestine constituted the majority of the popUlation 
in Palestine prior to 1948, almost 70% in comparison with almost 31 % of Jews. The number 
of Arabs could have been in excess of 1, 400,000 at the time of their expulsion, as Abu-Lughod 
pointed out in her studies on the popUlation of Palestine (Abu-Lughod,1971 and 1986). The 
number of the Palestinians who became refugees during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war 
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is disputed by various parties involved in the conflict, the issue being compounded due to its 
political character. The allegation is that the Arabs' interest is in inflating the number of 
refugees, whereas the Israelis' interest is in deflating these numbers (Shbeib, 1985: 115). Some 
of the disagreement might be due to the various definitions of a "Palestinian refugee" given 
by the various parties involved in the conflict. 
1.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF A DEFlNlTlON 
Refugees have been defined in different ways at different points in human history. The 
most common definition used was designed for refugees in the post - WWII era by the UN in 
1951. 2 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in its 1951 Convention 
and its Protocol of 1967, defines a refugee as: 
Person who is outside his/her country because of a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR,1988:11). 
This definition could be considered too narrow, since war victims and those fleeing 
generalized violence or starvation tend to fall outside it. The Convention's definition has an 
obvious shortcoming with regard to PRs, since it defines a refugee as one who is "unable or 
... unwilling" to return to the country of his nationality or former habitual residence, which is 
not the case for the PRs, who despite their inability to return, because of the many external 
factors which impede such exercise; have since 1948 been seeking repatriation and clinging to 
this right as endorsed in UN Resolution 194(111). (See Appendix 4) 
Moreover, Article I(D) of 1951 Convention excludes persons who are at present 
receiving from organs or agencies of the UN - other than the UNHCR - protection and 
assistance. Clause 7(C) of the Statute of the Higher Commission of Refugees indicates similar 
exclusion of a person "who continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the UN 
protection or assistance" (UNHCR, 1988:7). 
Since 1950, the PRs have been under the protection of UNRWA. But, UNRWA's 
protection has been inadequate, failing to provide protection during and after the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon, and for the refugees in the WB and GS (WBGS) since the start of the Intifada. 
This is due largely to the lack of a formal mandate for UNRWA to protect refugees. It is an 
operational agency, unlike the UNHCR whose universal humanitarian mandate retains more 
international authority and provides legal protection for refugees. 
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UNRWA's mandate is twofold. First, a humanitarian dimension, to provide urgent 
services to those refugees in need. Second, a long term aspect to do with rehabilitation of the 
PRs, which was the main mission of UNRWA at least in the first 8 years of its work. In order 
to put pressure on the refugees to accept proposals for resettling them, political questions, 
whether concerning a solution to the conflict or matters of repatriation and compensation, were 
specifically left outside the scope of UNRWA"s tasks and delegated to the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP), a body which had been set up in December 1948 
to enforce compliance with UN resolutions (Hadawi, 1967: 158). 
PRs are therefore recognized as refugees under the Convention and Statute of the 
UNHCR, yet, they are deprived of the rights under them. The UNHCR's omission of the PRs 
from its mandate in 1950 was because it was feared that the political nature of the Palestine 
question would interfere with the purely humanitarian role envisaged for the new office (The 
Independent Commission,1986:50-51). Yet this interpretation seems to have led to a lack of 
equity in provision of protection and assistance by the various agencies dealing with refugees. 
As a result, PRs have been dealt with as refugees and not refugees at one and the same time. 
The failure to provide international protection has created a legal vacuum. Israel's refusal, 
meanwhile, to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which governs the protection of 
civilians under military occupation, has highlighted the importance of protection for 
Palestinians' lives in the OTs. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention 
concerning refugee problems of 1969, has by far the widest definition of a refugee, within the 
other existing 20 regional instruments.3 The OAU's definition incorporates that of the 1951 
UNHCR Convention but is extended to apply: 
... to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events ... , is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence 
in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality (UNHCR, 1988: 194). 
A more recent definition, broader still than the OAU view, covers not only victims of 
man-made disasters, but, also victims of human rights violations. In the Cartagena Declaration 
of 1984, some South American groups proposed the extension of the term "refugees" to cover: 
Persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have 
been threatened· by .... massive violations of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order (Nash,1988:30). 
This extension to encompass victims of human rights violations "suggests a norm de 
legeferende rather than a widely accepted norm" (International Review of the Red Cross, July-
August(1988):361-362). 
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Moreover, the ICCR and RC movement have been recommending that the term 
"refugee" be broadened and unrestricted, so that it would meet contemporary needs (Ibid. :356). 
The OAU and Cartagena definitions do apply to the PRs whose flight resulted from 
occupation and foreign domination, which compelled them to leave their habitual residence to 
seek protection and safety. As Grahl-Madsen states: 
It does not matter in what way or in which circumstances he has left the said 
country. The main thing is that the person concerned is outside his country of 
nationality, or, in appropriate' cases, the. country of his former habitual 
residence (Grahl-Madsen, 1972:94). 
The many definitions of a refugee given in international law have given rise to two 
conflicting views. The first of these holds that the multiple definitions are important to prevent 
fraud and abuse (Nash, 1988: 191); and for the: 
safety of the refugees themselves, for the receiving nation, and for the sending 
nation ... the decision of whom to include and whom to exclude as refugees thus 
has consequences far beyond the immediate questions of "who gets in" 
(Ferris, 1985:5-7). 
The second view, in contrast, argues that those multiple definitions have been an 
exercise in semantics when compared with the urgency of the need of those seeking protection. 
As Keely argues, the question of "who is a refugee?" is the wrong question. "The starting point 
should be how to deal with people displaced by war .... (who) struggle for independence, not 
efforts to stretch and trim a definition from another context" (Keely,1981:25). 
Definitions of PRs do vary from that given by UNRWA, the PLO and Israel. The first 
UNRWA definition of a Palestine refugee was "for working purposes." In 1950, the first 
interim report of UNRWA's Director defined a Palestinian refugee as: "a needy person, who 
as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood" 
(UNRWA, 1990:6). 
This above definition was later refined, and the current definition used by UNRWA is: 
A Palestine refugee is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a 
minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of 
this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in 
1948 in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within 
this definition and the direct descendants of such refugees are eligible for 
Agency assistance if they are: registered with UNRWA; living in the area of 
UNRWA operations; and in need (UNRWA,1990:6). 
UNRWA's definition does have serious shortcomings. The definition excludes refugees 
who did not register with UNRWA for various reasons. In other words, eligibility is 
conditional upon need, as well as upon loss of home and means of livelihood. Gabbay 
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explained a number of reasons which rendered decision on eligibility a difficult task - these 
involved social, financial, and political factors (Gabbay,1959:172-174). It seems clear from this 
definition that it is designed solely for the determination of eligibility of UNRWA assistance, 
and not for any sort of protection whatsoever. Moreover, it should also be noted that other 
categories of refugees were excluded in this definition. These are, in particular, the well-off 
class and professionals who left Palestine following the Partition Plan, and who were not in 
need; Buehrig noted that this category of refugees, according to UNRWA estimates, constituted 
some 20% of the exodus in 1948 (Buehrig,1971:31). Also excluded are those who were outside 
Palestine for more than two years, for reasons of study or otherwise, and thus lost their 
eligibility for assistance. The exclusion of refugees who fled and who are not residing in the 
UNRWA's areas of operation, e.g. in Kuwait, are denied assistance, and have not been counted 
as refugees in UNRWA's statistics. Accordingly, as UNRWA itself warns, its records do not 
contain wholly accurate data (UNRWA,1986:4). To the UNRWA's definition, however, is 
added three other categories which arose as a result of the conflict. These are: Border-line 
cases; Frontier villages; and bedouins (pinner, 1959: 11-14). UNRWA has always affirmed that 
even persons who "ceased to be regarded by UNRWA as a refugee for the purpose of receiving 
relief, may still qualify as a refugee within the meaning of the UN Resolution 194(111}, 
(UNRWA, 1986:67). In this case, all Palestinians who are residing outside the historical land 
of Palestine, are considered refugees and are entitled to return whenever a solution is reached. 
Edward Said gave a description of the Palestinians condition as being in a state of "exile." He 
characterized exile existentially as a "condition of terminal loss" caused by "a discontinuous 
state of being" (Said,1984:49 and 51; Abu-Lughod,1988;61). 
UNRWA's definition does however, have an important positive element. It considers 
the direct descendants of 1948 refugees as eligible also; while the right to refugeehood is 
denied to descendants according to the Israeli authorities definition (Israel Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1967). Hence, in the sixties, the Palestinian themselves rejected the term refugee in 
the belief that "refugeehood" and nationhood are mutually exclusive: 
Between 1948 and 1969, Palestinians were almost uniformly treated by West 
Europeans and American spokesman as "refugees", and from that time on the 
"misunderstanding" was perpetuated. Even the United Nations in its annually 
reaffirmed resolution granting the "refugees" a right to return to their former 
home and to compensation for their lost property and I did not admit to the 
reality that these refugees constitute a "people" (Bassiouni,1981:177). 
In the sample surveyed, it was noticeable that the refugees avoid using the term refugee, 
and substitute it with the term muhajireen (exiles); the reasoning is that refugeehood implies 
permanency, whereas the term exile gives them more hope to demand right for repatriation. 
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Similarly, the term mukhayam (camp) is substituted by the word mu1askar (lit. 'military camp'), 
where the latter term denotes an ongoing mobility rather than rigidity. 
Like most other large dislocations of modern time, the exodus of the Palestinian people 
arose in the context of warfare. Those who fled their homes are now outside their habitual 
residence. The PLO's definition of a Palestinian refugee is stated in Article (5) of the 
Palestinian National Charter. 4 It reads: 
The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in 
Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. 
Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine 
or outside it - is also a Palestinian (Cobban, 1984:267). 
Article (5), reinforces Article (4), which defines Palestinians' identity: 
The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential and inherent characteristic, it is 
transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal 
of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not 
make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership of the 
Palestinian community, nor do they negate them 
(Cobban, 1984:267;Harkabi, 1974:52). 
The above Articles refer to the Palestinians as: firstly, a people with an independent 
identity, that does not disappear, but is transferred from one generation to the next; secondly, 
as a people who are part of the Arab world as a whole (palestinian Arab people). This label 
could be interpreted further in a wider context related to the growth of Arab nationalism or Pan-
Arabism and the influence of Gamal abdel-Nasser at the time. In fact, the Arab states have 
always agreed on the centrality of the question of the refugees itself - despite their disputes over 
it (Hudson, 1971:336). The issue of defining who is a refugee transcends concern with 
terminology. All refugees are considered as "victims of circumstances beyond their control and 
are in need of protection and assistance" irrespective of how they are classified and the 
terminology used for describing them (International Review of the Red Cross, July-
August(l988):365). 
It is vital when discussing the issue of terminology to assert a method for characterising 
why and how refugees emerge. In doing so it is crucial to emphasize the question of survival 
in refugees' experience. The forms and range of strategies for survival adopted by refugees to 
cope with the constrained conditions they live in are enormous. As D'Souza and Crisp's have 
noted: "The "refugee dilemma" is not just of intellectual or even humanitarian interest - it is a 
question of survival" (D'Souza and Crisp, 1985: 15). 
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1.5 NUMBER AND DESTINATION OF PALESTINE REFUGEES 
The contentious nature of the relative population size has meant that it is always difficult 
to give statistical estimates for the Palestinian population. This difficulty is compounded by 
several other factors. These are: the forced expUlsion in 1948 of the Palestinians; the offering 
of Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians living in Jordan- refugees and non-refugees; the 
geographical dispersal of the Palestinian population; the poor statistical bureaux in the host 
countries; and the unreliability of refugee registration figures by UNRWA. UNRWA itselfhas 
cast doubt on the reliability of the Agency's records as mentioned in the General-Commissioner 
Report (GCR) of 1979 : 
These statistics (of refugees) are based on the Agency's registration records, 
which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors 
such as unreported deaths and births, false or duplicate registrations or absence 
from the area of UNRWA operations (UN, 1979:59). 
The influx of refugees into neighbouring countries began to emerge as a result of the 
unrest in Palestine as early as 1947. The first to leave for safer parts, following the General 
Assembly Resolution on 29 November, 1947 to partition Palestine, were some 30,000 Arabs 
of the upper and middle classes, who sought a safer place, in the hope that they would return 
soon. Khoury observed that "The loss of so many key people led to a serious breakdown in 
communications and economic and administrative services among the Palestine Arab community 
once the British began to leave" (Khoury,1968:123). Those remaining were invariably left to 
the mercy of rumour, anxiety, and fear. The mass movement can be dated from the period 
between April and August 1948. 
The movement of refugees could be said to be of sporadic and unorganized 
character. In general, those from Galilee and the north coastal cities of 
Palestine fled to Lebanon and Syria. Others sought the nearest Arab-controlled 
territory in Syria and Transjordan. Some sought relatives and friends. The 
professional, business and former administrative people usually congregated in 
the larger cities of Beirut, Damascus, and Amman. Only few were able to 
carry personal effects and some money. Flight was generally disorderly and 
with almost no possession. Many went on foot, some by ship, cars, and trucks. 
In certain cases, entire villages kept more or less together (de 
Aubin, 1949:252). 
Various estimates ofPRs who were displaced in 1948 were given by various individuals 
and bodies, ranging from 630,000 to 780,000. UN Clapp Mission gave an estimate of 726,000 
displaced refugees in 1949, which was close to Palestinian estimates given by Hadawi 
(750,000) and Abu-Lughod (770,000-780,000), but exceeded an Israeli estimate by Pinner of 
539,000 refugees at the end of 1948. 5 
Moreover, refugees from Jaffa and the Gaza and Beersheba districts of the south 
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crowded into GS. 6 Most Arab inhabitants of Ramleh and Jerusalem districts fled to the hilly 
country on the WB of the River Jordan. About four-fifths of the refugees from the coastal area 
settled on the WB, while the remainder continued on to Jordan, finally coming to rest in the 
Amman and Zarka areas. (See Map 1.1). About 150,000 of the Arab population of Palestine 
remained behind in the new state of Israel, but those among them who had their houses 
destroyed or lost their livelihood found themselves quite as dependent on relief as those who 
had left the country. Initially they were assisted by UNRWA, but in 1952 the Israeli 
Government accepted responsibility for them (UNRWA, 1986:3-4;UN, 1952:3). 
The remaining portions of Palestine - WBGS- have received the greatest numbers of 
refugees, followed by the neighbouring Arab countries. Many refugees moved further afield 
in search of work or better living conditions, to places as far away as Iraq and the Gulf 
countries, particularly Kuwait and Bahrain. Table 1.2 below illustrates the distribution of 
refugees into the neighbouring countries in 1948. 
TABLE 1.2 Distribution of the PRs in the Host Arab Countries, 1950-1989 
Areas 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 
WB 272,692 324,035 398,391 
GS 198,227 255,542 311,814 367,995 469,385 
Jordan 506,200 613,743 506,038 716,372 899,811 
Syria 82,194 115,043 158,717 209,362 272,778 
Lebanon 127,600 136,561 175,958 226,554 294,272 
Total 914,221 1,120,889 1,425,219 1,844,318 2,334,637 
Source: UNRWA, 1990 
These figures indicate the residential stability and the limited movement of the camp 
dwellers, compared with the Palestinian population as a whole. This could be attributed to their 
particular conditions and lack of means. 
Map 1.1: Destination of Palestinian Refugees in 1948 
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1.6 DISTRIBUTION OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS 
One-half of the Arab Palestinian population is said to be dispersed and living outside 
the borders of Palestine. Table 1.3 below shows the distribution of the Palestinian population 
from 1952-1988, showing variations from one source to another throughout the period 
presented. 
TABLE 1.3 Palestinian Population Distribution in the World from 1952-1988 (000) (various 
estimates) 
Area 
Israel 
WB 
GS 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Gulf and 
Arab States 
Other States 
Total 
19528 
179 
742 
294 
150 
114 
82 
37 
1,598 
1961b 1967*c 
247 318 
805 900 
369 450 
380 466 
183 220 
116 140 
78 128 
20 27 
2,198 2,649 
196id 1975e 1981f 1984g 
392 534 550 602 
599 665 833 919 
346 372 401 509 
730 950 1,148 
225 280 492 2,035 
143 186 222 
359 395 622 713 
47 73 245 266 
2,841 3,455 4,513 5,044 
• These figures represent Palestinians resident in WBGS as of June 1, 1967 . 
1988h 
800 
1,200 
630 
1,450 
413 
285 
667 
340 
5,785 
•• These figures represent Palestinians resident in WBGS as of end of December 1967. 
a-e) From J.Abu-Lughod,1980. 
f) From G.Kossaifi, 1985. 
g) From The Palestinian Statistical Abstract for 1983,1986. 
h) From AI-Qzub(Jerusalem), 27 July, 1989. 
The scope of subsequent population redistribution is suggested by the figures in Table 
1.3. In 1975, only 45.5% of the Palestinians according to the estimates of Abu-Lughod, lived 
in the historical land of Palestine (Israel, WB and GS) as against 76% in 1952. Conversely, 
54.5% of the 1975 Palestinian population lived in areas outside Palestine, compared to only 
24% in 1952. The percentage of the Palestinian population living within the historical 
boundaries of Palestine had declined still further by 1984 to 40.2 %, while those who lived in 
the areas outside increased to 59.7 %. These changes could be attributed to several factors, 
mainly the second exodus of the Palestinians from WBGS as a result of the 1967 war. As 
shown in Table 1.4 the Palestinian population in Jordan had swelled from 466,000 at the 
beginning of June 1967 to 730,600 at the end of December 1967. 
As at 30 June 1989, there were 61 Palestinian refugee camps with a total population of 
2,334,637. Table 1.4 shows the distribution of camps and their population in the host 
countries. (See Map 1.2). 
Map 1.2: Distribution of Palestinian Refugee Camps 
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TABLE 1.4 Distribution of Refugee Camps in the Host Arab Countries (000) 
Population Number of Total camp Registered Percentage 
Area camps Population Persons not of Population 
in camps not in camps 
Lebanon 294,272 13 145,538 148,734 50.54 
Syria 272,778 10 69,015 203,763 74.70 
Jordan 899,811 10 190,847 708,964 78.79 
WB 398,391 20 104,977 293,414 73.64 
as 469,385 8 253,970 215,415 45.89 
Total 2,334,637 61 764,367 1,570,27 67.25 
Source: UNRWA, 1990 
The above figures indicate that the camps encompass 32.75 per cent of the total refugee 
population in the host countries. Whereas, 67.25 percent of those refugees reside outside the 
camps in the respective states and regions. As for the refugees residing in the camps, as has 
the highest number (253, 970) in 8 camps, followed by Jordan, Lebanon, WB and then Syria. 
This situation in aaza, where the majority reside in the camps, reflects a high rate of residential 
stability; in other words, it means that the economic mobility of refugees in terms of changing 
place of residence and relocation outside the camps is very limited; this economic immobility 
contrasts with their political mobility. The explanation of this phenomenon - of economic 
immobility and high political mobility - will be discussed in the remaining of the thesis. 
According to al-Qutub, the PRs in 1988 constituted 53.6 per cent of the total number 
of the Palestinian population now living in the host Arab states, including WBaS (AI-
Qutub,1989:93). Earlier estimates by the PLO Central Bureau of Statistics for 1980 and 1984, 
accounted for 42 % and 40.3 % respectively of the total Palestinian population (pLO,CBS, 1980 
and 1986). The High Commissioner for Refugees reported some 200,000 evacuees from the 
WB and at least 25,000 from as who fled to the East Bank by August of 1967 (Abu-
Lughod,1980:24-25). Abu-Lughod's estimates for residents of the WB who were forced to flee 
during the war is between 250,000-300,000, a number which is quite consistent with the results 
of the Israeli Defence Census taken in September 1967 (Abu-Lughod,1986:9). Moreover, in 
its report for the month of May 1968, the High Ministerial Committee for Refugee Relief in 
Jordan gave an estimate of 361,000 evacuees from WB and 38,000 from as (Arab Palestinian 
Documents, 1968:442-444). Adding to this the voluntary movement of the Palestinians from the 
OTs since 1967, as a result of the Israeli authorities policies and measures, gives a migration 
of 200,000 Palestinians between 1967 and 1981 (Filistine al-1hawrah,1982:184-187). 
1.7 GAZA STRIP: CAMPS AND REFUGEES 
Our main concern throughout this thesis is as refugees, in both residential areas -
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camps and housing projects. Before proceeding to deal with refugees in GS, it is important 
to define the area geographically. The term GS first appeared, according to the Egyptian basic 
law number 55, in 1955. Prior to this date-from 1949-1954 it was called "the submissive 
Palestinian I under the supervision of Egyptian military forces", as agreed upon in the first 
Rhodes Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949 (Current 
History,1949:232-36).7 This term was created to distinguish it from the surrounding area with 
which it had long been associated under the British Mandate, and which was known as the Gaza 
sub-district of Palestine (one of its 18 sub-districts). (See Map 1.3). Its boundaries enclose a 
roughly rectangular area of 363 square kilometres, or 142 square miles, that stretches 45 
kilometres from north to south, but is only 8 kilometres wide at its northern end, 5 kilometres 
at its narrow waist, and a maximum of 12 kilometres in the south. On the north and east it 
adjoins Israel. (See Appendix 1) 8. Although it was created as a zone of military occupation, 
Gaza has acquired contemporary political significance, and continues to have strikingly different 
demographic, social and economic patterns from its surrounding areas. 
Gaza is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. It served as a major 
junction along the ancient coastal road, with other roads branching eastward to Jerusalem, 
Hebron and Beersheba. It also served as a major port, and briefly as a railway and airline hub. 
Gaza population, however, has fluctuated greatly, as a result of its decidedly mixed fortunes in 
the course of history 9 (Ben-Ariel, 1975:60-61). Even in this century, during the British siege 
of Gaza in 1917, most of its 42,000 inhabitants were forced to flee. 10 (Raphaeli,1968: 44). 
Its population rose to 17,480 in 1922 (Statesman's Yearbook, 1925:185).11 Climbing by 1945 
to 73,000 (Village Statistics,1945:31), it tripled again after the 1948 influx. Since 1948, GS 
has had the largest Arab population of any city in the former Mandate area. As the capital and 
first municipality of the Southern district of the Palestine Mandate, it was the only one in the 
south to have elected mayors, although this applied only to the period from 1935 to 1948. 
As mentioned above, those who fled from the southern part of Palestine poured into GS, 
and a small proportion went into Egypt. By the end of 1947, the indigenous population of GS 
which came under Egyptian rule was estimated variously to be 80,000 and 88,000, with the 
influx of refugees into as, who numbered 200,000, including about 30,000 Bedouin from the 
Negev, the population increased threefold (UNRWA, 1986:3;Khluosi, 1967:41). 
Map 1.3: Sub-Districts of Palestine before 1948 
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The refugees settled near their occupied land, confidently expecting to return to their 
homes within a few weeks or months. Table 1.5 below presents various estimates of the scale 
of population displacement into GS following the May 1948 war. 
TABLE 1.5 The Palestinian Population Displacement into the Gaza Strip, 1948 (various 
estimates) 
Source Estimated Displacement 
UNRWA 
Sayigh 
Efrat 
Abu-Lughod 
Kossaifi 
Clapp's Misssion 
200,000 
200, 000 
200, 000 
201, 100 
185, 600 
190, 000 
Source: UNRWA, 1986; Sayigh, 1979; Efrat, 1977; Abu-Lughod, 1980; Kossaifi, 
1980; Buehrig, 1971. 
The above figures demonstrate that GS, with its small area, had absorbed a major part 
of the refugees, compared to the situation on the WB. On the WB the percentage of refugees 
relative to the indigenous population was 27.5 per cent in 1952, whereas, this percentage 
reached 200 percent in GS in the same year (HHal, 1974: 19). As a result, the density of 
population in GS reached 920 persons per square kilometre, while it was 580 person only on 
the WB (Hilal,1974:15).(Figure 1.1) 
Table 1.6 below illustrates the type of habitation of refugees and its relation to the host 
population in GS, as of the end of December, 1958. 
Figure 1.1: 
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TABLE 1.6 GS Population by Type of Habitation, at End of December 1958 
Principle location Host population Refugees Total 
Gaza city 53,342 45,631 98,973 
Shati camp 22,415 22,415 
Jabalya 5,179 3,834 9,013 
Jabalya camp 23,482 23,482 
Nazla 1,884 1,884 
Beit lahiya 2,448 2,448 
Deir el Balah 3,808 3,808 
Deir el Balah camp 6,055 6,055 
Bureij camp 11,820 11,820 
Nuseirat camp 15,255 15,255 
Mughazi camp 8,107 8,107 
Khan Yunis 16,863 23,341 40,204 
Khan Yunis camp 19,334 19,334 
Bani Suheila 4,712 4,712 
Abasan 3,503 3,503 
Ikbza'a 1,520 1,520 
Rafah 3,365 11,223 14,588 
Rafah camp 35,512 35,512 
Others 18,981 15,912 34,893 
Total 115,605 241,921 357,526 
Source: Official Statistical Bulletin, 1955-1958, GS, 1959. 
The Table above strikingly demonstrates that the refugee population in GS was double 
the number of the indigenous population. Yet UNRWA services covered refugees inside and 
outside of the camps equally. In addition, UNRWA provided for some who were categorised 
as economic refugees (notably 182,000 frontier villagers in Jordan, 100,000 non-refugees in 
Gaza, 11,000 Bedouin, 114,000 impoverished people in Jerusalem), because they had lost their 
livelihood but not their homes, and therefore did not meet UNRWA criteria (UNRWA, 1986:68-
69). 
UNRWA figures of 30 June 1990 showed that the total registered refugees in the GS 
were 496,339. They were approximately 70% of the total population in the Strip (estimated at 
700,000), compared to the 200,000 refugees and 80,000 indigenous population in 1948. Many 
of the refugees who poured into the GS were of rural origin (47%); 29% being urban; and 24% 
bedouins (Abu al-Namel,191979:3OO). Out of the 271,938 registered refugees, «59,091 
families), approximately 55% were living in the 8 camps there, together with 4,675 persons 
unofficially registered. The PRs in GS camps are distributed among 8 camps in the three zones. 
Table 1.7 provides enumeration of refugees as at 31.12.1990. 
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TABLE 1.7 Total Registered Camp Population of GS as at 31.12.1990 (000) 
location Official Registered Unofficial Total 
Families Persons Registered 
Persons 
Jabalia 13,108 59,194 601 59,795 
Shati 10,578 46,710 450 47,160 
Nuseirat 6,943 31,577 1,532 33,109 
Bureij 4,282 19,060 607 19,667 
Deir el Balah 2,471 11,101 251 11,352 
Maghazi 2,866 12,665 71 12,736 
Khan Yunis 8,366 37,050 564 37,614 
Rafah 12,181 55,623 641 56,264 
Gr Total 60,795 272,980 4,717 277,697 
Source: UNRWA Registration Statistical Bulletin for the Fourth Quarter 1990, Gaza, 
January 1991. 
As can be seen from Table 1.7, the SC where the field work was undertaken rates third 
in population size after Rafah and Jabalia camps. The only camp that exceeds in size those of 
Jabalia and Rafah is the Baqaa camp in Jordan with a population of 60,845 persons 
(UNRWA, 1991:9). In this context, it is noteworthy that the eight GS camps have the highest 
population (277,697 persons) compared to other areas; Jordan's 10 camps (225,335); 
Lebanon's 13 camps (156,636); WB's 20 camps (112,855); and Syria's 10 camps (83,726) 
(UNRWA, 1991:8). Each camp in GS has an average of 34,712 persons compared to an 
average of 6,440 in each Lebanese camp. The camps as, al-Qutub asserts, constitute small 
urban communities in the demographic and ecological sense, and they require a special 
classification in the study of urban societies in the Middle East, as they are all of a unique urban 
pattern (al-Qutub, 1989:96, 107). 
Population growth of the camps increased during the period of Egyptian rule (1948-
1967) (See Table 1.10). From 1961 to the end of June 1967, the growth rates of the camp 
refugee population reached a rate of 4.67% per annum. The population in GS in 1990 recorded 
a birth rate that reached 52.32 per thousand, the highest fertility rate in the world, or 33,142 
living births, an increase from 23,375 in 1988 and 32,463 in 1989 (WHO and the Gaza Health 
Services Research Centre, 1990: 1,2). The population of the GS is overwhelmingly young: 
51.7% of the residents and 37% of the total registered refugee population are under age fifteen 
(Okasha,1990:23; UNRWA,1990:15). 
The high growth rate exacerbated the density of population in the GS, which reached 
920 persons per square kilometre in the early 1950s (when it was only 580 persons on the WB) 
(Hilal, 1974: 15). (Figure 1.1). 
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An UNRWA worker hereunder gave an account of the conditions of Gaza refugees in 
1951, who were distributed among the various villages and towns of GS. They were often 
sheltered in private homes or placed temporarily in public buildings: eventually schools, 
convents, and former army barracks that were all put to use. She said: 
It is difficult to give a real picture of the situation of the refugees scattered 
about in mosques, schools and unfinished houses. One has to see for one's self 
to realize what it is to be a refugee, driven out of his tent by the howling winds 
and hailstorms to take shelter under any roof that affords some protection, 
carrying his luggage and his children under the lashing rains. The only shelters 
available at that time were the mosques of the town ... It is lucky that Gaza has 
17 mosques, large and smalL ... In every room about five or six families are 
installed. They put up some sort of partitions between them but as the space 
given to each family is only about two metres square, they have no room to 
shelter themselves properly. They sit in the comers where there is no room to 
stretch, looking like statues of misery ...... The conditions of these refugees is 
pitiable and their needs are great. They need everything: housing, clothing and 
food (King, 1981: 16-17). 
These conditions were also reported by the director of UNRWA in his first report to 
the General Assembly of 1951 (UN,1951:4); and by the former head of the Social Welfare 
Department at UNRWA Gaza (Interview, 27/711991). Mr. Majdalawi, a refugee himself, 
explained how he and his family camped under trees for a few days until they found shelter in 
one of the former British army barracks in Nuseirat. They spent a year there until The 
American Friends' Service Committee began its services on a volunteer basis; this was later 
coordinated with the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), which began its 
operations in January 1949. Other non-governmental organizations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies joined in the relief 
programme. Supplies of food and shelter (blankets and tents) were provided, and medical care 
was administered by the American Friends', the latter hereafter turned its attention to education 
(King,1981:18). 12 
The American Friends' Service Committee helped in establishing and supervising the 
refugee tented camps in GS - still in existence today - until the UNRWA was established upon 
recommendation of the General Assembly (Resolution 302 of 8 December 1949, paras 4 and 
7 (UNRWA, 1986). UNRWA assumed all the relief functions of UNRPR and the other 
voluntary agencies involved, on 1 May 1950. 
UNRW A services were very limited, however, as reflected in the money spent on each 
refugee in its charge, which averaged less than ten pence a day. Of this, five pence went on 
rations and other forms of relief, such as housing, a penny on health, and four pence on 
education (Mazzawi, 1968: 12;Hilal, 1974:25-26). Lack of funds has been the explanation given 
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by the Agency's General-Commissioner in every single report to the UN, since the 
establishment of UNRW A.13 
By 1950, only one-third of all UNRWA registered refugees lived in the Agency-
organized camps; a proportion which, interestingly, has remained constant until the 90's 
(UNRWA, 1986:80). In GS all tents had been removed by the year 1953 and replaced by huts. 
This replacement came as a result of the winter storms of 1951-1952, during which 5,120 tents 
were completely destroyed and almost twice this number were badly damaged, leaving in one 
nine-day period in December 56,000 refugees shelterless who had to seek refuge in mosques, 
schools, requisitioned buildings or with their more fortunate neighbours (UN, 1952:4). 
Nevertheless, such removal in other fields progressed slowly, and tents were only fully replaced 
by the year 1959 (UNRWA,1986:83). 
The size of shelters varied from one camp to another, but in general a family of four 
to five members had one room of 12 square metres, while a family of six to eight had two 
rooms. The area of land on which a hut was built usually did not exceed 80-100 square metres. 
The occupants were permitted to grow vegetables or erect additional rooms on this land as the 
family expanded by birth and marriage (UNRWA, 1986:83). The report of the Director of 
UNRWA of 1951 described the type of habitation which GS refugees occupied in 1951. It 
totalled 199,789 persons; 43.76% in tents; 7.59% in barracks; and 48.65% in towns and 
villages (UN,1951:23). 
In the late 80s, with the third generation of refugees reaching adulthood, the camps have 
become heavily congested (UNRWA,1986:83). There is still a very substantial proportion 
whose living conditions are far from adequate. Okasha's figures for 1989 indicate that housing 
density in the GS refugee camps is still very high, since camp refugees have been living in what 
is internationally defined as overcrowded conditions, i.e. more than three persons per room. 
In 1989, 40% of camp refugees in GS lived in overcrowded conditions. Okasha further 
explains that the median room densities for 1989 in GS camps were 3.1 persons per room 
(Okasha,1990:27). (See Chapter 7). 
The overcrowded conditions in GS camps (were) and are in part due to the 
unwillingness of some of the refugees to accept anything but the most temporary and transient 
type of accommodation, presumably because they have been led to believe that an improvement 
in their living conditions would somehow prejudice their chances of eventual repatriation. It 
is in part due also, as UNRWA stated, to the fact that the Agency has been unable, both 
because of shortage of funds and because of the unavailability of suitable sites, to provide 
accommodation in camps for many refugees who need them (UN,1954:2). 
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The belief is still strong among many refugees that any sign of possible permanency 
conflicts with their determination to return to their homeland. These refugees have refused to 
move out of the camps to the Israeli housing projects or other locations in GS. This issue and 
the conditions of the housing stock in the refugee camps of GS will be dealt with fully later in 
the thesis. 
As regarding the economic conditions of GS refugees, the first GCR of UNRWA 
estimated that only 20% of GS refugees were self-supportive; 50% were considered hardship 
cases; and 30% were in need of partial assistance (UN,1951:23). Although there are no 
references providing figures of the GS refugees of working age population, it was estimated 
by Okasha that in 1990 the GS population of working age was 379,360; 197,400 males and 
181,960 females (Okasha,1990:32). The economically active population estimated at 148,730, 
139,410 males and 9,320 females (Ibid.) The low female participation rate can be attributed 
to the influence of socio-cultural factors. 
The poor performance of the GS's economy is reflected in the large number of workers 
who were engaged in the Israeli economy, some 32.36% in 1990 (Ibid.:46), although this has 
been decreasing in the aftermath of the Gulf war. As regarding the occupational distribution 
of the active population, Okasha's figures for 1990 showed that there has been a general shift 
from production sectors into services and a downward trend in agricultural employment, from 
31.6% in 1970 to 18.6% in 1988 in GS itself. (SAl, various issues). The services sector in GS 
has always been the main employer of GS workers, accounting for about 38.24% in 1990 
(Ibid. :49); whereas, the construction sector in Israel has always been the main employer of GS 
workers, accounting for about 47.9% of the GS labour force inside Israel in 1989 (SAl, various 
issues). (See Chapter 7). 
1.8 GAZA STRIP REFUGEE POPULATION GROWTH 
GS is well known for having a high rate of population growth, made worse by the 
inflow of refugees in 1948. For example, population development during the British Mandate 
on Palestine, over the period from 1922 to 1946, indicated a rise in population in GS from 
19,000 to 71,000, with an average annual growth rate ranging from 5.8% in 1922 to 25% in 
1946; compared to those of 2.5% in 1922 and 10% in 1946 in WB (Gabriel and 
Sabatello,1986:247). This population increase could be attributed mainly to the composition 
of the population. The last 1931 Census in Palestine (later estimates of population up until 1947 
were based on that census) shows that 37.4% of the total population in Palestine was urban and 
62.6% was rural. The Muslims constituted 188,075 and the Christians 69,250 of the urban 
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population, compared with 128,467 Jews; while, of the rural population in Palestine the 
Muslims formed a majority (571,637), there were 22,148 Christians and 46,143 Jews 
(McCarthy, 1990: 159-160). 
These features of urban vs. rural distribution of the Muslim community in Palestine 
is a result of the fertility and mortality levels for this group before 1948 and after. As 
Thicknesse observed, despite the majority of the Palestinian population being rural their 
standard of living as a whole was higher than that of Arabs in other Arab countries, except 
perhaps Lebanon. He stressed that this is particularly true of the peasant and labouring classes 
and difficulties will be raised if their resettlement (after they became refugees) is undertaken in 
areas with a very low standard of living (Thicknesse, 1949: 12). 
However, population change in GS in the aftermath of the 1948 exodus, and during the 
Egyptian rule in the Strip (1949 -1967), grew from 280,000 in 1948 to 454,900 in 1966 (See 
Table 1.8). The annual growth was 2.7 per cent, with a population density of 1,250 persons 
per sq. lan., and a high natural increase, averaging 3.0 percent during 1950-64 
(Dahl an, 1989:241-244). Even in the fifties, Palestinian Moslem families were estimated to have 
the highest birth rate in the world, 54 per 1000 (Lemer,1958:307). 
TABLE 1.8 Population Change in GS, 1945-1966 
End of Population End of Population 
Period (000) period (000) 
1948 280.0 1958 357.5 
1950 288.1 1959 351.7 
1951 294.9 1960 360.5 
1952 299.3 1961 370.2 
1953 306.3 1962 382.1 
1954 312.8 1963 397.1 
1955 318.7 1964 412.4 
1956 336.0 1965 427.9 
1957 345.8 1966 454.9 
Source: Dahlan,1989:243. 
Between 1948 and 1967 emigration from the Strip was very limited compared to the WB, 
due to the Egyptian administration restrictive measures. In order to leave the· Strip, Gazans 
were required to obtain financial guarantees and the consent of the All-Palestine and Egyptian 
governments. In addition to these problems, GS residents (half of whom were refugees together 
with their descendants) lacked an internationally-recognized passport, (carrying instead an All-
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Palestine Government travel document which many countries refused to receive. Whereas, 
refugees who fled to the WB and Jordan were granted the same passports as Jordan citizens 
according to the Jordanian Parliament resolution of April 24, 1950, which announced the 
unification of the WB and the East Bank (Mansour and Kossaifi, 1990:820) 
The restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government on Gazans wishing to leave Gaza 
were protested against by Palestinian students in Cairo in March 1955, led by Yasar Arafat, 
Salah Khalaf, Zuhair al-Alami, and others who were members and leaders of the Palestinian 
Students Union. A sit-in and hunger strike at the Union took place and the Egyptian authorities 
were presented with three demands: the abolition of the visa system imposed on Palestinians 
entering and leaving Gaza; the resumption of a train service between Cairo and Gaza; and the 
introduction of obligatory military training for Palestinians to enable them to defend themselves 
against Israeli attacks. Their demands were met (Brand,1988:69). 14 
Emigration from the Strip continued until 1955 at a very low rate. Refugees with money 
or skills left the Strip, leaving behind the dispossessed villagers who had no alternative but to 
stay. In 1952, the first exit permits were issued for 2000 labourers and teachers from the Strip 
to go to Saudi Arabia. While Migdal and Kimmerling argue that those who left were unskilled 
labour and homogeneous illiterate, this latter argument is contestable because the Arab states 
economy at the time was in need of skilled and not unskilled labour to build their infrastructures 
(Metzger,1983:183; Kimmerling and Migdal,1993:200-1). 
The emigration of people from the Strip could be largely attributed to scarcity of 
employment for refugees and lower-class residents. For the latter the only source of livelihood 
was through the Egyptian public works projects, UNRWA jobs, fishing, and seasonal 
agricultural labour , supplemented by UNRWA rations and by remittances from family members 
who were working abroad. Citrus growers took advantage of the abundant supply of labour to 
pay low wages to workers. Per capita gross national product (GNP) in 1966 was only $80 
(Lesch and Tessler, 1989 :227). 
The 1967 war generated a second exodus of the Palestinians, some of them for the 
second time in their life. The mass migration from the OTs following the 1967 war, did not 
come to a halt until 15 March, 1970, when the Ministry of Interior in Jordan took a decision 
to let in migrants from WB, and particularly from GS, in only exceptional circumstances (The 
Arab Palestinian Documents, 1970: 149-150). 
This was further enhanced by a decision by the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee 
which had been formed at the end of 1978, to support the steadfastness of the people in WBGS. 
In its decision of 1983 it imposed restrictions on Palestinian emigration, especially the youth 
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who would otherwise be eligible for military conscription. This decision might seem a prudent 
one, as Kossaifi calculated, in order to prevent the draining of WB population 
(Kossaifi,1985:89). A third exodus of the Palestinian population is said to have taken place 
before and after the Gulf war in 1991 from Kuwait .. As stated by the PLO representative in 
Kuwait, the Palestinians decreased from 350,000 to 90,000 before the Iraqi intervention in 
Kuwait in August 1990 (al-Quds, 26 July,1991). 
The population change in GS resulted from the emigration of Gazans, mainly towards 
the East Bank of Jordan during and in the aftermath of 1967 war. The only full enumeration 
of the population of OTs is the Israeli census of September 1967. The principal purpose of the 
1967 census was "administrative." The aim was to establish the de facto (actually present) 
population (Schmelz, 1977:78). The results from this census have been used as the base for all 
the subsequent official Israeli estimates of the number of the Palestinians living in WBGS. 
Thus, the growth of the Palestinian population is calculated by adding births and subtracting 
both the estimates of deaths and the balance of population movement out of the OTs. Roy 
(1986) in her preface to Gaza Survey (1986), argued that the official population statistics and 
demographic predictions are unreliable because the only official census of GS was conducted 
in 1967 (See also, Benvenisti,1984:1). 
Okasha also argues that the growth rates of GS population since 1967, as given by the 
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics are not reliable due to lack of real reportings of infant births 
and deaths. It is clear that another census is imperative (Okasha,1990:9). In his statistical 
survey of GS population and labour force, Okasha incorporated official unpublished data and 
data published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. As assessed by various researchers and 
demographers, this survey is said to be the most reliable about the population of GS. Table 1.9 
shows these estimates of GS population and the sources of its growth since 1967. 
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TABLE 1.9 GS Population Estimates and Sources of its Growth (000) 
Population Natural Balance of Percent Population 
Year at begining increase population annual at end 
of year (1) movement(2; growth of year 
1967(3) 389.700 3.300 -12.200 -6.300 380.800 
1968 380.800 16.113 -32.300 -4.343 364.613 
1969 364.613 15.428 -2.900 3.378 377.140 
1970 377.140 15.958 -3.300 3.301 389.798 
1971 389.798 16.493 -2.400 3.551 403.891 
1972 403.891 17.090 -4.000 3.189 416.981 
1973 416 .. 981 17.644 1. 700 4.534 436.325 
1974 436.325 18.033 -1. 800 3.653 452.558 
1975 452.558 18.704 -3.500 3.304 467.762 
1976 467.762 19.333 -4.200 3.184 482.895 
1977 482.895 19.958 -2.900 3.471 499.953 
1978 499.953 20.663 -4.700 3.143 515.916 
1979 515.916 21. 323 -4.800 j, 152 532.438 
1980 53'2.438 22.006 -5.100 3.126 549.344 
1981 549.344 22.531 -5."300 3.088 566.576 
1982 566.576 23.238 -3.100 3.492 586.714 
1983 586.714 24.064 -1. 000 3.855 609.778 
1984 609.778 25.010 -4.800 3.260 629.988 
1985 629.988 25.839 -2.900 3.576 652.927 
1986 652.927 26.780 -3.600 3.488 676.106 
1987 676.106 27.435 -3.300 3.507 700.241 
1988 700.241 28.414 -3.700 3.468 724.956 
1989 724.956 29.417 -3.900 3.459 750.473 
1990 750.473 30.453 -4.100 3.451 776.8,"6 
Source: Okasha, 1990: 22. 
Out of the 750,000 persons at the end of 1989, the refugees in GS are estimated at about 
450,000 persons, in camps and outside camps. The camps' population growth has been on the 
increase during the Egyptian rule of the Strip. On 30 June 1961, the total population of the 
camps amounted to 155,592. This figure rose by 28.04% to reach 205,946 by the end of June 
1967, a rate of 4.67% per annum, and 260,782 by the end of September, 1989. Table 1.10 
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indicates the evolution of the camp refugees in GS since 1967 to 1989. 
TABLE 1.10 Gaza Strip: The Evolution of the Camp Refugees as Given by UNRW A 
Registration Data, 30 June 1961 - 30 September 1989 
Camp 30 June 30 June 31 Dec. 30 June 31 Dec. 30 June 30 Sept. 
1961 1967 1968 1975 1979 1985 1989 
Jabalia 28,669 41,417 41,062 41,427 43,640 51,225 56,603 
Beach 24,721 33,468 33,155 35,450 33,854 40,359 44,309 
Nuseirat 16,152 19,993 18,861 20,347 21,664 26,400 30,326 
Bureij 11,142 14,944 12,316 12,435 13,224 16,057 18,085 
Deir el- 6,710 7,783 7,456 8,106 8,674 9,854 10,634 
Balah 
Magahzi 7,964 9,985 9,037 8,434 8,975 10,506 11,913 
Kh.Yunis 21,250 30,002 28,813 29,694 29,816 33,269 36,276 
Rafah 38,984 48,354 45,198 41,656 42,994 48,816 52,636 
TOTAl 155,592 205,946 195,898 197,549 202,841 236,486 260,782 
Source: UNRWA, Registration Statistical Bulletin, Gaza, 1985 and 1990. 
A striking feature of Table 1.10 above is the decrease in the refugee population from the 
30 June 1967 enumeration, which resulted from out-migration from camps towards Jordan, 
during and in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The 1971 Israeli authorities' road-widening 
operations in the large camps in GS, to end the armed revolt that took place in the Strip after 
1967, also caused some decrease in camp population (See Chapter 4), as did the relocation of 
refugees to the Israeli sponsored housing projects (See Chapter 5). 
However, despite these decreases, the refugee population from 1979 onwards recorded 
an annual increase amounting to: 2.70% in Jabalia; 2.80% in Shati; 3.51 % in Nuseirat; 3.26% 
in Bureij; 2.11 % in Deir el Balah; 2.95% in Maghazi; 2.03% in Khan Yunis; and 2.10% in 
Rafah (Llewelyn-Davies Planning,1990, Table 2.4). 
SC shows an increase of 19,588 persons during the period from 1961 to September 1989, 
(the third highest after Jabalia and Rafah camps). Given that 450,000 of GS population are 
refugees, the figures above would indicate that the birth rate is very high in this region. 
A recent study on the number of births in GS indicates that, the number of live births 
in the Strip between the start of the Intifada on 9 December, 1987 and until 31 October, 1992 
was 158,814. Official statistics also indicate that three thousand births occur in the Strip every 
month. The study concluded that for every shahid (martyr) who falls victim to the Israeli army 
in GS (since the Intifada began 432 were killed in the Strip, 86 of whom were children under 
the age of fourteen) 367 were born (al-Quds Press,25 November, 1992). In WB refugee camps 
the number of live births increased by 25% (18,046 births) during the period from December 
1987 to October 1988, as the Jerusalem UNRWA office declared. Some WB doctors explained 
this increase as a result of the long curfews imposed by the authorities, particularly in refugee 
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camps (al-Quds,15 October,1988). 
A significant observation about the age structure of GS population is its youthfulness. 
More than 50% of the population is under the age of 15. Though the Israeli statistics after the 
1967 census do not distinguish between refugees and non-refugees of the Strip, it is accepted 
that 450 out of 750 thousands are refugees. Table 1.11 below gives estimates of GS population 
by sex and age at the end of 1989 as given by Okasha. 
TABLE 1.11 The Percentage Distribution of GS Population, by Age and Sex, end of year 
1989 
Thousands Percentages 
Age 
Males Females Total Males Females Total 
0 
-
4 78.21 72.14 150.35 10.42 9.60 20.02 
5 - 9 59.08 52.10 111.18 7.87 6.94 14.81 
10 - 14 47.32 44.86 92.18 6.30 5.98 12.28 
15 - 19 43.70 38.26 81.96 5.82 5.10 10.92 
20 - 24 38.53 36.06 74.59 . 5.13 4.81 9.94 
25 - 29 31.03 28.44 59.47 4.13 3~79 7.92 
30 - 34 18.29 15.10 33.39 2.45 2.02 4.47 
35 - 39 14.74 14'.61 29.35 1.96 1.95 3.91 
40 - 44 9.70 9.15 18.85 ',1.30 1.22 2.52 
45 - 49 8.40 12.03 20.43 1.12 1.60 2.72 
50 - 54 9.70 13.05 22.75 1.29 1.74 3.03 
55 
-
59' 9.31 9.95 19.26 1.24 1.33 2.57 
60 - 64 8.66 7.50 1~.16 1.15 1.00 2.15 
65 + 13.58 6.99 20.58 1.81 0.93 2.74 
Total 390.23 360.27 750.50 51.99 48.01 100.00 
Source: Okasha, 1990: 23. 
Table 1.11 indicates that the bulk of the population lies between the age groups 0-4 and 
5-14. Okasha' s estimates indicate that 47.11 % of GS population is below the age of 15; 
whereas, Israeli estimates gave a higher percentage of 49.48% in 1988 (Statistical Abstract of 
Israel, 1990:709). The second most common age group 15-19, and the third is 25-34. In the 
1967 Israeli census the refugee camp population was enumerated separately. This population 
in the age groups below 15 years was 88,534 (51.7%); whereas, the age group 15-64 was 
43.6%, and the age group 65 and over was 4.7% (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967 Census). 
44 
The 51.7% of the camp population which is less than 15 years of age is higher than is 
encountered for the same age group in the villages (50.8%), and the cities of the Strip (49.1 %) 
as given in 1967 census, which brings the percentage of the whole GS population below the age 
of 15 to 50.6%. 
According to the statistics given by the "Demographic Problem Committee" in Israel at 
its conference of 1 August 1988, the number of Arab children less than 8 years of age in Israel 
and the OTs is 630,000, while it reached 590 thousand for Jews in the same age category; in 
the year 2000 the number of Arab youths below 18 years of age will reach 1.4 million as 
against 1.3 million Jews (al-Quds,3 August, 1988). 
Regarding the composition of age and sex of registered refugees in GS camps, Table 1.12 
provides the latest estimate of the refugee population in the various age groups. It indicates that 
registered refugees less than 15 years of age amount to 37% of the total registered refugee 
population; whereas, the second most common age groups are those between 15-24 which 
amount to 19.4%. 
TABLE 1.12 Age and Sex Statistics of Registered Refugees of the GS as at 31.12.1990 
Age Number of Persons Percentage 
Groups Males Females Total Males Females Total 
0- 4 28,837 26,616 55,453 5.7 5.2 10.9 
5 - 9 35,825 33,547 69,372 7.5 6.6 14.1 
10 - 14 31,572 29,500 61,072 6.2 5.8 12.0 
15 - 19 27,273 25,007 52,280 5.4 4.9 10.3 
20 - 24 23,802 22,347 46,149 4.7 4.4 9.1 
25 - 29 23,742 21,632 45,374 4.7 4.2 8.9 
30 - 34 16,350 15,336 31,686 3.2 3.0 6.2 
35 - 39 13,836 12,705 26,541 2.7 2.5 5.2 
40-44 15,347 13,358 28,705 3.0 2.6 5.6 
45 - 49 13,019 11,220 24,239 2.5 2.2 4.7 
50 - 54 8,246 8,277 16,523 1.6 1.6 3.2 
55 - 59 6,500 9,049 15,549 1.3 1.8 3.1 
60 + 15,216 19,027 34,243 3.0 3.7 6.7 
Total 259,565 247,621 507,186 51.5 48.5 100.0 
~: Calculated from: UNRWA Registration Statistical Bulletin for the Fourth Quarter 1990:15. 
In Israel, and mainly for the "dovish" Zionists, too many Palestinians would create" a 
demographic problem" and a threat to the Jewish character of the state of Israel. As Peres 
stated, demography is becoming a more dangerous problem than geography (al-Quds, 26 
October, 1987). The numerous youth among the Palestinian population, have been taking a 
leading role and proving to be the most militant in resistance to occupation, despite the 
authorities' repressive policy. In this respect, the Minister of Economics and Finance in Israel 
stated that "... the coming of age of the first generation born under occupation and the "iron 
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fist" policy launched in August 1985 all contributed to the Palestinians' growing militancy" 
(Johnson, 1990:32). 
Transfer proposals, deportation of the young leadership from the territories, 
imprisonment of youth, the enforced separation of families and refusal of applications for family 
reunification, etc., are among the measures which the Israeli authorities implement to meet its 
objectives of having fewer Palestinian people on the historic and of Palestine. This policy also 
extends to include the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel, who are considered Israeli citizens in 
the legal sense, but who face discrimination in every single aspect of their daily life in Israel. 
The aim of introducing the issue of demography here is to stress that for the Palestinian 
population the demographic issue has been always a central theme in their struggle against 
Israel. Awareness of the demographic balance in Palestine emerged with the flow of Jewish 
immigration to Palestine during the British Mandate on Palestine. This political awareness has 
continued, especially after the doors of the ex-Soviet Union were opened for the Soviet Jews 
to migrate to Israel. In its report of 1990, the Israeli Statistical Bureau reported that 350,000 
Soviet emigrants have migrated to Israel since 1989, of which 265,000 moved in 1990 alone, 
bringing the percentage of emigration to its highest level (6.7 %) since the last Jewish flows to 
Israel from 1948-1951 (al-Quds,7 September, 1991). However, a specialist in Jewish 
demography has argued that with every group of 100,000 new Jewish immigrants (net of 
emigrants) equalization of the number of Jews and Arabs in the territories will not occur until 
around 2014 (DellaPergola,1990:27). Thus, in East Jerusalem, as statistics between 1983-1985 
showed, the Jews almost caught up with the Arab growth for the first time since 1967, the 
respective figures being 2.2 and 2.4, aided by the Arab migration from the city (JP, 22 
May, 1987). 
The fear among Palestinians over the demographic issue stems from two major factors. 
First, the connection between the number of incoming Jewish immigrants and their demand for 
Palestinian land. Between 1967 and the end of 1990, Israel had confiscated 3049,118 Dunums 
of land, 2895,643 in WB, and 153,475 in GS (al-Quds,9 August, 1991). Second, expropriation 
of land is connected to another factor, and that is the setting-up of settlements in OTs; The 
number of settlements that have been set-up in the OTs reached 145 by the end of 1991; of 
those, 128 were in WB, I 17 in GS. By November 1987, some 8 percent of the total area of 
GS, and half of the vacant state land, had been given to the Gaza Coast Regional Council for 
settlement (JP, 6 November, 1987). 
The number of Jewish settlers in OT's has been on the increase, as the Bulletin for 
Settlements Councils in WBGS shows. This figure reached 112,125 settlers at the end of 
46 
November, 1991; with an increase of 16,000 compared to January 1991 figures (96,000) (aZ-
Quds,24 January, 1992). According to the Israeli government plans the number should reach 
500,000 settlers by the year 1995 (aZ-Bayader aZ-Siyassi,1991:22); and a million settlers by the 
year 2000 (Davar,13 September, 1991). In that case, the Palestinians' fear has it roots in long-
standing Israeli policies and plans towards the people and the land of Palestine. The debate on 
this issue and its relation to the issue of dispersing PRs will be dealt with in detail throughout 
the study. 
To sum up, it is clear that the rate of growth of the GS refugee population has been 
increasing since 1948 to the present day. The analysis shows that more than 50% of the GS 
population is under the age of 15. This is despite the population losses caused during and after 
1967 war, which have been estimated at 115,100 persons (between 1967 and 1968). 
The concern of this Chapter was to provide the statistical and the conceptual framework 
which has comprised the Palestinian refugees. It has set the tone for what follows in the 
proceeding Chapters of the thesis. In the PRs experience, the weight of numbers has been of 
influence in two aspects: first a political one, their collective cohesion and determination to 
return having shaped their political consciousness to such a degree that almost all proposals to 
resettle them outside Palestine have been thwarted; second, a socio-economic one, which could 
be seen in the overcrowding and poor housing conditions, making GS one of the most densely 
populated areas in the world. 
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NOTES: 
1. 1931 British Mandate census formed the basis for subsequent Palestine population 
estimates until March 1947. 
2. It is named" Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee", agreed at Geneva on 28 /7 
11951. For the full text of the Convention's provisions, see: UN, UNHCR,1988:10-39. 
3. This Convention was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State Government at its 
Sixth Ordinary Session (Addis Ababa, 10 September 1969), given the name 'the OAU 
Convention Covering the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa '. For the full 
text, see, lbid.:193-2oo. 
4. This was agreed upon at the fourth Palestinian National Council meeting in July 1968. 
5. For more details on estimates of displaced refugees, see: Gabbay,1959; J. Abu-
Lughod,1973; Hadawi,1968; Pinner,1959; Thicknesse,1949. 
6. Eviction of Palestinians from the southern coastal plain, in particular from the Majdal 
town to Gaza Strip, took place in the early 1950s. For details on the eviction, see: 
Benny Morris,1990:257-269. 
7. The Egyptian military administration in GS lasted from 1949-1967, was terminated by 
the war of June 1967. Excluded was an interlude of Israeli occupation of the Strip 
between 29 October 1956 7 March 1957 as a result of the Suez military campaign 
(Khlousi, 1967:45; Castel, 1984: 1) 
8. The Gaza Strip is a part of the Palestinian coastal plain stretching from Haifa in the north 
to Rafah in the south. The Strip is divided into three zones: the Northern Zone, Central 
Zone, the Southern Zone. 
9. Ben-Ariel provides an estimated Gaza population of 8,000 in 1800, 12,000 in 1840, 
16,000 in 1882, 36,000 in 1897; making it the second largest town in Palestine during 
most of the century. 
10. Raphaeli notes that Gaza did not regain its pre-1917 population level until the 1948 
refugee movements. 
11. The Yearbook shows that Gaza was, despite its population losses during the First World 
War, the fourth largest city in the Mandate of Palestine. It has remained the fourth 
largest city in the former Mandate area, exceeded only by three cities: greater Jerusalem, 
Tel-Aviv/Jaffa Haifa. 
12. For more information on the refugees' conditions in the early years of the exodus, see: 
Cattan, 1969:71-72; Smith, 1984: 144; Hilal,1974:18-29; Buehrig,1971:30; 
UNRWA, 1986:79-80; Abu al-Namel, 1979:33-47. 
13. On facets of UNRWA budget expenditures since 1950 to date, see: UNRWA,1986:74-
79; UN,1951:4-5). 
14. For detailed information on the restrictions imposed on Gazans' emigration prior to 
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1967, see: Brand, 1988:41,48 and 92; Abu-Lughod,J. June 1983: 14; Abu Amru,1981. 
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CHAPTER nvO: PALESTINIANS: CHANNELS FOR EVICTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Yitsak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, was prohibited by a censorship board from 
including in his memoirs a first-person account of the expulsion of 50,000 Palestinians from 
Lod and RamIe near Tel-Aviv during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Rabin was puzzled by the 
prohibition, but obeyed Israeli law. The deleted section was leaked by the book's translator and 
was published in NIT' of 23 October, 1979 . 
... Allon repeated his question (to Ben-Gurion and Rabin): What is to be done 
with the population? B.G. waved his hand in a gesture which said. Drive them 
out! ... Driving out is a term with a harsh ring. Psychologically, this was one 
of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of Lod did not leave 
willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots 
in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where 
they met up with the borders... Great suffering was inflicted upon the men 
taking part in the eviction action. Soldiers ... who had been inculcated with 
values such as international brotherhood and humaneness. The eviction action 
went beyond the concepts they were used to. 
The example of Lod and RamIe's reveals part of the truth about the expUlsion of the 
Palestinian Arabs in 1948. Asking why this deletion was made sheds light on the contradictory 
statements given by the Zionist/Israeli leadership regarding the land of Palestine and its people, 
and the plight inflicted on them, and moreover, the kind of solutions proposed to solve the PRs 
issue, either by Israel in the post-1948 period or by Western countries. 
This Chapter discusses the two conflicting versions which have been given as the cause 
of the exodus. The Zionist's version and the Palestinian/Arab version give different 
interpretation as to the cause of the Palestinians' plight. Furthermore, these conflicting versions 
of who was responsible for the exodus give rise to another issue: who is responsible for finding 
a solution to the PRs' question? This is not to ignore recent interpretations given by "the new 
historians" in Israel. Their investigations about the exodus have revealed part of the truth as 
to who caused it, which partly supports the Arab version of the exodus. These "new 
historians" have chosen to disregard "the purity of arms" legends that surrounded the Israeli 
version of the 1948 exodus (Gilmour, 1987: 10). 
An understanding of the 1948 exodus needs to be studied in the context of the Zionist 
movement's ideology, policies and plans throughout the first half of the century. This is 
because it reveals in practical terms how the movement's apparatus was used in the goal of 
establishing a Jewish state, which carried out various forms of discrimination and denial of 
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Palestinians' right to land and independence. It argues that the Zionist/Israeli policies and plans 
to expel Palestinians from their land in the period pre-1948 and post-1967 did not change, but, 
they reflect continuity, which have been taking new forms: deportations, calls for transfer, and 
dispersion of Palestinians. 
The focus of this Chapter is to look at the development of the Zionist movement policies 
and plans. Its purpose is: to examine the nature of Zionist ideology; to show how it differs 
from other colonial schemes; to explain how and why it was able to achieve its goal in 
Palestine; to examine the crucial interrelationship between Israel's policies and plans to block 
return of PRs and the issue of resettlement; for the interlink between return and resettlement 
pose opposite questions and problems. 
Thus, some of the central questions being asked are: Why have Zionists been 
inconsistent regarding the exodus? Can the exodus be perceived as one born by design rather 
than by war? How did Zionism's relationship with the imperial powers help nurture its scheme? 
How did the political, socio-economic elements in Palestine Mandate, along with the push and 
pull of external factors beyond Palestinian control, coalesce to influence the subsequent history 
of Palestine and Palestinians? 
It is necessary to raise these questions, because the answers to them provide the 
background for a long-rooted Israeli policy of "no return," concomitant with their ongoing call 
to resettle PRs in the Arab countries, outside its borders, which the rest of this Chapter focuses 
on. 
2.2 THE CONFLICTING VERSIONS 
For nearly forty-five years the root causes of the PRs question have been disputed over, 
mainly by the two sides involved. The Israelis' claim that the exodus was partly ordered by the 
military leaders of the Arab High Command, who promised a quick victory and possibility of 
quick return. This version has been adopted as the official Israeli thesis, and by Zionist 
apologists abroad. They further argue that the war launched by the Arab states triggered the 
refugees to leave and is considered the second most important root cause. 
Addressing the Knesset Committee on 4 December 1949, Ben-Gurion claimed that the 
coverage of the expUlsion of Arabs were "fabrications designed to defame the state, " since the 
Arabs left on orders from the Arab leadership. He thus called a Knesset Committee to seek 
ways of combatting "such disgraceful allegations" (Segev, 1986:56). Ben-Gurion went even 
further to state that the creation of the problem "Was an organized plan by Arab states or 
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British or both" (F.R.U.S.,1949:903). 
Other reasons were given by Israel for the flight of PRs: that the exodus resulted 
from panic created by fighting in Palestinian communities; by rumours concerning real or 
alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion (Cited inKuhnhardt, 1984: 13). 
The Palestinian/Arab thesis alleges that the atrocities committed by the Zionist forces, 
of which the massacre of Deir Yassin was exceptional in causing panic and flight, and the 
terror activities of Zionist underground groups such as Irgun and Stem, had lead to a crusade 
battle to conquer Arab cities prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in order to create 
a fait accompli, linked to mass expulsion and mass flight. This was further combined with 
skilful psychological warfare. From the very beginning it was the aim of the Zionists to clean 
up the area of all Arabs.1 
The other allegation raised by Palestinians was that the British Mandatory authorities 
were responsible primarily for the panicky flight of the Arabs from Palestine. In a letter 
publ ished in the Palestine Post on February 2,1949, El ias Koussa, a distinguished Arab attorney 
and member of the Arab National Committee of Haifa, wrote that the British administration had 
laboured "to create an atmosphere permeated with fear and alarm ... The idea that the Arabs 
should quit their homes was advanced, sponsored and propagated by the British." He continued 
to say that: " .. .It was the British, and not the Jews, who first put into effect the dislodgement 
and deportation of the Arab population." When conditions in Tiberias became acute in an area 
where friendly relations between Arabs and Jews formed a bright illustration of the possibility 
of the two communities cooperating, the British authorities forcibly transported the Arab 
inhabitants en masse to Transjordan. Another influence of British authorities policies was seen 
in the Arab flight from the Haifa area, when the British informed the Haifa residents that they 
would not protect them (Schechtman, 1952: 12-13). 
The British role with regard to the flight of PRs could be seen also in connection with 
the British government decision to withdraw its Mandate from Palestine on 14th May 1949. 
Rees Williams, Under-Secretary of State for the colonies, considered this withdrawal without 
handing over responsibility to any other responsible authority "is unprecedented in the history 
of our Empire" (Shlaim, 1987:50). Walid Khalidi further argued that, at the time of British 
withdrawal, the balance of power was in favour of the Zionists in Palestine, and considered that 
such withdrawal" was an open invitation for a Zionist military take-over of the country," and 
further "increased the fragmentation of the Arab scene while it furthered the cumulative 
consolidation and extension of Jewish power" (Shlaim, 1987:51-52;Pappe, 1992:99-101). 
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Literature about the conflict covers fully the two conflicting versions of the exodus. 
Yet, the Israeli version has been particularly accepted (Said, 1988). This is despite the 
investigations that took place in the sixties to refute the Zionist claims. Ershkin Childers and 
Walid Khalidi were the first scholars to investigate the Israeli claims. They have screened Arab 
documents - newspapers and radio broadcasts in particular and come to the conclusion that no 
plans for self-imposed evacuation or orders for self-evacuation were reported. On the contrary, 
they found evidence that official and non-official institutes in the Arab world, including 
Palestinian groups, had taken a hostile attitude towards those who fled their homes. 
Accordingly, they called upon Palestine Arabs to stay in their homes and jobs, they even 
threatened to punish severely those who were planning to leave. Refutations of Israeli claims 
made by Arab scholars were based on the strategies, tactics and plans carried out by the Jewish 
military organizations and the Israeli army later on. 2 
It was difficult to investigate those plans without obtaining the secret documents held 
by the Jewish! Israeli Defence Departments. This material was opened for researchers at the 
beginning of the 80s, when thousands of documents related to the 1948 war and the 
circumstances encircling the expulsion of the Palestine Arabs became available. This led to the 
emergence of what is called "the new history," especially in Israel, where the "new historians" 
have been taking a new role in investigating both versions of the exodus, and the circumstances 
that surrounded the first Arab-Israeli war. 
2.3 THE "NEW HISTORIANS" INTERPRETATION OF PALESTINIAN EXODUS 
Benny Morris is considered the most prominent of the "new historians" and published 
the results of his investigations on that subject firstly in 1986. 3 Other Israeli historians have 
also been tackling the subject, and have shown empathy with the PRs, and sometimes the 
Israelis who are victims in their own society. Among those are, Tom Segev, who debated the 
issue of discrimination against the Oriental Jews by their Western fellowmen; Simha Flapan, 
who has written about the 1948 war and the fabricated Israeli claims of Arab power and attacks; 
and Avi Shlaim, who researched the personal relationship between the Zionist leadership, 
Britain and King 'Abdullah of Jordan. 
Morris agreed with Khalidi and Childers with regard to the absence of evidence to 
support the Israeli claims of the exodus, and in particular, in relation to the myth of the radio 
broadcasts. A summary of Morris's argument is that the expulsion happened as a result of the 
Israeli military operations, and not because of a systematic plan to expel Arabs from Palestine. 
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In his introduction to The Binh, he wrote: "It cannot be stressed too strongly that while this is 
not a military history, the events it describes - cumulatively amounting to the Palestinian Arab 
exodus - occurred in wartime and were a product, direct and indirect, of that war" 
(Morris, 1987:3). 
The Palestinians refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or 
Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the 
protracted, bitter fighting that characterized the first Israeli-Arab war; in part, 
it was the result of deliberate, not to say malevolent, actions of Jewish 
commanders and politicians; in smaller part, Arab commanders and politicians 
were responsible for its creation, through acts of commission and omission 
(Morris, 1991: 114). 
Morris's explanation that the causes of the exodus were not pre-planned but rather the 
outcome of conditions of war does not always stand up to examination - even in his own 
contradictory arguments. Having based his explanation on the war only, he goes on to write: 
"In April-May, and indeed, again in October, the "atrocity factor" played a major role in certain 
areas of the country in encouraging flight" (lbid.:288). This was the period in which the Jewish 
military gangs had committed several massacres in Arab villages-Deir Yassin, Nasser el-Din 
near Taiberis, and Ein el-Zaitoun near Safad (Morris,1987:287-8). 4 
It is difficult to see that how the expUlsion of about 800,000 within such a short period 
of time does not result from a pre-planned systematic policy of expulsion. Morris's 
interpretation of the exodus has been criticized by many. Among these are Norman Finkelstein 
and Nur Masalha (JPS,1991). 5 Norman considered Morris's argument as one of the "happy 
median", in which the old myth was substituted by a new one. He wrote: "The results of 
Morris's research thus apparently belie the most damaging Arab claims and exonerate Israel of 
any real culpability for the catastrophe that befell Palestine's indigenous population in 1948 " 
(Finkelstein, 1991:67). Masalha argued that Morris's research ignored the "inherent link 
between the "transfer" of the Arabs and the acquisition of their land on the one hand and 
Zionism's long-advocated imperative of accommodating millions of Jewish immigrants in the 
Jewish state on the other" (Masalha, 1991:97). As a Palestinian scholar Masalha joins other 
Palestinian scholars who consider Morris's arguments to be more dangerous than the general 
Israeli version of the 1948 exodus (al-Mithaq,23 April,1988). For a clearer understanding of 
how the evacuation happened, we need a review of the Zionist movement's ideology, policies 
and plans which were mobilized during the 1948 expulsion. 
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2.4 ZIONISM'S INSTRUMENTS TO SHAPE HISTORY 
In representing their case to the West, the Zionist movement based its propaganda 
around two issues: the people and the land of Palestine (the territory they decided would become 
Israel). These have been the main factors in the conflict between Palestinians and Jews/Israelis 
since the beginning of the century. 
2.4.1 The "Empty-Uncultivated" Land 
Zionist apologetics portrayed Palestine to the West as being a backward province, a 
largely uninhabited territory, where Jews, with their biblical right to the land, and as 
representatives of Western civilization could reconstitute a Jewish homeland and bring back 
civilization to it; a notion, which was stressed by Herzl in his novel " Altneuland " (Old-
Newland), and by Weizman in his letter to C.P. Scott (editor of the Manchester Guardian) 
(Said: 1980:23-24;Waines, 1977:21;Ro'i, 1968:204;Flapan, 1979:25-26;Hirst, 1977: 17). Yet, it 
was a view at odds with the descriptions given to the land of Palestine by various visitors to it 
(Said,1980:11;Waines,1977:31-32;Barbour,1946:32). In addition, Zionist presence in the 
Middle East would protect European interests - mainly Britain's - in the area. 
This concept of the 'empty territory', which the Zionist movement adopted from the 
West, had earlier found its first expression in Alphonse de Lamartine's writings (Said, 1980:9}. 
The view of the 'empty territory', which was conceived in the 19th century, was exploited by 
the imperial powers for their own ends (Rodinson, 1968: 14}; and the idea formed the corner-
stone of "Political Zionism", as Weinstock observed. He explained: 
This modernized version of the original Zionist mystique, now stripped of its 
initial religious and quasi-messianic content and remoulded in the spirit of 
contemporary nationalism, is commonly called 'Political Zionism'. It carried 
obvious implications for the inhabitants of Palestine, since they were scheduled 
to become aliens in their own country - assuming they were to be allowed to 
remain where they were - without ever being consulted (Weinstock,1973:51). 
The distortion about the barrenness of the land of Palestine which the Zionist 
apologetics often conveyed was carried out with the ultimate aim of colonizing it. Believing 
that their dignity and honour flowed from the land and after having been confined to ghetto life 
and city occupation land ownership had an aura of permanence to them. A critique of this myth 
came from Asher Ginzberg (pen-name Ahad Ha' Am) a Russian Jewish writer and a strong 
advocate of the bi-nationalist idea (see below). After his visit to Palestine in 1891, he wrote: 
We abroad are accustomed to believe that Palestine nowadays is almost entirely 
desolate: a barren desert where anyone can buy land to his heart's content. In 
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fact that is not so. All over the country it is hard to find arable land that is not 
cultivated ... (Cited inGaraudy, 1983:38-39). 
The Palestine Royal Commission report of 1937 gives a good account about the 
cultivability of the land. It showed that the export of citrus fruits alone (most citrus plantations 
were owned by Palestine Arabs) in 1935, constituted 84 per cent of the total exports. The total 
area of citrus groves grew from 28,000 dunums in 1919 to about 300,000 dunums in 1936 (213-
214). 
It remains to examine the validity of the Jewish claim that this advance has been largely 
due to the introduction of new technological methods in cultivation in Palestine by Jews. 
Alexander Scholch, a German historian, researched thoroughly the economic and social history 
of Palestine for the period extending from 1856 to 1882 and asserted that "Palestine experienced 
a remarkable economic upswing in the two and half decades following the Crimean 
War ... (when) it became more and more export oriented;" primarily as a result of the extension 
of the area under cultivation and not by introducing improved methods of production 
(Scholch, 1982: 17,55). 
It is not surprising to see the lust for the land which Herzl's diaries revealed when 
published twenty-six years after his death in 1904. He believed that in the acquisition of the 
land of their choice, Zionists should resort to armed conquest (Khalidi, 1971: 115). This notion 
was later adopted by the Revisionists of the Zionist movement. This essential component in his 
strategy to acquire land was further associated with a clever tactic: to purchase land from the 
Arabs while "we (Zionists) are not going to sell them anything back" (Cited Hirst, 1977: 18). 
Yet, despite all the tactics used by Jews to purchase land in Palestine, with huge 
amounts of money offered; and the British authorities pressure on Arabs to sell their lands, the 
Jews were able to possess only 5.76% of the whole area of Palestine by the end of the British 
Mandate in 1948 (Hadawi,1963:25). The largest part of these acquisitions were sold to Jews 
by non-Palestinian landlords, as confirmed in the Shaw Commission Report in 1930, which 
stated that only 10% of land purchased by Jews was sold by the Palestinian peasants, while the 
rest was purchased from landlords living outside Palestine (Ruedy, 1971: 134). 
2.4.2 The Palestine Arabs: A Distorted Picture 
Amidst these issues, the Arab Palestinian was ignored and treated as anon-entity. But, 
"when it was necessary to deal with him, they made him intelligible, they represented him to 
the West as something that could be understood and managed in specific ways" (Said,1980:25-
26). It is no wonder then to see the West ignoring Arab aspirations to independence after 
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WWI, despite the promises given by McMahon to Sharif Hussein.6 
Promises by the Allies to the Arabs and the Jews proved to be of a double-standard: 
despite their role in the war with the Allies against the Ottomans, Arab independence was still 
denied. At the same time they promised Palestine to the Zionists, by issuing the Balfour 
Declaration on 2nd November, 1917, 7 even though the population of Palestine was at that time 
about 90% Arab, and only 8% Jews. This was further supplemented by complete disregard to 
the Arab wishes in selection of a mandate (Monroe, 1981:66). 
This was despite the fact that Article 2 of the Mandate asserts 'the safeguarding of the 
civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.' 
It has to be noticed that the Palestine Arabs were not mentioned by name in the Mandate 
Articles in any way;8 nor were their political rights of any concern to the Mandate designers, 
or in the Balfour Declaration, which guaranteed only the "civil and religious rights" of "the 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." Edward Said sees the relation between Zionism 
and the West as follows: 
Between Zionism and the West there was and still is a community of language 
and of ideology; so far as the Arab was concerned, he was not part of this 
community. To a very great extent this community depends heavily on a 
remarkable tradition in the West of enmity toward Islam in particular and the 
Orient in general (Said, 1980:25-26). 
Zionists, in planning for the achievement of their goal, had manipulated this idea; which 
found its roots in the age-old conflict between the Occident and the Orient, where Islam 
prevails. The idea was used by successive leaders from Herzl and up until today. Israel's 
mission was seen as "a device for holding Islam - and later the Soviet Union, or communism -
at bay" (Ibid.:29). 
The West perceived the Arabs of Palestine from a Zionist perspective, where Zionists 
assumed for themselves a superior position. This campaign which the Zionists carried out 
successfully embraced political motives as observed by Alan Taylor: 
The dehumanized image of the Palestinians which the Zionists developed and 
propagated was instrumental in displacing the moral issue and establishing an 
aura of legal justification around Zionist goals and activity (faylor,1974:48). 
The Arabs were regarded as simply nomads. From a colonialist perspective they were 
counted "as merely part of the flora and fauna." In addressing the people of Palestine, King 
George V described the Arabs of Palestine not by name, but as the "general population" of the 
country. For the first Jewish settlers in Hadera settlement in Palestine, the Palestine Arabs were 
termed as "Barbarians." Moreover, in the terms of the British Mandate (Article VI), they were 
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described as "the other sections of the population," and in the Balfour Declaration, they were 
referred to as the "existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." 
Thus, in whatever documents or statements used, behind the minute selection of such 
terms was a well-planned policy, going back as far as the time of Herzl and involving the 
removal of the Palestine Arabs. Herzl views on this issue were reflected in his diaries: 
We shall try to spirit the penniless population (palestine Arabs) across the 
border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying 
it an employment in our country. The property-owners will come over to our 
side. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be 
carried out discretely and circumspectly. Let the owners of immovable 
property believe that they are cheating us, selling us things for more than they 
are worth. But we are not going to sell them anything back (Cited in 
Hirst, 1977: 18). 
This idea, however, cannot be divorced from the idea of establishing a Jewish state in 
Palestine. So, when the question of removal is posed, discussion of Zionist policy towards the 
Palestine Arabs in terms of labour, land purchase, calls for transfer and resettlement, and other 
discriminatory policies have to be considered in depth, which will lead us to the central 
argument of why and how the Palestinians have now become refugees, and why their return has 
been blocked by Israel since their dispossession. 
2.S TRANSFERRING THE PALESTINIANS: PAST AND PRESENT SCHEMES 
2.5.1 Pre-1948: Transfer, Favourable Solution 
There is a definite link between Israeli state policy to accommodate new Jewish 
immigrants and the expulsion of Palestine Arabs, throughout the history of the Palestine/Israeli 
conflict the justification of such ideas was that the Palestine Arabs "had no particular attachment 
to their homes, to the land" compared with "the Jews who had been exiled from it 2000 years 
ago" (Chomsky, 1983:51). 
Before 1948, Ben-Gurion was the strongest advocate of the transfer of Palestinian 
Arabs. In his view, the whole idea was not 'morally and ethically' wrong (Flapan,1979:261). 
His commitment to a Greater Israel (and not a partial Jewish state) was reflected in his view 
on dealing with the Arabs, either by 'mutual agreement' or requiring "to speak to them in a 
different language" (he meant force) (Chomsky,1983:162). In his memoirs he asserted that, 
Every hesitation of ours in regard to the necessity of transfer, every hesitation 
over the possibility of putting it into practice, every doubt of ours in respect to 
the justice of the idea, may result in our losing a historical opportunity (Cited 
inFlapan,1979:260). 
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This idea was further reinforced by Sharett, Berl Katzenelson, Joseph Weiss and others. 9 
It is claimed that Ben-Gurion's attitude was shaped by the proposal of transfer put forward by 
the British during the period of the Peel Commission in 1937. At that time, the partition of the 
country and the establishment of two states, one Jewish and one Arab, was being discussed. 
The proposal stressed the necessity to obtain an agreement for the exchange of land and 
population between the two states, as had happened in the exchange effected between the Greek 
and Turkish populations on the morrow of the Greco-Turkish War of 1922. This proposal was 
initiated by Nansen who was awarded the Nobel Prize for his exchange plan (Palestine Royal 
Commission Repon, 1937:390-1). But, as Flapan argues, the debate on the transfer of Palestine 
Arabs was at the back of Ben-Gurion's mind long before the Peel Commission's investigation 
(FI ap an , 1979:261). 
Transfer of the Palestine Arabs became the main debating issue after the 1937 Partition 
Plan and during the Zionist Congress in Basle. Zionist leaders were divided between those in 
favour of the transfer, represented by Arthur Ruppin, Sharett, Weizman and Golda Meir, the 
latter stating that, "The Arabs had vast territories, in which the Arabs of Palestine could settle" 
(Ibid.:262), and those against it, such as Rabi Hillel Silver, who concluded that the transfer was 
"impractical and cannot be justified on moral grounds "(Ibid.). This rejection of the transfer 
was voiced too by the more right-wing circles in Zionism (at a time) who considered it to be 
impractical rather than immoral (Ibid.:264). 
However, Zionist lobbying on the transfer issue outside Palestine proved to be 
successful. Weizman's remark to colonial secretary William Ormsby-Gore is said to have led 
the way to the British Labour Party resolution of 1944 which suggested that "efforts be made 
to encourage the Arabs to move out of Palestine and made room for the Jews" (Epp,1970:166; 
Louis & Stookey, 1986:80). In this respect, Weizman explained that "The whole success of the 
scheme depended upon whether the government genuinely did or did not wish to carry out this 
recommendation (peel Commission's recommendation). The transfer could only be carried out 
by the British government and not the Jews" (Hirst, 1977: 130). 
On the American scene, ex-President Hoover called for the Palestinians transfer to Iraq. 
This was denounced by the American Zionist Emergency Council when they declared that: "The 
Zionist movement has never advocated the transfer of Palestine's Arab population ... 
nevertheless when all long-accepted remedies seem to fail, it is time to consider new 
approaches" (Ibid.:131). 
The above discussion indicates that the intention to dispossess the Palestine Arabs and 
the achievement of a Jewish majority was not much of a secret but manifested itself in various 
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forms. The King-Crane Commission (1919) revealed this fact in its report. They said: 
The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish 
representatives, that the Zionist looked forward to a practically complete 
dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine by various 
forms of purchase" (Epp,1970:142). 
2.5.2 The Palestinian Refugees Post-1948: Resettlement, Another Form of Transfer 
Since 1948, calls for the retu~n of the PRs to their homeland and properties has been 
a central demand by PRs themselves, the Arab states and the international community 
(Shahin, 1981 :58). As a result of pressures from the various parties to allow their return, 
Israel's position began to crystalize with regard to the question of return. At the local level, 
the Israeli decision makers made every attempt to create facts about land rights aimed at 
hampering the refugees' return. At the external level, Israel tactics aimed at delaying a 
solution, in order to maintain the status quo of the new regional and demographical situation. 
For the Israeli leadership, the Palestine refugee question was considered marginal in 
comparison to the establishment of new settlements on occupied Arab land to absorb the huge 
numbers of Jewish immigrants, finding a solution to the economic and living conditions, and 
getting admission to the United Nations (Lorch, 1993:vol. 1). In his address to the first Knesset 
on 8 March,1949, Ben-Gurion made no mention of PRs.and their rights. Yet, focus was on 
their foreign policy programme: in striving to attain an Arab-Jewish alliance (socio-economic, 
cultural, and political cooperation with the neighboring Arab countries) within the framework 
of the United Nations, and in guaranteeing the right of all Jews to leave their countries of 
residence and settle in their historic homeland (Lorch,1993:376). The ingathering of exiles 
(Jews) was further facilitated following the issue of the twin laws: the Law of Return and the 
Nationality Law (Lorch, 1993:611 ,613). 10 
The Palestinian exodus was considered by Sharett "the most spectacular event in the 
contemporary history of Palestine, in a way more spectacular than the creation of the Jewish 
state, is the wholesale evacuation of its Arab population .... " (Segev, 1986:29). 
Moreover, Chaim Weizman was not alone when he described it as "a miraculous simplification 
of the problem" (Gabbay, 1959: 110). Evacuation of Palestine Arabs from Palestine has been 
considered a historical turning point for Israel and a solution to what Zionist ideology calls " 
'the Arabs' question." 
In this respect, the question of PRs return was made clear by Sharett and Weizman and 
Ben-Gurion, the latter wrote: " ... we cannot permit them [the refugees] to return to the places 
which they left ... .1 don't accept any formulation that we should encourage their return: their 
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return must be prevented ... at all costs" (Flapan: 1987: 17). 
In the Knesset session of 1 August 1949, the Foreign Minister Sharett reconfirmed the 
basic stand on the refugee "problem", 
that the solution lies primarily not in returning them to Israel but in settling 
them in other countries .... [and] that within the framework of a comprehensive 
peace [the government] would be ready to make its contribution to settling the 
refugees by taking a certain number of them back (Lorch, 1993:525). 
In practical terms, this policy had translated itself in the formation of the "Transfer 
Committee" at the initiative ofYusefWeitz of the Jewish National Fund, just two weeks after 
the establishment of the state (Morris,1986:531). The committee outlined its proposals for 
action, which can be seen to be a cornerstone of Israeli policy towards refugees return and 
included the following: 
1) Preventing the Arabs from returniIlg to their places. 
2) (Extending) help to the Arabs to be absorbed in other places. 
The first activity subdivides into a number of aspects: 
1) Destruction of villages as much as possible during military operations. 
2) Prevention of any cultivation of land by them(refugees), including reaping, collection (of 
crops), picking (olives) and so on, also during times of ceasefire. 
3) Settlement of Jews in a number of villages and towns so that no "vacuum" is created. 
4) Enacting legislation (geared to barring a return) ... 
5) (Making) propaganda aimed at non-return (Ibid. :531-32) 
To change the former physical structure in Palestine, the "Transfer Committee" took 
a decision to destroy "deserted" Arab villages so as to prevent their former inhabitants from 
returning to them. The destruction of Arab villages by Israel proceeded on a large scale, 
irrespective of Count Bernadotte's protest to these actions (Cattan,1969:41-42). It was reported 
that as a result of this decision, only 88 Arab villages remained out of the 434 large and small 
villages which existed before the war (Kamen,1987:457;Morris,1987:155-175).H That 
destruction was executed with the full approval of Ben-Gurion (Morris,1987:532-3), although 
it was a verbal approval only, and lacked formal government authorization. Ben-Gurion aimed 
at staying anonymous, as if the Committee implemented the policy on its own, so that no harm 
could come to the foreign policy of the state (Morris, 1986:536). On 28 July 1948, the 
Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property replaced the former one, thus, its emphasis was 
on the transfer of refugees out of Israel by resettling them in the neighboring countries 
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(Ibid:540). These policies and measures reflected a continuity of pre 1948 policies whose aims 
were to prepare the scene for expulsion of Palestine Arabs; post-1948 they aimed at blocking 
PRs return, by calling for their resettlement in the Arab countries. The submission of 
proposals for the settling of Palestinian of the Land of Israel in the Arab states was the task of 
a third committee appointed by Ben-Gurion on 29 August 1948, aimed at barring return 
(Morris, 1986:546-7). The new Committee in the autumn of 1948, urged the Israeli Defence 
Forces to expel Arabs and move refugees away from the new, expanding borders ... " 
(Ibid. :549). 
In its first monthly report to Ben-Gurion on 26 October 1948, the new Committee put 
its suggestions in relation to PRs. It recommended that: refugees be resettled in the host 
countries, preferably Iraq because it didn't have a border with Israel, followed by Transjordan 
and Syria, with assistance from UN and international aid; but, if Israel faced pressures to allow 
return it would be permitted to self-supported refugees or for family reunification purposes 
(Ibid. :550;Thicknesse, 1949 :29). 
The committee was selective about who would be allowed to return - only self-
supporting and skilled persons - Israel was introducing discrimination. Discrimination was also 
showed along religious lines. In a conversation among USA officials and Eliahu Epstein 
Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, on 29 January 1949, Epstein said that: 
" The Israeli Government would welcome back the Christian Arabs ... " He implied that "such 
a welcome would not be accorded the Moslem Arabs ... " (F.R.U.S.,1949:709). 
When considering the immediate administrative, educational, and other costs for the 
return of Palestinian refugees compared with the absorption of Jewish immigrants, 
discrimination was obvious. An allowance of only £100 was made for every Palestinian refugee 
compared with £600-£900 a head spent on a Jewish immigrant (Thicknesse, 1949:29). 
The assumptions and work of the "Transfer Committee" and the other Committees 
which were established to carry out the transfer policy reflected an overt Israeli policy with 
respect to the refugee question at the time, which set the basis for a continuous Israeli policy 
towards the question of refugees. Practically, the policy took the form of destroying Arab 
villages, confiscating Arab properties, harassing and deporting the refugees away from the 
Israeli borders to the neighbouring Arab countries. While these were seldom a declared policy, 
these activities aimed to prevent a return to the previous demographic and geographic situation 
of the new state. 
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2.5.2.1 "Israel's Justification of the "No Return" Policy 
Israel's rejection of return of PRs formulated despite international legitimacy in . 
endorsing this right as represented by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 
(III) of 11 December 1948, allowing the PRs return or providing compensation for those who 
did not wish to return (See Appendix 4). 
The Israeli state criticism of Resolution 194 (III) was based on that: 
1. The resolution encompassed four approaches to solve the refugee problem: return to their 
original place; resettlement; economic and social rehabilitation; and or the payment of 
compensation. To stick to one solution only - repatriation- which the Arab states advocated, 
was not acceptable to Israel, and it did not apply to all refugees. 
2. Any return should not be the refugees' choice. Israel wanted three preconditions to be met 
by those who choose to return: to live in peace with their neighbors; to recognize the existence 
of Israel; and to recognize the new political and national status quo. In fact, Israel linked up 
the legal right of return of refugees with reaching peace agreements with the Arab countries 
(Thicknesse, 1949:22-26;Shaheen, 1981 :61). 
Israel's preconditions could be understood as an indirect method of refusing to discuss 
the refugee question or to reach a solution to it. It was a pragmatic approach involving a 
negotiated settlement with the Arab countries, aimed at reducing pressures from the UN, USA 
and world public opinion by alleging that the Arab states were responsible for the plight of 
the refugees, since they would not accept a peaceful settlement with Israel. 
However, while the majority in Israel showed opposition to the return of refugees, 
there were a number of voices which questioned the policy of successive Israeli governments 
towards the refugees. The Diaspora Jews were also conscious of this moral issue which one 
journalist called "the moral millstone around the neck of world Jewry" (Jewish Newsletter,9 
February 1959). Rabbi Benjamin, for example, wrote: 
In the end we must come out publicly with the truth: that we have no moral 
right whatever to oppose the return of the Arab refugees to their land .... that 
until we have begun to redeem our sin against the Arab refugees, we have no 
right to continue the ingathering of the exiles .... The fact that the Arab refugees 
fled in panic .... is no excuse for depriving them their homes, fields and 
livelihood ... (Jewish Newsletter, 1 December,1958). 
The position of the Israeli political parties - right, left and religious - towards the 
refugee question met with the official stand of the government and was based on a Knesset 
resolution of 11 November,1961 (Lorch,1993:1268). Their percepection of the problem was 
as a humanitarian economic one rather than a political one. Israel's rejection of return was 
63 
based on four aspects: "historical, political, security and economical." 
2.5.2.2 The "Population Exchange" Myth 
The Israeli leadership considered the PRs issue as no different from any other refugee 
movement around the world, resulting from the formation of new political settings. An 
example of population exchange which Israel regarded as similar to its own was the one 
between Turkey and Greece after the IWW, and the one between Pakistan and India after the 
establ ishment of the two states in 1945 (Gab bay ,1959 :296;Schechtman, 1952: 105-107). 
Based on this theme of "two-way population shift," Israel saw in integrating refugees 
and resettling them amongst their own Arab brothers the best solution to be reached. It became 
important for Israelis to talk of "one single Arab people" because that made it possible for them 
to evade Israel's need to assume part of the burden and make its contribution to the solution of 
the refugee issue. The argument was that it was a matter of Arabs who fled and wandered from 
one Arab country to another but remained in the large Arab homeland (Gabbay, 1959:297). 
Israel's talk of "population exchange" is but an excuse "to hide one of the blackest 
stains on its record" - the expulsion of Palestine Arabs -. The "double exodus" is a myth 
because, in fact, the two movements of population are not comparable. The Arabs from 
Palestine were true refugees; their exodus was, by and large, an involuntary or enforced 
movement. Most of the Oriental Jews arriving in Israel from Arab countries were emigrants, 
not refugees; their exodus was, by and large, a voluntary movement" (Parliamentary 
Association/or Euro-Arab Cooperation, n.d.:9). 12 
Sir John Glubb, former Officer Commanding the Arab Legion, commented on the 
Israeli claim that the Arab exodus was voluntary. He wrote : 
The story which Jewish publicity at first persuaded the world to accept, that the 
Arab refugees left voluntarily, is not true. Voluntary emigrants do not leave 
their homes with only the clothes they stand in. People who have decided to 
move house do not do so in such a hurry that they lose other members of their 
family -husband losing sight of his wife, or parents of their children. The fact 
is that the majority left in panic flight, to escape massacre. They were in fact 
helped on their way by the occasional massacres - not of very many at a time, 
but just enough to keep them running (Glubb,1957:251). 
Yet, Israel did not openly admit the tactics used to force Jews living in the Arab 
countries to emigrate to Israel. Zionist agents were active through several schemes such as : 
"Operation Magic Carpet" and "Operation Ali Baba" whose goals were to recruit Jewish settlers 
for Palestine on lands that the Palestine refugees left behind, so as to prevent their return. 
The case of emigration of Iraqi Jews was distinguished; some Israeli sources including 
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evidence that: 
agents provocateurs exploded bombs in a synagogue and other places 
frequented by Jews in Baghdad, in order to convince Iraqi Jews that they would 
have to leave. These acts compromised many innocent Jews allover Iraq; Jews 
who refused to emigrate ... were labelled as traitors to their country [Israel] ... 
The series of bomb outrages in Iraq succeeded in escalating Jewish emigration from Iraq 
and between 14 January and 10 March 1951 forty thousand registered to emigrate to Israel 
(Woolfson, 1980: 182-197;Hirst, 1977: 155-164). 
2.5.2.3 Palestinian Refugees: A Security Threat 
The second factor which Israel relied on to prevent the return of refugees was the 
security factor. Israel's fear stemmed from the risk that refugees returning would form a "Fifth 
Column" inside Israel as stated by Shertok at the knesset session of 28 July 1948 and at the UN 
in November 1950; or a time bomb as stated by Golda Meir in the early 1960's 
(Lorch, 1993:230,534;Flapan, 1987:24-25;Gabbay, 1959:300). Israel accused the Arab states of 
using the problem as a political weapon against Israel (Lorch, 1993: 1027), fearing that the hatred 
of the returnees towards Israel, united by ties of blood to the neighbouring countries and not 
to Israel, would be suicidal. 
Earlier, on 5 April, 1949, Sharett stated in a conversation with the Secretary of State 
Acheson and Dean Rusk that: 
... security in Israel is indivisible ... (and) Israel could not give up the minimum 
security which it had won with so much blood and expenditure by reintroducing 
large number of refugees into the very areas from which Israel had been 
seriously threatened (F.R.U.S.,1949:892). 
In the early 1960's, Israel's fourth Prime Minister Golda Meir, claimed that repatriation 
of the PRs would mean the placing of a time bomb inside Israel (Flapan,1987:24-25). Israel's 
preoccupation with national security became even stronger with the Arab governments' 
insistence on the return of refugees, and other Arab policies towards Israel, such as the 
economic boycott of Jewish products inside and outside the Arab World; the closure of the Suez 
Canal by Egypt to Israeli shipping, - challenged Israel's existence in the region (Palestine, 5 
February,1949, & 28/29 March,1952) 
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2.5.2.4 Lack of Economic Infrastructure 
The economic conditions of the new state formed the third justification to block return 
of refugees. Sharett and Epstein argued that the economic infrastructure of the PRs has been 
destroyed, their houses had been either destroyed or filled with "Israeli refugees" and their 
herds no longer existed and emphasized that the new state was engaged in settling new Jewish 
immigrants, unable to take on a double economic burden (F.R.U.S.,1949:709). 
Every possible measure was therefore taken to prevent mass repatriation, including 
rumor-mongering, activated by Commitment Dayan, aimed at discouraging the refugees from 
even contemplating a safe return. Meanwhile the Jewish National Fund, with the government's 
assistance, turned the empty Arab villages either into agricultural plots or into a no-man's land 
in order to prevent repatriation (Kamen,1988:68). 
The economic difficulties of the new state and its security were two overriding 
considerations as explained by Weizman president of Israel in a letter to president Truman on 
24 June, 1949, used as a pretext to prevent re-admission of PRs. Instead their resettlement in 
the congenial surroundings of an Arab society was suggested (F.R.U.S.,1949:1172-3). 
A warning was raised by Abba Eban, the Israel representative to the United Nations on 
27 November, 1957. He said: 
That one cannot repatriate people in geography alone. To live in a modern 
state is to live not only within its landscape but also within its tradition and 
culture, its religious heritage and linguistic expression; its community values 
and its special impulses of patriotism and nationhood .. .In this sense resettlement 
in Israel would be not repatriation but alienation from Arab society and 
transference to the only State in the area in which Arab loyalties do not 
predominate (Cited inGabbay, 1959:292). 
Surprisingly, a similar warning was raised by the Conciliation Commission. It warned 
that refugees would find different conditions to what they have left (Gabbay,1959:302,304), 
despite the fact that its task entailed making every effort to implement UN Resolution 194(111). 
The Israeli leadership went even further in portraying the return of the "primitive Arab 
fellah (peasant)," as an obstacle to the progress the Israelis had made in agriculture, industry 
and commerce (Ibid.:301-2). 
The Israelis considered repatriation "unrealistic, unjust and injurious to Israel, to the 
welfare of refugees themselves and to ultimate peace and stability in the Area" (Cited 
in/bid. :285). This same stand had been adopted as a systematic policy by Israel, especially 
when the return of 1967 war refugees was posed, as well as over the issue of family 
reunification in the OTs as discussed below. 
If there was a lack of economic infrastructure this was due to the Israeli measures taken 
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in confiscating Palestinian Arab properties. As Segev put it, 
The urge to grab has seized everyone, the government Custodian as well as 
civilians; In the State Archives in Israel, files containing information on the 
plundering and looting of Arab properties are still closed ... [but] the index titles 
tell about the content: Plunder of Abandoned Arab Property; Looting; 
Possession without Permit; Robbery (Segev,1986:70,72). 
Segev further described the actual scenes of Jewish looting of Arab possessions 
(Ibid.:79); and Don Peretz (1972:310) explained how valuable Arab possessions became for 
new Jewish settlers. Even the land belonging to the 180,000 Arabs who remained in Israel after 
1948 became the subject of official expropriation in 1953. " The Land Acquisition Law of 
Israel" passed in the Knesset on March 10, 1953, legalized the acquisition by the state land 
belonging to Arabs living in Israel, without their consent. The pretext given for possession is 
given in Article 2; was for Israel's: development, settlement or security (The Middle East 
Journal, 1953:358-360). This law legalized the confiscation of a million dunums of land 
between 1948-58, from the Palestinians who remained in Israel (Jiryis, 1976:77-90). 
Israel's position of no-return was and still is aimed at repudiating the Palestine problem 
in general and the Palestine refugee question in particular, in the framework of resettling them 
in the Arab countries (Lorch,1993:525). 
2.5.2.5 Israel's Foreign Policy and Palestine Refugees 
Israel was aware that adopting a hardline stand towards the repatriation of refugees 
would jeopardize its relations with the United States - a member in the CCP -. 13 Thus, 
Israel's foreign policy towards return of PRs was characterized as being vague and pragmatic, 
essentially for political reasons; and it was manifested during Israel's dealings with Count 
Bernadotte, and in its position in the CCP conferences. 14 
This pragmatic position became clearer after Israel's admission to the United Nations. 
That was considered a big success for the Israeli state and where UN Resolution 273 stated: 
"That Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and 
is able and willing to carry out those obligations" (UN, 1978:53). Following its admission, 
Israel's policy towards the refugee problem and its readiness to allow the return of 100,000 
refugees, as declared in Lausanne Conference, began to change. This was despite assurances 
given by the Israeli representatives Abba Eban and Elath in their meeting with the Secretary 
of State, Acheson, and other USA officials, that Israel accepted to allow return for "a good 
number (of refugees) to non-strategic areas" (F.R.U.S.,1949:945). 
Even though Israel signed the Lausanne Protocol of May 1949, this was only in order 
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to get admission to the United Nations, as revealed by the Israeli representative to the Lausaune 
Conference Walter Eytan. He said: "My main purpose was to begin to undermine the protocol 
of 12 May, which we had signed only under duress of our struggle for admission to the UN ... " 
(Pappe, 1992:212). 
The CCP's report to the United Nations in early 1952 explained the reasons behind its 
failure to solve the refugee question during the Lausaune and Paris conferences (1951). Its 
tasks were unachievable because of the different priorities set by the Arab states and Israel. 
Israel sought to give economic incentives to the Arab states (perla, 1990: 116), while, "the Arab 
states urged that the refugee question, as the most urgent issue, be settled first, but Israel 
insisted that this be linked to a territorial settlement in a peace treaty. Therefore, CCP's efforts 
(in its two conferences in Lausaune and Paris) to link the two questions were unsuccessful" 
(United Nations, 1978:51). 15 
In the aftermath of the CCP's failure Israel adopted new tactics, beginning to separate 
the refugee problem and the conflict with the Arab states. Israeli officials argued that the 
refugee problem required a humanitarian solution, backed by Western states in the UN. Sharett 
declared Israel's readiness to pay the refugees minimal compensations, under the supervision 
of UN trustees, in order to demonstrate Israel's positive contribution towards a solution to the 
refugee plight. However, the preconditions for compensation included: holding peace treaties 
with the Arab countries; considering Israel's economic capacity; receiving an international aid 
or loan; and compensation exempting Israel from any other obligations, such as over the 
properties of refugees. Israel's contribution, with other aid was to be used to integrate refugees 
in the Arab countries, and was a sum to be deducted from this contribution to compensate for 
frozen Jewish property in Iraq. 16 
This was so due to UN Resolution 394 of 14 December 1950, which did not emphasize 
the return of refugees as it appeared in Resolution 194(111) paragraph 11; but, demanded that 
the host governments of refugees should treat them well without discrimination (United Nations 
Resolutions on Palestine (1947-1972),1973:22); and to a previous Resolution 393 of 2 
December 1950, which for the first time had recommended "the reintegration of the refugees 
into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement" (Resolution 
393(V), Assistance to Palestine Refugees, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 2 December 1950). Israel received support in resisting return from the US, Britain 
and France, who in May 1950 declared that Israel's border must be protected (Nasser al-
Din, 1982: 153). 
Resolutions 393 and 394 represented a big shift which suited Israel's policy and basic 
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position, and so, It proposed the compensation project. However, the minimal compensations 
proposed would not never meet the real losses which the PRs had sustained and would never 
be accepted by the refugees themselves (peretz,1954:403-408). 17 
UN Resolution 512 was used by the Israelis to ban the discussion of the Palestine 
problem as a separate item on the General Assembly agenda. In this they were successful, 
despite Arab opposition, the annual report of the Director of UNRWA, replacing the Palestine 
problem on the General Assembly agenda from October 1952 until the 28th session, which 
started in December 1973 (Kirisci,1986:7). 
In the light of the above claims and policies given by Israel to block return, it is 
interesting to examine the stated policies against incorporating GS and all its refugees, as 
proposed by Ben-Gurion in 1949 and reiterated by him in 1955 and 1957. 
2.5.2.6 Trading Refugees For Territory 
In a meeting in Tiberias on April 18, 1949, Ben-Gurion surprised his companions -
Mark Ethridge the US representative to the UN, and other members - by stating: 
(The) present Gaza Strip might become autonomous like Luxembourg. If Egypt 
did not want Gaza because of (the) refugees therein, Israel would accept and 
permit those refugees to return to their homes. Transjordan could have (access 
to the Mediterranean) without (a) corridor but with right to free passage 
(F.R.U.S.,1949:926-7). 
He confirmed this stand formally again in Lausanne in May 1949. When Ben-Gurion 
made his proposal, he had in mind the border problem, rather than an attempt to find a solution 
to the refugee problem (Gazit,1987:233). This Israeli stand was favored largely by US 
diplomats in the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) who were surprised by the offer. 
In late May they had opposed Israel's intention to hold on to territories not allocated to her in 
the Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, but by the beginning of June they favored awarding 
the Strip to Israel, and set three stipulations: Israel had to guarantee equal rights to refugees and 
non-refugees in the Strip; must not make any change in the refugees' status; and Israel had to 
make "equitable territorial compensation to the Arabs in return for the Strip" 
(F.R.U.S.,1949: 1090, 1096). Ben-Gurion's offer was a watershed, especially with regard to the 
refugees of Gaza Strip. His dream was to establish the Third Israeli Empire (Tuma, 1974: 197). 
Three motives compelled Ben-Gurion to take this position: Jordan's interest in including the 
coastal Strip into its territory; the Egyptian military presence which was conceived as a threat 
to Israel's security; and the establishment of an All-Palestine Government there (Ibid. :225). 
In seeking to remove the Egyptian presence, Ben-Gurion' s proposal was a departure 
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from the Israeli position with respect to refugees' return. Just a few days before this surprising 
offer, Ben-Gurion stressed that resettling the refugees in the Arab countries was a more humane 
approach than their return to Israel. However, his offer still rejected the concept of freedom 
of choice for refugees, as called for in Resolution 194(111), which he viewed as a serious danger 
to Israel (Ibid. :226-7). 
Israel's incorporation of GS was an attempt to avoid further pressures to absorb 
refugees. It was opposed by the Arab state representatives at Lausanne, especially from Egypt, 
as a move to "trade refugees for territory" (F.R.U.S.,1949:1097), which was uncooperative 
and unconstructive in solving the PRs question (lbid.:1181-2). 
The Israeli leadership admitted later in August 1949 that the Gaza proposal had done 
more harm than good. Israeli-American negotiations on the Gaza proposal shifted to the issue 
of returning 100 000 refugees, in return for the peace Sharett wanted (Ibid. :238). Sharett hoped 
that with time the large number of refugees in the Strip would be depleted and an arrangement 
could be reached between Egypt and Israel (Ibid. :242). However, the return of the 100,000 
did not materialize too, despite the pressure the Truman Administration imposed by suspending 
the loan from the Export-Import Bank to Israel. The Israeli's argued that they were willing to 
have half-a-million Arabs in their state, as detailed in the Partition Plan of 1947 (Ibid. :243). 
The refugee issue in Gaza could be seen as the core cause for the abandonment of the 
Gaza proposal. Sharett hoped that they would deplete; Ben-Gurion, motivated by security, 
changed his original plan to return all Gaza refugees to Israel to a number a fraction of the 
original. Israel feared that allowing Gaza refugees to return would cause refugees from 
Lebanon and Jordan to be transferred to Gaza (lbid.:240). Consequently, the Gaza proposal 
came to an end. It had represented, however, a deviant strand in Israel's official policy 
towards refugees. In March 1955, Ben-Gurion proposed in a Cabinet meeting conquering the 
GS, but it did not pass (The Economist,1957:267). He also raised this desire in response to the 
General Assembly resolution which called upon Israel to withdraw from the Strip. Addressing 
the Knesset on 23 January 1957, Ben -Gurion stated that Gaza had to remain in Israel's hands. 
He added that the GS was never Egyptian, and that the inability of the UN to prevent the 
incursion of the " Fedayeen being organized by the Egyptian rulers" requires us to stay for 
the "benefit of its inhabitants as well as of their neighbors across the borders" 
(Lorch, 1993: 1027). These same reasons were cited by Ben-Gurion in the Knesset on 15 
October 1956 prior to the Suez war. 
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2.5.3 Post-1967: Scenarios For Transfer 
The stand of the right-wing circles (before 1948) on the question of transfer is quite 
similar to the mainstream thinking of the right-wing parties in Israel in the 1990's. Shlomo 
Gazit in the late seventies emphasized that "the solution (to the Arab problem) must be found 
outside historic Eretz Israel" (Cited inChomsky,1983:117). Former Deputy Minister Michael 
Delek believes that it is "the Western states (who) have the political and moral obligation to 
tend to the transfer of the Arab population from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) to the 
Hashemite kingdom. Only a (population) transfer can solve the Palestinian problem" (Ha 'aretz, 
27 July, 1987). Moreover, Israel Meidad sees in the "transfer of population a principle and 
humane solution to political problems" (Said, M.,1990:11). 
Ariel Sharon, former Defence Minister, expressed his: "hopes to evict all Palestinians 
from the WBGS and drive them into Jordan" (Chomsky,1983:49). A more extreme campaign 
on the transfer was launched by a political party called Moledet (homeland) who won two seats 
in the 1990 Israeli elections. Rehavam Ze'evi's (Ghandi) proposal calls for transfer of the 
Palestinians in the WBGS to the Arab countries (Said,M.,1990:11;Brown,1989:47). Similar 
extremist campaigning was carried out by Rabbi Meir Kahane and his supporters. In his book 
They Must Go, he explains why the Palestinians should be driven out and the means to 
implement it. 
Ze'evi saw in transfer a moral idea, although others stressed its role in preventing war 
and providing the people of Israel with security. He continued to argue that: 
If it isn't moral, then Zionism and Zionist practice over the past century is not 
moral. The settlement enterprise in the land of Israel and the War of 
Independence were full of operations for the transfer of Arabs from villages -
was it moral then but not now 7 (Ha 'aren, 17 August, 1988). 
Moreover, he attacked the left in Israel for not supporting "transfer" and he indicated 
that the leftist movement Hashomer Hatsaer had established 75 Kibbutz on Arab villagers' land 
after they expelled their inhabitants from their homes. He advocated more expUlsion through 
imposition of economic restrictions and by preventing Arab labour from working in Israel (al-
Hayat,2 July, 1990; al-Quds,9 December, 1988). 
The irony is that notonly extremist right-wingers as Ze'evi and others are considered 
strong callers for transfer but such racist calls were also heard from the head of the High Court 
of Appeal in Israel - a prestigious religious institute -, a legislative magistrate Dov Lie'vi. 
Israel Zamir commented strongly on Lie'vi statements in al-Hamishmar of 13 February 1992, 
especially that they were from such a prominent figure. Lie'vi, meeting with a number of 
Rabbis, said: "We must take all the Arabs whose age ranges from 16-60 years, from either 
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Gaza and Jenin (a town in the WB) and transfer them to somewhere else ... to Eden paradise" 
(aI-Quds aI-Arabi, 15116 February, 1992). The High Rabbi of Rohovot Simha Cook 
commented on Li' evi statements by saying: 
By mentioning paradise, Lie'vi meant that Arabs will be transferred to what 
might be considered a paradise to them, such as to Saudi Arabia or Egypt, in 
fact, he meant expulsion, which is a policy that could be carried out by the 
security departments (aI-Quds aI-Arabi, 15/16 February, 1992). 
2.5.4 Expulsion: A Method to Quell the Intifada 
With the stepping up of the Intifada in December 1987, public frictions in Israel 
between the various parties and within the one party itself were highlighted, and, more 
importantly, within the political and military organization. One example of this friction is the 
statement given by the Israeli Chief of General Staff, Dan Shomron, who admits that the 
Intifada is an expression of a national struggle and could not be quelled (JP,11 January,1989). 
Rabin and Shomron also declared that the Intifada" cannot be solved by purely military means, 
and that the solution can only be a 'political one'" (JP, 27 January, 1989). 
The expulsion of Palestinians was suggested as a method to quell the Intifada. In the 
first nine months of the Intifada, 33 persons were expelled from the OTs, and an expulsion 
order was issued for another 25 persons (lCCP,1988:5,7-8). Yosef Goell, a member of The 
JP editorial staff, wrote in this respect: 
My own impression is that expulsion is the single punishment that is most 
feared by Palestinian nationalists, for both symbolic and pragmatic reasons. It 
should have been resorted to much more frequently, and in much larger 
numbers .. .it is an eminently reversible act, certainly when compared to being 
killed, or maimed by bullets and truncheons (JP,27 January, 1989). 
New scenarios for the transfer of Palestinians from the OTs were designed on the fringe 
of the Gulf War. In an article in the JP of 8 January, 1991, Shlomo Gazit - ex head of Israeli 
Military Intelligence - wrote that: If Iraq hits Israel, it is assumed that the Intifada will be 
strengthened in the WBGS, and as Israel will be in a state of war, all moral and legal 
restrictions will be lifted and the army will use maximum violence, leading to a mass expUlsion 
of the Palestinians from the OTs to the East Bank of Jordan. Designed by Gazit's, this scenario 
should not be analysed in isolation from Israeli leadership aspirations to see that happening, 
exploiting the out-break of war and the diversion of world attention to carry it out. 
Surveys conducted in Israel during the Intifada showed a similar tendency. Tel-Aviv 
University's survey showed that four out of ten Israelis support the idea of "transferring the 
Palestinians out of the territories" (The Observer, 12 June, 1988). Whereas, in another survey 
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with 2,277 high school students in Giva'tiam, it was found that 40% support transfer of 
Palestinians from the OTs (al-Quds, 25 April,1991). An earlier survey following the Mount 
Temple massacre in November 1990 showed that 20% of the sample surveyed are for the 
expulsion of Palestinians (al-Quds,14 November, 1990). In the midst of the argument over the 
transfer of Palestinians lies the question of the demographic balance in Israel. The fear of the 
Gentiles is implanted in the minds of the youth from an early age. Commitment Menuhin, in 
his book The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time, wrote explaining how: 
All through the years of our studies at the Gymnasia, we daily imbibed an 
endless harangue about our sacred obligations towards Amaynooh, Arzaynooh, 
Moladtaynooh (our nation, our country, our fatherland). It was drummed into 
our young hearts that the fatherland must become ours, 'goyim rein', (clear of 
Gentiles-Arabs); that we must dedicate our lives to serving the fatherland and 
to fighting for it (Cited inGrollenberg, 1980:21). 
2.6 "DEMOGRAPHIC THREAT": A REFLECTION OF A MORE SERIOUS BAITLE 
The interrelation between Jewish immigration and birth rate of Palestinian Arabs is what 
the Jews/Israelis have been preoccupied with under the slogan of "demographic threat" or 
"demographic problem." The Arab birth rate is feared most by the Israelis. The questions 
remains as to whether or not is Israel demographically outnumbered? And, if so, what is the 
real justification behind this "demographic threat "? As Janette Abu-Lughod noted issues of 
demography have been a major problem for the two major parties involved in the Palestine-
Israeli conflict. And, 
have created a level of tension seldom seen in the staid field of population 
statistics - an indication that statistics are serving asa surrogate for or at least 
a reflection of a more serious battle (Abu Lughod, 1986: 1). 
In this context, it could be argued that the core of this "problem" lies simply in Israel's 
preoccupation with security and guilt. This Chapter has argued that the Zionist ideology of 
dispossession or transfer of Palestine Arabs - pre-1948 or post-1967 - provides the context for 
a better understanding of the "demographic threat". It become clear that the conflicting 
statements given by Zionist/Israeli leadership, together with their discriminatory policies, were 
all aimed at achieving one goal, to expel Palestinians. 
The Likud position on demographic issue is linked to the debate on the future of the 
OTs. 18 This is further linked to the ongoing debate on settling the new Soviet immigrants in 
the Israeli settlements in the OTs. Shamir sees in the flood of the Soviet Jewish immigrants an 
imperative to hold on to the OTs. He declared on 14 January 1990: "big immigration requires 
Israel to be big as well, we need the space to house all the people" (JP,15 January,1990). 
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The Palestinian Arabs in Israel are not excluded from these policies, the most extreme 
open policy in this respect being the " Koenig memorandum of 1976 ", calling for measures to 
" thin the concentrations of existing Arab population, reduce employment and educational 
opportunities for Arabs and otherwise encourage their emigration - policies that some Israelis 
described as reflecting "fascist values" (Chomsky, 1983: 149; Hirst,1977:343). 
The Likud seems to be ready to ignore the "Palestinian human deluge" which has so 
frightened the various sections of the Israeli society, giving way to mounting pressure from the 
Labour's Party to withdraw from heavy areas with Arab population. These fears which 
intellectuals, youngsters, and (mainly) extremists of the Israeli polity have been voicing, could 
be seen to have one single racist motive - whether the group who articulates them - is official 
or unofficial, right or extremist, the call is that there is no room for the Palestinians amongst 
us and they should leave. This sort of policy has been further extended to cases of family 
reunification for Palestinians from the OTs, an issue that deserves examination. 
Between 1967 and 1987, 140,000 requests for family reunification were submitted to 
the Israeli authorities, but only 9,000 were granted (B'Tselem, 1989: 101). Israeli officials have 
acknowledged that family reunification is limited for demographic and political reasons, and 
requests for family reunification are granted only on a restricted basis, as mentioned in the US 
1988 Country Report on Human Rights Practices (Cited in Whittome, 1990: 10). According to 
the Israeli government, Palestinian family reunification is considered a privilege and not a 
natural right: cases are only considered on "exceptional" humanitarian grounds or because it is 
deemed in the interests of the Israeli military authorities to grant a permit (Ibid.: 1990:28). 
The denial of family reunification permits to Palestinian families must be considered in 
the light of the Israeli policy to grant the right of Soviet Jews to settle in the OTs 
Under international law, an occupying power is not permitted to change the 
demographic composition of the region occupied. Why then, Israel is applying a double 
standard in terms of citizenship for the Palestinians and the Soviet Jewish immigrants or those 
from any other country? The latter are granted Israeli citizenship as soon as they arrive, 
Palestinians residents who were born in the WB and the GS are denied that and only granted 
an Israeli identity card. Therefore, Palestinians in the WBGS stand to lose their right of 
residency. 19 
The Israeli authorities have been trying to defeat the Palestinians in various ways; at an 
individual level by using humiliating methods to break people's dignity; and at a collective level 
by attempting to destroy the cohesive unity of the Palestinians as a whole. Having a history 
of negating Palestinian rights to return and to sovereignty and self-determination, the Israelis 
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are also trying through their policies and measures to stop the Palestinian voice from demanding 
those rights, and yet calling for their transfer and resettlement outside Palestine. 
"Security is always invoked to justify humiliating, barbaric attacks on the sUbjugated 
population" (Levidow, 1990:23). To illustrate this concept, Hirst concluded that "In security's 
name (Israel) found justification for military exploits which only deepened the encircling hatred-
hatred which, in turn, engendered still more such exploits, and necessitated more and more 
arms to carry them out" (Hirst, 1977:175). Based on this interpretation of the causes of 
Israel's security, one could assert Edward Said's explanation that the ongoing debate on the " 
demographic problem" used by the Israeli leaders is just a scandalously racist framework 
(Said, 1990: 13). For the question is not the number of Arab population, whose transfer is 
necessary on both military and demographic levels (Ha 'aretz,22 July, 1988). The real threat to 
Israel comes from the claims for legitimate rights (which every nation is entitled to) from a 
people (palestinians) inflicted with injustice and repression. As Michael Adams has stated : 
The Israelis, since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, were motivated by 
two considerations, both of them inherent in the history of the Zionist struggle 
to gain possession of Palestine. One was the appetite for land on which to 
extend and consolidate their physical presence in Palestine; the second was a 
preoccupation with their national security. The two, of course, were closely 
linked; the more they could extend their territorial occupation, the more the 
Zionists believed they would be able to make themselves secure against a 
possible counter-attack. And since every further extension of their occupation 
of Palestine also sharpened Palestinian resentment and desire for revenge, the 
Israeli preoccupation with security was a real one. Precisely because they knew 
they had deeply injured the Palestinians, the Israelis knew also that they must 
face the danger of Palestinian counter-action, and the more the injury was 
compounded, as it was in 1967, the greater that danger would become, unless 
the Israelis could destroy the Palestinian sense of nationhood and tear out at the 
roots any incipient movement of Palestinian resistance. It was on this dual aim 
that the Israelis based their policy towards the OTs after 1967 
(Adams, 1977:32). 
Another type of internal insecurity which the Zionist enterprise faces is through the 
counter-migration of Jews from Israel, which is said to cancel out any demographic benefits 
achieved via immigration. This counter-migration, if analyzed from a Zionist perspective, 
indicates the erosion of the state on both political and ideological levels. This is considered a 
real threat to a country which was established to ingather Jewish exiles in a safe refuge. An 
issue of concern to the Knesset on June 12,1990 was the quality and quantity of those 
emigrating. A great number of those emigrants are academicians and scientists; two-thirds are 
within an age-range of21-32 years (Garaudy, 1983:126-7;al-Hayat,14June,1990). According 
to Uri Gordon, head of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department, 19,000 Israel is emigrated 
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in 1988 and more than 20,000 were expected to leave in 1989 (Israel and Palestine, 1990: 14). 
Addressing a conference of the World Zionist Movement in 21 June, 1987, Rabin 
disclosed his fears with regard to Jews who choose to live outside the Jewish state. He stated 
: " for 2000 years we have been a people without a land, and since 1948 we established our 
state, but, only 25-30% of world Jews choose to live here". He added: "we have become now 
a land without a people" (al-Quds,22 June, 1987). For Joseph Quzick from the Israeli 
Immigration Department, counter-migration is an ideological problem, Israeli youths not 
knowing the meaning of having a homeland after living 2000 years in the Diaspora (al-Quds,9 
September, 1988). The fear among officers in the Absorption and Immigration Department of 
the Jewish Agency in Israel, is that Israel will become a transit point for Jews to migrate to 
USA and the West (al-Quds,13 August,1991).20 
For those leaving, Israel is no longer a safe refuge. Since the establishment of Israel, 
the number of emigrants reached 400,000 Jews, leaving mainly to New York and Los Angeles' 
which absorbed 200,000 Israelis (al-Hayar,17 July, 1990). Given this, one could explain the 
benefits and the importance of the immigration of the Soviet Jews to Israel today, irrespective 
of all the surrounding problems of housing, employment, education, culture, etc., that they 
might face. What is of primary concern for the Palestinians is the Soviet Jews that will tip the 
balance in Israel's favour. 
This Chapter has surveyed the important historical background to the character of 
Zionism and Israeli state formation which crucially shaped Israeli thinking on resettlement of 
PRs. We can now examine in Chapter three the detail of two issues in particular. The first is 
the Western countries advocacy of resettlement as a solution to the PRs question, a position to 
coalesce with the Israeli position. The second is the PRs forms of rejection to such a solution, 
with particular emphasis on the role played by GS refugees under the Egyptian rule. 
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NOTES: 
1. Many studies have been written on the versions of the exodus given by both sides to the 
exodus. For more details on the subject,see: David Gilmour, 1987; Amnon Kapeliouk, "New 
Light on the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Refugee Problem and Its Origins, "JPS (Spring 1987); 
Benny Morris,1986 & 1989; John Davis, 1968;Michael Palumbo,1987;Nafez Nazzal,The 
Palestinian Exodus from Galilee,1948. Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies,1978; Rony 
Gabbay, 1959; Don Peretz, 1958;Rosemary Sayigh,1979. 
2. Walid Khalidi (1959) & Erskine Childers (1961 &1971) refuted this myth which had elicited 
a lot of comments by various Arab and Jewish scholars; for comments on Ershkine's, see: The 
Spectator: May 26;June 2,9,23,30;July 7,14, and 21,1961. 
3. His first article was in 1986; he further elaborated on his arguments in his books of 1987 and 
1990. 
4. Plan Dalet was the plan designed and implemented by the Haganah to control and destroy 
the Arab towns and villages after expelling their Arab inhabitants. The Plan was directed 
against those villages which were located within the area allocated for the Jewish State in the 
Partition Plan of 1947. For more information see: Walid Khalidi, " Plan Dalet: Master Plan for 
the Conquest of Palestine," JPS Autumn(1988):4-70; Michael Palumbo,1987:34-46;Ilan 
Pappe,1992:87-99. 
5. Benny Morris responded to the criticism raised by both in the same issue of JPS, 
Autumn(1988):98-114. An earlier article by Nur al-Deen Masalha is published in JPS, 
Autumn(1988): 121-137. 
6. This came in a letter from Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt 
to Sharif Hussein of the Hijaz on 24 October 1915. For the full text of this letter see: 
Khoury, 1968 :359. 
7. The Balfour Declaration which was issued on November 2nd, 1917, was addressed in the 
form of a letter to Lord Lional Walter Rothschild, a leading English Jew in sympathy with 
Zionist aspirations. See: (Khoury,1968:360). 
8. For more details on these correspondence and discussions, see: Ingrams, 1973:94 - 104. 
9. For a full account of transfer of Palestinian Arabs before 1948, see, Masallaha, Nur-eldeen, 
The Concept of 'Transferring' the Palestinian Arabs in Zionist Thinking, Planning & Action, 
1982-1948. Beirut: Institute For Palestine Studies, 1992. 
10. For more details, see: Lorch, 1993:372-450. 
11. For more on the destruction or emptying of villages and those which remain, see 
Shukri' Arraf, al-Qaryah al- 'Arabiyyah al-Filastiniyyah (The Arab Palestinian Village). 
Jerusalem: Arab Studies Society, 1985: 163-279. 
12. For further information on the "two-way population" movement, see:Terence Prittie and 
Bernard Dineen. The Double Exodus: A Study of Arab and Jewish Refugees in the Middle East. 
London: The Goodhart Press, n.d. 
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13. United Nations Resolution 194(111) involved also the establishment of the Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine composed of three Member States of the United Nations (France, 
Turkey and the United States). The Commission was given broad authority to carry out the 
functions previously entrusted to the UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte for Palestine and 
was instructed to assist the governments and authorities involved in the Palestine conflict with 
the purpose of achieving a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. For more 
details, see: Mallison, 1979). 
14. For more detailed information on Bemadotte's mission and his dealings with the various 
parties concerning the quest for a solution to the situation in Palestine, see: Joseph Heller, " 
Failure of a Mission: Bernadotte and Palestine, 1948" , Journal of Contemporary History, vol.14, 
Number 1-4,1979:515-534; Cary David Stanger, "A Haunting Legacy: The Assassination of 
Bernadotte", Middle East Journal 42(1988):360-370; Lorch,1993:261-265; Mallison,1979. 
15. On the Lausanne Conference and Paris Conference see: l1an Pappe, op.cit., pp.203-243; 
Benny Morris, 1987, op.cit., pp. 254-285; and Rony Gabbay, op.cit., pp. 237-265, and 329-
339. 
16. More details on the Israeli position towards the payment of compensation are given in Don 
Peretz, "Problems of Arab Refugee Compensation" . The Middle East Journal, 
Autumn(1954):403-416. 
17. The CCP's estimate of abandoned Arab land was at about £PIOD million and of movable 
Arab property was £P20 million. Whereas, the Arab League estimate was about £P2 billion. 
For the debate on the variation in estimates, see, Taqreer 'an Ba 'yh Amlak al-Lajeen al- 'Arab 
bi-Wasitat al-Haras aI-Israeli (A Report on Sale of Arab Refugees Abandoned Property by the 
Israeli Custodian). Cairo and New York: The Arab League and The Palestine Office for 
Refugees, 1955. 
18. For discussion of the Labour and Likud's debate on the demographic question and its link 
to the future of the O.Ts, see: Mark Tessler & Ann Mosely Lesch, 1989: 277-279. 
19. For more details see: Candy Whittome,1990; Rizeq Shuqair and Randa Saniora,1991; 
Khaled al-Batrawi and Mouin Rabbani,1991. 
20. The main reason behind out-migration has been the high unemployment rate in Israel, 
according to the Central Bank of Israel in 1991. 
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CHAPTER THREE: REINFORCING THE STRATEGY OF DISPERSAL 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous Chapter we dealt with the historical background and reasons for the 
Palestine refugee "problem", firstly, to understand the emergence of the refugee "problem" 
within the historical, socio-political, and economic context; and secondly, to debate the Israeli 
position with regard to finding a just solution to PRs based on UN resolution 194(111), which 
called for return or compensation. 
Protagonists for each view antagonise each other and fuel the content of the issues. 
Allegations raised by the two main parties to the conflict have been always centred around 
who was responsible for the exodus, since the party responsible must pay the price and solve 
the problem of refugees. 
This Chapter examines the proposed positions and solutions to the Palestine refugee 
question as given by the different groups between 1948 and June 1967. In particular, we 
examine the positions of the Arab countries, the Western countries and the Palestinians 
themselves. 
The Chapter demonstrates through historical and political analysis that the expulsion 
or dispersion of Palestine Arabs did not occur as a result of war as Morris argued, yet, it was 
carried out and still is according to a systematic strategy and tactics, which advocate transfer 
of Palestinians from their own land. 
It was debated that the blocking of return of PRs and calls for their resettlement in 
the Arab countries are parallel, by which both aim at reinforcing dispersion rather than 
repatriation and the finding of a just solution to the refugee question. Justifications such as 
the "demographic threat" are not convincing in concealing the plight of the PRs and the 
feeling of guilt which Israel tries to evade. 
As a result of the General Assembly failure - through the CCP - to implement UN 
resolutions, and in particular Resolution 194(111); and its failure to enforce Israel to achieve 
a just solution to the refugee question, the US and Britain made a shift towards finding a 
humanitarian and economic solution rather than a political one. Thus, proposing reintegration 
and resettlement projects in the Arab countries. 
This Chapter examines the refugee forms of rejection to resettlement schemes during 
the period from 1948 to 1967. The position of GS refugees are particularly assessed. 
Because of the specific historical events and experiences they faced while under the Egyptian 
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Administration. These included, a strong rejection of resettlement and to the first Israeli 
occupation of GS in the 1950's. Their case and experiences are distinguishable compared with 
other refugee communities in the host countries; and the influence of their distinctive 
experiences was formidable, shaping Gaza refugees political and military performance 
thereafter. 
3.2 RESEITLEMENT PROPOSALS: POLITICAL RIGHTS OVERLOOKED 
All resettlement proposals for Palestine refugees addressed the problem as economic, 
requiring economic solutions (Cattan,1969:142-3), and the political aspects of the problem 
were neglected. The Palestinian refugees despite the miserable conditions they were living 
in, remained aware of the political implications of proposals to resettle them and saw in 
proposals deemed humanitarian even involving resettlement amongst their brethren in the 
Arab countries, an attempt to liquidate their status as refugees and their loss of Palestine (al-
Abed, 1969:54-55). 
3.2.1 United Nations Plans 
The UN passed resettlement proposals, and proposed its own plans at the same time. 
Secretary -General Hammarskjold's Report of 15 June 1959 became official General 
Assembly document no. A/4121. Hammarskjold's plan did not differ much from earlier 
initiatives arguing that the political and psychological difficulties of the refugees could be 
resolved through economic development of the region, and their real economic integration. 
He stressed in his report that economic integration of the refugees should not and would not 
prejudice any rights established by the UN Resolution 194(111), recognizing the right of the 
refugees to choose between return to Israel or settlement in the Arab countries. He was in 
favor of an economic solution first, which he believed through continued efforts would solve 
the political problems, not only for the refugees but also to remove the obstacles in the way 
of the region's economic development. In other words, in his report he subsumed the political 
matters into those of economic development. He saw in the refugees not a "liability but an 
asset for the future," a reservoir of manpower, which with the economic potentialities of the 
area, could contribute to raising the standards of living in the whole region (Sayigh, 1959:36). 
Hammarskjold's report corresponded to a previous reccommendation made by President 
Eisenhower to the GA on 13 August 1958. 
The shortcomings of the Hammarskjold plan were that: it overlooked the national rights 
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of the Palestinians; it dealt with regional economic development, which would result in 
economic cooperation with Israel and then political cooperation, of benefit to Israel in ending 
the boycott; his report did not include any indication of whether the money needed was 
available or where it would come from; he did not indicate in his report where the refugees 
could be reintegrated, other than in the region generally (Sayigh,1959;41). 
Arab acceptance of this plan, with no guarantees would have been tantamount to giving 
up their rights, economically as well as politically. Hammarskjold had exceeded his legal 
limits when he submitted this plan, for his mission had been to give suggestions to the 
Fourteenth session on ways that the UN could continue to care for Palestine refugees 
(Ibid.:53-54). His report separated the economic aspect of the refugee problem from the 
political and humanitarian aspects, and ignored the fact that the economic factor was a result 
of the political conflicts. It also separated the refugee problem from the conflict as a whole 
which was one of nationhood (Ibid.:71). 
3.2.2 Plans by Other Groups and Organizations 
Other plans were submitted to the UN by groups and organizations in the United States, 
but their content did not differ from those submitted previously by UNRWA. 
3.2.2.1 U.S. Proposals 
Perhaps the first official suggestion to resettle refugees was made by Ambassador 
Stanton Griffiths in Egypt, head of the Refugees Committee. He suggested that former camps 
evacuated by Jewish immigrants in Cyprus could be used for the resettlement of PRs. The 
CCP agreed to his suggestions, and discussed them with British officials and Arab officials 
(JP,18 February,1950). 
Another proposal was submitted by a group of church leaders and politicians in the 
United States, advocating the resettlement of refugees in the Arab countries. Water projects 
on rivers in Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon were to be carried out for the benefit of these 
states and Israel. $800 million was suggested as a budget, and a policy of no-return for 
refugees to Israel was stated; this would disrupt the economy and security of the new state. 
This proposal, like the Kein Plan, suggested Iraq as a country that could absorb three-quarters 
of a million refugees. It was reminiscent of Ben Gurion's suggestion favouring of Iraq for 
refugee resettlement, because it did not have borders with Israel so refugees would not seek 
to infiltrate and return to their properties (Palestine, July(1961):21;Gneim,n.d.:75-76). 
The American Friends of the Middle East Society's plan of January 1952, published 
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in the American press, advocated the resettlement of the refugees in the places where they live 
and donations were required from members to construct experimental villages for this 
purpose. The Johnston Plan of 1953-1955, considered one of the most important, sought 
to carry out water management projects in the River Jordan valley, which would create 
employment opportunities for resettled refugees (F.R.U.S.,1958-1960:36). However, 
Johnston himself believed that the project was not designed as the answer to the refugee 
problem (Ibid. :209). 
3.2.2.2 Joint British-U.S. Stand Towards the Refugees 
Official U.S. policy towards resettlement of the refugees can be perceived through 
Department of State activities. John Foster Dulles (The US Secretary of State) made 
proposals on 1 June 1953 and 26 August 1955 suggesting the resettlement of refugees in the 
Arab states, through the development of water management projects and with the US as a 
major contributor; payment of compensation for lost property; return of a limited number of 
refugees to Israel; and the solution of the border problem between Israel and the Arab states. 
In brief, the Dulles proposals could be seen to favour Israeli interests, and they failed mainly 
due to Egyptian and Syrian opposition (al-Din, 1982: 153). 
Eisenhower proposals of 5 January 1957 and August 1958 following the Suez War also 
emphasized an economic solution to the refugee problem through regional economic 
development. This development would serve two objectives: improving the living standards 
of the people in the Arab countries (although the Palestine problem was not specifically 
mentioned); and curbing Communism (al-Din, 1982: 153). 
The last official US plan to resettle refugees was that of Joseph Johnson on 2 October 
1962. He suggested that refugees be given a choice of return or compensation from UN and 
US funds, maintaining Israel's right to refuse returnees on security grounds. The failure of 
this proposal led the US on 20 November 1963 to request the revival of the CCP as a last 
attempt to solve the refugee question. The CCP reported to the GA in December 1963, 
advocating an economic solution which the Arab representatives refused to have any part in 
(al-Din, 1982: 154). 
Joint conversations between the US and British officials on the refugee issue - mainly 
from the Foreign Office -, favoured resettlement as a solution. Robert McGhee, the US 
coordinator on Palestine Refugees matters, was the most active member. It was felt that 
"Transjordan, Syria and Iraq, in that order offer the best opportunities for refugee 
resettlement; only token contributions could be expected from Lebanon and Egypt", and that 
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"the best approach to Arab governments would be to stress the development aspect for their 
benefit and not to stress the refugee aspect" (F.R.U.S., 1949:908). 
In submitting policy papers to the State Department, McGhee believed that absorption 
of the refugees into the economies of the Arab states on a self-supporting basis could only be 
achieved through raising the economic potential of the countries involved, by an increase in 
amount or productivity of arable land, development of new industries, improvement in 
transportation, and so on. (F.R.U.S.,1949:936;Pappe,1988:141-2)). He went on to emphasize 
that, 
The questions of economic development and of the solution of the refugee 
problem are indivisible, and both must be taken fully into consideration and 
carefully coordinated in any overall plan which is evolved. This would also apply 
to US assistance to the Near East through the "Point Four" Program 
(F.R.U.S.,1949:937). 
Putting it in simple terms, the British Ambassador to Egypt, said: 
Although (the refugees) have a very natural desire to return to their local fig tree 
and vine, it should be possible, if they had a reasonable prospect of acquiring 
some other fig tree and vine elsewhere, to maintain their morale and to put tools 
in their hands for their own salvation (F.R.U.S., 1949:837). 1 
3.3 SMALL PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED 
In addition to the Israeli sponsored resettlement schemes implemented in the GS in the 
early 1970s, small resettlement projects were carried out in some of the Arab host countries 
in the pre-1967 period. The project initiated and conducted by the Arab Development 
Society in the Jordan Valley in Jericho marked the first and only attempt to rehabilitate PRs 
and provide employment and housing for them on the remaining land of Palestine. The 
importance of the project (as an experimental village) was seen in two aspects: in enhancing 
self-reliance among refugees', and of being executed by Palestinian Arabs and not outside 
forces (Hourani, 1951 :501). 2 
Other projects were set up outside Palestine. In Syria the first resettlement project in 
Arab countries came into being in April 1953. Land was provided for UNRWA to set up an 
agricultural project for the resettling of refugees and by 1954 400 refugees settled there. The 
shortcoming of the project were that it lacked a route of transportation, refugees were unable 
to reclaim the land, and, moreover, it was a project outside Palestine (Gneim,n.d.:77-78). 
October 1961 witnessed the opening of the first section of the East Ghor Canal in 
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Jordan, a US-AID financed the project together with the related East Ghor Rural Development 
Project (Sutcliffe,1973:471). Economically, its goal was seen as increasing agricultural 
productivity through the expansion of irrigated farming. Politically, it was important 
because 61 % of the people in the project were PRs. The Jordanian government tried to hide 
the fact that the East Ghor Canal was in fact a refugee resettlement project, for two reasons: 
to avoid being seen to depart from general Arab policy on the issue of PRs resettlement; and 
to avoid the protest the refugees would make if it was announced as being a resettlement 
project (Sutcliffe, 1973:472-473). A survey conducted in the project in 1966 showed that as 
a refugee resettlement project, it was a political failure, i.e. it failed to change the project 
farmer's political identity, and 52 % of project farmers - not highly significant statistically, but 
certainly highly significant politically-, were more concerned with Palestine than with any 
other national problem. The refugees continued to define themselves as Palestinians rather 
than Jordanians, evident in the involvement of some in the Palestinian guerrilla movement 
before the 1967 war, particularly in the attack on Moshav Beth Yosef across the Jordan River 
on the night of April 27, 1966 (Sutcliffe,1973:480-81). 3 
This experiment of PRs resettlement proved the futility of the theory that the 
improvement of living conditions would reduce nationalistic tendencies towards the cause; an 
assumption - as we will discuss in Chapter 8 - which the Israeli authorities made when they 
carried out the resettlement projects in the GS. 
3.4 RESISTING RESEITLEMENT 
Neither Israel nor the US ever had the power to compel resettlement and the PRs and 
the Arab states were successful in resisting it. The refugee position was to completely reject 
any sort of permanent settlement outside Palestine (Ward, 1977:26). For them, the only 
solution to their diaspora was a return to their homes and properties, a view generally, 
although not always, echoed by other Arabs. 
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3.4.1 The Arab Position Towards Resettlement 
The position of the Arab states towards the refugee problem was that of an insistence 
on return or compensation, based on Resolution 194(111). Their stand was represented by the 
Arab League, which aimed at uniting the Arab countries into one bloc to curb Israeli and 
Western efforts to overlook a just solution to the refugee problem. In consequence, their 
official stand towards resettlement was to reject it completely, despite the prospects of 
economic development. The first protest by the Arab League was made to the CCP, against 
UNRWA work programmes aimed to resettle refugees, and adhered to Resolution 194(111) as 
a solution (Palestine, 20 April, 1951). 
The Arab governments believed that the West had supported the creation of Israel, and 
so the West should extend assistance to the refugees. They made that position clear in their 
response to the Clapp Mission's recommendation to end relief and embark on resettlement 
(Forsythe,1971:31). In particular, they stressed that the weak socio-economic infrastructure 
of the Arab states could not cope with the huge numbers of refugees, which they perceived 
as an additional economic burden (Lenczowski, 1980:415). 4 
Jordan was the only country to show some flexibility towards the resettlement of 
refugees, the small projects it implemented reflecting this. Jordan was the most interested in 
having the refugees in its midst, contrary to other Arab states which considered them an 
economic burden. Athough Jordan maintained its position in line with the other Arab states 
regarding repatriation, in principle it accepted the resettlement of refugees not wanting to 
return (F.R.U.S.,1949:963). 
McGhee, the US coordinator of Palestine refugee matters, concluded in his policy 
papers to the State Department that Transjordan "appears to see in the refugees an opportunity 
to improve its political and economic position, (whereas) the Arab states are reluctant to 
accept refugees for permanent resettlement for political as well as economic reasons" 
(F.R.U.S.,1949:935). It is no wonder then, that Jordan responded positively to the Blandford 
plan; embarked on the Yarmouk-Jordan River project with UNRWA (although after signing 
the agreement UNRWA withdrew and the project was shelved), backed the Johnston plan 
which aimed at finding a consensus between Syria, Jordan and Israel regarding the use of the 
Yarmouk-Jordan waters; embarked on the East Ghor Canal Project; and approved the Alami's 
project in Jericho. Some other small resettlement projects were carried out by Jordan, with 
UNRWA or US funding; these included: constructing 150 housing units in Ghor Nimreen 
(Palestine,30 May,1951). The Truman's project "Point Four" in Jordan (an agreement 
signed between the US and Jordan in June 1951, to be funded by both countries equally) 
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aimed at resettling refugees in Jordan (Palestine,7 June,1951). Moreover, Jordan provided 
1300 Dunums of land in Beit Qad near Jenin to UNRWA, which started a housing project for 
refugees to settle 100 people (Palestine,10 February, 1952). 
Jordan's interest in resettling refugees may have resulted from its need for cheap 
labour in the 1950s and 1960s to build its economic infrastructure. Indeed, in most host 
countries as Rouleau wrote, refugees became the "ready for export" labourers, and provided 
a cheap and eager workforce at the disposal of Arab economic forces without securing tangible 
improvements in the living conditions in the camps (al-Qutub,1989:98). As refugees in 
Jordan became politicized and involved in PLO factions, Jordan's position changed to one of 
enmity rather than the alliance seen in the 1950s and 196Os. 
The Arab states' collective stand towards the Blandford Plan and Johnston and 
Hammarskjold's resettlement projects was clear, they were fully aware of the ulterior political 
motives which the projects carried. Protests were made by the Arab Syrian and Iraqi 
representatives at the UN; and Lebanon and Syria expressed opposition to resettlement and 
to Blandford himself during his visit in February and March 1952. Only Saudi Arabia agreed 
to Blandford's scheme (Palestine, 23,24 January; 10 February, 21 March, 1952). 
In response to the Johnston plan, the Lebanese Parliament on 26 July 1955 took a firm 
decision not to cooperate in losing a drop of water from Lebanon's rivers (AHCP,1955:48). 
A statement by the Ba'ath Socialist Party in Palestine and Jordan warned Arabs of the 
consequences of such a project and demanded their rejection of it (AHCP, 1955:51). The 
Syrian government refused to cooperate with Israel over common water usage 
(peretz,1955:397-412); and Egypt's official stand towards the Blandford plan and the diversion 
of water from the Nile for the development of part of Sinai was that it "did not feel that the 
Nile's water could yet be spared" (United Nations Review, 1953: 46). Although Egypt did 
later sign an agreement with UNRWA in the framework of the Blandford plan for Sinai, it 
did not come to fruition because of strong opposition by GS refugees. 
The Arab press and media played an important role in condemning the Johnston Project, 
seeing only a political and economic benefit for Israel. They stressed that it would solve the 
water problem for Israel; put an end to the Arab boycott of Israeli products; lead to economic 
cooperation between the Arabs and Israel, which naturally would be followed by a political 
settlement. The consequences would be to secure the existence of the Jewish state; resettle 
the refugees where they are and to block their return; and arrive at a peaceful settlement 
between the Arabs and Jews (AHCP,1955:37). 
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3.4.2 The Palestinian Refugees Rejection of Resettlement 
The PRs rejection of resettlement took two forms. The first was active verbal and 
written protests and condemnation in the host countries. The second was the promotion of 
the collective identity of Palestinians in exile, as a survival strategy in the face of external 
socio-economic and political pressures, deepening and enhancing their insistence on return 
as an exit from the state of dispossession that was imposed on them (Sayigh, 1979: 103; 
Tibawi,1963:507-526; Hirst, 1977:265-276). 
Fawaz Turkii, a Palestinian poet and writer and a refugee himself, wrote explaining that 
phenomenon among Palestinians : 
... .1 did not feel I was living among my "Arab brothers." ... .1 was a Palestinian. And 
that meant I was an outsider, an alien, a refugee, burden. To be that, for us, for my 
generation, meant to look inward, to draw closer, to be part of a minority that had its 
own way of doing and seeing and feeling and reacting (Turki,1972:8). 
The General-Commissioner reports reflected the bitterness of refugees and their 
insistence on return. The refugees collectively remained opposed to certain types of self-
support projects which would mean permanent resettlement and the abandoment of hope of 
repatriation (UN,1955:5;UN,1957:1). 
3.4.2.1 Reaction to Proposals: Official and Unofficial, Verbal and Written 
In reacting to the proposals made by the Clapp Mission and the Blandford (See Chapter 
six), Johnston and Hammarskjold's plans for resettlement, the refugees as well as the official 
organizations that represented them, voiced their protests by holding conferences. Statements 
and communiques were distributed by the executive committee of these conferences 
condemning the proposals and criticizing their initiators. The first reaction which marked 
refugee opposition to resettlement was opposition to the work programmes proposed by 
UNRWA, based on the Clapp Mission's recommendations in 1950. Strikes were organized 
by refugees and work was refused. Food rations were rejected in Lebanon and Syria, and the 
work programme was labeled an "Anglo-American imperialist scheme. " UNRWA reported 
that the vast majority of refugees did not get involved in the strikes and violence, and believed 
that those actions by refugees and the bitter criticism in the Arab press of UNRWA's motives 
and personnel, were closely related; yet, in the same report they indicated the refugees 
tiredness of uprootedness and insistence on return (UN, 1951 :5). This opposition forced 
UNRWA to end its works programmes in 1951 (Don Peretz, 1975: 13). 
The Communique of the Executive Committee of the Refugees Conference held in Gaza 
in 1952, in reaction to the Blandford resettlement plan, condemned the scheme for addressing 
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the refugee question as a "socio-economic problem" only and for Blandford's wish that the 
refugees would not develop "a professional refugee mentality." They further criticized 
UNRWA's complaints of a lack of budget, pointing out that US $ 200 million had been 
committed to the resettlement plan. The Committee made it clear that the only solution to 
the refugee issue would be repatriation based on UN resolution 194(111). (Executive 
Committee Communique, 1952:1-4). A similar position was taken by the Executive 
Committees of refugees in Syria (26 March, 1952) and Bethlehem and Hebron Districts 
camps (8 February, 1952) in conferences they held to respond to the Blandford plan 
(Palestine,9 February;21 March; 27 March,1952). 
Official Palestinian opposition was voiced by Izzat Tannous in Beirut on 20 March, 
1952, and by the communique of the Palestine Refugee Conference held in Jerusalem on 20 
July 1955 in response to the Johnston Project (Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, 
1955:49). The Refugees' Conference held in Gaza regarded the Johnston project as a 
solution to Israel's water problem at the expense of the refugees' RR (Ibid.:50-51). 
The official stance of the Palestinians, represented by the Arab Higher Committee for 
Palestine, corresponded with the refugees' demands. The Committee criticized UNRWA 
for its initial support of the Johnston project, pointing out that it had exceeded its mandate -
which is humanitarian - by getting involved in the political aspect of the Palestine problem. 
The Johnston Project would lead to cooperation between the Arabs and Jews, the liquidation 
of the Palestine problem, and the solution of the refugee question through resettlement outside 
Palestine. Thus it would provide protection to the Jewish state and in supporting it. 
UNRWA proved to be a political organization biased towards imperialism and Jews. The 
Committee gave evidence of UNRWA's bias in this respect, in terms of UNRWA's 
cancellation of funding for the Yarmouk project, which only brought benefits to the Arabs, 
and replacement by the Johnston project which served Israel (AHCP,1955:31). 5 
The Arab Palestine Conference in Beirut on 26 June 1959, rejected the 
Hammarskjold's project totally, and adhered to the national rights and demands of the 
Palestinian people. The Conference asked the Arab states and the Arab League to curb the 
plan and to accelerate efforts to revive a Palestinian entity, calling for the convention of 
another conference on 12 July 1959 to discuss and further such a plan (Sayigh,1959:89-92). 
The 12th of July conference reconfirmed the earlier recommendations with one addition, 
the denouncement of UNRWA's past and present rehabilitation and emigration projects. 
UNRWA was asked to cease the latter, on the grounds that they would lead to the liquidation 
of the Palestine problem, and the non-cooperation of the Arab states with UNRWA was 
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sought in this respect (Sayigh,1959:93-96). 
In a press conference in Beirut on 17 July 1959, Sayigh stated that Hammarskjold had 
concentrated in his report on the results of the PRs question and ignored the reasons. 
Moreover, he had only tackled one result and ignored the rest; that the conditions of the 
refugees today are a result of Palestine being usurped, of Palestinians being dispossessed, and 
of Israel blocking their return, despite UN resolutions in this respect. The discussion of the 
refugee problem should not be separated from the mother problem -The Palestine Question -
, he argued, should be tackled within this context (Sayigh,1959: 106-107). 
3.4.2.2 Refugee Infiltrations 
Border infiltration by refugees in the 1950s was a reflection of the refugees' insistence 
on return. In the early years of the exodus their actions lacked an organized frame. Their 
crossings were to their original houses and properties during harvest time to sow wheat, to 
bring back some of their herds, or to retrieve some of their left assets. However, these 
infiltrations were more than socio-economic, having a political dimension because the 
refugees were infiltrators on land occupied by Israel. As infiltration became a subject of 
discussion among refugees, admiration shown for the courageous acts of those who crossed 
the borders and returned with some of their assets, so the myth of Israel's power come to be 
questioned (Abu al-Namel, 1979: 117;Paiestine, 28-29 March, 1952). 
However, it was only in the early 1960's that a greater cohesion and identity, and a 
stronger tendency to assert political rights through organized action began to emerge among 
the refugees. They began to resort to military means to achieve the liberation of their 
homeland, groups of Palestinian militants forming guerilla organizations to harrass and 
undermine Israeli power and authority in Israel proper. 
Israel's retaliation against infiltrations involved military attacks and raids on Arab host 
countries; Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Gaza Strip, of which the latter was a major target. 
Between Israel and the Arab countries there was only a Truce or Amistice Agreements and 
not peace in the technical sense of international law (Burns, 1969:22). 6 Infiltrators were 
also targetted by Israeli forces and many were killed (Cattan,1969:62; Lenczowski,1980:424-
5;Paiestine,5 February, 1949;Burns,1969). 7 
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization's (UNTSO) functions included the 
supervision of the cease-fire and the truce between Arab countries and Israel and 
investigations of incidents involving breaches of the Armistice Agreements 
(Burns, 1969:22,27). However, UNTSO faced difficulties in carrying out its responsibilities 
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due to continuous incidents on the borders between Israel and the host countries (Lenczowski, 
1980:366). In July 1954 the United States, Britain and France proposed a Demarcation of the 
frontier and the erection of barriers as a measure to prevent infiltration and reprisals. 
The Israelis considered the truce lines as their own borders. Attacks and raids on Arab 
countries were carried out with two objectives ; first, for expansionist purposes over the rest 
of the Arab land, and secondly, to force the Arab countries to surrender to Israel's political 
conditions. 
Moshe Dayan doubted that infiltrations across the borders from Jordan and Gaza were 
conducted by destitute refugees. He considered them to be carried out by "highly trained 
gunmen acting on paramilitary lines, (for) the raids have been well synchronized and carefully 
planned military operations executed with a high degree of precision" (Dayan,1955:260-1). 
If Dayan's argument was true, it could be considered an appraisal of the Palestinian's raiders' 
effectiveness; but, it was more likely an invention used to massage public opinion. Cattan 
differs from Dayan with regard to the military character of the operations. He explained: 
The violations (of the Truce lines) attributed to the Arabs were not acts of 
governments but the acts of individuals or of Palestinian commandos ... .In 
contrast, Israel's raids against its Arab neighbours were organized military 
operations undertaken by regular forces, often on a large scale... (C attan , 
1969:61-65). 
3.4.2.3 Arab Governments Position Towards Infiltrations 
Neighbouring Arab governments discouraged infiltration, fearing another war. Their 
commitment to the Armistice Agreements entailed forbidding military or non-military forces 
to cross the borders and they took strict procedures to inhibit infiltrations, to control refugee 
camps, and disarm refugees (Smith, 1984: 152). In Lebanon, for example, stern restrictions 
were imposed to prevent infiltrations; a refugee camp was transferred from the frontier area 
to the centre of the country, etc. (Lenczowski, 1980:366). 
Incidents across the borders between the Gaza Strip and Israel were of a distinctive 
nature. The unique character of GS refugees and the effect of Israeli reprisals will be 
examined in the following section. 
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3.4.2.4 Israel's Justification For Reprisals 
Israeli raids violated the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of July 
15, 1948 (Burns,1969:21) and Israel's raids on Qibya on 14-15 October, 1953 and Nahalin 
in March 1954 (villages in the West Bank) and later on Gaza on 28 February, 1955 were 
condemned by the Security Council. Israel justified the raid on Gaza as "necessary to force 
Egypt to respect the armistice agreement .... (and) to prevent their civilians from crossing the 
demarcation line- "infiltrating," as it is called" (Burns, 1969:21). 
Addressing the Knesset on 15 October, 1956, Ben-Gurion considered the UNTSO to be 
incapable of compelling the Arabs to abide with the armistice agreement. He justified Israeli 
reprisals by saying: " We had no choice but to take action to defend ourselves ... this was, 
rather, our national duty ... "(Lorch,1993:947-8). Yet, the Security Council had not taken any 
resolution condemning Arab countries for violation of armistice agreements (al-
Nims,1979:85). 
Burns believes that the Israelis learned how to practise reprisals from the British, since 
the latter conducted punitive measures against rebellions in Palestine and the north-west 
frontier of India and elsewhere (Burns, 1969:62). 
Seeing itself after the 1948 war as the powerful regional actor, Israel sought recognition 
from the Arab countries through military actions. Dayan's statement in The JP of 4 
September, 1955 is typical in this respect : "If the Egyptians did not declare war after the 
Gaza clash, or the Jordanians after Nahhalin, it is an indication that they and the other Arab 
countries were unable to defeat Israel." He continued, "Retaliatory actions were punitive 
actions, not revenge. They were also a warning that if the government concerned did not 
itself impose dicipline on its citizens and prevent their transgressions in Israel, Israel forces 
would play havoc across the border" (Burns, 1969:63). 
3.5 GAZA REFUGEES: THE FIRST INTIFADA, BACKGROUND AND 
CONSEQUENCES 
On the morning of March 1, 1955 hundreds of thousands of refugees from Rafah to 
Beit Hanun, took to the streets shouting: "No settlement! No relocation! Oh, you American 
Agents !" 
So Mu'in Basisu wrote describing the first Intifada of GS refugees against the joint 
UNRW A-Egyptian project to resettle them in the Sinai Desert; and in reaction to the Israeli 
raid on Gaza the night before. One of the leaders of the demonstration shouted: "They wrote 
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the Sinai project in ink, and we shall erase it with blood" (Basisu,1980:31-2). 8 
The Gaza Strip has always been prioritized when the issue of refugee resettlement was 
posed, due to the socio-economic problems there, the large concentrations of refugees in that 
limited geographical area, and the high population density. Yet the Sinai project was the first 
to be planned and thus to be implemented. The refugees rose against UNRWA and the 
Egyptian government which had cooperated to implement the project. "We want arms not 
food" shouting and attacking and damaging UNRWA installations and food supplies worth 
$70,000 (Abu al-Namel, 1979:50-51 ;UN, 1955:8;Palestine,3,4 March, 1955). 
The Project preparation had extended from October 1952-1955, and entailed the 
transfer of 50 hectares of land in North-West Sinai to agricultural land and the resettlement 
of 20000 refugees from Gaza as an initial experiment, others to be relocated later (Abu al-
Namel,1979:82-87;Basisu,1980:29;Palestine,8,18,21 March, 1952). The leaders of the first 
Intifada succeeded in obtaining a copy of the project written by UNRWA's experts, 
described by Basisu as an appalling document. He wrote: 
In spite of the Agency's [UNRWA] engineers' admission that it would be 
impossible to live in that piece of hell due to the lack of water and the prohibitive 
cost of reclaiming the desert, and in spite of the doctors' forecasts of the diseases 
that would plague the refugees, especially those resulting from the effect of dust-
staturated air on the lungs and eyes of the children - in spite of these 
reservations, the report carried the Agency's experts' approval (Basisu,1980:29). 
The Egyptian Administration resorted to harsh measures to force refugees to relocate. 
Sa'ad Harnza, military governor of Gaza used to go to the camps and shout at the refugees: 
"if you do not go to Sinai in these trucks, you will go there on foot!" (Ibid.:23). 
Rejection of the project took many forms, and for the first time a unity between the two 
conflicting parties - the Communist Party and the Moslem Brothers - against Egyptian rule, 
and against the Sinai project took place; and both were behind the success of the first Intifada 
(Abu Amru, 1987: 19-20;Abu al-Namel, 1979:72;). 
The peasants formed the nucleus of rejection to the project, despite their receiving 
secret police threats. Only some Mukhtars (village presidents) supported it. Cells in the 
camps were formed, and leaflets of the report were distributed from Beit Hanun to Rafah, 
playing a big role in the history of Gaza (Basisu,1980:25-30). These protests saw the Sinai 
project defeated, and "the illiterate masses of Gaza felt that they had been responsible for 
its defeat" (Basisu,1980:39). 
The eruption of the March Intifada in the GS is best understood in terms of two 
interrelated factors. The first was the Egyptian Administration's policies towards refugees in 
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the GS; and the second was the Israeli raid on the Strip on February 28, 1955. The outcome 
promoted fundamental changes for Palestinian refugees in the GS, and in Egyptian Arab and 
foreign policy, marking a turning point in contemporary Arab history as a whole. 
3.5.1 Gaza Strip Refugees Under the Egyptian Administration 
"The Palestinization of Egypt's conscience began with the Gaza raid on February 
28,1955, and it was seemingly completed in 1967" (Love, 1969:696). Since the June 
Revolution of 1952, the Egyptian policies had not identified strongly with the Palestinian 
cause, as reflected in Egypt's involvement in the Sinai project with UNRWA in 1953 (Abu 
Amru,1987:16;Abu al-Namel,1979:61). Indeed, Egypts' decision to exile Haj Amin al-
Husseinni from Gaza to Cairo on 17 October,1948, and forbid his return to Palestine, came 
just five months after the 1948 war. He headed the "all-Palestine Government" (APG) in Gaza 
which was approved by the Palestine National Council held in Gaza town on 30 
September,1948 and functioned in linkage with the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine in 
Cairo, never developing into a political force of any consequence and being officially 
terminated in 1963 in 1963, after nine years of representation in the Arab League 
(Brand, 1988:23-26). 
The Egyptian Administration's action towards the president of the APG could be 
attributed to two reasons. First, the Egyptian government's intention to hold armistice 
agreements with Israel, and second, the fear that the presence of the Mufti in Gaza would 
further incite the refugees, given the popular atmosphere prevailing then to return and liberate 
Palestine (Abu al-Namel,1979:24). Similar fears were voiced by Israel, that the Mufti would 
exploit the situation of crowded refugees in Gaza to carry out raids on Israel (Gazit,1987:225). 
Moreover, Egypt, in common with the other Arab states hosting refugees, took stern 
measures to stop infiltrations of refugees. In the Strip the Palestine Holy War Forces were 
amalgamated with the Egyptian army as a step to liquidate these forces; arms were withdrawn 
from refugees; yet, the Egyptian Administration did not hesitate at a time to employ 
infiltrators to gather military information about the new state (Abu al-Namel: 1979: 112-113). 
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3.5.2 Gaza Raid: Event, Reactions, Repercussions 
The effect of the Gaza raid of28 February 1955 contributed in great part to the creation 
of the first militia in the Palestinian Resistance movement in 1965. Gazans demonstrating on 
the 1st of March,1955, voiced their demands to the Egyptian government which included, 
besides the cancellation of the Sinai project: "that Palestinians in the camps be trained and 
armed so that they can defend themselves against Israeli raids; that freedom to assemble, 
publish and strike be protected; that amnesty be granted to all those who (were arrested in the 
demonstrations) ... " (Basisu,1980:36-37;Love,1969:83;Paiestine,6 March, 1955). The Gaza 
demonstrations and demands by refugees were concomitant with other strikes and demands 
by the Palestinian Student Union in Cairo. The Palestinian students in Cairo insisting on 
discussing their demands with Nasser, which included "the introduction of obligatory military 
training for Palestinians (in the Gaza Strip) to enable them to defend themselves against 
Israeli attacks" (Brand,1988:68-69). 
The Egyptian Administration approved the refugees' demands, and an official 
proclamation was issued that: "the camps would be armed and general military conscription 
would be declared soon" (Basisu,1980:38). That was a great victory for the Palestinian 
refugees in the Strip. The leaders of the first Intifada in Gaza and in the Palestine Student 
Union in Cairo later became official leaders in the PLO, such as: Yasser Arafat, Salah 
Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir etc. (Ihid.:64-84). 
Prior to the event of 28 February, 1955, the Israeli press was seen to be inciting the 
public on the effect of the infiltrations of refugees which was accelerating, and threatening 
retaliation if the crossings did not stop (Ihid.:70). 
The February 1955 raid on a military camp in Gaza had been preceded by others: an 
attack on 28 August, 1953 on Bureij camp in GS left 20 dead and 62 wounded 
(Love,1969:276) and another on 14 August, 1954 destroyed the water pumping station in 
Gaza which supplied all Gaza residents with water. The latter raid was perceived as a 
warning to the Egyptian government over its stand against the Western plans to form a Middle 
East Defense Alliance (Abu al-Namel,1979:90; Lenczowski, 1980:283). 
The February raid of 1955 marked the climax of the Egyptian -Israel border incidents 
since the armistice. Sharret who authorized the raid was astounded at the scale of the 
casualities, especially on the Egyptian side, most of whom were Palestinians (Stephens, 
1973: 156;Palestine,2 March,1955). 9 
The cause of the February raid could be seen not only in the result of the Gaza refugee 
infiltrations to Israel, but also in two other affairs which exacerbated Egypt-Israel relations 
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between November 1954 and February 1955. The first was Israel's frustration over the 
Egyptian refusal to allow the Israeli vessel Bat Galim to pass through the Suez Canal, which 
Egypt had blockaded. The second was the trial of a number of Jews in Egypt for espionage 
and sabotage (Stephens, 1973:3-4, 15;Burns, 1969:73-75;Love, 1969: 12). The US, France and 
UK were also frustrated over Egypt's rejection of a Middle East Defence Pact, and 
sympathized with Israel in that matter. 
The raid on Gaza came only three days after the signature of the Baghdad Pact, which 
Egypt had refused to sign. To many Egyptian commentators the raid was a "deliberately 
coordinated double blow designed to humble Egypt and force peace on Israel's terms ..... 
Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact narrowed still further his slim chances of 
modernizing Egyptian armaments from the West" (Love,1969:200-201). Britain and the US 
refused to supply Egypt with arms, compelling Nasser to resort to the Eastern bloc 
(Love, 1969:225). For Russia the deal outflanked the "Northern Tier" siege line of the 
Baghdad Pact and established Russian influence in the heart of the Middle East. It was a 
diplomatic triumph for the Kremlin on the scale, not of ephemeral months or years, but of 
centuries ... [since it was blocked] by the Mongol Empire (Ibid.). 10 
Ben-Gurion justified the Gaza raid of February 1955 as was "the first step in a stronger 
security policy of "active defence" destined to develop eventually into a " preventive war " 
against Egypt" (Stephens,1973:156). The political character of the raid was obvious; to curb 
the new positions of the Egyptian revolution (Ibid.: 156). 
The Gaza raid brought about unexpected repercussions in Egyptian internal and external 
politics. Before the raid Egypt was seen by the US State Department as the "Arab country 
most likely to lead the way to a realistic settlement with Israel. It was the biggest Arab State 
and Egyptian public opinion was thought to be less emotionally involved in the dispute with 
Israel than public opinion in other countries" (Ibid.). Yet, Nasser's position had changed from 
seeing the war with Israel as counterproductive in 1955, to supporting Palestinian insurrection 
in Israel after the Gaza raid (Nasser,1955:210-211;Burns,1969:19). The Egyptian 
government became more flexible towards infiltrations and Fedayeen commandos were 
trained to launch military attacks inside Israel. In addition, Nasser's stand towards peace 
changed to one of Pan-Arab ism and nationalism and realizing that he had to build up Egypt's 
defences to face Israeli aggression, Nasser shifted his economic priority from development 
to rearmament (Love,1969:225). Linking the arms deal with Russia to the Gaza raid, Nasser 
called it "a turning point" in Egypt's modern history" (Ibid.:l00-l01). This "turning point" 
was affirmed on July 26, 1956 when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and the blocking of 
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Israeli shipping in it coincided with the Fedayeen raids inland. On October 23,1956 Nasser 
signed a military alliance with Syria Jordan and Saudi Arabia in rejection of the Baghdad Pact 
(Edelman, 1964: 172). The military training of Palestinians in Gaza began by Egyptian 
Lieutenant Colonel Hafez. However, not all Egyptian policies in this period were in the 
interests of Gazans. The Teachers Union for refugee schools, whose members had played 
a big role in the first Intifada was dismantled; the Egyptian Administration prohibited 
demonstrations and strikes, and curfews were imposed at certain times in the Strip (Abu al-
Namel, 1979: 103-105). 
The number of trained Palestinian Fedayeen (commandos) reached about 1000 between 
1955 and 1956 (Abu al-Namel, 1979: 114). They consisted of 1936 and 1948 veterans who 
knew the geography of Palestine well, were literate and knew the Hebrew language or other 
languages. It was reported that during the period from 5 December, 1955 to March 1956, 
180 military operations were launched in Israel proper by Fedayeen, either individually or 
collectively, an average of 2 operations per night (Burns, 1969: 139). 11 
Protesting again to the Security Council on March 14, 1956, Israel condemned the 
Fedayeen attacks, whilst making no mention of the massacres Israel committed on 31 
September, 1955 in Khan Younis in Gaza on 5th April, 1956, which resulted in a great 
number of casualities on the Arab side (Burns, 1969: 140;Abu al-Namel, 1979: 119).12 The 
Security Council took no resolution to condemn these Israeli massacres, but passed a 
resolution calling on both parties to abide with Article One of the armistice agreement and 
bring tranquility to the area. Burns explained why no condemnation was undertaken by saying 
: "This was no doubt due to the aversion which the Fedayeen campaign had excited, and 
possibly also to the feeling that the Egyptians were as much to blame as the Israelis ... " 
(Burns, 1969:91). 
Israeli military retaliations were accompanied by two other campaigns, on the political 
level and at the propaganda level. In the first, Israel tried to use the border conflict to raise 
other conflicts with the Arabs, such as the peace settlement, the refugee problem, the 
Fedayeen incursions and Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal (Ibid.: 106, 146). In the second, 
it used the Arabic word Fedayeen as "synonymous with marauders, cut-throats, murderers," 
[adding] "It used to have an honourable connotation" (Ibid. :85). "The Israeli authorities and 
press concentrated on the various crimes [the Fedayeen] perpetrated, conveneniently forgetting 
to mention anything about the dead and wounded Arab civilians in Gaza (Ibid.;141). Israel 
portrayed itself as the victim, trying to put all the blame on the Egyptian side, without 
mentioning the Palestinians. To prove their allegations, they forced Fedayeen prisoners during 
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interrogation to give testimony "which substantiated the Israeli contentions that many raids 
into Israel were organized by the Egyptians" (Ibid.: 86-87). The Israeli propaganda aimed at 
damaging the relationship between the Palestinians and the Egyptian, trying to hide the fact 
that the Fedayeen were Palestinian and not Egyptian (Ibid.:86). 
In an attempt to further its political damage Israel attributed the killing of Lieutenant 
Colonel Mustafa Hafez,- whose duties included recruiting Fedayeen from the Gaza refugees 
and who was killed by a bomb sent by the Israeli intelligence service on July 13 1956 -, to 
the refugees who "have become embittered by Hafez strong-arm methods of recruiting 
Fedayeen, and the fact that many of the young men so recruited were captured or killed by 
the Israelis." But, that was refuted in the killing by a bomb (sent by the Israeli intelligence 
service) of Colonel Salah Mustafa on July 14 1956, whose duties included organizing 
Fedayeen raids from Jordanian territory (Ibid.:I64). 
Though the Fedayeen raids in Israel proper stopped following the Suez War in 1956, 
the refugees gained a new image, other than being dependent only on charity. Their actions 
laid out the comer- stone for a coming organized resistance movement which appeared in 
1965. Through these raids, the relationship between the Nasserrist regime and the Palestinians 
was enhanced, contrary to the intentions of the Israeli propaganda-machine . 
3.5.3 The Israeli Occupation of Gaza Strip 
Israel's forces invaded Egypt's territory on October 30, 1956, and left on 3 November, 
1956. Israel's official explanation was that it aimed at annihilating the Egyptian Fedayeen 
concentrations in the Sinai Penninsula (Lenczwoski, 1980:432). However, this was only part 
of the truth. Israel feared the process of unification between the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian 
states of October 25, and the threat that would bring to her existence. Israel was also 
concerned to secure free passage in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba for her ships, 
being denied access by Egypt. Finally, Israel's political objective was to obtain recognition 
for her existence from the Arab countries by reaching a' formal treaty of peace. Israel 
believed that such objectives were realisable in view of two favorable developments: the Suez 
Canal nationalization crisis, which led Paris and London to consider punitive action against 
Egypt; and the approaching Presidential elections in the United States, which would tend to 
paralyze American diplomacy (Ibid.:532-3). 
With the Israeli occupation of the GS which lasted until 12 of March 1957, an era of 
terror began. 13 The UN General-Commissioner Report of December 1956 described the 
brutal measures committed by the Israeli occupiers against the population, to demoralize them 
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and force Gazans to surrender and accept an Israeli solution to the Palestine problem. Israeli 
massacres in Gaza on 1 November, 1956, in Khan Yunis on 3 November, 1956 and in Rafah 
on 12 Nov. 1956, indicate the brutal measures undertaken by the Israeli forces. The 
Palestinian casualities during the period of the Israeli occupation of Gaza Strip were 930 
killed, 215 lost, and 716 wounded (UN,1957:14). Israeli measures included: psychological 
warfare, torturing those charged with belonging to or hiding Fedayeen, and seeking to 
demoralize the Palestinian people by raping Palestinian women. Such measures did not come 
to a halt until all refugees took a collective stand against them. Basisu commented on that 
by writing: 
Palestinians' had learned from 1948 disaster not to separate between land and 
honour, in which one cannot save his own honour and leave the Israeli occupiers 
to violate the honour of the land (Basisu, 1981 :46). 
Other Israeli tactics included pressuring the leadership to collaborate with the Israeli 
occupiers and encouraging emigration (Ibid.:52). In response to these Israeli measures, an 
underground resistance movement began to formulate. "The National Front" and "The 
Popular Resistance Committee " aimed at raising Gazan morale and awareness in the face of 
the Israeli policies. "The National Front" later declared the importance of starting contacts 
with Jewish progressive forces in Israel, causing some ideologues not to join it. This strategy 
(contacts with Jewish progressive forces) was adopted by the Palestinian National Council in 
its 1977 session (Basisu, 1980:53-54). Both movements rejected Israeli propaganda to 
internationalize the Strip, and called upon the Egyptian Administration to return to the Strip. 
Both adopted methods of civil disobedience and boycotted contacts with the occupiers. Both 
fronts were hit by the Israeli occupiers in January 1957, and their activities stopped 
completely (Yassin, 1991:38). 
Some other movements also appeared such as the "Youth of Revenge" who acted 
strongly against collaborators. Resistance of Gaza refugees to occupation led to the 
imprisonment of many of the leaders, including the mayor of Gaza, Munir al-Rayyas, Dr. 
Haida Abdel-Shafi, head of the Health Sector in GS at that time, and others (Gaza 
Massacre,n.d.: 141). 
The Palestinian resistance during the Israeli occupation of GS in 1956/1957 was civil 
and not military resistance, since most of the military trained troops - Fedayeen -, secretly 
left the Strip for East Jordan at the beginning of the occupation and continued their operations 
from there (Ibid.:13). 
Withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza on March 12, 1957, followed the announcement 
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of Golda Meir, - Israel's Foreign Minister - on March 1, 1957 in the General Assembly of 
Israel's intention to comply with the February 2,.1957 GA resolution and previous GA 
resolutions (Burns, 1969:252). The 2nd. of February GA resolution and other resolutions 
had emphasized the need for Israel to withdraw from the Strip, and "called upon the 
governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the 1949 General 
Armistice Agreement, and stated that the maintenaance of the armistice agreement, after the 
Israel withdrawal, required the placing of the UNEF on the Armistice Demarcation Line, and 
the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report" 
(Ibid.:247-8). 
Meir's decision in the GA had been preceded by a number of sessions in the Knesset 
on the issue, which had rejected withdrawal for various reasons. Ben-Gurion had spoken 
thus on 21 February, 1957 Knesset session: "Egypt must not return to the Gaza Strip, either 
directly or indirectly; an arrangement must be found which will guarantee Israel's 
security .... the rehabilitation of the permanent settlers (refugees), who were impoverished 
during Egypt's occupation, and the resolution of the refugee problem by the UN, Israel is 
prepared to help in all this ... ," he continued, " .. .Israel cannot withdraw without a guarantee 
of freedom of navigation (in the Suez Canal). " He further added: " ... Any attempt to impose 
a perversion of law upon us will encounter the undaunted opposition of the Israeli nation" 
(Lorch, 1993: 1042-4). 
According to the GA resolution of February 2, 1957, UNEF was to take over from 
Israeli forces. Israel had rejected the idea of withdrawal and the resumption of Egyptian 
civilian or military control of Gaza, requesting that a de facto UN administration be placed 
there (Burns,1969:252). However, only 48 hours after the Israeli withdrawal, the Egyptian 
Administration returned to Gaza, in response to strenuous efforts and demands by the Gazans 
to have it back (Ibid. :264). 
Week-long demonstrations by the Gaza population over UNEF attempts to 
internationalize the Strip after the Israeli withdrawal could be looked upon as the second 
Intifada in the Strip. The Gaza population were united in one national front against the 
internationalization conspiracy (Basisu,1980:55-56), and also brought about the failure of the 
conspiracy to incorporate GS with Jordan, led by Sa'di al-Shawwa who contacted King 
Hussein through Habis al-Majjali (Ibid.:56). However, one demonstrator was killed in the 
demonstrations by UNEF guard, trying to replace the UN flag on the Egyptian Administration 
Headquarters with that of Egypt (Burns,1969:262-3). 
The General-Secretary of the General Assembly had commanded the internationalization 
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on the ground that "It will guarantee good civilian administration and foster the economic 
development of the territory and its people" (lbid.:251). 14 However, extending UNEF 
functions to civil administration in the Strip, could also be seen as an attempt to control 
infiltrations from the Strip to Israel and prevent the Israelis crossing demarcation line and 
firing on Arabs (Ibid. :272-4). 
In April 1965 compulsory military training of Palestinians began, followed by a popular 
training. The number of those given popular training in the Strip reached 20 000 by 1966 
according to the first head of the PLO, Ahmad al-Shuqairy (AI-Yawimayat al-Filistinniye, 
from 117-3111211967: 193). This training, plus the political awakening of the Gaza refugees 
as a result of the Israeli occupation and other militant experiences, made the Strip refugees 
unique compared with all other refugee concentrations in the host countries, enhancing their 
insistence on the right to return and their support for a Palestinian entity. 
3.6 FAILURE OF RESETTLEMENT STRATEGY 
In all the negotiations held, and the proposals issued for resettling refugees, refugees 
were perceived not as a "liability but an asset for the future," a reservoir of manpower, 
which, combined with the economic potentialities of the area, could contribute to raising the 
standards of living in the whole region. However, on the political level they were perceived 
as a threat to stability and peace in the area, which could be exploited by Communism and 
radical movements (Thicknesse,1949:8). 
The places proposed for resettlement schemes were invariably arid areas, with no water 
or transport routes, and needed intensive manual labour. Thicknesse and Schechtman give 
full details of the schemes proposed for resettlement in the Arab countries - Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Iraq,Egypt and other non-Arab countries such as Turkey and South America, and 
explain the socio-economic and political difficulties faced in implementing such projects 
(Thicknesse, 1949:33-58;Schechtman, 1952:77-94). 
In all the proposals the self-determination of the Palestine refugees and non-refugees was 
overlooked. For the West, the refugee question was not a priority on their agenda, and was 
not perceived as an immediate political problem, which caused the problem to be dragged on. 
Because neither Israel nor the US had the power to compel resettlement, the Palestinians 
and the Arab states were successful in resisting it. As a result of the failure of the 
resettlement strategy , UNRWA - as the tool of UN - "ceased to be prominent in the capitals 
of the affluent West." It was even raised in the US Congress that "UNRWA's relief was 
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helping to subsidize Palestinian Commando groups ... but the main politics of the refugee 
situation were well beyond UNRWA's purview or control" (Forsythe,1983:97). Conflict 
emerged between the American Congress and the Foreign Office on the question of funding 
UNRW A, despite their similar approach to the refugee question (pappe, 1988: 140, 159). 
With the accelaration of Fedayeen activities and military training for Palestinian 
refugees, it became clear that resettlement as an option had become a dead letter, and there 
was no turning back to it as a solution, no matter how great the number of refugees became. 
If the refugees had been resettled, and reintegrated in the Arab states, the Palestinian problem 
would have died a long time ago; instead, the Palestinians continued to insist on their own 
political rights and thus challange the legitimacy of Israel. 
3.7 IS HUMANITARIAN AID POLITICIZED? 
Given UN and US and UK foreign policy on the Palestine refugee issue it must be asked 
whether humanitarian aid is politicized 1 A senior official of one major donor government 
stated in 1983: 
Refugee policy always has been and always will be part of foreign policy . .like the 
other arts of foreign policy, refugee policy involves persuading governments to 
cooperate with our purposes and objectives (The Independent Commission on 
International Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI),1986:27). 
As discussed in Chapter two, the West mainly the UK and US gave support to the 
Zionist movement and Israel in order to maintain a foot in the area, using Israel to guard 
their interests. By the same token, the West's approach to the Palestine question has been 
undertaken with their military, political, and economic interests in mind. For the West, the 
refugees were perceived as a threat and a source of instability in the area, which would effect 
their own interests. It is thus, not surprising to read in every report of the General-
Commissioner of UNRWA a statement which indicates that UNRWA exists to help keep 
stability and peace in the area. Moreover, the unity of the Arab states over the Palestine 
problem was also considered a threat; the West preferring a disunited Arab world which it 
could more easily control. The nationalistic and revolutionary awareness raised in the Arab 
world in the aftermath of the 1948 war was seen as a threat to Western interests, which 
sought to benefit from the undeveloped economies of the Arab world, much as the Soviet 
Union did. Early US hopes of reaching a political solution were soon abandoned and the 
West aimed at liquidating the refugee question through resettlement and reintegration in the 
economy of the area, connecting this goal with water management projects involving Israel 
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and ending what Ben-Gurion called Israel's "water-battle". The proposals suggested by the 
US corresponded with its interests and Israel's interests, at the expense of the political rights 
of the Palestinians. 
The West, led by the US - as the large contributor to UNRWA - did not try to 
persuade and or pressure the Arab governments into accepting resettlement, leaving the Arab 
governments to set terms for UNRWA's operations in their territory that effectively forestalled 
resettlement. When an Agency programme ran counter to repatriation-oriented Arab policies, 
friction between UNRWA and the Arab states followed (UN, 1956:6). For as Forsythe 
argues, the US is in need of consent of Arab governments for UNRWA to operate on its 
lands, and this consent is an effective diplomatic instrument to " win friends and influence" 
in the Arab world (Forsythe,1971:40). America's support of UNRWA and its search for 
consent in order to win friends in the Arab world contrasts with the Soviet bloc position. 
The Soviet Union managed to establish close diplomatic, economic and military liaisons after 
1955 with the Arab governments, despite assuming few financial responsibilities for the 
Palestinian refugees (Ibid. :41). 
Donor governments which include major foreign powers, have, through the provision 
of assistance tried to reinforce their authority in the Palestinian conflict (ICIHI, 1986: 125-
126). This politicizing of humanitarian assistance can make existing crises more intractable, 
as William Shawcross argued in respect of the Kampuchean relief operations after 1979: 
Cambodia is a dismal drama, the playing of which began years ago. During this 
act nealy all the players used humanitarianism as a fig leaf for either the poverty 
of the ruthlessness of their politics. The humanitarian instincts of people around 
the world, and the mandates of the organizations that are supposed to protect and 
implement our collective conscience, were exploited by almost all sides for 
political ends" (ICIHI,1986:29-30). 
It cannot be denied that all refugee problems reflect political problems; indeed, as 
suggested by the 1984 World Refugee Survey, "the failure to address the political dimension 
of refugee situations is itself a recognition of their overriding importance (Nichols & Griffin, 
1985:19). 
Humanitarian action cannot solve anything in itself and cannot claim to provide 
definitive solutions to the fundamental problems which are at the source of conflicts. All that 
can be achieved by it, as stated by the president of the ICRC in 1984; is that: 
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.... Humanitarian action, if properly understood and 'intelligently used' by 
governments, may allow them breathing space in which to seek - in a spirit of 
peace and conciliation - political solutions which will themselves eradicate the 
humanitarian problems (International Review of the Red Cross,July/August 
1983:324). 
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NOTES: 
1. For more details on British foreign policy toward the P.Rs question compared with that of 
the US, see: Pappe,1988:124-161. 
2. For a more detailed description of the project, see, Cecil Hourani. " Experimental Village 
in the Jordan Valley." The Middle East Journal, volume 5, Autumn(1951):497-501). 
3. More information on the East Ghor Canal is given in Claude R. Sutcliffe. " The East Ghor 
Canal Project: A Case Study of Refugee Resettlement, 1961-1966." The Middle East Journal, 
Autumn(1973):471-482. 
4. On living conditions of Palestinian communities in the Arab states see: Laurie Brand, 1981. 
For a personal account of a refugee in exile see : Fawaz Turki. Soul in Exile, Lives of a 
Palestinian Revolutionary. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988. 
5. UNRWA's support and funding of the Yarmouk project was through two agreements signed 
with Jordan, and 200 000 refugees were to benefit from this water management project. After 
work began UNRWA cancelled the agreements and the project failed. Later in 1953 UNRWA 
proposed a more comprehensive project for River Jordan water, to benefit Israel as well as 
Jordan. For more details see, Palestine, The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, 1955:28-30. 
6. Armistice Agreements or Truces were held between Israel and Egypt on 24 February; 
Lebanon on 23 March; Jordan on 3 April; and Syria on 20 July,1949. The agreement with 
Egypt was cancelled in September 1956; all the rest were cancelled following the 1967 war. 
7. It was reported that between 1949 and 1966 Israel launched tens of attacks on the Arab 
countries and caused hundreds of killings and injuries. Those attacks were condemned by the 
Security Council fourteen times, as well as by UNTSO (Cattan, 1969:62). 
8. For more on the demonstration by refugees see Basisu, 1980:32-40. 
9. Casualties on the Egyptian side were: 36 soldiers and 2 civilians killed; 29 soldiers and 2 
civilians wounded. On the Israeli side: 8 were killed and 9 wounded (Stephens, 1973:151-2). 
For more details on the raid see Love, 1969:5-20; Bums, 1969: 17-21). 
10. For more discussion on the deal see: Love, 1969:91-103; Dekmejian, 1972:44-45). 
11. For more details on the Fedayeen operations in Israel proper, see Burns, 1969: 136-149. 
12. The April 1956 massacre resulted in fifty-six Arabs being killed and 103 wounded, men, 
women and children (Burns, 1969: 140). 
13. On the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1956, see Bums, 1969: 177-186. 
14. For more details on UNEF 48 control of the Gaza Strip, see Bums, 1969:255-276. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLANNING FOR RESEITLEMENT OF REFUGEES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the period from 1948-1967, the Israeli position towards PRs emphasised their 
resettlement/rehabilitation, rather than return or payment of compensation. After the 1967 war, 
Israel was confronted with a major problem, finding itself facing about 600,000 refugees in the 
WBGS. The search for a solutionis to this "problem" began in the early months of the Israeli 
occupation. 
The plans and proposals drafted by the Israelis reflected a continuity of pre-1967 
policy, rather than change. The rigid situation which the refugees had been confined to since 
1948 was a result of each side's assumption that to change the status quo was against its own 
interests, whatever it might have done for the refugees. For the Arabs, resettlement would have 
been an admission that a return "home to Israel" was not the only solution. For the Israelis, 
resettlement in advance of a peace treaty seemed to pose insoluble problems of "where?" and 
"how?". However, the Israelis sought an end to the refugee camps, which represent a visible 
reminder of the refugees' plight in 1948; and are a focal point of Palestinian identity and 
militant resistance, requiring constant army surveillance. By breaking up the concentrations of 
refugees, the Israelis assumed that they would be able to sever the refugees' link with their 
homeland and their desire to return to it, i.e. their sense of nationhood and right to self-
determination . 
This chapter discusses Israeli policies regarding the refugees of the GS, reflecting on 
the dilemma which the Israeli parties were and still are facing over finding a solution to the 
refugee issue. It focuses on GS and not WB because the Israeli resettlement schemes were only 
implemented in GS, and because conditions in Gaza are far worse than anything in the WB, 
or any other Palestine refugee community. The proposals and procedures of the Israelis, and 
the repercussions of their actions, are all examined in some detail. 
4.2 EARLY PHASES OF RESEITLEMENT 
The GS has always been considered a unique area compared to other areas of Palestine, 
because of its poverty and lack of infrastructure and potential. "Nothing I saw in South Africa 
(in Soweto) can compare with Gaza in misery, in confinement and racial discrimination, in 
sheer oppression" (Said,1992:53). 1 Such sentiments are echoed in the words of former Israeli 
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Foreign Minister Abba Eban after a visit to Gaza, who said: 
... It would take a Dante to give an adequate literary expression to the intense 
concentration of dejection, bitterness and despair crowded into a small, squalid 
enclave of gloom. It must be a long time since anybody smiled in Gaza (The 
Observer,7 February,1988). 
Since the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967, policies, measures and confrontations 
between the population in the Strip and the military authorities have taken a different form 
from those on the WB, especially relating to the role of refugees. This is not to undermine the 
role of the refugees in the WB, and the daily harassments and confrontations they face from 
the authorities. It is to recognize instead the very special situation in GS. 
The overcrowdedness of the camps in the GS and the militancy of its youth have been 
of major concern to the Israeli authorities. The authorities' operations in "thinning out" the 
camp population in the GS could be considered as being the first step in a long-term policy 
aimed at finding a partial or final solution to the refugee "problem". Policy has been a mixture 
of maintaining security in the Strip advocating and implementing resettlement schemes at the 
same time, which would not have been possible to implement if the security pretext had not 
been used. Since the early days of occupation, the Israeli military authorities have used two 
methods to "thin out" the GS's refugee population: encouraging emigration; and the road-
widening operations in the camps. 
4.2.1 Encouraging Emigration 
The first method adopted by the Israeli authorities was to encourage the emigration of 
a large number of the Strip's population to Jordan. This "clean surgical operation", as the 
Israelis like to call it, saw the GS population fall tremendously after the 1967 war, from 
450,000 on 1 June 1967 to 346,000 as of end of December 1967. This fall was not, as Ann 
Lesch concluded, the result of flight during the war, since Gaza residents were bottled up in the 
Strip with no place to flee. "Rather, it was a result of a systematic Israeli policy of encouraging 
people to leave in the months following the war. " 
It was reported that various inducements were offered to the refugees. Free 
transportation was provided across Israel and the WB to the bridges leading to Jordan; provided 
- in some cases - the refugees signed a document stating that they were leaving of their own free 
will (Lesch, 1984:6; Keesing's Contemporary Archives,August 19-26(1967):22215). A payment 
of 50 Israeli pounds, or $14, was made to to each family that agreed to leave for the East Bank, 
to help cover the travel expenses to Amman, through the offices Israel had set up in the 
refugee camps (NIT,31 July, 1968). However this inducement was stopped after Gazan's 
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complained to the delegation of the ICRC (The International Review of the Red Cross, 
September(l970):456). 
Such inducements were accompanied by repressive measures undertaken by the Israeli 
authorities to force Gazans to leave, particularly in the largest camp in Gaza - Jabalia 
(Palestinian Documents, 1968:614-5). Some of those who left were women and children who 
wanted to join their husbands working abroad; others were afraid to remain under Israeli rule. 
In contrast to this exodus, a mere 5,000 persons were allowed to return to the GS during the 
six-year period from June 1967 until 1973 under the "family reunion" scheme (Lesch, 1984:6). 
The influx of GS's refugees to Jordan did not come to a halt until July 1968, when 
under pressure from Arab nationalists in Amman, the Jordanian government began returning 
refugees stopped at the Allenby Bridge. The] ord ani an government then raised the issue in the 
United Nations, in mid July 1968 accusing Israel of forcing the refugees to emigrate. Jordan's 
decision, and that of the other Arab states, was aimed at preventing the draining of the OTs 
population and in support of their sumud (NIT,31 July,1968;27 September,1968). 2 Israel 
rejected Jordan's accusation concerning expulsions of refugees, claiming that, "measures had 
been adopted to ensure that passage from the WB to the East Bank would be permitted only to 
those who requested it in writing from the mayor of their community, the head of their village, 
or other local authority." It was also claimed that the Israel Defence Minister Dayan, during 
his visit to the Allenby Bridge, had pleaded with the Arabs not to be hasty and, if they finally 
decided to go, to delay their departure until the bridge was in better shape" (Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives,August 19-26(1967):22215). 
Israel's denial of Jordan's accusations was insufficient to conceal its desire to see the 
refugees leave the densely populated Strip. In August 1971, Gen. Shlomo Gazit, the military 
administrator of the OTs, stated that, " ... the intention is to remove (tens of) thousands of people 
for whom the Strip is too narrow and too poor." That was further confirmed by former Prime 
Minister Rabin in February 1973. He called for, "a natural shifting of population to the East 
Bank ... The problem of the refugees of the GS should not be solved in Gaza or al-Arish but 
mainly in the East Bank ... " (Cited in The National Lawyers Guild Report (NLG),1978:22,24). 
The Israeli official line towards refugees was reinforced by Israeli individuals. For example, 
Gabriel Stein, a Professor of physical chemistry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and 
former Chairman of the Israel Academic Society, suggested that: necessary means should be 
provided to enhance the emigration of refugees, especially in the case of the GS. This could 
be through granting a sum of money to each family ($6,000), derived from the International 
Fund, irrespective of the eventual political form which the GS will assume (Stein, 1968: 16-17). 
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The official declared policy and actions were in contradiction with the assurances made 
by the Israeli representative at the UN to the General-Commissioner of UNRWA, Mr. Laurence 
Michelmore. The Israeli Ambassador noted, " it was not the policy of the Government of Israel 
to expel Arab inhabitants of the occupied areas" (Keesing's Contemporary Archives,August 19-
26,1967:22215). The difference between declared policy and actual policy is explicable, 
Israel's covert policy towards refugees never intentionally being unveiled by the authorities. 
Despite all means used to encourage the emigration of GS refugees, however, the uprooting 
of the whole refugee population that some Israeli extremists sought was not achieved. 
4.2.2 The Road-Widening Operations 
Failing to encourage the emigration of the largest number of the Strip's refugee 
population, the Israelis also failed to quell the resistance movement in the Strip, despite the 
measures undertaken to do so, either through repression or persuasion. One of the methods 
attempted to persuade the Gaza-based guerrillas to give up resistance was the circulation of a 
pamphlet in Arabic asking them to surrender and promising them a lenient treatment if they did 
so (al-Quds,3 August,1971;ARR,August 1-15,1971:426). By 1970, with the escalation of 
resistance in GS, the Israeli government openly discussed the need to "thin out" the Gaza 
refugee popUlation and embarked on a new programme to do so by coercion. This programme 
was, it could be argued, the first enacted policy regarding the resettlement of the GS refugees, 
began in the early 1970's and put into practice by the middle of 1971 with the beginning of the 
road-widening operations in GS camps. Because the refugees would have opposed anything 
which smacked of "resettlement", it had to be done by a "backdoor" device. What may have 
started as a limited security operation later developed into a comprehensive resettlement 
programme. 
So far as there was a policy, it was to move out one in five of the people who occupy 
the Gaza camps, in an attempt to fight the escalating resistance in the Strip. This was 
confirmed by Schlomo Gazet, the former Coordinator for the OTs, who stated in a press 
interview that: "the intention is to evacuate one-third of the Strip's refugee population, about 
60-70,000 to new places in the Strip (al-Quds,22 August,1971; The TImes,22 July,1971). 
In July 1971, Israel began systematically destroying homes in refugee camps, forcibly 
removing thousands of Gaza residents to al-Arish in the Sinai Desert, to unoccupied camps in 
the WB, and to smaller Strip camps. As to the circumstances under which the refugees were 
removed, an Israeli official claimed that all had been given 24 to 36 hours' notice and offered 
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an option of where they should go (The TImes,3 September,1971; NIT,July 22; 20 & 31 
August, 1971). 
The authorities' plan worked in phases: first to evacuate the effected refugees to the 
already available accommodation in al-Arish, as well as in smaller Strip camps, then, once the 
empty al-Arish flats were all occupied, future transfers would all be to the Strip. Israeli sources 
indicated that for every home demolished in the camps, another home of at least the same 
standard was offered. A high ranking Israeli official said the "evacuees are free to take it or 
leave it and the Military Government arranges transport to the destination named by the 
evacuees" (JP,17 August,1971). 
The demolitions and evacuation in Gaza, involving about 15,000 people, was the first 
phase in the Israeli plan and began in July 1971. The second phase started in January 1972, 
the so called "the Spring Phase"; and the third phase started in 1976. 
The transfer of refugees was of a forcible nature and violated Article 49 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, which prohibits "individual or mass forcible transfers ... regardless of their 
motive" (International Review of the Red Cross,September(1970):456). The absence in the 
O. T's of a "protecting power," in the form of a state, on behalf of the Palestinians, represented 
in the UN on equal grounds with other member states, made it impossible to ensure compliance 
with the Geneva Convention. 
4.2.2.1 Reasons Given for the Crackdown on Camps 
The main reason given by the authorities for the road-widening operation was 
"security." In breaking up the larger camps, the "security" element was both a genuine reason 
and a pretext. It was genuine because driving wide roads through makes it harder for Fedayeen 
to hide, or to dominate the population, and dispersed refugees are easier to police than when 
they are crowded into camps. It was a pretext because, as The Guardian commented at the 
time," naked resettlement would have been fiercely opposed by the United Nations", which ran 
the camps. The Guardian continued, "moving occupied populations also infringes the Geneva 
Convention, to which Israel is a signatory. All this can be got round in the name of security" 
(The Guardian, 19 August, 1971). 
There were also other contradictory reasons given by the Israeli officials for the 
crackdown. Schlomo Gazet, former Co-ordinator of the OTs, stated that security and military 
reasons were behind the road widening operation in Jabalia camp. He said that the operation 
was not part of a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem, and did not intend to improve 
the refugees living conditions, but it sought to enhance the military authorities' control over the 
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camps (a/-Quds,l August,1971;1he 1imes,31 July,1971; NYI',29 July, 1971;Cohen, 1972, 1). 
This combination of security and resettlement was thus confirmed in the Ministry of Defence 
report on the OT's: "The slackening of terrorist activities in 1971 made possible the 
implementation of Israel's rehabilitation programme" (Ministry of Defence, 1983:56). 
Peres, Minister-in-Charge of refugees affairs, believed that a partial solution to the 
refugee problem was beyond driving wide roads through the Jabalia camp (al-Quds,2 
August, 1971). Moshe Dayan's view was that the operations in Rafah, Jabalia and Shati camps 
were carried out for humanitarian reasons and not political ones, aimed at improving the living 
conditions of refugees, who got new houses to replace those demolished in the camps as well 
as financial aid and employment (al-Quds,2 August,1971;29 December, 1972). On occasion, 
however, the punitive element in the new policy emerged. In a reply given to a deputation of 
Gaza leaders asking him to stop evicting people from the camps Dayan said: "I will do so when 
you start doing your jobs and keeping your areas quiet" (The Guardian, al-Quds,19 August, 
1971). The same response was given by the Strip's Military Governor to Jabalia camp's 
Mukhtar (village president) when the latter protested about the demolitions, the Governor 
adding that: what we have done is nothing compared to King Hussein (The Observer, 1 
August, 1971). Emanual Marx emphasized that Israeli policy in the camps during this time 
served as a collective punishment against the Strip's inhabitants (Marx, 1988: 11). 
Dayan complained that the Fedayeen in Gaza were still able to defy him. Prompting 
him and Barlev to direct Sharon to "establish order" in Gaza. The "crackdown" followed an 
attack on an Israeli family by the Fedayeen, which resulted in the murder of two children and 
the wounding of their mother, and most Israelis believed that it was a direct result of the Aroyo 
murders. However, approval for the operations was given by the Cabinet on 20 December -
a fortnight earlier (The Observer,1 August,1971). 
Erial Sharon, the head of the Southern Command in GS at that time, planned this 
programme systematically, assigning it to an elite Israeli officers. A quote attributed to Sharon 
began to make the rounds, that "the only good" terrorist" is a dead "terrorist." "It is claimed 
that within seven months Sharon and his men ended "terrorism" in the GS (Benziman, 1985: 115-
116;Aronson,1987:46-7). The operations in the camps were accompanied by other measures 
by Sharon had undertaken. He dismissed the mayor of Gaza, Ragheb al-Alami (who had been 
appointed by Egypt in 1964) and removed the entire municipal council; he deported 12,000 
members of families of suspected Fedayeen to detention camps in Abu Zeneima and Abu Rudeis 
in Sinai (Halabi, 1985:77-81; Palestine Affairs, April(1972):196). 
Sharon's strategy and programme was not his first attack on refugees in the GS; in 
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March 1954 he had attacked al-Bureij camp in the Strip, to halt infiltrations from the GS and 
the Sinai Desert to Israel, with lethal results. His reply to critiques of the operation was " .. .If 
we don't act forcefully against the refugee camps they will tum into comfortable nests for 
murderers" (Benziman,1985:49). Moreover, it was Sharon who had led the massacre of 
Palestinians in Kibya in October 1953, 3 and this pattern of excessive violence and 
uncontrolled behaviour also showed itself in Lebanon in 1982, with regard to the Sabra and 
Shatilla massacres (Benziman,1985:263). 
Other reasons given for the eviction of refugees came in a response to Carol Johnson, 
MP, and her colleague, from a high Israeli official who said that "the destruction of homes was 
an interim measure - the camps were too large and must be reduced in size. In the "near 
future" the refugees would be allowed to return and a process of re-education would begin -"to 
teach them to wake up to 1971" - in new villages to be built for the purpose." That observation 
contrasted with another reply to a question Carol Johnson posed to the Israeli representative in 
London, who noted that, " what is happenning in the camps is "resettlement and construction 
work" (The Times, 3 September,1971). The former Israeli UN representative in his reply to 
U Thant's protest about the operations in the camps, claimed that they had been carried out to 
make Gaza inhabitants safe from Fedayeen' activities (al-Quds,30 September 1971). Major 
Amir Cheshin, information officer for the Israeli military command in charge of the GS, said: 
"a solution to the terror would not have been found without opening roads." (NYI',24 
November, 1974). 
The above Israeli statements demonstrate that even the Israelis themselves were in two 
minds as to what they were about. They emphasised the security problem, and further stressed 
the humanitarian aspect of the operations . Yet, at the same time they argued that it was 
necessary for the refugees to "wake up to 1971." What they probably meant was that refugees 
should start to lead an independent life away from UNRWA, to improve their living conditions, 
and settle down more permanently; implying that a return back to their previous home and land 
was unviable. These contradictory statements nevertheless provide ample evidence of the 
ulterior motives of the policy to impose control over the refugees community and to quell their 
resistance to occupation. The major concern of the Israeli authorities was to retain the Strip, 
but, with the minimum of refugees (NYT,April 2,1973). 
The delegation of the NLG concluded that Israeli policy in Gaza had three objectives. 
The first was to reduce the large, unwanted Palestinian population within its desired borders by 
resettling a portion of the Palestinian Gaza population beyond the Strip. The second was to 
remove and transfer the population in order for Israel to claim that the refugee problem had 
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been eliminated. The third objective was to neutralize UNRWA by depleting the refugee rolls 
(NLG,1978:27). The Israeli leadership further assumed that separating the refugees from 
UNRW A would be one way to diminish their refugee identity and break their connection with 
the past (Locke and Stewart,1985:62) 
4.2.2.2 Explaining the Israeli Crackdown in Gaza 
The Israeli crackdown on camps and refugees in the Strip is widely regarded as the first 
reversal of the so-called "liberal" policy of occupation instituted by Defence Minister Moshe 
Dayan in the first days after the June 1967 war. Several internal and external factors lay 
behind the crackdown. The first of these was Israeli military authorities' fear of the escalation 
and domination of the Palestinian resistance movement in the Strip. That resistance prohibited 
an Israeli civil presence and promoted the need for more than just minimal military presence 
(al-Quds,6 January, 1971). The fear could be attributed to the specificity of the situation in the 
Strip with regard to the level of militancy among its population. Daily confrontations between 
the two opposing sides - the resistance movement and the Israeli military forces -, allowed no 
place for a third party. Each side was trying to liquidate the existence of the other and enhance 
its presence on the land . 
The resistance movement caused a reduction of the Israeli civil presence in the Strip, 
in contrast to other occupied areas. As a result of the resistance Israeli soldiers in GS were not 
allowed to walk alone but in groups, with their Ouzi guns. The escalation of Fedayeen 
activities in the Strip in the last months of 1970, led the Israeli Cabinet to vote for an even more 
stringent security policy on January 3, 1971 (NYT,February 2,1971; Palestine Affairs, 
November(1971):232-233). In a further attempt to tighten control of people's movements, 
from the beginning of July 1971 the Government has forbidden camp dwellers to leave their 
areas without special permits. 
Keen to reach a permanent settlement - in a hurry - for the Strip and its refugees, the 
Israelis adoption of a new policy of resettlement coupled with economic expansion was a 
variation on an old theme, the "carrot" and the "stick" clearly visible. However, the manner 
in which they acted was recognized at the time to be storing up more trouble for the future (see 
chapter seven) (The Observer,1 August,1971). 
A second reason for the crackdown was the simultaneous crackdown on the Palestinian 
resistance in Jordan, often called "Black September," which drove the Palestinian armed 
resistance out of Amman to Jarash and Ajlun in the northwest. The refugee camps were the 
main target, and casualties were substantial there, where the fiercest resistance had been 
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launched. July 1971 was the month when the Jordanian authorities completed their crackdown 
on Palestinian resistance, 4 at the same time giving encouragement to the Israeli military 
authorities to crush the Strip's resistance and enact their "iron fist" policy. A reliable and 
independent source in Gaza confirmed that it was the Israeli intention to break: up the large 
camps as quickly as possible before opposition, either external or internal, mounted (The 
Observer,1 August, 1971). The Israeli press played a great role in calling upon the military 
authorities to "emulate the Jordanian regime in crushing Palestinian Fedayeen",. and to 
"implement what King Hussein had done in the East Bank in the GS." The Israeli authorities 
exploited the negative effects which the "Black September" events left on the Strip's population, 
and circulated pamphlets in Arabic calling upon the Fedayeen to surrender (Palestine 
Affairs,November(l971):232). 
A third reason for Israeli policy in Gaza related to the relative tranquillity on Israeli 
borders on the Suez and River Jordan. As a result of the calm following cease-fire agreements, 
Israel began to enjoy peace on all its fronts except "the only front" in the GS. Schlomo Gazet 
revealed the effect of the cease-fire upon Israel in dealing with the camps. He stated: "We do 
not have to forget that the cease-fire had facilitated so much the issue of dealing with the 
camps. The cease-fire made it possible for us to mobilize more forces and allocation of funds 
etc, and this was not possible a year ago" (Ma'ariv, 20 August, 1971). The cease-fire enabled 
the Israeli authorities to double the army garrison in Gaza, and deploy a tough "border police" 
called the Green Berets in Gaza town, armed with truncheons (Palestine 
Affairs,November(1971):232-233). 
4.2.3 Voices of Opposition 
The camp operations demonstrated an action without precedent against the refugees 
of the GS by the military authorities. These operations evoked protest among various circles, 
including official and civil Israelis; Palestinians inside and outside; and the Arab states, 
represented by the Arab League. 
4.2.3.1 Israeli Protest 
There was both official state and civilian opposition in Israel to operations in the 
camps. In Tel-Aviv, 80 Israelis demonstrated in protest at the policies in the OTs and the 
demolition of houses in GS camps and the evacuation of refugees, organized by the Israeli 
Human Rights Committee and leftist elements (al-Quds, 24 August, 1971). 
Criticism of the operations was also heard from two faculty members of the Hebrew 
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University who carried out a study on the UNRWA operations in the GS and the WB. They 
wrote: 
First, the evacuation was carried out almost over night, with an advance 
warning of only few hours; second, the transfer to al-Arish cuts off the 
evacuated refugees from their former livelihoods; third, the Arabs are not used 
to living in multi-storied buildings. As a result, a large part of the evacuees 
never reached al-Arish. They "got lost" on the way, at the homes of relatives 
and acquaintances in the Strip, etc., and many who did arrive have left." 
They, thus concluded that, Israel's policy towards refugees especially towards 
the Gaza refugees," is a combination of errors and omission and moves like that 
were too few and too mistaken (Magen,1972:37). 
Their criticism it must be noted reflected concern with the humanitarian position of the 
refugees rather than with the political repercussions. 
Direct opposition to Sharon's operations from official circles was expressed by Lt.-
General Yitzhak Pundak, a former Commander of the Gaza region, who argued for the 
reduction of all police and military involvement in the GS. Pundak advocated an alternative 
policy to Sharon's use of force and fear, calling for the improvement of living conditions and 
the material welfare of Gaza's population. He also saw the importance of normalizing relations 
between Israel and the local population, thereby reducing the attractiveness for Gazans of 
joining in the "terrorist" and other underground operations.5 Sharon's approach was the 
antithesis of Pundak's . Even Pundak's men - the senior officers on assignment in the Gaza 
region - found themselves trapped "between implacable foes and conflicting orders, " when 
implementing Sharon's strategy (Benziman, 1985: 117). 
It was not only Pundak who voiced his opposition to the Sharon programme in the Strip. 
Yitzhak Abadi, the former senior field commander charged with implementing Sharon's 
programmes, joined Pundak in opposing the military actions carried out by Sharon in the Strip, 
and the hostility it was engendering among the population. He attributed the populations 
involvement in resistance to the worsening economic conditions of Gazans and thus he 
proposed, like Pundak, to try and give economic support and compensation to the innocent 
majority of Palestinians in the Strip. However, his voice remained unheard and he resigned. 
Explaining his resignation to Dayan, Abadi said that, "he could no longer be a partner to 
Sharon's reign of terror." In fact, Sharon's reign of terror ended after Abadi's resignation, 
when Dayan decided to transfer responsibility for the GS from the Southern Command - headed 
by Sharon - to the Central Command (Benziman, 1985: 118). 
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4.2.3.2 Palestinian Protest 
Palestinians inside the Strip protested against the operations in the camps in many 
ways. Mukhtars of the camps and outstanding figures requested the Defence Minister to halt 
the operations, but Dayan refused. He refused to meet the Mukhtars, until they carried out their 
responsibility in a way he viewed as proper and stopped resistance to the occupation (al-Quds,4 
August, 1971). The mayor and municipality members of Gaza also sent a memorandum to the 
Defence Minister condemning and requesting the halt of the road-widening operations and the 
evacuation of refugees (al-Quds,18 August, 1971). Residents of Jabalia camp demonstrated at 
UNRWA headquarters in Gaza in protest at the forceful movement of 30 families from Jabalaya 
camp to al-Arish. Those families had their personal IDs confiscated by the authorities, and 
were transferred in 50 trucks (which belonged to Arabs) to al-Arish (al-Quds, 28 July, 1971). 
To protest against the operations and the dispersion of refugees, two guerrilla 
organizations, the Popular Front and the Liberation Front for the Liberation of Palestine, called 
for a seven-day general strike in the Strip. The Israelis believed that local leaders, rather than 
guerrilla organizations, were behind the strike. Political opposition to the removal of refugees 
arose when it became apparent that Israel's objectives went beyond mere "security". Most of 
the Palestinian workers from the Strip who commuted daily to Israel were stopped by the 
strikers from going to work. Only about 500 people went to work, a tenth of the normal total 
(al-Hadaj, March(1971):20; Palestine Affairs, November(l971):234). 
The Israeli counter-measures against the strikers involved intimidation and the violation 
of civil and human rights. Shops which participated in the strike were welded shut. Licence 
plates were stripped off from 20 taxis whose owners joined the strike (al-Quds, 15 August, 1971; 
The Guardian, 16 August, 1971). There was strong Israeli press reaction to the response of the 
Strip's population to the strike called by the Palestinian organizations and the Israeli press 
began to call into question the Israeli "iron fist" policy in the as. AI-Hamishmar Supplement 
of 6 August, 1971 reported that, 
the "iron fist" policy is not generating miracles, which would liquidate the 
guerrillas of today, and also those who will grow up tomorrow .... The youths 
of Jabalia, Shati, Bureij, al-Maghazi and Nuseirat camps, who are throwing 
lemons today-- which resemble hand grenades-- on Israeli army, will throw 
tomorrow real grenades, and will substitute sticks for Kalashnikov guns. 
The article's prediction regarding the youth of Gaza seem to have been fulfilled in the 
historical events of the Intifada. Other Israeli reaction argued that the success of the resistance 
movement in the Strip was attributed to the very strong links between the resistance movement 
and the people as a whole. Ha 'olem Hazeh of 3 August, 1971 reported that it is impossible to 
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separate between the people and the Fedayeen, the people themselves are potential 
Fedayeen ..... . and this is the reason for the emergence of five Fedayeen in the place of a killed 
or imprisoned one (Palestine Affairs, November (1971):234). 
Benziman saw this strong link between the resistance movement and the people in GS 
in a different light. He claimed that, " the local Palestinian population was trapped between the 
terror of the IDF and that of the PLO. Local PLO leaders used flagrant torture and the most 
horrifying forms of murder to intimidate the locals from any show of cooperation with the 
conquering forces of their enemy" (Benziman, 1985: 117). 
Benziman's claim received publicity in the early years of the Intifada, when the killing 
of collaborators by nationalist militants in the OTs was reported under the slogan "Arabs are 
killing Arabs." A more realistic interpretation of the phenomenon is given by Rabbani. He 
wrote: 
Discussion of collaborators in the OTs should be removed from the "Arab kills 
Arab" vacuum to which it has been consigned and proceed from the realisaton 
that the reproducion and elimination of collaborators has been part and parcel 
of every struggle for freedom from colonial rule. Put in proper perspective, 
the current situation forms an indictment rather than justification for Israeli 
rule, and similarly allows for a more serious evaluation of the problem 
(Rabbani, 26 1992: 16). 
Another communique by the PFLP associated activities in the Strip with efforts to 
liquidate the Palestinian movement in Jordan. Condemning the evacuation of the Strip's 
refugees, it attributed the authorities' measures to two goals: to annex the Strip by evacuating 
as many people as possible to reduce population density in order to diminish the revolutionary 
aims of the Palestinian movement and replace refugees with new Israeli settlers; to create an 
atmosphere and environment of hatred among the Israelis for the Palestinian national movement 
(al-Hadaj,6 March(1971):20). 
On the official level, Yasar Arafat protested about the operations in the camps and 
considered them to be more brutal than the Israeli attack on the Strip in 1956 and 1967. He 
called on international public opinion, the Arab nations, the humanitarian and political 
organizations, and liberation movements in the world to act in order to stop the Israeli 
authorities' measures and violations of human rights against the Palestinian population (al-
Dustour,31 January, 1971). The same calls were made by the Palestinian Red Crescent to 
international organizations (al-Dustour, 6 February, 1971) and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross also expressed concern about the forced transfers and urged that rehousing and 
compensation be accelerated and intensified (International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 1971:51). 
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al-Ittihad newswspaper described the operations in the GS camps as brutal war-crimes, 
similar to those committed in Vietnam by forces of North America (al-Ittihad, 10 August, 1971). 
Individual Palestinians protested at the transfer of refugees to al-Arish by the authorities. They 
argued that, "if they want to transfer us from here they have to ask us where we want to be 
transferred. I am ready to be transferred to my home in Hamameh" (a village in Palestine), and 
another refugee said, "I am ready to go from here but to Jaffa" (Palestine Affairs, 
September(1971):213). 
The irony was that despite terrible living conditions in the camps, for the Palestinians 
living there, many of whom had been there for 45 years, it was their home. The camps 
became like rooted villages. How was it possible to estimate levels of compensation for a vine 
that has taken 15 years to grow? And how do you restore the pride and dignity of a people who 
have put two decades of their life into making a decent home for themselves and their families? 
The evacuated refugees voiced other grievances than the loss of their old houses. By 
being moved away they faced transport problems in commuting to work, and facilities in the 
smaller camps were unlike those found in larger camps. The evacuated refugees also lost 
proximity to families and relatives (The Observer,1 August,1971). The Palestinians believed 
then that it was only the latest phase in a long campaign of harrassment designed to drive the 
refugees out of the GS forever, in preparation for Israeli annexation, and discounted the urgency 
of the security problem, which the authorities reiterated. 
4.2.3.3 The Arab States Protest 
In a conference on Palestine refugee affairs convened in Cairo in 1970, attended by 
members of the Arab League and the PLO, recommendations were made to support the 
. steadfastness of the people in the OTs, and to stop their emigration. It was demanded that 
UNRWA should not cooperate with the Israeli authorities in changing the status of the refugee 
camps and evacuating of the refugees (al-Quds,6 February, 1970). Sixteen Arab states, 
prompted by the Arab League, requested the UN to send a fact finding mission to GS (al-
Quds, 19 September, 1971). Furthermore, the Egyptian government, the former administration 
of the Strip, asked the UN to intervene immediately to protect the inhabitants of the GS from 
Israeli plans to evacuate them from their homes to other areas. Mr. Riad, Egypt's Foreign 
Minister, stressed in a message to the UN Secretary-General that the situation in the GS was 
deteriorating. Together with the Arab League, Mr. Riad considered the expUlsion of the 
inhabitants a "brutal and inhuman crimes" that should be halted (The Guardian, 17 
August, 1971;NIT,20 August, 1971). 
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4.2.4 Procedures and Repercussions of the Operations in the Camps 
To pacify the GS, the authorities altered the structure and form of the three big camps, 
Jabalia, Shati and Rafah, under the pretext of security, as follows: 
1) " The clearing of a security perimeter around the camp that would effectively 
isolate the built-up area from its surroundings and render it impossible for 
anyone to enter or leave the camp without being noticed. 2) The division of the 
large camps into smaller units or quarters, each of which could be entered and 
searched with relative ease. 3) The paving of roads in the camps to enable the 
security forces to enter the camps in their vehicles, travel rapidly, and without 
fear of land-mines. 4) The introduction of street-lighting to facilitate control 
of the camps after dark" (Yogev,1973:28;JP,25 August, 1971). 
The circumstances in which the refugees of the three effected camps were removed 
reflected the harsh policy of the authorities. An Israeli official confirmed that the refugees were 
given 24-36 hours notice; and they were offered an option of where they should go (The 
1imes,3 September,1971). The options offered were: al-Arish, the WB, and smaller camps in 
the GS. A Palestine Affairs report gave the number effected families as 2,009 some 346 of 
those were transfered by the authorities to al-Arish, and 28 to the WB, while the others found 
houses in smaller camps in the Strip, or in towns of the Strip (Palestine 
Affairs ,November(l971 ):233). 
Ma 'ariv also reported that, the military government established a unit named "Yasheh" 
(Housing of Gazans Unit) in the early seventies. The unit constructed two housing projects: one 
between Jenin and Nablus, (Fahma), and the other near Ramallah in the WB. About a hundred 
families were transfered, after being paid a small amount of money and given a house, this 
small number reflecting, according to Vardi, the former WB commander, the Gazans 
unwillingness to move to the WB (al-Quds, 25 March 1988; 4 August,1971). 
Other refugee families from J abalia and SC were transferred by the authorities to 
Shweikah village in Tulkarem area in the WB, where they were accomodated in houses 
belonging to the Custodian' (al-Quds, 16 August, 1971). Dr. Haider Abdel-Shafi, an eminent 
physician and the official head of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, believed that the 
goal of the authorities was to reduce the Strip's population. He described the steps taken in 
the demolition of houses. One soldier paints a large "X" on houses and shops in the camps 
to identify those to be demolished, and another soldier tells the family they has to move. This 
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was done in a complete arbitrarily way without consulting the residents (NLG 
Report,1978:25;NIT,20 August,1971).( See Plate: 4.1). As a result of demolitions in the 
camps, houses were in great demand by evacuated refugees in the GS. In consequence, the 
rent increased from 20-30 Israeli Liras to 70-80 IL per month (ai-Quds,3 August,1971). 
Ha 'aretz and The Observer reported on the maltreatment and force used on the refugees 
faced during the evacuation of camps: 
Many Palestinians were brought to hospital with broken bones. At army aid 
stations, it was seen that many people had been flogged on their bare backs, 
resulting in blisters. Search patrols pulled down houses, destroyed furniture 
and property. Members of patrols and Border Guards, claiming they were 
searching women, stripped them and left them naked in the streets. The Red 
Cross protested against the treatment, with the result that later women were 
stripped in side streets and refugee camps rather than in the main streets. 
Israeli security men prevented doctors from taking the injured into hospitals 
(NLG Report, 1978:25; The Observer, 1 August, 1971;ICRC Annual 
Report, 1971 :50-51). 
The forced immigration of parents and families of Fedayeen was carried out by the 
authorities, and they were taken to detention camps in Sinai desert like Abu Znemah, 
Kaseemah, Nald, al-Tur, and al-Arish, and to camps in Saint Catherine(Moses Mountain). Abu 
Znemah camp was closed at the end of November 1971 under pressure from the Red Cross 
(PaiestineAffairs,April(1972): 196;Halabi,1985:81). The Israelis claimed that if some (refugees) 
were moved against their will, "it was because the Arabs had no way of knowing that better 
lives awaited them in their new surroundings .. and resettlements should become attractive to 
them" (NIT,18 December, 1971). However, this was refuted in The Guardian comments of 
19 August, 1971, which reported that houses were given at random and that made it worse for 
the refugees. "Where some families were offered spacious middle class house in el-Arish, 
others were put into hovels far worse than the huts they left behind." The Israeli authorities 
sealed off Jabalia and Gaza SC from the outside world by declaring them "military areas." It 
was explained in Jerusalem that the camps where closed "to prevent people from demonstrating 
for the benefit of foreign journalists" (Ibid.) 
The activities in the camps were part of Israel's new plan to tame the turbulent GS. But 
neither the carrot (inducements such as one-way exit permits, jobs in the WB and more work 
opportunities in Israel) nor the stick (the heavy-handed repression on camps in 1971) worked. 
The steady pulse of violence, both against the Israeli soldiers and Arab collaborators, did not 
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diminished. "Gaza is the only place where the Palestinian resistance ("terrorism" to the 
Israelis), at a terrible cost and with suicidal tenacity, is worthy of the name" (The Observer, 1 
August, 1971). Yet, the forcible transfers did not end in 1971, it was reported in Ha'aretz in 
July 1975 that new methods were adopted to obtain "voluntary" relinquishment of property 
rights 6 (NLG Report, 1978:23). 
Figures on the number of demolished shelters in the three camps affected by the road-
widening operations reveal the magnitude of the issue under discussion, although they differ 
from one source to another. According to the JP report, 1,807 shelters were demolished 
altogether (JP, 31 August, 1971). The UNRWA office in Gaza gives a figure of of 10,794 
rooms, with 3,941 affected families (24,067 persons) (UNRWA, 1991). The Palestine Affairs 
report meanwhile, gives a number of 2,009 shelters: 1,011 houses in Jabalia, which 
compromised 924 families (6,503 persons); 598 in Shati, compromising 591 families (4,020 
persons); and 400 in Rafah camp, compromising 400 families (2850 persons) (Palestine Affairs, 
November (1971):233). 
The demolition of camp shelters by road-widening, under the pretext of security 
continued throughout the years, at a slow pace . In all, the road-widening operations in the 
camps, are reported to have resulted in the demolition of 10,000 shelters between 1967 and 
1984 (Locke and Stewart,1985:59). 
Annual Reports of the General-Commissioner give details of the housing situation of 
the affected refugees by the 1971 demolitions. The last, of 1984, indicated that many families 
were still living in unsatisfactory conditions, some of them in real hardship; while some had 
moved into new Israeli housing projects, and others had voluntarily purchased plots of land in 
the Israeli housing projects. The agency is said to be continuing to pursue these cases with the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UN,1984:26). The affected refugees, found themselves 
with of two options: to purchase new houses in the Israeli sponsored housing projects or to 
move to shelters vacated by others opting for the new housing (UN, 1975: 11). 
One of the features of the operations in the camps was that the refugees transferred to 
al-Arish were removed from the providing hand of UNRWA. They lost their entitlement to 
its services, despite the Israeli officials' assurances that their status as refugees would not be 
affected and their future needs would be attended to (NLG Report,1978:27;The Times,3 
September, 1971). 
This destruction of people's homes raises the question of who owns the camps. It is 
quite clear that the Israeli authorities exert complete control over the camps, through the 
different measures of harassment undertaken against the camp population. 
121 
UNRWA's lack of executive authority over the camps was starkly apparent. They have 
no means of appeal. Some of them have building permits issued by UNRWA before the Israeli 
occupation but these are no longer valid. If there are houses where the Israelis do not want 
them, then they will be removed (Locke and Stewart,1985:60). 
In fact, the original shelters belong to UNRWA, built on land provided by the Egyptian 
administration on unused governmental and Miri land. 7 Some camps in the middle zone of 
the GS were built on private land, the owners compensated, or the right of ownership was 
maintained until UNRWA's mandate terminates. So UNRWA "ownership" of lands or houses, 
then, is no more than a figurative expression, indicating the housing-land and the buildings 
provided by UNRWA, and distingishing these from private or freehold lands and houses. 
UNRWA protested at the operations in the camps. UNRWA complained about the 
short notice it received from the authorities before the demolitions were carried out, and asked 
that the demolitions should be halted, not only because of the extent of the hardship and distress 
suffered by the refugees, but because destruction of shelters was much in excess of the 
alternative housing available (UN,1973:7). UN GA Resolution 2792 C (XXVI), of 6 December 
1971, called upon Israel to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters and from further 
removal of refugees from their present places of residence and to take immediate and effective 
steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and 
to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation (UN, 1973:7). 
General-Commissioner reports do not give a clear indication of whether the Agency got 
reimbursement from the authorities for the demolitions of 1971 or not. But in 1974, a reference 
was made to a construction programme of new shelters in small camps like Maghazi and 
Nuseirat with reimbursement by the Israeli authorities, to replace shelters demolished by road 
widening in these camps. There was no mention of the 1971 demolitions, but the events of 
1974 did raise a question about possible compliance between the authorities and UNRWA to 
"thin-out" large camps (UN, 1974:20). 
To sum up, the military authorities' crackdown on the camps was carried out with 
security in mind, despite the different pretexts given. The security pretext could be said to have 
served the authorities on two counts: to exercise more control on camp population; and to 
disperse refugees. The aim behind the liquidation of the refugee camps and the refugees as a 
category was to negate their characteristics as refugees, which forms the hard nucleus of the 
whole Palestinian problem, and to attempt to promote the Israeli resettlement schemes in the 
long run. One might, given the above discussions, assume that the measures taken by the 
Israeli authorities against the camps and its population in the GS would be likely to lessen the 
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Palestinian will to resist. However, the result seemed more likely to be to deepen hatred and 
stiffen resistance than to improve security. 
4.2.5 Future of Gaza: A Fundamental Dilemma 
Since the creation of the state of Israel, the fate of the GS has been an insoluble politico-
military problem. The link between the future of the Strip and the future of the refugees has 
always been a controversial issue, especially in the post-1967 period. Various contradictory 
statements were given by Israeli officials with regard to staying or leaving the Strip. Their 
conflict on this issue was very much effected or related to the existence of a huge number of 
refugees, whose growth and militancy was perceived as a threat to Israel's security. The 
fundamental dilemma over the Strip is that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians knew what 
its future was going to be. The former, worked on the pragmatic basis of holding on to what 
they have and the latter resisted anything that smacked of turning that operation into a 
permanent Israeli presence . 
In Gaza, as in Jerusalem, politics and planning has always gone hand in hand. The 
difference, of course, was that whereas Israel claims to have annexed East Jerusalem, Gaza 
remains a surviving pocket of Palestine, unclaimed by Egypt, or Jordan or even Israel itself. 
In the early seventies, the Israelis believed that to improve their image in the Strip, 
economic integration and development programmes should be developed. They thought that 
the inhabitants in GS sufferred so much from the Egyptian administration and they had ended 
the Egyptian curfew on them. In the early days of the aftermath of the 1967 war, Levi Eshkol, 
former Prime Minister of Israel, stated that Israel intends to keep the former part of Jerusalem 
and the GS (JP,10 July, 1967). The Alon Programme also recommended the annexation of the 
GS to Israel; a similar stand was taken by Golda Meir and Galili, who also suggested the 
establishment of permanent settlements in the Strip and in Sinai (al-Quds,4 
February, 1969;Flapen,1972:22; Karawan,1973:13). The most important statement in the early 
years of occupation was by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, in an interview with the Israeli TV. 
He called for the annexation of the GS to Israel, and the absorption of the refugees there, to 
ensure stability and security in the Strip. He added that the GS's population preferred an Israeli 
rule. He went further to suggest that the government should take a decision to make the Strip's 
population Israeli citizens, in order to solve the problems they face, particularly unemployment 
(al-Quds,24 January, 1971; Karawan,1973:22). 
Dayan's comments contradicted the general thesis at the time, which was that the Gaza 
refugees were a threat to Israel's security, and it was affirmed that the "thinning out" of the 
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Strip's population was implemented with security in mind. At a later stage, Dayan stated that 
the Israeli government should operate as a permanent government in the OTs. He indicated that 
the setting up of the Israeli housing projects for refugees in the GS was an example of a 
government which wanted to stay, and Israel needed to regard itself as the "permanent 
government" in the area. In a later visit to the Strip on 25 April, 1972, he confirmed his stand 
towards the Strip and added that GS's population should be treated as equal with Israeli citizens, 
despite them being considered foreigners (ai-Quds,26 April, 1972). He went further to say that 
what was going on in the camps (the road-widening operations) was not the solution to the 
refugee problem, but just an attempt to improve their living standards. His statements were 
criticized by government colleagues (ai-Quds,22 August, 1971;The 1imes,3 September, 1971;The 
Economist, 11 September, 1971). 
Was Dayan flying kites to test the wind when he proposed annexation of the Strip? Did 
he use the issue to learn about the reaction of his fellow Israelis with regard to the future of the 
GS? Or was his order to Sharon to carry out the operations in the camps, the first step to a 
solution of Gaza's problems? Gaza refugees certainly posed a big problem for the Israeli 
authorities. Dispersing them and setting up Israeli settlements was seen as a first step in a long-
term solution to the Strip if it was to remain under Israeli control. Therefore, as discussed 
above, the claims of Dayan and other Israelis that the operations and the resettlement of 
refugees were carried out to improve the living standards of the refugees could be considered 
a complete fallacy. 
The Israeli parties also differed with regard to the Strip's future. Members of the 
Labour Party in Israel voiced their position with regard to the future of the Strip and, although 
differences did appear in their statements, they agreed to keep the Strip. Some stated that the 
GS was part of the state of Israel and should remain under Israeli control, a position which met 
with the Likud's aims (Aviram,1969:45). Other ministers in Mapam advocated first solving 
the problem of the refugees of GS before deciding on its political future (Karawan,1973:38 & 
40). Still other ministers in the Mifdal and Gahal stated that the WB and the GS and the 
Golan Heights have to be annexed to Israel, and Israeli law be implemented there (ai-Quds,6 
August,1971;28 March,1972;Flapen,1972:22;Karawan,1973:43 & 49). The same stand was 
taken by the Israeli expansionists, who wanted the GS for themselves but were worried because 
the refugees were being "spread out" and encouraged to take root (The Observer, 1 
August, 1971). 
A shift in the Israeli parties' position towards the GS began to appear after the eruption 
of the Intifada, their statements reflecting the confusion and the inconsistency they were in. 
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Facing the turbulent GS during the Intifada, the Doves and the Hawks in Israel have considered 
a solution to the problems which Gaza presents. A call has been around since late December 
1990 that "Gaza comes first," as suggested by Knesset member Yussi Belin from the Labour 
Party, and Professor Yaer Hirshfield, from Haifa University, and initially rejected by both the 
Labour Party and the Likud Party (Israel Yearbook, 1990:256-7). Beilin suggested that a 
Palestinian demilitarised state should be established in GS with complete sovereignty. He 
suggested that if the Palestinians accepted this offer they would receive international aid to 
improve the Strip's economic situation and the resettlement of refugees. This state could be 
used later to carry out the rest of the peace negotiations (al-Quds,3 & 15 January, 1991). 
Explaining the "Gaza-first" solution, Beilin said: " Israel has no historical attachment 
to the GS and achieves no security gains by retaining it and its 700,000 Palestinian 
inhabitants .... The Palestinians, in turn, would realize their right to self-determination in Gaza 
and acquire an immanent interest in achieving peace with the Arab countries" (Israel 
Yearbook, 1990:256). Withdrawal from the GS was also proposed later by the Shinui and Ratz 
movements, as a way of maintaining Israel's security (al-Quds, 3 July 1991). 
Belin's call corresponded with a recent statement by Rabin and other ministers in the 
Labour Party in 1993. Rabin stated his wishes "that GS will disappear in the sea," because 
no one is willing to take it, which reflected the dilemma which the Israelis were in over the 
Strip. They believed an urgent political solution - through withdrawal - should be found for 
the Strip, ending a source of trouble to the authorities and for the safety of Israeli soldiers. 
This position was also agreed upon by the Likud members, especially following the escalation 
of resistance during the Intifada (al-Quds al-Arabi,14 September, 1991; Ha'aretZ,30 
March, 1993). 
Likud's agreement to withdrawal from the Strip, after initially rejecting it, could be seen 
as one contradiction of its ideology which calls for establishing " Eretz Israel ." The shift in 
the Likud's position was even voiced earlier - in the second year of the Intifada. Dan Meridor, 
a Likud Knesset member, said that Israel has made a big mistake by occupying the GS, which 
Egypt and Jordan refused to take (al-Quds,28 July, 1988). 
The dilemma which the Israeli leaders were in over the future of the Strip reflected 
itself in their statements. During a visit to the Strip Moshe Arenz, former Defence Minister, 
stated that the GS and Israel would form an all-inclusive economic entity, whatever the future 
political solution would be (al-Quds ai-Arabi, 16 January, 1992). Foreign Minister Shimon Peres 
also suggested recently that the implementation of autonomy in the GS first, - a similar call to 
that of Rabin on 23 May, 1993 -, would serve as an example, after reaching a formulation with 
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the Palestinians (al-Quds al-Arabi,8 June, 1993). Whereas, in December 1992 Rabin said that 
Israel would not withdraw from the Strip, for fear that the Palestinians would kill themselves 
(al-Quds ai-Arabi, 15 December, 1992). The irony, is of course, that Rabin's fears have no 
grounds when daily killings in the Strip are undertaken by the Israeli soldiers through a 
systematic design. 
The paradoxical approach adopted by the Israelis towards the future of the Strip raises 
the question as to whether these statements reflect the real stand of the Israeli government in 
power then and today? Or are they just used for internal consumption and to meet partisan 
interests, regardless of the wishes of the Palestinians and the efforts which should be made 
towards a peaceful settlement? 
4.2.5.1 Palestinians Stand Toward the Strip's Future 
For the Palestinians, the status of the Strip as part of the OTs is of the same importance 
as the other occupied lands. It cannot be separated from the WB. As Faisal Husseini and 
Abdel-Shafi negotiated in the peace process in 1993, GS has to be part of a comprehensive 
agreement with Israel (al-Quds ai-Arabi, 18 June, 1993). This same stand was also voiced with 
regard to Beilin's Gaza-first solution (Israel Yearbook, 1990:257). 
Palestinian attitudes towards the Strip and its future have been consistent. This was 
obvious in the Gazans' reaction to the authorities' early statements to annex the Strip; 
especially after the opening of the borders between Israel and the GS. For example, al-
Shawwa - Mayor of Gaza in 1972 -, said that the only option for us is to appeal to the UN to 
help us, and for the GS to be placed under international supervision until resolution 242 is 
implemented and Israeli withdrawal from the OTs is undertaken, to allow the Palestinians the 
right to self-determination (al- Quds,21 & 27 April, 1972; Ma'ariv,21 April,1972). 
Further condemnation by the Gaza Municipality was voiced, in response to the decision 
of the Foreign and Security Committee of the Knesset to annex the Strip. Cables were sent to 
the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Defence Minister and Military Governor of Gaza, and a copy 
was sent to the UN General Secretary (al-Quds, 20 February, 1977). Moreover, the conclusion 
reached by the delegation of the NLG in its report was that "Israel's objective of road 
widening was not to alleviate overcrowded conditions in the camps, nor to facilitate access and 
lighting for security patrols, but the objective is greater: to lay the foundation for its annexation 
by and incorporation into Israel" (NLG Report, 1978:24). 
The agreement between Israel and the PLO of 13 September 1993 will give the Strip 
and the town of Jericho a degree of autonomy. This is the first step towards reaching a final 
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settlement for the Palestine-Israeli conflict in a five-year interim period. This thesis will not 
deal in detail with the agreement of 1993, but will refer to some of the possibilities it raises for 
refugees, in the concluding Chapter. 
The Israeli explanation of withdrawal from the Strip is given by Peres. Talking to a 
Jewish audience in "Park East" Synagogue in Manhattan New York, on 27 September 1993, 
he said: " What is there in Gaza? Poverty, lack of resources, 35,000 births per year and the 
refugee camps, we have nothing to look after in Gaza; who says that Gaza is for us, he/she is 
not a Jew (aI-Quds aI-Arabi, 28 September, 1993). It is of importance to consider Peres's 
words in the light of the above debate about annexing the Strip and the big change in the Israeli 
policy on withdrawing from the Strip. It is a policy shift promoted by the militancy and the 
high birth rate of its refugees, and the persistent resistance to occupation and the tensions from 
decades of under-development. 
4.3 THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR RESEITLING REFUGEES 1967-
This section discusses the various suggestions and official proposals given by Israeli 
officials concerning resettlement of the WBGS's refugees since 1967. Their propositions and 
debates highlighted the conflict among the various Israeli parties, as was the case in the pre-
1967 war. As emigration of refugees from the OTs did not meet the wishes of the Israeli 
authorities, new suggestions were made, which it is important to tackle here. They reflect a 
continuity of policy, aimed at breaking the concentration of refugee camps and at dispersing 
refugees in an attempt to break their collective identity and militancy. 
In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the question of the PRs in the OTs imposed itself 
enormously on Israel and the state was compelled to find a solution to the refugees under its 
control. This section tackles the positions of the main Israeli political parties with regard to 
refugees and propositions for their resettlement, Their solutions ranged from a complete transfer 
of refugees to other places, to resettling them where they live and to find a just solution to the 
problem. The importance of these suggestions is that they enable us to trace the different fault 
lines which distinguish Israeli thinking with regard to the refugees "problem" and highlight links 
of continuity and discontinuity in the Israeli state's relationship with PRs. They also highlight 
the struggle between Israeli forces and PRs and emphasize that the Israeli state policies and 
agendas were not set out in a vacuum. 
In the first days after the end of June 1967 war, the refugee question was discussed at 
Prime Ministerial level in Israel. Allon's proposal of July 1967 was the first to suggest a 
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solution to the Palestinian problem through peaceful means, liquidating the refugee problem, 
by resettling as refugees in the WB and al-Arish (Zaru, 1991:138). 
Although the idea of transferring a large number of the as's population was not new, 
it came under the spotlight as the struggle between the resistance movement and the military 
authorities reached its peak, specifically in the Strip at in the early 1970's. The idea was 
expressed by Knesset members in debates on the refugee issue, and appeared in the form of 
several projects suggested by Israeli officials. 
4.3.1 The Early Debates 
During the early years of occupation, the first stage of debates on the PRs began in the 
Knesset. These debates highlighted the conflict among the various Israeli parties, as was the 
case in the pre-1967 period. Four schools of thought appeared with regard to refugees in the 
territories. Opposition to any form of resettlef!1ent; the transfer and resettlement of as refugees 
in the GS and WB villages and towns; improving the refugees' conditions where they lived and 
allowing their integration to the general life of the territories; and, finally, adherence to UN 
resolutions. The first three views were all offered without the recognition of the PRs the Right 
to Return. 
The first school included Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (who was the leading figure in 
opposing resettlement) and Rafi Party members, who were against the resettlement of refugees 
within the borders of the territories, and the denial of Israel's full responsibility for the 
problem. Voluntary emigration was seen by Eshkol as an exit to the problem; whereas Rafi 
argued that it would be an exchange of population between Arab Jews who immmigrated to 
Israel and Arab refugees who left Palestine (Ha'aretz,13 November, 1992; Karawan, 1973:21). 
Though a large number of Palestinians emigrated from the territories during and in the 
aftermath of the 1967 war, Eshkol's assumptions remained unreliable, since refugees in as 
remain a majority. Hesitancy towards resettlement was also voiced by Mapai for security 
reasons, and it advocated international co-operation to solve the problem (Karawan, 1973:23). 
In the second school, a small group in the Mirach advocated the idea of transferring 
all the refugees and resettling them in the WB. This idea was supported by Ranan Weitz, the 
head of the Settlement section in the Jewish Agency, who was famous for his project of 
resettling refugees in al- Arish (Karawan, 1973:21). 
Other parties in the Knesset - Liberals; Ha'Olam Hazeh; Free Center; and Mafdal -, 
advocated the resettlement of refugees in towns and villages of the territories and compensation 
for those who wanted to leave, so as to eliminate the phenomena of the refugee camps. The 
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Mafdal and the Free Centre saw the payment of compensation as a parallel to resettlement of 
refugees, - mainly GS refugees which compromised one-third of the population. They saw in 
this policy a method to facilitate control over the territories (Karawan, 1973: 43). The Platform 
Committee of the National Religious Party proposed and advocated the transfer ofPRs from GS 
to Arab countries and called for their resettlement in "Judea and Samaria" and in the Arab 
countries. Thus they approved a clause that the responsibility for the creation and non-solution 
of the refugee problem lies with the Arab countries (JP,6 December,1987). Furthermore, 
Mapam's Peace Proposal of 11 December, 1969 and August 1972 called for the integration 
of refugees in the general life of the territories, through the construction of housing projects, 
the adoption of a new socio-economic policy to improve living conditions, and provision of 
employment in agricultural, industrial and public services sectors (Younis,1979:111;al-Hur and 
al-Mousa, 1983: 110). Mapam's idea was supported strongly by the Prime Minister Golda Meir 
and Moshe Dayan, who were against the return of refugees to Palestine proper (Karawan, 
1973: 15 & 23). The Mirach (a coalition of the Labour Party formed in January 1968, itself an 
amalgamation of the Mapai, Ahudat Havoda, Rafi and Mapam parties in 1969) were divided 
over how to deal with the refugee problem. The Mapam recommendation was considered, and 
approval given to a "main project" prepared in 1968 and in 1969 by a social-economic planning 
team consisting of engineers, sociologists, and experts on water and electricity. The project 
involved the liquidation of the biggest camps in the Strip, starting with Rafah camp, which had 
a population of 40,000 people. The plan suggested the evacuation of 2,400 of the 6,000 
families which lived in the camp. The team suggested further offering economic incentives to 
the camp residents, for example, housing at a symbolic price in urban regions and the 
improvement of public services in the new locations. With regard to the provision of 
incentives, the team's programme explained that, 
The incentives are meant to hasten the process of evacuating the camps as part 
of the general change. Caution must be observed to prevent the impression 
among the refugees that the evacuation policy will liquidate their status as 
refugees or undermine its two basic principles - the rights to the return of 
property and to draw food rations and other UNRWA amenities. The supply 
of housing or any other assistance was not to be linked to the matter of 
compensation for property in Israel or with giving up the refugee ration-card 
(Zakin,1972:62 & 66). 
Officials in the military government in the territories advocated resettlement of refugees 
in the territories. Belonging to the third school, Alexander Aviram, - the man responsible for 
the Civil Administration at the beginning of the occupation -, suggested that the government 
could make an experiment by issuing an international tender to build housing - in the first stage 
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in the GS. The Israeli government could pay its share from the absentee property funds and 
there would be an appeal to the nations of the world to contribute for this purpose. Aviram 
suggested "that the Israeli Government or the Zionist movement (I think Dr. Goldmann would 
agree) could appeal to world Jewry to help build peace by contributing for this purpose in order 
to remove the shame with which the Arab countries have been making capital for 20 years" 
(Aviram, 1969:46). 
The Ha"Olem Hazeh, Rakah (the Israeli Communist Party) and Matzpen (the Israeli 
Socialist organization) represented the fourth school of thought. Supporting UN resolution 194 
(III), payment of compensation or return was seen as the way towards solving the refugee 
problem. Uri Avniri, the voice of the Ha'Olem Hazeh movement proposed in March 1968 that 
the solution should be coordination between the Palestinian people and the Israeli people after 
ending the situation of war between Israel and the Palestinian republic that would be established. 
Israel would not be responsible to resettle refugees who chose to return - not necessarily to their 
former homes - with international funds (Karawan, 1973 :57).· 
Rakah emphasised that no just peace would prevail in the area and for the people of 
Israel, without recognizing the national rights for the Palestinian people alongside the national 
rights of Israelis (Younis,1979: 111-113;al-Hur and al-Mousa,1983: 160;Karawan,1973:58). 
Matspen, who consider Israel a colonial regime and have been condemning the authorities' 
measures in the territories argued that the non-Zionist Israeli state should compensate those who 
wanted to return and those who did not, through a willingness to withdraw from some parts of 
the territories where the Palestinians could have their own independent state if they wished 
(Karawan,1973:60). 
4.3.2 The Crystallization of Plans 
Initial debates were distinguished by confusion over the issue of PRs. The period 
between 1968 and 1976, a second stage in the process, witnessed intensive discussions of the 
refugee issue and proposals were crystallized, submitted and named after those who suggested 
them. These proposals are discussed below, with the exception of the Ben Porath Plan which 
brought a great internal and external outcry, and appear to converge on a number of points. 
Whereas Israel pre 1967 was talking about refugees outside its borders and control, in the post 
1967s it was forced to deal with those within its borders. In some proposals by Israeli officials 
one can detect a slight change over where to resettle refugees and how. 8 
Weitz, Dayan, Galili and Allon agreed to reduce the density of the camp population in 
the GS by resettling them in the WB and al-Arish, in housing projects that would be set up for 
130 
that purpose after the dismantling of the camps. As Allon put it, a model village was to be 
constructed in order to prove to the world Israel's good intentions (Younis,1979:115-116; al-
Qabas,13 November,1988). 9 They believed that the refugee problem would be solved only 
through the rehabilitation of the refugees and not by giving them their legitimate rights as 
Anwar Sadat declared, which implied the return to Ramlah and Yaffo (al-Quds,19 March, 1971). 
Weitz even suggested how the rehabilitated Palestinians were to be employed; 10% in 
agriculture and the rest in new industrial enterprises and public services. Similar calls were 
made by Peres in 1970, when he recommended that centres of trade and industry be established 
near the new locations to enable refugees to earn a steady living, and raise their standards of 
hygiene, welfare and education (Zakin,1972:64). Weitz further recommended payment of 
compensation to refugees in need, to enable them to buy houses in the housing projects. He 
believed that through resettlement of refugees the gap in living conditions between the refugees 
and non-refugees might be reduced (al-Hur and al-Mousa, 1983:158). However, this project 
was rejected by the government at the end of 1969 (al-Qabas, 13 November,1988; Palestine 
Affairs, September (1971):213). Weitz's eccentric idea appeared in his second proposal for a 
peace settlement of December 1972, when he retreated from the idea of resettling refugees at 
al-Arish and instead advocated their resettlement in Rafah, because he viewed the refugees as 
a "different" ethnic group than their Arab brethren (Karawan,1973:31). 
The Galilee Document, entitled "Rehabilitation of Refugees and development in the 
WBGS" , suggested the allocation of funds for a four-year plan to rehabilitate refugees and 
for development. The foundations of this plan were changes in the living conditions of the 
refugees (by setting up new housing projects besides their camps, and the renovation of camps), 
plus the integration of refugees within the nearby towns, to be under municipalities' 
responsibility (Davar,16 August,1973; Karawan,1973:33). 
The Eban and Peres proposals coincided with regard to seeing a solution to the refugee 
problem in the context of a comprehensive peace or regional settlement. Earlier in 1969 both 
doubted the possibility of relocating refugees to a new life, since circumstances and facilities 
for such projects were lacking in Israel which was in a state of war 
(Younis,1979:113;Karawan,1973:26). Nonetheless, Eban called for the convention of an 
international conference, in the presence of the Middle Eastern countries, of states that 
contribute to the UNRWA and the specialized committees at the UN. Both Eban and Peres 
agreed upon the idea of integrating refugees living outside the OTs in the productive cycle of 
the societies they live in (Salman, 1975: 161;al-Hur and al-Mousa,1983:111; Younis,1979:113). 
Allon's comprehensive and thorough proposal of 1972 argued that a solution to the 
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refugee "problem" could be achieved in the framework of autonomy rule for the Palestinians 
in the territories. He affirmed that the seeds of the Palestinian entity had been rooted since the 
1967 war and a political phenomenon named Palestine would soon emerge on the world map. 
However, the government did not agree (Karawan, 1973:29). Israel Galili's committee called 
for a partial solution to the refugee problem, until peace treaties were reached with the Arab 
countries (al-Quds,9 August,1971). 
Outstanding public Israeli figures also voiced their views with regard to resettlement of 
refugees. The president of the Bank of Israel called upon the Israeli government to allocate 
funds for the rehabilitation of PRs within the context of a peace treaty. He said that this could 
be carried out and funded with the establishment of an international fund with Israel as a 
contributor (al-Quds, 2 December,1971). The suggestion of tendering for housing, discussed 
earlier, was made by Alexander A viram, the man responsible for Civil Administration at the 
beginning of the occupation (Aviram,1969:46). 
The first practical action began in February 1970, adopting some of the proposals of 
the social-economic planning team set out in 1968 and 1969. Peres was vested with 
responsibility for the rehabilitation of the refugees outside the camps (Zakin,1972:64) and set 
up a secret trust fund (frust Fund for the Economic Development and Rehabilitation of 
Refugees) in May 1970 for this purpose. Contributions from philanthropists abroad, both 
Zionists and non-Jewish, reached IL 7 million in the first half of 1972 (Zakin,1972:64-5). The 
trust was secret because, as Peres told The Observer's correspondent, "the chance of success 
is in inverse proportion to the amount of publicity. " Peres's hoped that, through resettlement 
of Gaza refugees, the military government could replace UNRWA's works (JP,22 
September, 1971). The trust was used to improve the infrastructure of camps - IL 522,000 
being allocated for the improvement of four Gaza camps; IL 220,000 for improvements in five 
refugee camps on the WB; IL 300,000 for improvement of the Shifa Hospital in the GS; and 
IL 22,500 for the electricity network in J enin. The funds were spent without revealing the 
ultimate political goal, of resettlement (The Observer,1 August,1971; Zakin, 1972:64-5). 
4.3.3 Ben Porath Plan: A Multiplicity of Intentions 
The largest plan, which provoked a lot of protest by the refugees and those in other 
circles, was unveiled by Minister Ben Porath on November 20, 1983. It covered all refugees 
and seven years after the 1976 Weitz proposal. Ben Porath chaired a committee on refugee 
resettlement while serving a minister without portfolio in the Begin government in the 1970s. 
He argued against the official UN position that a just solution to the refugees required their 
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repatriation or, at least, their compensation for lost property. 
His programme was costed at $1.5 million and involved rehousing in the society at 
large 30,000 refugee families ( about 250000 people) over a five-year period. Refugee status 
was to cease for those who fled from their homes as a result of the Arab-Israeli wars. The Ben 
Porath plan suggested the dismantling of the camps in the WBGS and the resettling of their 
inhabitants, on a voluntary basis, in better housing in the towns and cities. 
Porath described the Israeli intention to erase the camps as humanitarian and voluntary 
and without political implications. "The main motif of the plan is that an exchange of 
population has occurred in the Middle East." He was precise in his indication that this 
governmental proposal would not prejudice any future Arab-Israeli political negotiations. He 
stated in a press conference that resettlement of GS refugees should be an example Imodel to 
resettle other refugees in other locations (al-Hourriah, October (1985);17; JP, 21 November, 
1983). In answer to a question on the timing of the plan's announcement, he said: "this is 
connected with the situation which the PLO is passing through - after the 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon" (al-Talia'h,24 November,1983). He failed to indicate how his scheme could be 
implemented, except that American aid was to finance the programme, fuelling Palestinian 
suspicion that it was only the prelude to expulsion of a substantial percentage of the refugee 
population. However, when efforts to raise American funds failed, the plan died as official 
policy (Viorst, 1989: 109-110). 
Though Ben Porath plan was not disclosed fully by the government, Israeli officials 
revealed the proposed places for resettlement of refugees. The Jordan valley (Fasayel area) was 
given a priority; and Qalandia and Shufa'at camps in Jerusalem were suggested as the first for 
clearing (al-Awdeh, December (1983):35; al-Hourriah, October (1985): 16). Jericho was 
suggested, where refugees could fill empty camps, the inhabitants having deserted during the 
1967 war (al-Bayader al-Siyassi, November (1983):28). Ben Porath himself, at a press 
conference in West Jerusalem, was unclear as to whether the refugees would be resettled near 
their homes within the "Green Line." He said: "if we do so, then we will have to send the 
Jewish refugees who came from the Arab countries to their own homes" (al-Fajr English,25 
November, 983). The irony in Porath's answer, is that, despite its vagueness, it still implies 
denial of the right of the Palestinians to live where they want on their own land, while new 
Jewish settlers in the territories are given priority to live wherever they want. 
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4.3.4 Reactions To Ben Porath Plan 
4.3.4.1 Palestinian Refugees' Reaction 
The refugees in the OTs unequivocally rejected the idea of Ben Porath plan. The Ben 
Porath plan has been criticized as an attempt to create Bantustans along the South African model 
for the Palestinians. Collectively and individually, protests by the refugees was stronger than 
ever before. On the collective level, coordination committees were formed from representatives 
of the 20 camps in the WB to frustrate the implementation of the plan, and raise awareness 
among the camp population about Israeli plans to resettle refugees (al-A wdeh , November 
(1983):20; Locke and Stewart, 1985:62). 
In a press conference in West Jerusalem at Beit Agaron on 21 November 1983, 
organized by the Israeli Committee in Solidarity with Birzeit University, residents from 
Dheisheh camp (near Bethlehem) challenged the Israeli press attending the conference to go 
and ask the refugees their opinion regarding the resettlement plan. Dheisheh camp residents 
were the most active against the plan; since their camp was nominated as the first to be 
dismantled. In this conference, the chairman of the Social Youth Centre in Dheisheh camp 
said, " we in Dheisheh camp reject Ben Porath's settlement plan because we do not want to 
improve our living conditions but rather look for a historical political solution based on UN 
resolutions; "other residents of the camp asserted that harassment had increased since the Ben 
Porath plan was presented (al-Quds; al-Fajr; 22 November,1983). 
Furthermore, several communiques were issued by representatives of PRs on the WB 
dealing with this issue. On 21 November, 1983 residents of Dheisheh camp issued a statement 
rejecting the plan, and calling upon all parties, institutions and progressive individuals both 
inside and abroad to work for a speedy end to the policy of resettlement and repression (al-
A wdah , November (1983):3). Individual refugee protest and rejection of the plan was as 
intensive as the collective voice. Their stand stemmed from the strong belief that a solution to 
their problem should take place in the framework of a comprehensive peace, with no separation 
between them. Further to that, some accepted resettlement, but, only in a Palestinian state. 
In the words of a Gazan refugee: " The Israelis aim to create new facts. By destroying the 
camps, they hope to destroy our yearning to return to Palestine and our status as refugees" 
(MEI,January (1984):11; al-Awdah,November (1983):38). In protesting at Ben-Porath's plan 
the PRs saw a link and connection in the timing between his proposal and the call by the Israeli 
Settlements Council in the OTs, to impose "order" on the WB camps, through the demolition 
of houses located on the main roads so as to facilitate the movement of settlers and Israeli army 
134 
personnel. The refugees attributed this call to the escalating Palestinian resistance, particularly 
among camp residents (al-Talia'h, 24 November,1983; al-Awdah,November(1983):37). The 
Arab states, in reaction to Ben Porath plan, persuaded the UN General Assembly in 1983 to 
denounce the Israeli idea as "a violation of (the refugees') inalienable right of return" 
(Viorst, 1989: 110) 
Shamir's initiative of May 14,1989 formed the next official stand towards a solution to 
the refugee question after Ben Porath's proposal. The initiative was launched almost six months 
after Arafat recognized Israel's existence and renounced terrorism, encouraged by the 
American administration who saw in it possibilities for moving the peace process forward. 
Article 4 (c) of the initiative reads: 
Israel calls for an international endeavor to resolve the problem of the residents 
of the Arab refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district in order to 
improve their living conditions and to rehabilitate them. Israel is prepared to 
be a partner in this endeavor (New Outlook, August (1989):37). 
From the Palestinian point of view, the initiative was perceived as one of addressing the 
Palestinians, "not as a people, but as a hindrance in what is called Judea and Samaria, and it 
overlooked the two-thirds of our people who are in exile ", as put by Faisal Husseini in an 
interview with New Outlook (New Outlook, August (1989): 16). The focus on rehabilitating 
refugees in the territories only implies a denial of their right of return together with those who 
live outside Palestine, as Resolution 194 (III) entails. 
4.3.4.2 Alternative Israeli Reaction 
The Israeli progressive forces' position towards the plan was voiced in the Beit Agoron 
conference by representatives of the Solidarity Committee with Birzeit University. Their 
argument was that the refugee problem cannot be reduced to the living conditions of refugees 
only; the Palestinian problem is not merely a refugee problem, and the refugees should remain 
in their camps until a compehensive settlement for the whole Palestine-Israeli conflict is found 
(al-Quds,25 November,1983). 
Another critical Israeli voice came from Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of 
Jerusalem and a well known writer on the O.T's. He called the plan "a storm in a tea cup", 
adding "the fate of the plan will be similar to the fate of at least 10 other supposed plans aimed 
at "improving" the conditions of the Palestinian refugee camps." He continued to say that, if 
it is aimed to create new facts, as the 1971 camp operations in GS, then it is a bad plan (al-
Fajr, 25 November,1983). 
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4.3.4.3 The Americans: Reaction or Collusion 
The American comment on Ben Porath plan was given by John Hewes, the spokesman 
for the State Department. He stated that the Reagan administration objected to any Israeli plan 
to relocate refugees unwillingly from their camps in the WB. Hewes abandoned the idea of 
absorbing ten of thousands of PRs in the US, as discussed at State Department level, in early 
July 1983. He added that, if Israel submits this plan to Washington, the US position will stem 
from the refugees' position themselves; and UNRWA's position, being responsible for refugee 
affairs. He emphasized that refugee participation in the Ben Porath plan has to be voluntary 
not enforced, and in coordination with UNRWA (al-Quds,15 August, & 24 November, 1983). 
This American position is completely different to its general position on the refugee question 
pre-and post-1967, when it had advocated resettlement of PRs in the Arab countries. It also 
contradicted a secret American Project discussed and promoted in Richard Murphy's flIes, 
which became available to some European and Arab sources. Under the pretext of" improving 
quality of life" in the OTs, Murphy revealed that the American administration insisted on 
resettlement of refugees as the only solution to the refugee problem. Thus, recommending the 
liquidation of the refugee camps in the OTs, and regular Israeli attacks on the refugee camps 
in Lebanon, to force the Palestinians there to emigrate. In fact, since 1982 the US has opened 
its doors to PRs in Lebanon, as have Canada and Australia (al-Mithaq,3 April,1986). Claude 
Julian, in his book America's Empire, described Murphy as a counterfeit of the "merchant of 
Venice. " In each trip to the Arab capitals, he tried to sell one basic purchase - a secret 
American plan aimed at resettlement of PRs where they live, after the dismantling of the camps, 
and by integrating refugees with the indigenous population (al-Mithaq,3 April,1986). 
The question to be raised is, could Ben Porath's plan be seen as part of the "American 
Orchestra" which aims at systematic liquidation of the refugees and their camps? And, in that 
case, how truthful was the American reaction to the Ben Porath plan? Israeli-American 
coordination could be further seen within the framework of George Shultz's proposal, when he 
was the American Secretary of State, for what he called the " quality of life " 
(Viorst, 1989: Ill). In 1986, a "new policy" by the Israeli authorities to "improve the quality 
of life" in the territories began to see the light. This was seen via the appointing of new 
Palestinian mayors in the municipalities to replace Israeli generals. Moreover, the American -
Israeli coordinated project, which was presented under economic cover, found a third partner. 
Jordan's Five-Year Plan for Development in the East and WB of October 1986, was perceived 
in association with the American-Israeli programme. This Jordanian plan for the two Banks was 
given out despite the disintegration of political coordination between the PLO and Jordan on 
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19 February 1986. 
The American-Israeli-Jordanian coordination for a new "development" policy in the 
territories was seen by the PLO as reinforcing Israeli occupation on Palestinian land. For the 
PLO, such a coordination could serve the Israelis in future peace negotiations. The Israeli-
Jordanian coordination aimed at curtailing PLO power in the territories, by establishing an 
alternative leadership. "The Village Leagues" were the embodiment of this coordination; 
formed from former Jordanian officials living in the WB. These Leagues were short-lived, due 
to the massive support of the WB population for the PLO (Shahin, 1986: 142-3; Peretz, 1986:98-
100). 10 
Having discussed all this, it is important for us to note that the Israeli authorities stand 
and dilemma over the PRs issue post- 1967 was, and still is, a replica of its position in the 
pre-1967 era, discussed in the previous Chapter. Analysis has enabled us to see the link and 
continuity in Israeli policy and plans towards refugees. These reflect denial rather than 
recognition of political rights, and thus a continuity in their dispersal strategy. This position 
is further linked to the PRs natural increase and militancy, especially in the GS, where 
resistance to occupation has been of unique nature, as has the Israeli response to it. 
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NOTES: 
1. Similar descriptions were given by Sir Anthony Parsons in a conference in Oxford in 1991. 
2. Jordan's aim to prevent emigration did not meet with what was reported by the NIT' 
correspondent, who wrote that barring their admission was on the "ground that it relieves 
Israel of a burden and creates added problems for the strained Jordanian economy (NYJ', 31 
July, 1968; 27 September, 1968). 
3. The Kibya massacre resulted in the killing of fifty-three persons who were in no way directly 
responsible either for Jordan's policy or the acts of the infiltrators. The operation was 
immediately denounced by Britain and the United States, and the Security Council voted Israel 
as an aggressor. The Kibya incident opened a new page in Arab-Israeli relations; with the 
Jordanians - and the entire Arab world - crying for revenge. 
4. For more details on the events of "Black September", see: Brand, 1988: 171. 
5. In GS, and before Sharon carried out the operations in the camps, the authorities established 
two commands: one to deal with security and the other with civil affairs. For details, see: 
Palestine AjJairs,July(1971): 175. 
6. The methods used were of a coercive nature to force owners "concede" their land. For 
example, "people who worked as teachers or in other government service jobs are fired because 
they refused to sell their land ... etc." (NLG Report, 1978: p.25). 
7. The term Miri refers to the rural land in the Ottoman empire which was not "owned" in the 
Western sense of the term but was held hereditarily on a usufruct basis. The term Miri has 
been in use since then. For more details on the land-tenure questions see: Doreen Warriner, 
" Land tenure problems in the Fertile Crescent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," in the 
The economic history o/the Middle East, 1800-1914: A book o/readings, Charles Issawi (ed.). 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966 : 71-78. 
8. During the period from 1968 to 1973, the following proposals were submitted by Israeli 
officials towards solving the refugee problem, mainly in the Gaza Strip. Ra'anan Weitz 
proposals of 1967, 1969 and 1976; Abba Eban proposal of 8 October, 1968 before the General 
Assembly; Yigal Allon proposals of 1968 and 1972; Shimon Peres proposal of 1969; Israel 
Galili proposal of 1971 and 1973; Moshe Daya proposal of 1971; Ben Porath proposal of 
November 1983; Shamir's Initiative of May 1989. 
9. Ra'anan Weitz was the head of the settlement's section in the Jewish Agency, 1963-1984, 
who always advocated P.Rs resettlement. His role continued in the post-1967 period. 
10. For more details on the Village Leagues, see: Salim Tamari in Aruri,1986:377-390. 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
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THE RESEITLEMENT PROCESS: POLICY AND 
PROCEDURES 
This Chapter provides a detailed analysis of the issue of resettlement in GS. It relies 
on data obtained from the sample survey, in addition to some statistics from UNRWA regarding 
the camp shelters. 
The first section of the Chapter tackles the aims of the authorities in carrying out 
resettlement schemes, and awareness of these aims by the refugees. It is revealed that the 
refugees have a very clear idea of Israeli aims and policies, regardless of their educational 
attainment. 
This Chapter offers details of the criteria for relocation. These are: a down-payment; 
residency in a refugee camp; the demolition of camp shelter; and the signing of a contract. It 
is argued that the demolition of camp shelters is a particularly serious precondition for 
relocation when perceived in the wider context of the socioeconomic conditions of refugees. 
The refugees' lack of means enhances their residential stability or immobility, compared with 
other sectors of the Palestinian society. 
A critical perspective is brought to bear on the Israeli claim that the resettling of GS 
refugees aims to improve their housing conditions. This is difficult to sustain. The demolition 
of camp shelters aggravates the housing crisis in the camps, instead of alleviating the problem. 
Rather than being carried out in order to ease overcrowding, as the Israelis claim, the 
demolition of camp shelters is undertaken for reasons of security and in order to suppress 
Palestinian resistance. 
The final section of the chapter draws on field data to examine the reasons behind 
removals from the SC to the housing project. It is demonstrated that relocation was not 
undertaken by the refugees as a gesture of support for the Israeli schemes, but to alleviate 
overcrowding in their camp shelters, made more acute by the absence of new construction by 
UNRW A and the building restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on camp residents. 
Furthermore, an important feature of the findings from the two case study area is that 
it illuminates an important political aspect with regard to the reason for accepting to move out 
from the camp, which can be understood in the context of reinforcing a national goal by staying 
on the Palestinian soil and the enhancement of their sumud (steadfastness) as a collectivity. 
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S.2 AIMS OF RESE1TLEMENT 
A pattern can be discerned in the Israeli authorities' explanations of the aims behind 
the crackdown on the camps in 1971 and the establishment of the housing projects in the GS, 
characterized by giving conflicting statements when both issues were posed. The humanitarian 
.claims made by the Israeli authorities did not convince the refugees, whose understanding of 
the aims of resettlement is discussed below. 
5.2.1 Refugees' Awareness of Aims 
The proper context for a better understanding of the attitudes of the refugees towards 
the aims of resettlement is the relationship between refugees and the Israeli authorities. Since 
1967, this relationship has been one of enmity rather than amity. For GS refugees this enmity 
dates to the first Israeli occupation of 1956/1957. The Israeli efforts to win "the heart and 
mind" of GS refugees by setting up the housing projects, following the crackdown on the camps 
in 1971, did not improve its image among refugees . 
. Refugee awareness as to the real motives behind resettlement are shown in Table 5.1. 
The majority of refugees, 72.5% in the SC and 74.4% in the SR project, consider the aim of 
resettlement to be political. This seems to be because respondents understood the Israeli policy 
to be the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, and the elimination of the term refugee and 
his/her status, by dismantling the camps. Other respondents, in informal discussions, 
mentioned that the authorities want to dismantle the SC, to make way for their "Riviera" 
complex of hotels and restaurants. Some refugees in the SR project confided to the author that 
the publicity element has a role, the authorities using the projects as a model to show the 
foreign visitors their good intentions in trying to solve the refugee problem through providing 
more humane housing conditions. The element of publicity was also emphasized by Dr. 
Haider abdel-Shafi, serving Israel in improving its image vis-a-vis the issue of PRs (Interview, 
28/7/1991). 
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TABLE 5.1 Refugees Attitudes on the Aims of Resettlement 
Aim 
Humanitarian 
Economical 
Political 
Don't know 
Total 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Frequency 
SC SR 
2 9 
9 3 
103 67 
28 11 
142 90 
Percent 
SC SR 
1.4 10.0 
6.3 3.3 
72.5 74.4 
19.7 12.2 
100.0 100.0 
The awareness of the political motivation of Israeli policy was revealed cross-
sectionally among the refugees, in both locations and irrespective of their educational status, 
even being noticeable among the illiterate respondents (see Table 5.2). 
TABLE 5.2 Aims of Resettlement by Level of Education in both Locations (in numbers) 
Aims of Res.! Hum. Econ. Pol. Don't Know Row Total 
Educ.Level SC SR SC SR SC SR SC SR SC SR 
ntiterate 
- 1 23 16 .10 4 34 20 
Elementary 3 2 1 19 15 8 2 29 21 
Preparatory 1 1 21 11 10 1 33 13 
Secondary 2 4 1 26 17 4 31 24 
Tech. College 1 9 3 9 4 
University 3 5 5 6 8 
Total 2 9 9 3 103 67 28 11 142 90 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
This awareness could be attributed to three factors: firstly, the politicized atmosphere 
in the GS and its effect on the population, mainly in refugee communities. These communities 
are part of the broader Palestinian society, in which the politicization process is as old as 
political Zionism. That was observed by the Shaw Commission of Inquiry which came to 
Palestine after the 1929 rebellion. It reported that the Arab Fellaheen (peasantry), despite a 
high rate of illiteracy, were "highly conscious politically and, in fact, were more politically -
minded than many Europeans" (al-Kayyali,1970:254). The s~cond factor promoting an 
understanding of the political nature of resettlement was the role played by the Youth Clubs 
and Committees in the camps in stirring the national consciousness and enlightening the refugees 
about the resettlement schemes, and later about the Ben-Porath project; Thirdly, the Intifada 
enhanced the political consciousness C?f the Palestinians in the OTs, taking a non-class character, 
being mainly due to the escalation of the "iron fist" policy by the authorities against the 
population. (See Chapter 8). 
Moreover, the PLO call at the beginning of the housing projects in the early seventies 
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might also be a factor in the rejection of resettlement. It forbade the refugees to accept the 
offer and move out, and for more than a year no families did (Viorst, 1989: 110). 
It could be argued that the goal of providing alternative housing may be legitimate, 
given the poor conditions in the camps; the Israelis apparently have a further motive in 
pursuing that policy. It is linked to the attempts to separate camp people from their community 
and from their refugee status. 
5.2.2 Conflicting Israeli Aims 
Israelis claimed that humanitarian motives were behind the setting up of the housing 
projects. Major Amir Cheshin, former information officer for the Israeli military command in 
charge of the GS, told a NIT correspondent "that the idea behind the projects is less security 
and more humanitarian" (NIT,24 November, 1976). The same was said by Brig. Gen. Freddi 
Zak, the Deputy Coordinator for the OTs. He argued in a seminar on the government housing 
projects on 10 July 1989, that they are very important humanitarian schemes which offer the 
refugees the chance to improve their standard of living by moving away from the miserable 
conditions of the camps (UNRWA Records,PIO,19 July 1989). 
In contrast to these views, a Defence Ministry official, when questioned about the 
demolition of camp shelter, as a pre-condition to moving to the housing project, said: " Of 
course we demolish them. The whole point of the projects is to get rid of the refugee camps" 
(JP, 19 October, 1988). Additionally, we might consider the Minister of Defence report on the 
achievement gained: "As the refugee changes his status, he becomes a local and urban resident, 
with equal rights" (Ministry of Defence, 1983:57). Therefore, the elimination of the camps and 
the refugee status could be seen as twin political motives behind refugee resettlement schemes. 
In the early stage of the projects, Dayan, the then Defence Minister, explained, "The 
purpose of the project is to improve the standard of living ... we have no designs on their 
political status as refugees. But in the meantime, they will live a better life." Whereas, in an 
earlier statement, he said, that the result of such policy is to make GS refugees "refugees in 
name only" (NIT, 2 April, 1973). 
5.3 THE EXTENT OF ISRAELI HOUSING PROJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP 
UNRWA reports were the only source on refugee resettlement in GS. This was because 
it was impossible to have access to information from the Rehabilitation of Refugees' Division 
in Gaza. The UNRWA records differentiate between two type of projects, even if they carry 
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the same name and are in the same location. The differentiation is based and related to the 
authorities policy with regard to the schemes, as mentioned below - the stage of offering houses, 
and the stage of offering plots of land. Regarding the first stage, the first project to be 
established was Canada Camp or project before 1973 (named after a multinational peacekeeping 
contingent stationed there in the 1960's). It is of importance to give some detail about this 
project since it is a unique case in the Strip. This project was left in Egypt after the Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai in 1982, as part of the original Camp David peace accords between 
Egypt and Israel. 
In June 1989 there were 891 families (5370 persons) in 488 houses, in the Canada 
Project (UNRWA, 1989: 1). They live divided by a high security fence in Rafah (town in GS). 
In June 1985, the Egyptian and the Israeli government negotiators agreed on the gradual return 
to the GS of the refugees stranded in the Canada camp. The Egyptian government apparently 
agreed to pay "compensation" to the refugees to ~e extent of US$ 8,000 per nuclear family; 
while the Israeli government would make available 500 plots of land in the Tel Sultan housing 
project in Rafah, for an estimated 750 families, and would also issue Israeli identification cards 
(UNRWA, PIO Records,3 June 1985; The Middle East, 1988: 17). 
The implementation of the return was delayed until June 1989 when the first group, 
comprising 20 families (105 persons) was allowed to return. Some technical points, which 
where agreed upon later between the Egyptians and Israelis, delayed the return. One of these 
was compelling, in that the Israelis made it a condition that "the 20 returning families have to 
sign undertakings to abide with the Israeli rules and regulations while the Egyptians said it 
should be the prevailing rules and regulations" (UNRWA, PIO Records, 5 June, 1989). Since 
June 1989, families have been returning from the Canada project in stages. 
The delay was partially attributed also to the opposition raised by the Israeli settlers in 
the GS, who in 1986 voiced their protestations against the Egyptian-Israeli agreement; and later 
in 1989 camped on the allocated site for the returnees. Their opposition was revealed by Zvi 
Handel, chairman of the settlers council, when he said: "For the last seven years, the PLO 
has operated a branch office in the Egyptian Canada district, and they trained those Arabs due 
to come over here to be terrorists" (NYI,8 December,1989; al-Quds,ll and 12 April,1986). 
The other projects established - of the first stage type - were as follows: 1) The 
Shuqairi project in Khan Yunis which commenced in March 1973; by June 1989 it had 135 
families (848 persons) in 128 houses; 2) The Brazilian project in Rafah started in April 1973, 
in June 1989 it had 436 families (2820 persons) in 422 houses; 3) The SR project in Gaza town 
commenced in March 1974, it had 790 families (5029 persons) in 806 houses; 4) AI-Amal 
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project in Khan Yunis commenced in May 1979, it had 802 families (4853 persons) in 842 
houses. Houses in the first stage type project are of three categories: houses with 2 rooms, 
houses with 3 rooms and others with 4 rooms; houses also are of two, four or five storeys. 
The second stage type where plots of land were offered started in September 1974 in 
Nasr Site in Gaza town. By June 1989, 36 houses were constructed on 36 plots of land, with 
36 families (186 persons). The SR project, of July 1976, where 1000 plots were allocated, of 
which 126 were under construction in June 1989 was composed of 741 houses and 1186 
families (7190 persons). Beit Labia project in Jabalia, which commenced in October 1977, saw 
700 plots allocated; by June 1989 it had 30 under construction, and consisted of 472 houses and 
832 families (5280 persons). Tal Sultan project in Rafah started in April 1978, with 1600 plots 
of land allocated, 72 of which were under construction, and has 943 houses with 1041 families 
(6399 persons). AI-Amal project in Khan Yunis commenced in July 1979, 200 plots were 
allocated, 8 were still under construction, and had 184 houses with 343 families (2084 persons). 
Rafab Brazilian project, also commenced in July 1979, with 109 plots allocated, and consisted 
of 109 houses and 161 families (1038 persons). The last of the projects set up was Nazleh Site 
in Gaza town in April 1981, where 180 plots were allocated. It consisted up to June 1989 of 
168 houses, accommodating 163 families (1195 persons). 
In all, the number of houses of the first stage type reached 2686, accommodating 3054 
families (18,920 persons) by June 1989; whereas, the second stage totalled 6642 allocated plots 
of land, of which 250 were under construction, and consisted of 5428 houses and 6905 families 
(42,798 persons) (Calculated from UNRWA, Accommodaton Office,June 1989). 
5.4 CRITERIA FOR RELOCATION 
Any refugee living in a camp is eligible to apply through the Housing Department in 
the Civil Administration in Gaza to obtain a house or a plot of land in the Israeli sponsored 
housing projects. Applications could be submitted to the military government through the 
mayor in hislher area. This open procedure emerged in the late seventies, to distinguish it 
from the first period of the housing projects in which relocation was done in complete secrecy 
and carried out by a "backdoor" device. 1 
Several conditions must be met in order for a refugee family to relocate to the housing 
project: A down-payment; residency in a refugee camp; and demolition of the camp shelter. 
These are considered below. 
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5.4.1 A Down-Payment 
A down-Payment ofIL 24,000 was required in the first stage, when the authorities used 
to offer three- room houses (fype A) of an average area of 42 square metres, and built on a 250 
square metres plot of land, on 99-year leases as given in the contract. The cost of the housing 
units was heavily subsidized. In a later stage, and until 1976, the houses offered were two-
room houses (fype B). Since then very few vacant houses have been offered to refugees. The 
price in the second stage ranged from IL39,000 to IL 42,000. The family was generally 
required to pay IL 21,000 as a down-payment, and could arrange a mortgage through the 
Housing Department (fhe Branch of Refugees Rehabilitation) for the remaining amount, as had 
been announced by the Civil Administration in 1977. 
Houses in the projects were constructed by either the Public works Department, local 
contractors or Israeli contractors. 
For those who relocate to the housing project, infrastucture is provided by the Civil 
Administration at nominal cost. The authorities claim that grants of about $20,000 were 
provided to each refugee family, in services and cash to relocate (UNRWA Records,PIO, 19 
July,1989; Ministry of Defence, 1983:56). 
The houses offered were of very poor quality. Refugees relocated "hated the tiny, box-
like flats that Israelis like, hot in summer and cold in winter and no space to absorb expanding 
families" (The Independent, 18 July, 1989).2 (See Plate 5.1). The rebuilding of these poor -
quality houses from scratch was undertaken by some refugee families, who had remittances 
from sons in the Gulf, others made patchy repairs to survive rainy winters (Locke and 
Stewart, 1985:60) 
In the SR project, 40% of the sample survey indicated that they had bought a house; 
whereas, 60% had bought a plot of land. The sample survey also showed that 35.6% received 
a two-room house; whereas 4.4% received a three- room house. Out of the total households 
sampled in 1991 at the SR project, 40 received houses, of which 20 (22.2%) added rooms to 
their housing units and 10 (11.1 %) demolished their houses and rebuilt them from scratch on 
a multi-storey style, and 60 (66.7 % ) built their houses directly, since they received vacant plots 
of land from the GS Housing Department. Plate 5.1 shows multi-storey buildings bordering 
the old type of houses provided at the first stage of the project. 
The authorities shifted their policy in 1976 from offering houses to offering plots of land 
of 250 sq.m. to each refugee family. A family was entitled to build its own house from the 
ground on that land, and it was stipulated that it should be a concrete building of one or two 
stories. In 1978, the price of each plot of land (200 sq.m.) was IL20,OOO according to the 
Plate 5.1 
Photo: 
Type of old houses given for refugees at the first stage in the Sheikh Radwan Israeli 
sponsored housing project. 
The author. 1991 
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refugees; yet, the Ministry of Defence report stated that the land was provided free of charge. 
Refugee families were given two options in assistance for the construction of their houses: first, 
a loan of IL30,OOO, which would be repaid over 10 years with an interest rate of 14%; second, 
a grant of IL10,OOO (UNRWA Records, Accommodation Office, Gaza,5 April, 1978; Ministry 
of Defence, 1983:57). 
In 1977, the size of the plot of land was further reduced to 125 sq. m. The authorities 
attributed this shift to the shortage of land suitable for building purposes. So, from 1977 
onwards two-storey buildings were constructed on each plot, to accomodate two families on 
each parcel of available land (lbid.:58). However, this Israeli justification regarding land 
shortage in GS has to be examined against the authorities' policy to pave the way for future 
projected expansion of Jewish settlement in the Strip. Table 5.3 indicates the size of plots of 
land received by refugees in the SR sample survey. 
TABLE 5.3 Size of Plot of Land Received by SR Residents 
Size 
125 sq.m. 
200 sq.m. 
250 sq.m. 
300 sq.m. 
375 sq.m. 
450 sq.m. 
500 sq.m. 
Total 
Frequency 
13 
15 
52 
5 
2 
1 
2 
90 
Source: The 1991 sample survey. 
Percent 
14.4 
16.7 
57.8 
5.6 
2.2 
1.1 
2.2 
100.0 
Fifty two of the residents interviewed (57.8%) received 250 sq.m. plots, and might 
have relocated during the period 1978-1982, before the reduction in the plot size was made. 
It was explained by respondents that land was allocated according to the number of married 
sons in the family. For example, an extended family with four married sons would receive 500 
sq.m. plots of land. 
The plot of land offered is "four times the size of the plot ... lived on in the camp" as 
Freddy Zaq, Deputy Co-ordinator for the OTs, claimed in a seminar on the housing projects 
on July 10, 1989 (UNRWA Records, PIO, 19 July, 1989; Ministry of Defence, 1983:56). 
Yet this is difficult to sustain. Some of the households surveyed in the Shati camp are much 
more spacious than the housing units surveyed in the SR project, especially those in Blocks 68 
and 69 where houses have asbestos roofing -like in the camp -, the rooms are very narrow, and 
no space is available for expansion. The variations in type of houses and size of plots of land 
in the project are very obvious. This is the result of the various stages and various policies 
undertaken by the authorities to allocate a house or a plot of land. The first stage could be 
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called the "publicity stage," which aimed at promoting the schemes and encouraging refugees 
to relocate, through giving incentives. 
The land upon which the housing projects were set up is considered by the authorities 
to be the government's land. However, many Palestinians raise the question of the legality of 
the purchase of land by a refugee family from an occupying authority which does not have clear 
title to the land. That is particularly crucial as this issue concerns the refugees' ownership of 
this land in the eventuality of a settlement. As one refugee from the SR project said in response 
to the question of whether he was grateful to the government for offering new housing, "We 
have no reason to be grateful. The government has done nothing except to allow us to build 
houses on land that is not theirs to sell anyway. By using it we stop Israel using it " (JP, 19 
October, 1988). 
5.4.2 Residency 
The second condition for relocation to a housing project is residency in a refugee camp. 
Housing in the projects is not open to refugees who are not currently living in a refugee camp. 
Furthermore, a family residing in a refugee camp can only move to the housing project nearest 
their camp. For example, a family living in the SC can only move to the SR project. The 
family cannot choose to move to al-Amal project in Khan Yunis. 
In spite of that condition, some non-refugee families interested in settling in the housing 
projects purchase a house in the camp and demolish it, to become eligible for resettlement. 
Israeli official estimates indicate that 25 % of the shelters in GS camps are now occupied by 
non-refugees (Marx,1992:288).(See Table 5.4). But the meaning of these figures is 
questionable. They are dubious especially because there has not been a census of the population 
since 1967 in the OTs (including, of course, the refugee camps). In addition, UNRWA records 
or enumeration are not very accurate, due to discrepancies in registration of newly born and 
deceased refugees. 
Refugee families living outside the camps who are interested in living in the housing 
projects follow this same method, as confirmed by some respondents in the sample. The 
authorities are aware of this fact; Major Cheshin told NYJ' correspondent: " We find out that 
refugees who long ago left the camps are buying rooms in shelters inside the camp just to be 
eligible for the new projects" (NYJ',24 November,1976). 
In 1972, Moshe Dayan put the movement to the Israeli housing projects down to rise 
in income among refugees, a view also emphasized in the Israeli Ministry of Defence's report 
(a/-Quds,14 December, 1972; Ministry of Defence, 1983:57). 
148 
Refugees living in spacious houses in the camps and willing to move out to a housing 
project are aware of the land problem and the demand for houses in the Strip. Thus, as one 
respondent from the SR told the author, they sell their large house in the camp for a very high 
price, and buy a small one for a low price and demolish it to meet the authorities' condition for 
relocation. 
TABLE 5.4 Resettled Families and Persons in the Housing Projects, by Status of the 
Population, 1989 
Status of 
the pop. 
Refugees 
Non-Refugees 
Total 
Houses built by the Govt. 
Houses Families Persons 
2,666 3,034 
20 20 
2,686 3,054 
18,823 
97 
18,920 
Source: UNRWA, Accommodation Office, Gaza, 1989. 
Plots of land housing built 
by refugees 
Plots Families Persons 
2,605 3,714 22,946 
137 137 932 
2,742 3,851 23,878 
It is clear from the Table above that the majority of the housing projects residents are 
refugees (22,946 persons). Previous residence of the SR's sample survey confirms this, as 
shown in (fable 5.5). 
TABLE 5.5 Former Residence of the SR Project's Population 
Fonner Residence Frequency Percent 
City 7 7.8 
Camp 83 92.2 
Village 
Total 90 100.0 
~: The 1991 sample survey 
Those who come from the SC constitute 80 (88.9%) out of the sampled survey; 
whereas, the remaining 3 (3.3%) come from labalia and Deir el Balah camps in the Strip - a 
minimal number, which contravene the stated conditions for relocation set by the authorities-. 
5.4.3 Demolition of the Camp Shelter 
A third condition set by the authorities for relocation to the housing projects is that 
the camp shelter of the family be demolished. The demolition of the shelter is generally 
carried out by the families themselves. The shelter is inspected by the authorities, who have 
no direct involvement in the demolition, and should be destroyed within twelve months of the 
agreement. In consultation with the authorities, UNRWA are informed of demolitions done so 
that the "facts" of the demolition can be properly recorded. The demolition of the shelter 
weakens the structure of the remaining adjacent dwellings. Camp shelters are constructed in 
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eight room units which share a common roof. These shelters are allocated in one or two room 
individual family dwellings. UNRWA helps the affected destitute families in carrying out the 
repairs and claiming compensation from the authorities (UN,1982:21). The authorities, 
however, disclaim this fact. A report of the Ministry of Defence ascertains that, "Since the 
rehabilitation project is based on the goodwiil of those residents interested in being rehabilitated, 
areas are being vacated in the refugee camps haphazardly and do not necessarily adjoin each 
other. " The report in justifying demolition of camp shelter indicates that, "there is no 
continuous stretch of land available for construction of another housing project. The areas in 
the camps should, however, be taken into account when planning to relieve the distress 
concerning available land in the region" (Ministry of Defence, 1983:58). 
After demolition of the camp shelter, building permits are granted by the local 
municipality. Building permits for refugees to build houses in the housing projects are easy to 
obtain, in contrast to the restriction on building in the camps, as discussed below. Obviously, 
this could be counted as other evidence of the authorities policy which carries political 
implications, to evacuate the camps and eliminate them completely in the long-run. 
UNRWA's protests against shelter demolitions in the camps, and the authorities' 
response, are tackled in Chapter 6. Despite protestations at the UN level, this pre-condition 
for relocation has not been cancelled. However, one justification given by the authorities for 
the demolition of shelters which might explain this fact is that the refugees extricate building 
stones from the rubble for use in adding rooms to their new houses in the project (NYI,2 
April,1973; UN,1977:23,& 1987: 17). 
During the Intifada, a new phenomenon began to arise. This was to do with the spaces 
caused by the demolition of shelters in the camps, upon relocation. Camp residents have been 
making use of this space by expanding their own shelters, though in a shoddy way, as Plate 5.2 
illustrates. The authorities have not done anything to halt it, due to the prevailing political 
circumstances in the Strip. 
Table 5.6 indicates that the large camps: Jabalia, Shati, Khan Yunis and Rafah-, had 
the largest number of demolitions. This is because these four camps have housing projects 
adjacent to them, where refugees are allowed to relocate. 
The issue of receiving compensation for destroying the previous lodging in the camp, 
has been one of contention between the authorities and the refugees who moved out. 
Compensation is paid to refugees by the authorities only for the demolition of privately built 
rooms and additions, and not for UNRWA - built rooms. This is an issue which has been 
pursued by the Agency, with little success. 
Plate 5.2: Space in Demolished Houses in the SC as Used by Camp Residents 
Photo: The Author 1991 
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TABLE 5.6 Voluntary Cases Demolition, in the GS Camps, Up to June 1989 
Camp 
labalia 
Shati(Beach) 
Nuseirat 
Bureij 
Deir el-Balah 
Maghazi 
Khan Yunis 
Rafah 
Total 
Families 
786 
2,209 
7 
8 
14 
9 
978 
906 
4,917 
Persons 
4,874 
11,029 
34 
42 
89 
56 
5,875 
5,591 
27,590 
Source: Calculated from UNRWA, Accommodation Office, Gaza, 1991. 
Rooms 
1,302 
2,667 
10 
15 
25 
15 
2,074 
1,656 
7,764 
One respondent told the author that the authorities threatened to imprison him if he did 
not come to collect the compensation, which he refused to take because it was too low. He 
was ultimately forced to go and take it. 
When raising the question of compensation for the sample survey in the SR project, 
respondents showed hesitancy in replying. The same attitude was shown by refugees when the 
issue of income was raised. Fear among refugees or other people under survey stems from 
their suspicion that those who are interviewing them may be tax employees. Also, some did 
not know the exact amount received, as they mixed that with the mortgage payments they had 
to pay. Some 66 (73.3%) affirmed receiving compensation, while 20 (22.2%) said that they 
had received no compensation. The explanation given by some respondents for not receiving 
compensation was that their residence in the project was not organized through the Housing 
Department, but by purchasing a house in the project from previous tenants; and, accordingly, 
they did not sign a contract or receive compensation. 
Usually the authorities assess the camp shelter, and refugees are paid the assessed value. 
At the same time, the refugees are asked to sign bills of exchange for the compensation value 
of the demolished camp shelters, which will be cancelled later when the demolition is carried 
out. 
Only 9% of the 1991 sample survey conducted in the SR project indicated they were 
in any way satisfied with compensation payments, their dissatisfaction relating to the value 
they received. The fieldwork showed that 54 (60%) of the compensated households received 
compensation below 5% of the value of their former shelter; whereas, 12 (13.3%) received 
between 10% and 30% of its value. 
Some UNRWA reports show that some refugee and non-refugee families from ouside 
the camps moved to the housing projects without demolishing former shelters. This could be 
seen as another contravention of conditions for relocation, in addition, to the aforementioned 
• 
152 
contravention of being a refugee (See Table 5.7). 
TABLE 5.7 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Total 
Refugee and Non-Refugee Families Relocated to the SR Project Without 
Demolition, Up to December 1988 
Houses Allocated Lands Allocated Total 
Ref. Non-Ref. Ref. Non-Ref. 
2 2 
3 3 
15 15 
1 1 
9 9 
7 1 8 
19 13 2 34 
18 3 21 
29 13 33 18 93 
Source: Calculated from UNRWA, Accommodation Office, Gaza, 1991. 
As UNRWA reports show, those who relocated without demolition to the SR project 
came mainly from Gaza town and the local area, while only 3 families out of the 93 came from 
Jabalia camp. 
This type of demolition, enacted in conjunction with relocation, is not the only form 
undertaken against camps and refugees. Other forms of demolition, as Table 5.8 showed, have 
taken place since the 1967 occupation of the WBGS. These have been carried out under several 
pretexts, mainly to maintain security and public order. 
TABLE 5.8 
Cause of Demolition 
1967 War demolition 
1971 Road widening 
Contravention 
Town planning 
Border line 
Punitive cases 
Voluntary demolition 
for resettlement 
Total 
Demolition of Rooms and Affected Families and Individuals in GS Refugee 
Camps, as of June 1989 
Cum. no. Cum. no. of 
of rooms affected families 
1,020 485 
10,794 3,941 
112 63 
1,060 497 
793 267 
868 347 
7,764 4,917 
22,411 10,517 
Cum. no. of 
affected persons 
3,435 
24,067 
402 
2,609 
1,671 
2,399 
27,590 
62,173 
~: Calculated from UNRWA, Accommodation Office, Gaza, 1991. 
The demolitions are in violation of international law and conventions, and can be 
interpreted as being used by the authorities as a form of collective punishment against 
Palestinians . 
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5.5 A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
In addition to the three conditions set out by the authorities for relocation, refugee 
families are asked to sign a contract written in Hebrew, I obtained an Arabic text of this 
contract. The provisions of the contract are meant to organize the relationship between the 
tenant and the landlord. 
A precise reading of the contract would imply that it has been outlined for the landlord's 
(the Israeli authorities) interest, not for the tenant. Provision 23 reads: "the law of tenants 
protection or any other legislations which could lead to protect the tenancy is invalid on this 
contract according to the rules of ordinance No. 253 (GS and North Sinai) issued in 5729-1969, 
concerning the invalidity of the legislation of tenants protection in specific cases." This 
provision is clearly to override the tenant's right of protection from the landlord. Moreover, 
provision 24 indicates that the contract can be made invalid by the authorities on instructions 
issued by the military command; it further confirms that the "legislations of the State of Israel 
are valid on this contract and the jurisdication court of Beer Sheva is the only court specializing 
in dealing with what is related to or results from this contract. " 
The data from the SR project showed that 79 (87.8 %) of households had signed a 
contract when relocated; whereas 3 (3.3%) said they did not; and 8 (8.9%) households said 
they did not know. Moreover, knowledge of the duration of the contract was patchy. Some 
57 (63.3%) of the 90 said that the duration of the lease is for 99 years, whereas 27 (30%) said 
they did not know exactly; and 2 (2.2 %) said they did not know at all. Actually, the contract 
does not indicate the period of tenancy, the only mention of duration is in the term an 
"agreement of development and long tenancy," giving the landlord full authority in designating 
the duration he wants. 
The conditions of the rehousing agreement are not very well known to refugees, and 
neither is the way in which the agreement could be revoked. Some respondents said that 
during the process of signing the Housing Department did not give the refugees time to read 
the Arabic translation; they even, refused to give them a copy of the contract, and they were 
asked instead to go to Jerusalem to obtain a copy: many as a result gave up. The SR sample 
survey showed that only 16 (17.8 %) of the refugees knew what the provisions of the contract 
entailed; whereas, the majority, 60 (66.7%), did not know what it contained at all; and 3 
(11.1 %) said that they were not sure. Knowledge or ignorance of the provisions of the 
contract has nothing to do with the educational level of the respondents, as shown in Table 5.9. 
It is obvious from this Table that, 33 out of 86 residents, whose level of education ranges from 
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preparatory to university, do not know the content of the contract. Thus it is the method of 
contractual procedure (as dealt with above) undertaken by the authorities, and not the ignorance 
of the second party, that is the reason for the lack of knowledge of contract provisions. 
TABLE 5.9 Knowledge of Contract By Level of Education Among the SR Residents (in 
numbers) 
Knowledge of contract! Yes 
Educational level 
llliterate 4 
Elementary 3 
Preparatory 1 
Secondary 4 
Tech. College 
University 4 
Total 16 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
No 
13 
14 
10 
15 
4 
4 
60 
Other 
1 
3 
2 
4 
10 
The inter-relation between signing the contract and deprivation of political rights is 
what the refugees do have some doubts about. The majority of respondents in the SR sample 
survey (37.8 %) said that they were not quite sure whether this contract has an effect on their 
political rights; whereas, 29 (32.2%) said it has an effect; and 21 (23.3%) said it will not 
deprive them of their political rights. The cause and effect relationship between resettlement 
of refugees and deprivation of their political rights will be elaborated upon in full detail in 
Chapter 8. 
The question to be raised here is that, from a legal point of view, Israel as an 
occupying power has no right to implement its legislation and jurisdication on the people under 
its control: Israel stands in violation of international conventions and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (See Chapter 8). Yet, this might be considered only one of many breaches of law 
enacted by the authorities in the OTs where Israel tries to implement the law that best suits its 
interests, and when this does not apply issues military orders. Up to December 16, 1992 there 
have been 1369 Military Orders on the West Bank (Rabah & Fairweather,1993). 
5.6 RELOCATION: REASONS, FORMS AND AITITUDES 
This section examines the form of relocation which the refugees have undertaken. It 
further shows the reasons behind relocation, which has not necessarily been out of support for 
the Israeli resettlement schemes, but, rather out of necessity to alleviate overcrowding in the 
previous camp shelter. Assessing housing satisfaction is tested here through the attitudes of the 
relocated refugees towards their new housing in the project. It is to be noted that during the 
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Intifada relocation of refugees has slowed down a great deal, which could be attributed to the 
bad economic conditions of the refugees, and the prevailing political circumstances (See Chapter 
7). 
5.6.1 Does Voluntary Relocation Imply Support? 
Even though the majority of the sampled survey in SR indicated that their movement 
was voluntary, they objected overwhelmingly to the policy of resettlement as a whole. 
TABLE 5.10 Attitude of SR Project and SC Residents Towards Resettlement 
Attitude Frequency 
SC SR 
Support strongly 13 
Support 18 
Don't support 100 
No response 11 
To~1 142 
11 
33 
43 
3 
90 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
Percent 
SC SR 
9.2 12.2 
12.7 36.7 
70.4 47.8 
7.7 3.3 
100.0 100.0 
Those who did not support resettlement form the majority: 43 (47.8%) in the SR 
project and 100 (70.4%) in the SC. Whereas, those who support resettlement come in second 
place, 18 (12.7%) in the SC and 33 (36.7%) in the SR project. The disapproval of 
resettlement was for various reasons. For 17 (18.9%) resettlement is not the political solution 
to the refugee problem; while 6 (6.7 %) indicated that living in the project is insecure, in terms 
of tenancy and provision of services by UNRWA. Another 7 (7.8 %) of respondents in the SR 
project, 7 (7.8 %) said that it was overcrowding which obliged them to move out of the camp; 
and the remaining 11 gave various answers : more taxes have to be paid in the project, 
dissatisfaction with the quality of building, no UNRWA protection, and fewer social contacts 
among residents. 
Rejection of resettlement by refugees has always been linked to resistance to their exile. 
Mere mention of resettlement and construction of permanent shelters in camps was always met 
with strong opposition. In their life in camps, refugees developed a sense of impermanence 
which "became a mark of the emerging Palestinian consciousness" (Migdal & 
Kimmerling, 1993: 194; Ward, 1977:26). 
It is this stand by refugees which made the Israeli authorities question the feasibility of 
the resettlement schemes in GS prior to 1972-73. They were faced with the following 
questions: would the refugees living in the camps agree to leave them, and would the refugees 
agree to accept the Israeli administration's housing solution, after many years of hate 
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conditioning against Israel who they regard as directly responsible for their situation? A study 
conducted in 1952-1953 showed that only 10% of refugees accepted resettlement as a 
permanent solution. In the minds of the refugees, acceptance of permanent resettlement 
meant "acceptance of permanent defeat and of permanent expatriation." Their precondition for 
accepting resettlement, was that it has to be carried out through an inter-Arab cooperation, with 
extended Western and economic assistance (Bruhns, 1955:132-33). 
Residents in the SC also gave their reasons against resettlement. The main one was 
concern to maintain their identity as refugees (21.1 %); while, 25 (17.6%) considered living in 
the project insecure, relating to tenancy and access to UNRWA services. Another 18 
(12.7%) indicated that resettlement was not the political solution to the refugee problem; 12 
(8.4 %) regarded resettlement as a method to eliminate camps and liquidate the refugee 
problem; 7 (4.9%) did not support resettlement because it broke social ties with families and 
relatives; 4 (2.8 %) showed no support with respect to the pattern of buildings in the project 
(multi-storey) which are unsuitable from a social perspective; and the remaining 4 (2.8%) gave 
other answers or did not know. 
An interesting explanation for not supporting resettlement was given by one respondent, 
the Mukhtar of the Falloujah, a village in Palestine of 1948. He said that refugees who left a 
lot of property and land behind in 1948 rejected the idea of moving out of the camp and 
accepting 200 or 100 sq. m. of land in the project, while this was acceptable to those who had 
no property or land. The validity of this assumption could be checked against responses given 
by SR respondents regarding left property in Palestine 1948. Their responses indicated that 
only 33 households out of 90 had left no property behind; while the other 66 households had 
left a lot of property and land, in some cases as much as 500-800 dunums of land. 
It is clear then, that political reasons were behind the unsupportive stand for resettlement 
among most residents in the two case study areas: 42.2% in the SC and 18.9% in the SR 
project respectively. When the sampled survey in the SC was asked to give three situations 
in which they would accept resettlement, the results showed that 50 (35.2 %) would accept it 
in the framework of a comprehensive political solution to the Palestine problem; 35 (24.7 %) 
said they would accept it if faced by pressures from the authorities; 28 (19.7%) gave the 
narrowness of camp shelter as a reason for acceptance; 21 (14.7%) said they would not accept 
it at any rate; 18 (12.6%) said they would accept it if means were available; 10 (7.0%) said 
they would accept it if there was a collective decision to move out; and 9 (6.3 %) gave other 
reasons. 
Moreover, the majority of residents in the sample survey of the SR project, 65.6% and 
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37.3 % in the SC, think that the refugees in general do not support resettlement schemes. Only 
21.1 % in the SR project and 13.4 % in the SC think that refugees support it, the remainder in 
both locations saying that they don't know. 
The SR sample findings suggested that the refugee disapproval of resettlement in general 
is mainly related to their fear of loss of political rights. For 90 (100%) of the respondents 
gave this answere as a first priority (out of three answers); 9 (10%) said that their lack of 
support stemmed from the fact that resettlement is a temporary solution and not a permanent 
one to their problem; 13 (14.4%) thought that the refugees' lack of financial means lay behind 
their disapproval; 8 (8.9%) gave tenancy insecurity as a reason for disapproval among refugees; 
whereas, 5 (5.6%) attribute disapproval to lack of social cohesion in the project. It seems that 
neither levels of education nor employment influenced respondents' support for or resistance 
to resettlement. 
TABLE 5.11 Support for Resettlement by Level of Education in the SR Project & SC (in 
numbers) 
Support for resettlement! 
Level of education 
Strong 
support 
SR SC 
ntiterate 
Elementary 
Preparatory 
Secondary 
Tech. College 
University 
Total 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
11 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
1 
6 
3 
3 
13 
Support 
SR SC 
8 2 
8 2 
3 4 
11 4 
1 2 
2 4 
33 18 
Don't 
support 
SR SC 
11 28 
10 19 
7 22 
10 22 
2 7 
3 2 
43 100 
No 
answer 
SR SC 
3 
3 
2 
4 
2 
11 
As indicated in Table 5.11, 21 out of 43 in the SR project who have a lower educational 
attainment do not support resettlement; whereas an almost equal number 22 out of 43 in the 
project who have a higher educational level gave the same response. The same is true of the 
SC, where 47 out of 100 with low educational level are unsupportive of resettlement; and 44 
in secondary and preparatory level gave the same response. This would imply that the 
educational level of a person as a variable has no effect on his/her support or otherwise for 
resettlement, as was the case with knowledge about the aims of resettlement (fable 5.2). 
The same is true of the interrelation between employment/job and support for 
resettlement. Table 5.12 below illustrates this point. 
158 
TABLE 5.12 Support for Resettlement by Employment in the SR Project and the SC (in 
numbers) 
Support for resettlement! 
Employment 
Scientific 
Administrative 
Clerical 
Sales 
Services 
Agriculture 
Production 
Transport 
Unemployed 
Housewife 
Student 
Retired 
Disabled 
Total 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
Strong 
support 
SR SC 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
11 
11 
13 
Support 
SR SC 
2 
4 
1 
7 
1 
17 
33 
1 
3 
1 
3 
7 
1 
18 
Don't 
support 
SR SC 
4 
3 
4 7 
3 10 
1 7 
1 7 
1 1 
2 8 
24 41 
2 1 
2 4 
2 7 
43 100 
No 
answer 
SR SC 
3 
3 
1 
4 
1 
2 
11 
Housewives comprise the largest number of those who do not support resettlement, 24 
in the SR project and 41 in the SC. Of the remaining number of those who do not support 
resettlement, 11 in the SR and (40) in SC work in categories between clerical and transport 
jobs the remaining 8 in SR and 20 in SC include students, unemployed, retired, and disabled. 
Those who have moderate support for resettlement, as the Table shows, are in second place 
among all categories while, those who do not support it come in first place. 
We now move to compare the attitudes of the SR sample survey to those of the SC with 
regard to moving out of the camp. Responses of the sample survey in the camp showed that 
59 (41.5%) gave a yes answer; whereas, 83 (58.5%) answered no. The 59 respondents gave 
the following preferences for places they would like to move out to. 15 (10.6%) preferred the 
SR project; 35 (24.6%) wanted to go to any place better than the camp with its unhealthy 
environment; 3 (2.1 %) wanted to move only to their original town in Palestine of 1948; 5 
(3.5%) to a bigger house in the camp itself; 1 (0.7%) gave other reasons. In sum, their 
decision to relocate is taken in order to accommodate themselves in more adequate housing, 
recognizing that their present shelter cannot be improved to satisfy all their requirements. 
The reasons for their desire to move out of the camp are given in Table 5.13. 
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TABLE 5.13 Reasons for Willingness to Move Out of the SC 
Reason Frequency Percent 
Narrowness 30 21.2 
Authorities harassment 6 4.2 
Unhealthy environment 10 7.0 
Insecure tenancy 3 2.1 
Lack of privacy 3 2.1 
High pop. density 4 2.8 
Others 3 2.1 
Total 59 41.5 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
Narrowness of the camp shelter is given as the main reason for intention to move out 
by respondents; this result corresponds with the answers given by the residents who had 
already moved out to the SR project already (fable 5.11), 77.8% giving the narrowness of 
shelters as the main reason behind their relocation. Table 5.13 shows higher rates of mobility 
and the strong relationship between intention to move and the size of household which, through 
household overcrowding, only indirectly involves the physical size of housing. As each family 
grows, it outgrows the shelter space and prompts the need to move. The unhealthy environment 
of the camp is the second most common reason while the authorities' harassment against the 
camp population comes in third place. 
Those in the sample survey in the SC gave the reasons for their unwillingness to move 
out shown in Table 5.14. 
TABLE 5.14 Reasons For Unwillingness to Move Out of the SC 
Reason Frequency Percent 
Stay close to family & relatives 17 12.0 
Maintain refugee identity 35 24.6 
Lack of means 8 5.6 
All above reasons 23 16.1 
Others 
Total 83 58.3 
~: The 1991 sample survey 
The reasons for staying put given by the 83 respondents have socio-economic and 
political implications. Moreover, as Muth noticed, every decision to move from one location 
to another entails various costs and benefits. Costs include both direct monetary costs like 
moving expenses, fees, registration fees, and indirect social costs such as the cutting of social 
ties and friendships, and the need to adjust to a new environment (Muth, 1973:56). 
It is also noticeable that there is a weak association between the educational level and 
employment and the reasons for staying put given by the 83 respondents (Table 5.15). 
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TABLE 5.15 Desire to Stay in the SC by Educational Level (in numbers) 
Reason for stayingl Close to Maintain Lack of All Total 
Educational level fam.& reI. ref. ID means 
Dliterate 4 6 3 6 19 
Elementary 3 8 1 1 13 
Preparatory 6 10 2 7 25 
Secondary 3 6 2 5 16 
Tech. College 3 4 7 
University 2 3 
Total 17 35 8 23 83 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
The inter-relation between the desire to stay and occupation was also observed. 
Housewives constitute the highest proportion, 35 out of 83, who show an intention to stay put, 
and those engaged in administrative, sales, clerical, production and transport jobs shared the 
housewives reluctance to move. This analysis indicates that neither educational level nor 
occupation of respondents is of influence on their decision to move out or stay put in the camp. 
Although those 83 refugees might be in unsatisfactory housing conditions, their intention to 
stay put was based mainly on political grounds. 
5.6.2 Voluntary vs. Compulsory Relocation 
Movement of the refugees since the commencement of the housing projects has been 
of two types: compulsory or voluntary. The compulsory nature of their relocation is not 
admitted by the authorities, who claim that all relocation is on a voluntary basis. Yet, as we 
have documented, the indirect methods used by the authorities to disperse refugees, such as the 
demolition of camp shelters (Table 5.9), indicates a very coercive impetus to the housing 
projects. 
An example of the considerable coercion used in achieving relocation is the case of the 
415 families in SC (General-Commissioner Report of 1977). Between April and the end of June 
1976 the Israeli authorities carried out a survey of 415 families in the camp, who were later told 
by the authorities that their shelters were listed for demolition. The only option for them was 
to purchase houses or land in the SR project or move into vacated shelters alongside other 
refugees which the authorities could allocate to them (UN, 1977:23). It is important to note that 
this survey was carried out just a year after the commencement of the SR project, which 
suggests the likelihood of the forced removals being part of a policy to promote Israeli 
resettlement schemes. 3 
There are two dimensions to the Israeli policy of resettlement. On the one hand, it 
leaves a narrow option for refugees to reaccommodate themselves, and thus promotes the 
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purchasing of houses/land in the housing project; and on the other hand, by allocating vacated 
shelters in camps, the authorities are making themselves responsible for camp accommodation, 
which could be considered a derogation of UNRWA's functions in this respect, and has been 
seen as evidence of UNRWA's lack of jurisdiction over the camps. This raises the question of 
the legality of such procedures by the authorities in relation to UNRWA's mandate, given that 
such procedures are not carried out by a "proper" host government but by an occupying 
authority. 
Moreover, one more indirect way to pressurise refugees to move is cited in the General-
Commissioner's Report of 1987: "There are some cases where refugees are placed under 
pressure to persuade them to move. For example, in labalia and Rafah camps bulldozing 
activities have left shelters isolated and completely surrounded by mounds of sand higher than 
the shelters themselves, thus making it extremely difficult for the families to remain and live 
a normal life" (UN, 1987:17). 
The form of relocation undertaken by the relocated refugees in the SR sample survey 
is showed in Table 5.16. 
TABLE 5.16 Form of Relocation by SR Residents 
Form 
Voluntary 
Compulsory 
Other 
Total 
~: The 1991 sample survey 
Frequency 
78 
11 
1 
90 
Percent 
86.7 
12.2 
1.1 
100.0 
The reasons behind relocation were given as follows : 
TABLE 5.17 Reasons for Moving Out to the SR Project 
Reason Frequency Percent 
Security demolition 4 4.4 
Road widening 9 10.0 
Town planning 
1967 war demolition 
Narrowness of camp's shelter 70 77.8 
Improvement in income 
To improve social status 2 2.2 
Political considerations 1 1.1 
Other 4 4.4 
Total 90 100.0 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
The movement of refugees to the SR project was out of necessity to alleviate 
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overcrowding, made more acute by the absence of new construction by UNRWA and the 
building restrictions imposed by the authorities on camp residents. 
Those who moved out to the project were typically young married sons who lived 
within the extended family in the camp and due to overcrowdeness left the old behind. The old 
lived in the remaining room/s of the shelter, the authorities usually requesting the demolition 
of one room, if one son from the extended family moved out to the project. 
This Chapter has demonstrated that the Israeli aims for setting up the housing projects 
are far from humanitarian, and more for security reasons. The refugees' awareness of the 
political motives behind these projects was very high. Moving out to the housing projects was 
mainly due to overcrowding in the camp shelters and the unhealthy environment, rather than 
to support Israeli schemes. The Israeli policy toward the camps has aggravated the housing 
crisis further. By imposing building restrictions in camps, and the demolition of camp shelter 
as a precondition for relocation; the authorities are increasing the housing crisis, and leaving 
a very narrow chance for refugees to resist the Israeli resettlement scheme. Yet, the refugees 
believe that by staying on the Palestinian soil they are reinforcing a national goal through their 
sumud (steadfastness) as a collectivity. 
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NOTES: 
1. Methods used included, visits by collaborators employed by the authorities to refugee 
households in the Shati' camp trying to convince them to relocate by promising incentives, e.g. 
low price for a house and long-term mortgage. Later on those collaborators were killed by the 
Fedayeen in Gaza. For more details on the subject see, Palestine Affairs, December 
(1972):234-237; & April(1973):220-222). 
2. A description of the poor quality of the houses offered to refugees in the projects is given 
in MERIP Reports, March(1978):21. 
3. 216 families in Rafah camp, and 167 families in Khan Yunis camp, whose shelters were 
demolished in connection with the widening of roads and related housing projects, are other 
cases in point. The option opened to them was similar to those families affected in Shati camp 
(UN, 1974:20). 
164 
CHAPTER SIX: UN AND UNRWA POSITION TOWARDS RESEITLEMENT OF 
GAZA STRIP REFUGEES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses UNRWA's position on the issue of resettlement in the GS since 
the 1970's. The discussion below shows that UNRWA's proposals to integrate and resettle 
refugees into the productive life of the area have been seen by the refugees as an anathema. 
Failing to achieve any success at this level, UNRWA shifted the balance towards other services, 
specifically health and education. It was believed that UNRWA's educational programmes 
would give refugees the skills necessary for productive participation in whatever society they 
lived, regardless of the political situation. Yet, this chapter reveals that the emphasis on 
education served the integration policy indirectly. The issues of resettlement and reintegration 
have not been raised again by UNRWA officials, for fear of pressures from its clients. 
This chapter also discusses UNRWA's housing policy in connection with its budgetary 
policy. The operational literature which UNRWA provided from its archives lacks precise 
statistical data and information about UNRWA's shelter assistance programme, this programme 
having little priority in the Agency's operations compared with those of education and health. 
Indeed, building restrictions have been imposed in the camps by the Israelis, as part of wider 
schemes in the OTs aiming to curtail development. Planning has been used as an instrument 
of collective punishment, affecting Palestinian prospects of nationhood (Coon, 1992: 10). 
The attitudes of refugees concerning UNRWA's role in resettlement were collected in 
the two case study areas. It is shown that such attitudinal responses have to be understood 
within the framework of the refugee-UNRWA relationship. This relationship has been shifting 
to cope with the new circumstances during the Intifada, and UNRWA has departed from its 
original mandate, which was confined to relief and other services. The Agency's shift in policy 
has been criticized by the Israeli authorities, whose own actions caused those changes to take 
place. 
6.2 THE AGENCY'S MANDATE 
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) was established according to G.A. Resolution 302 of 8 December, 1949 (Article 
22). It began its operations on 1 May 1950. Its mandate includes the care of refugees - inside 
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and outside the camps -, with relief services, shelter, social assistance, health and education 
care. These services apply to the five field offices where UNRWA operates; Jordan; Lebanon; 
Syria; the WB and the GS; known as the host countries. Two premises are the basis for 
UNRWA operations: one, that consent of the state where UNRWA operates is required, and 
the other, that UNRWA has to adhere to the mandate given to it by the UN to safeguard its 
interests (UN, 1986:25). 
Legal responsibility for administering the camps is not within UNRWA's mandate; nor 
is eliminating the camps. The host governments remained responsible for the maintenance of 
law and order and similar governmental functions as part of their normal responsibilities 
towards the population within their borders (UN, 1984:25). Camp leaders appointed by 
UNRWA run the camps, since UNRWA, for political and practical reasons, found it necessary 
to disengage from even the appearance of running the camps. Thus, it has exercised no police 
or land control over them at all since 1969 (UNRWA,1986:84). 
No changes in the ownership and tenure patterns have occurred in the camps since their 
establishment. Residence in the camps is voluntary, as is leaving them. Yet permission is 
needed from UNRWA to join a camp or to transfer between camps. Refugees' perception of 
the ownership of SC shelters is that they belong to UNRWA (fable 6.1). 
TABLE 6.1: Shelters by State of Tenure in the Shati Camp 
State of tenure 
UNRWA property 
Owned 
Other 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
Frequency Percent 
142 100 
Purchasing and renting houses in the camps is another issue; this is carried out by 
some refugees (illegally), who own a shelter in the camp but do not actually live in it. 
6.3 UNRWA: BUDGETING FOR SHELTERS 
A useful way of assessing the shortcomings of UNRWA's housing policy in the camps 
is to examine its budget for this activity during the 43 years of its existence. Sections on camps 
and shelters in the General-Commissioner reports from 1950 -1992 reveal developments in this 
area. UNRWA's policy towards improving or developing camps shelters deteriorated from the 
early 1960s. Only poor and hardship cases had their shelters repaired at the Agency's expense. 
Therefore, the following questions must be asked. Does UNRWA's policy towards camp 
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improvement in general - and not just for hardship cases - reflect a long-term strategy of the 
Agency? Does this policy complement the refugee refusal of a state of permanency in their 
camps? Is an understanding of this policy better achieved in relation to a long-term strategy 
of finding a solution to the refugee problem and elimination of the camps ? 
Examining UNRWA's budget indicates a decrease in the field of shelters, as illustrated 
in Table 6.2, compared with budgets in other areas of expenditures. 
TABLE 6.2: UNRW A's Expenditure in the Fields of Relief, Shelter and Education in US 
Dollars (various years) 
Year Relief Shelter Education 
51152 16,046,242 1,059,628 167,579 
54155 22,281,630 1,890,000 
60/61 13,274,464 678,109 10,055,602 
1965 12,300,997 379,934 14,597,558 
1970 12,148,336 252,127 20,602,112 
1976 28,839,558 372,133 53,918,104 
1980 31,744,369 557,095 95,773,793 
1983 2,929,321 544,248 114,341,532 
1985 3,201,482 621,937 117,316,483 
1990 5,098,295 1,259,065 118,993,946 
Source: General-Commissioner Annual Reports, various issues 
Table 6.2 indicates that expenditures on shelter construction or improvement are lower 
than those on relief and education, except in the early years of UNRWA, when the camps were 
under construction. UNRWA's explanation for the slow rehabilitation and construction of 
shelters has always been a lack of funds. The Deputy Director of UNRWA in GS explained 
that "improvement of camp shelters is confined to hardship cases only for lack of funds, and 
UNRWA has no ulterior motives in this respect as some refugees think" (Interview with 
D.Kelly, 30 July 1991). In general, the maintenance and repair of the camp shelters in which 
the refugees live is the responsibility of the refugees themselves. The Agency shared with the 
host Governments the cost of maintaining and improving the infrastructure, such as roads, in 
some camps (UN,1976:8-9). 
It is noteworthy also that UNRWA made a shift from relief to other areas after 1982. 
Emphasis was placed on education in the early sixties, following the failure of the integration 
policy proposed by UNRWA in the first decade of its life. 
A large number of refugees in this sample survey saw a link between UNRWA's policy 
of cutting rations and services for refugees and the issue of resettlement. UNRWA's decision 
to end its basic rations programme was made in September 1982, following the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon which UNRWA claimed required a shift in funding priorities. The rations since 
then have been limited to "special hardship cases". In 1990, out of the total refugee population 
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in the five areas of operations, only 138, 000 received food rations (UNRWA, 1990: 17;Viorst, 
1989:56-58). 
Palestinian organizations and refugees have questioned the motives behind the decision 
to cut rations, educational and health services. Their questions have especially referred to the 
cut coinciding with the activities of the Israeli Ben-Porath Committee, set up in 1983 to 
dismantle the refugee camps in the absence of a political solution. The Federation of 
Professional Unions in the WB condemned the Ben-Porath resettlement proposal and expressed 
their apprehension about this issue (al-Quds,13 December, 1983; al-Hourriah, 6 October, 
1985: 17;al-Mithaq, 19 October, 1983; Tariq al-Shararah,JanuaryI985:9). 
It has also been observed that the cut in rations was accompanied by increasing 
interference by the authorities in the camps' affairs. For example, funds from the authorities 
have been allocated to build a kindergarten in al-Far'ah camp in the WB. Such a project, and 
others, were originally UNRWA's responsibility (al-Talia'h,8 January, 1987). 1 
It is argued that UNRWA generally recognizes the bitter miserable living conditions 
of GS refugees; to which the previous UNRWA Commissioner - General Giacommelli attributed 
the emergence of the Intifada. The repressive measures of the Israelis led Giacommelli to say: 
" Our impression is that the unrest has been dealt with in a way that may serve to create more 
turbulence rather than improve security ... "(UNRWA News 147,January 
1, 1988:2;Viorst, 1989: 112). Therefore, one could assume that priority would be given to 
improving camp shelters. But, along with the persistent claim of lack of funds, UNRWA has 
directed its construction programme towards building new schools, clinics, and other 
infrastructural facilites, rather than making real improvements in camp shelters 
(Viorst, 1989: 113). 
While there is a substantial contribution by Arab countries, especially by Syria and 
Jordan, the increase shown in the 1990 relief budget is attributed to the expanded programme 
of assistance established by UNRWA in 1988. A target figure of $65 million was agreed, 
which was intended to improve living conditions in the OTs and which was endorsed as a result 
of the deteriorating situation in OT's since the Intifada. 
Accordingly, and with $33.6 million received or pledged by 30 June 1991, the expanded 
programme was developed during 1988 and 1989 and covered shelter rehabilitation, including 
reconstruction, upgrading, repair and maintenance of shelters belonging to special hardship 
families; and improvement and expansion of health services, including construction for various 
UNRWA's programmes. During the 1990/91 period, it was reported that 60 construction 
projects were under negotiation with potential donors (UN, 1991 :24-25). 
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In GS, for example, 124 shelters were repaired (28 in Shati camp) during the first six 
months of 1991, from funds from Kuwait ($714, 283) & Italy ($327, 780). As explained by 
engineers in the Shelters Rehabilitation Unit at UNRWA office, Gaza, shelters improvements 
are intended for hardship cases only, and from contributions donated for this purpose. 
The answers and claims given, irrespective of whose responsibility, do not justify the 
continuation of the poor housing conditions in which the refugees live. The existing conditions 
of impoverishment among the refugees - especially in the GS camps -, stand in violation of the 
right of people to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, including 
adequate housing. 2 The inadequate housing conditions of the Palestinian people in the OT's 
were of concern to the Commission on Human Settlements at the GA in its twelfth session (of 
24 April-3 May 1989) (UN, 1989:26). 3 
Denial of an adequate standard of living and adequate housing for the PRs could be 
further seen to conflict with their basic requirements for social and economic development 
which General Assembly Resolution 411128 (Declaration on the Right to Development) of 4 
December 1986 lays down. Recognizing that fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent, so the promotion of development for individuals as an inalienable human right 
should be carried out by virtue "of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social cultural and political development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized (UN,1987:366). 
6.4 UNRWA's POSITION ON RESEITLEMENT 
For a comprehensive picture on UNRWA's position towards resettlement of PRs in the 
GS, the issue has to be placed in its historical and political context. That will enable us to 
gauge similarities or differences in the Agency's policy towards the issue under discussion, 
throughout the period from 1950 to the present. 
6.4.1 UNRWA's Plans For Resettlement: A Instorical Background 
UNRWA was used as a tool by UN diplomacy to set the scene for resettlement of PRs. 
UNRWA's budget provided the scapegoat; lack of international assistance for relief being 
given as an excuse for difficulties in promoting resettlement. UNRWA's survival depended on 
its contributors, with the US as the most powerful actor involved. The view is that the US 
considered UNRWA an "interim solution" to the refugee question, as the US spokesman stated 
in 1981 at the General Assembly (Forsythe,1983:99). 
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Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December, 1949, paragraph 5, emphasized the change-over 
from a relief programme to one of works development. (1bese recommendations were 
inconsistent with the final report of 1949 of the Economic Survey Commission (Clapp 
Mission) appointed by the CCP). To promote the work programmes in the Arab countries, 
Howard Kennedy, the director-general of UNRWA, visited the host countries to seek financial 
and moral support. Burqa in Libya was suggested as a location for settling refugees, Sinai 
desert in Egypt, and Ghor Nimrin in Jordan (Paiestine,14,22 February, 1,22 March, 14 April,and 
5 May,1951). 
The first UNRWA plan for reintegration, was the Blandford Plan of 11 December 1951, 
named after the director and head of the Advisory Commission, and which was based on Clapp 
Mission's report of 1949. This plan sought to promote economic development and improve 
water management in the Arab states, which would help the reintegration of the refugees in the 
economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis and assure them better living conditions, 
without prejudice to Resolution 194(111) of 11 December, 1948 (UN,1951:12;UNRWA,1986: 14). 
A fund for reintegration of refugees ($200 million) was recommended and endorsed on January 
26, 1952 by the General Asembly, for a three-year programme (UN, 1951:5;Cattan, 1969: 142). 4 
Another UNRWA plan to resettle refugees had been made by Mr. Kein the Deputy 
Director of UNRWA, suggesting that the Arab countries carry responsibility for solving the 
refugee question, with $300 million to do so from the UN, and advocating the transfer of 100 
000 refugees from Gaza and other places to Iraq and Libya, but this came to nothing 
(Paiestine,July(1961):21;Gneim,n.d.:76-77). 
However, the architects of the Blandford plan had ignored the warning issued by the 
head of the Commission, Gordon Clapp. He wrote in his final report : 
The region is not ready, the projects are not ready, the people and Governments are not 
ready, for large-scale development in the region's basic river systems or major 
undeveloped land areas ." He continued to say , " To press forward on such a course 
is to pursue folly and frustration and thereby delay sound economic growth (Cited 
inPeretz, 1972:287-8). 
Why, then, did the Western powers seek to solve the refugee question through 
reintegration and rehabilitation, against Clapp's advice and in the face of rejection by the 
refugees and the Arab states, and given the economic constraints of the countries involved ? 
The answer must lie in Western patronage of Israel. The architects of the reintegration 
programme had three central concerns: with the economic significance of the programme for 
the Near East countries; with the threat to peace and stability which refugees filled with human 
misery and suffering would constitute, and the risk that they would become the tools of pressure 
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groups wishing to exploit their misery for political or other reasons; and with the impact of 
refugee life and future uncertainty on the minds and morale of the exiles, which would create 
and reinforce a professional refugee mentality (UN,1951:5,13-14;UN,1952:3). 
UNRWA's concerns and fears, if taken at face value could be seen as genuine. 
However, the assumptions of American diplomacy: that economic development projects would 
raise the living standard of refugees, and thus reduce their desire to return to Palestine explain 
PRs and the Arab host countries skepticism of the political implications of those schemes. 
Attempts by UNRWA to reintegrate refugees between 1949 to 1959 did not succeed, 
the obstacles being more serious than had been anticipated. The General-Commissioner 
admitted that: 
.... UNRWA should not again attempt works projects designed to settle the refugees. 
From this experience one should not conclude that economic development is not wanted 
by the people of the region on the contrary, it is wanted and at an accelerated rate 
... and should proceed independently of UNRWA, but not in the context of refugee 
resettlement (UN, 1962:2; UN,1964:2). 
Subsequent Commissioner-General Annual Reports reflected that reality, and emphasized 
that the only acceptable solution for the refugees was a return to their homes (Cattan,1969:143-
147). 
6.4.1.1 Another Form or Dispersion by UNRWA: Emigration Encouraged 
In an interview with the Arab Broadcasting Agency, the director of UNRW A 
announced a new project, involving UNRWA's readiness to cover the expenses of emigration 
for refugees who obtained visas to any country in the world. Every refugee would be paid 
$150, in addition to a transfer allowance which would enable him/her to start work and settle 
down in his /her new residence. The director further mentioned that $112 million had been 
committed to carry out the project and make it a success (Palestine,23 June, 1951). 
Canada accepted UNRWA's project and showed willingness to receive refugees who 
could support themselves; and the Canadian Parliament reconfirmed this position later in 1955. 
A similar stand was declared by Ecuador president Galo Plaza, in a press conference in New 
York (Palestine,23,30 June,1951). 
To encourage emmigration to Burqa in Libya, UNRWA opened an office there in 
November 1951. Registration offices were also opened in Beirut, Damascus ,Jordan and Egypt 
for refugees interested to emigrate. The Libyan government agreed in the early stages to allow 
in 200 refugees, peasants and professional people; and on 23 November 1952 to accept 2500 
refugee families, UNRWA paying $2 million to the Libyan government. King Idris refused 
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ultimately to approve it, unless the agreement between UNRWA and Libya include assurance 
of the refugees' RR (Gneim,n.d. : 82-83;Palestine,25 July, 1961 :22). 
UNRW A additionally tried to promote the emigration of PRs to Europe, Brazil and to 
Mecca by providing financial incentives, and UNRWA General-Commissioner reports during 
the period from 1954-1960 report on those who emigrated at UNRWA's expense (UN,General-
Commissioner Reports, 1955-1960;Palestine,25 July, 1961 :22;Gneim,n.d. :85). 
Missionary organizations from Europe and the US assisted UNRWA in encouraging 
emigration of PRs. They promised them "a better living" in the foreign countries and hundreds 
were attracted by the offer, to escape miserable conditions (Gneim,n.d.: 85-86;Palestine, 16 
April, 1955). However, many of those who emigrated to Brazil wrote to the Arab Higher 
Committee for Palestine asking for help to go back, due to a lack of employment, police 
repression of wage labour and frustrating living conditions (Gneim,n.d.: 85-86) 
UNRWA's reason for encouraging emigration was perhaps a blend of two motives. 
First, the dispersion of refugees and the normalization of their return through reintegration in 
other countries outside Palestine; second, to move towards the Clapp reccommendation to 
terminate relief. 
Attempts by Israel between 1967 and 1968 to transfer Gaza refugees to Libya and Brazil 
met with no success. An official document in the Israeli archives confirms that land for this 
purpose was bought in Libya, and is still registered in Israel's name (Khamis,1991:8). 
6.4.1.2 Would Education Promote Resettlement? 
In 1959, on the basis of the failed resettlement and emigration experience by UNRWA, 
the Agency embarked on a new programme 
... to launch an adequate, interrelated programme of education, vocational training, and 
individual assistance ... The talents of maturing refugee youths can be salvaged and put 
to constructive use by a well-planned and promptly executed programme for improving 
general education ... and for expanding specialized types of training that fit young people 
for employment in an era of technological progress (UN,1960:3). 
Since then, training and education have been the focus of UNRWA's activities with 
refugees (see Table 5.27 (UN,1991), S serving the PRs on two counts. On the one hand, this 
programme was and is, an individual incentive for the refugees to improve their status in the 
labour markets; and on the other hand, "[it] was entirely counter to the idea of resettlement, 
for the schools reaffirmed and strengthened Palestinian nationalism" (Forsythe, 1983:93). An 
UNRWA official described this process: 
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One of the byproducts of the UNRWA/UNESCO education programme has been its 
contribution towards the preservation of the PRs' identity with the Palestine culture and 
within the wider context of Arab culture. This is partly because so many of them have 
been able to attend schools in which almost all the children are Palestine refugees and 
virtually all of the teachers are also Palestinians (Dickerson, 1974: 128). 
In Gaza, a blend of UNRWA's education programme and Nasserist revolutionary 
themes have with other factors, played a role in shaping the unique political and militant 
character of the Strip's refugees. 
One negative aspect of UNRWA's education and training programme, however, has 
been the migration of skilled labour away from the immediate region of crisis, thus achieving 
the aim originally defined in the 1950s. The question is, was UNRWA's shift to education a 
well-planned policy aimed at serving a long-term strategic goal of dispersing refugees, under 
the pretext of improving living conditions? Or was it the outcome of UNRWA's responses to 
forces shaping its policy (e.g. US) in which it operated with Israel? 
6.4.2 UNRWA's Position on Refugee Resettlement in Gaza Strip 
The UNRWA and the UN position towards refugee resettlement in the GS has been to 
oppose "the fact that people are being forced to move from the camps," as stated by Ronald 
Davidson, former deputy director of UNRWA in 1976 (NYI',24 November, 1976; Ma 'ariv,28 
November, 1976). The position of ICRC also towards forced transfer of GS refugees by the 
Israeli authorities was similar to that of UNRWA (ICRC,1971:50-51). 
Yet, despite this overt criticism of Israeli policy, UNRWA's actions regarding the 
resettlement of refugees into the new housing projects are equivocal. For instance, the Deputy 
Director of UNRWA in Gaza Office, Mr Desmond Kelly, in an interview on 30 July, 1991, 
commented: 
As far as we are concerned we neither encourage or discourage the refugees to 
move from one location to another. Our job is only to provide services to 
refugees wherever they live. 
This statement meets with UNRWA's official reaction to the Ben-Porath proposal of 
1983 to resettle refugees of the WBGS. As Viorst wrote: " UNRWA's anxious not to 
discourage a migration to better (living) conditions," because it shares the concerns of the 
Israelis - though not necessarily their motives - about living conditions in the camps. Therefore, 
UNRWA did not distance itself completely from the Israeli proposal, but opposed it on the 
grounds that the UN could not consent to "any attempt to coerce refugees into compliance". 
However , UNRWA "would not oppose measures voluntarily accepted by the refugees," thus 
confirming the Agency's belief that better living conditions "would neither deprive Palestinians 
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of their identity nor divert them from their nationalist goals" (Viorst,1989:110 & 112). This 
latter statement proved valid, as the findings of the sample survey have shown (See Chapter 8). 
The refugees in the housing projects in GS have been even more active during the Intifada than 
their compatriots in camps. 
UN resolutions have condemned Israeli resettlement schemes. In the General Assembly 
on 23 November, 1976, a resolution was passed overwhelmingly in which the United States 
joined with 117 other nations in calling on Israel to halt refugee resettlement efforts in Gaza and 
to return immediately all the Palestinian refugees of Gaza to their old camps. Chaim Herzog, 
the Israeli delegate to the UN addressing the General Assembly members, said that by 
approving the resolution, "You will make yourself the laughing stock of the world" (NLG 
Report,1978:25;NIT,24 November, 1976;Ma'ariv,28 November,1976). 
In a later UN General Assembly Resolution of 12 December, 1983, with 146 in favour 
and no abstentions, Israel was criticized for its reported plans to resettle refugees on the WB, 
following the announcement of the Ben-Porath programme. In passing the resolution, the 
Assembly confirmed Security Council Resolution 237, of June 1967, calling on Israel "to ensure 
the safety, welfare and security" of inhabitants of OTs. Expressing its alarm at Israel's plans 
to remove and resettle PRs, destroying their camps in the process, the General Assembly called 
on Israel, "to abandon its plans and to refrain from the removal and from any action that may 
lead to the removal and resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the WB and from the destruction 
of their camps" (UN,1969:1). 
Furthermore, General Assembly Resolution 41169, of 3 December 1986, considered 
Israeli measures to resettle PRs in the GS and their displacement to constitute a violation of their 
inalienable RR, as entailed in Resolution 194(111); thus, requesting Israel to desist from the 
removal and resettlement of refugees in the GS and from the destruction of their shelters 
(UN, 1987:243). This issue has also been a particular concern of the Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Demography at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on its 9th of June session 
in 1988 (Council of Europe,9 June,1988:2). One of the main criticisms by UNRWA regarding 
resettlement of refugees was with respect to the demolition of the camp shelter as a pre-
condition for the provision of a new house in the project. In the annual reports of the General-
Commissioner, emphasis is placed on this issue rather more than on the difficulties which the 
refugees face due to relocation; UNRWA's protest, as voiced by Davidson, former deputy 
director of UNRWA, is that such shelters are UN property, and that they are needed for the 
growing refugee population, and their demolition would intensify the housing shortage in the 
camps (NYI',24 November,1976;UN,1978:23;& 1987: 17;Ma'ariv,28 November,1976). 
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Davidson's charges about forced relocation and demolition of shelters were admitted by 
Major Cheshin, the Israeli liaison officer for Gaza. An official response to these complaints 
from the Defence Ministry was "Of course we demolish them. The whole point of the project 
is to get rid of the refugee camps" (JP,19 October, 1988). Commander Major Hassin, 
spokesman for the WB, replied to UNRWA's criticism by saying: 
If we had done nothing to rehabilitate the refugees or build new houses, 
wouldn't the housing shortage in the camps be even more intense? Has the 
UNRWA allocated any funds to solve the housing problem? (Ma 'ariv, 28 
November, 1976). 
In addition, the Israeli Government's position was that materials from demolished 
shelters be used by the refugees in new construction, and congestion in the camp is also relieved 
(UN, 1987:17). 
6.S UNRWA - REFUGEE RELATIONS 
Table 6.3 indicates how refugees in the sample from the Shati camp and the Sheikh 
Radwan housing project view UNRWA's role in resettlement. 
TABLE 6.3: Refugees' Attitude Towards UNRWA's Role in Resettlement 
Variables Frequency Percent 
sc SR sc SR 
Major role 14 3 9.9 3.3 
Minor role 2 2 1.4 2.2 
No role 97 72 68.3 80.0 
Don't know 29 12 20.4 13.3 
No answer 1 1.1 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
~: the 1991 sample survey 
The majority of refugees in both locations saw no role for UNRWA. Responses seemed 
to be on the basis that UNRWA had not improved the housing conditions of refugees in the 
camps and that the excuse that UNRWA lacked suitable funds was unjustified. One refugee 
from the SR project was particularly angry at the level of conspicuous consumption by the 
UNRW A GS office which provided expenditure for 500 air-conditioners and transport. Another 
respondent saw a link between American support to Israel and the former's major contribution 
to UNRWA, which is one of the highest, the dialectic relationship between the two dictating 
the kinds of policy and solutions proposed for the refugee problem. 
Moreover, the Palestinian refugees saw another linkage between resettlement and the 
issue of orders restricting construction in the camps. In a public announcement issued by the 
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Civil Administration of the GS with regard to "Israeli Building Regulations in the Refugee 
Camps of the GS" it was stated that any change in the camp shelter in whatever form was 
prohibited and violators would be penalized accordingly (See Appendix 5). UNRWA's position 
in relation to the Israeli building restrictions in camps was given by the Deputy Director in 
Gaza office. He said: "The Civil Administration made their rules, we have no bearing on their 
making decions. They don't consult us and we don't have any role in that" (lnterview,30 July, 
1991). Although this answer is improbable, it begs the question of what constitutes UNRWA's 
role? 
The same is said about the WB camps. A case in point is the four camps in Nablus 
area, which in 1986 the authorities were added to the municipality by the authorities. Much 
development took place thereafter, but recently the authorities deleted that annexation, 
development was frozen, a system of roads to allow rapid deployment of military vehicles to 
the refugee camps was built, and the area has mostly been expropriated (Coon, 1992:95). Yet, 
"improvement of refugee camps (or their removal) has not been addressed in any of the outline 
plans in the WB" (Coon,1992:97,131-2). 
As well as the refugees, UNRWA is also subjected to construction restrictions in the 
GS. Co-ordination is required between UNRWA and the Military Government, and has been 
since early 1981. Permits have to be obtained from the authorities for school construction, 
including additions and changes to existing schools, according to Military Order No.654 of July 
1980. Other UNRWA projects are affected, such as the project for disabled refugees within 
the Khan Yunis camp, which was obstructed in May 1982 according to the General-
Commissioner despite detailed co-ordination of the project some time before with the Military 
Government (UN, 1983: 12-13). 
What cannot be understood or explained is that almost a year later, in October 1983, 
UNRWA issued similar regulations for the WB camps, forbidding residents to build a second 
storey onto their existing shelters. That policy was condemned and protested at by the refugees 
in the WB camps. Letters of protest were sent to the UNRWA director, which connected the 
procedure with the cut in services and the Israeli resettlement programme aims in the long run 
of liquidating the refugee problem (ai-Quds,18 October;ai-Mithaq,15 & 19 October,1983). 
Building restrictions, either by Israel or UNRWA can be better understood within a 
broader context. The refugees themselves are not against any construction programmes and 
improvement of their living conditions, as they declared to the Commissioner -General, if these 
are carried out by UNRWA and not by the Israeli authorities, whose projects have clear political 
implications (Viorst, 1989: 112). Fear of refugees stems from the fact that the Agency might be 
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used in an attempt to keep them in permanent "refugee" status, for, as Nabil Sha'at has put it, 
many see UNRWA "as an agent for humiliating them with charity while it white-washed the 
international community" (Viorst,1989:117). As one refugee noted, "[UNRWA] is giving us 
morphine injections, its creation was a conspiracy of reactionary right-wing governments .... 
They have made beggars out of us" (Cossali & Robson, 1986: 122). Similar views were 
expressed by 55.6% of respondents in a survey conducted in six refugee camps in Lebanon, and 
among PRs in Lebanese towns 60% saw UNRWA as damaging for the refugees on political, 
psychological and living levels (JPS,1973:35-37). 
The Agency was seen by refugees to reproduce colonialist attitudes towards refugees, 
for its structure consisted of two separate hierarchies, one "international" made up of former 
Mandate Government officials, and the other "local", each with different status, conditions and 
pay levels (Sayigh,1988:19). It is ironic that the majority (70%) of the international staff are 
Americans and Britons, when the PRs perceive their countries to be the most responsible for 
their plight and its aftermath (McDowall,1981:11). 
Refugee confidence in UNRWA only recovered after the PLO obtained observer 
status at the UN in 1974, and after UNRWA began to identify its goals with those of the 
organization and a rapprochement with the Palestinians followed. The PLO, since the mid-70s, 
has encouraged Arab countries to contribute to UNRWA's budget. In November 1992, at the 
second round of the refugee talks in Ottawa, the head of the Palestinian delegation Dr .Hallaj 
considered the participation of UNRWA in the talks to be important. He said that it represents 
the international community's concern for the PRs' plight, and it embodies the efforts to be 
undertaken to find the proper mechanisms to deal with the refugees, until a just solution is 
reached (Filastin al-1hawrah, 1992: 14). 
UNRW A was brought back into its original role of being a provider of emergency 
assistance as a result of the Lebanon crisis, the deteriorating situation in OTs, and the 
consequences of the Gulf conflict, which have effected the Palestinians economically and 
morall y. This was despite the fact that UNRWA's emphasis in the first 25 years of its existence 
was in helping refugees build a future for themselves, through obtaining educational skills, 
self-help projects and income-generating schemes. UNRWA's role has been transformed by 
these three factors, and its new high profile in the territories among refugees has helped it to 
reinvigorate itself. 
The provision of emergency assistance by UNRWA, however, has included both 
refugees and residents. Commissioner-General liter Turkmen said in his opening statement at 
the Informal Meeting of governments in Vienna on 5th of June 1991: 
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(the consequences of the Gulf crisis) erased much of what was left of a disparity 
in conditions between refugees and residents ... the distinction .... has become 
academic. In humanitarian and practical terms it is no longer feasible to use 
such concepts. 
The new task of UNRWA in response to the Intifada has also exceeded its original 
mandate, which was based on provision of humanitarian assistance, to that of "general 
assistance" to protect refugees. This rejuvenated mandate was put into practice in April-May 
1988, on the recommendation of US Under Secretary of State Marrack Goulding who, after a 
visit to the territories, requested the introduction of "extra international staff within the 
Agency's existing administrative structures". As a result, nineteen "guardian Angels" (so called 
by Jansen) were appointed in the WB and GS offices. The appointment of the 19 Refugee 
Affairs Officers was criticised by the authorities, because they interpose themselves between 
Palestinians and the Israeli army, and "their presence alone acts as a deterrent and this has made 
Israeli troops hostile" (Jansen,1989:9;Schiff,1989:70). 
The adoption of a new flexible position by UNRWA towards the changing conditions 
and the camp community it serves in the OTs, was facilitated by UNRWA's "pragmatic, action-
oriented" structure, as Turkmen said. Yet this view, together with UNRWA's changing stance, 
is contrary to the findings of a study done by some members of the faculty of the Hebrew 
University. Examining UNRWA's operations in the WBGS, they applauded its success, which 
they attributed to "the sense of mission of its top-level officials", yet they found that one of its 
defects lay, in its being, "a static organization which finds it difficult to adjust to changing 
circumstances" (Magen, 1972: 35). 
6.6 HOUSING NEEDS 
The Israeli building restrictions in the camps can be seen as an indirect attempt to force 
residents to move out to the housing projects. These projects.are the only alternative for 
refugees because of the limited availability and high prices of land and houses, and the 
continuous increase in house-rents in the Strip. The housing problem in the OTs is illustrated 
by the following Table: 
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TABLE 6.4 Demand and Supply of Housing Units plus the Annual and Accumulative 
Shortage in the WB & GS, Years 1975, 1980,1985 & 1990 
Year 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
Supply 
Units 
5,606 
9,362 
8,891 
10, 108 
Demand 
Units 
9,440 
11,725 
14,562 
18,054 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues. 
Annual Accumulative 
Shortage Shortage 
3,834 3,834 
2,363 15,722 
5,671 35, 718 
7,946 69, 720 
Factors behind the housing shortage are related to the Israeli authorities' restrictive 
measures on construction and building, a general policy which serves the strategic goals of the 
Israeli settlements policy, and the future of the OT's. Sixteen Military orders on the WB alone 
were issued since 1967 which deal with supervision of construction and urban and rural 
planning, which under occupation has been seen as a matter of political debate. All these orders 
relied on "security purposes" as a pretext to give jurisdiction to the authorities to carry them 
out (Rabah & Fairweather, 1993;Coon,1992:40). 
This Israeli policy for restructuring an adequate supply of housing in the OTs dovetails 
with the overall strategy of controlling as much land in the territories as possible under the 
pretext of maintaining "public order and security, or for public purposes". Barriers to 
construction development in the OTs are related to Israeli planning schemes for a large number 
of Palestinan villages and towns throughout the WB and the GS. The Palestinians, as a report 
for the US Government states: "are not permitted to participate in significant public policy 
decisions concerning land and resource use and planning" (Coon, 1992:39). East Jerusalem 
residents are the most to suffer from Israeli planning policies, and the problems over obtaining 
building permits are often insurmountable. As admitted by the advisor to the mayor " ... Young 
Arab couples have no opportunity to build new homes" (Coon,1992:93). 
The first scheme for planning was known as the Partial Regional Master Land Use 
Scheme No. 1182 of 1982, it covers an area of 446,279 Dunums. It includes 49 towns and 
villages, plus seven refugee camps in the WB (Daqqaq,1983:9). While these and other 
unpublished schemes for physical planning, by the Israeli Higher Planning Council, were not 
"deposited legally", 6 the authorities have been implementing them. As Coon put it, "For the 
Palestinians the planning system is of vital concern because it affects not only their prospects 
of future prosperity, but their prospects of nationhood. " He added that: "the apparatus of town 
planning can be a powerful force for the good of a community ... (and) it could be an even more 
powerful means of oppression" (Coon,1992:3,10). This has been done through the issuing of 
military orders, often to the detriment of the Palestinians. Aware of the motives of such 
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planning schemes, the Palestinians hence protested in various ways - by holding press 
conferences, reporting to the UN, the Israeli High Court, and the High Court in Lahai (al-
Jarbawi & Abdel-Hadi,1990:40 & 43). 
Under the planning process, the Palestinians are paying a high price: denial of building 
permits; demolition of houses which the Israeli authorities claim were "illegally built" and 
expropriation of land for settlements. More recently, the Planning Council has become a major 
player in the Israeli war against the Intifada. Planning has been used as an instrument of 
collective punishment against villages which have an active role in the Intifada. Such was the 
case of the village Idna near Hebron, where the army notified 114 Palestinian families, during 
a three-week military siege, that their homes would be demolished because they lacked building 
permits. Another case is the village Kisan near Bethlehem. In 1982 the Israelis destroyed 26 
homes in this village, ostensibly because they were built without permits. Yet, the real 
intention was revealed six years later with the confiscation of 50,000 dunums of Kisan land and 
the setting up of Ma'aleh Amos settlement on it (al-Fajr English,26 December, 1988). A study 
of lands held under the control of Jewish settlement showed that 95 % of such land had been 
privately owned (Cited in Coon,1992:203). International condemnation of Israel's policy on 
Palestinian building permits, while muted, did lead UNCTAD to say : 
The restrictive practices of the occupying authorities, in terms of administrative 
obstacles of issuing building permits and the transfer of funds from 
abroad ... have stifled local efforts and effectively barred a potentially large 
number of families from procuring decent housing." (Sadler and Abu 
Kishk,1983:38). 
Denying the Palestinians the right to development and planning could be further seen 
in the light of Israeli settlement policies in OT's and the intention "to allow full scope for the 
colonisation of the WB by Jews" as Coon put it (Coon, 1992:204). Jewish settlement in the OTs 
carries with it political motives, as explained by a former Israeli minister who described 
settlement" ... as the backbone of the Zionist movement, and ... the only means to defeat any 
peace initiative which is intended to bring foreign rule to Judea and Samaria" (Saleh, 1990:347). 
As in the early years of the Zionist movement, the current Israeli settlement policies in the OTs 
are attempting to achieve the same advantages of both concentration and dispersal as Coon 
said. He quoted the three principles of Halabi, Turner and Benvenisti's: " (a) interconnection 
between existing Jewish areas to create continuity, (b) fragmentation of existing Arab 
settlement, and (c) concentration on powerful new Jewish settlement blocs" (Coon,1992:175). 
This craving for land by Jews is further aggravated by another Israeli policy towards 
the population of the OTs, in which the Israelis "do not recognize most Palestinian ownership 
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rights," as explained by Coon: 
The Israelis have stopped the process of land registration - so most Palestinian 
land is not formally registered - so the Israelis do not recognise ownership 
rights to that land - so they do not allow subdivision of that land - so they 
refuse development permits (Coon, 1992: 114). 
Given this, one can argue that the Israeli building and construction policy towards the 
refugee camps should be considered in relation to the general Israeli policy of construction and 
planning applying to the OT's as a whole. 
6.7 UNRWA - ISRAEL RELATIONS 
Between 1967 and December 1987 UNRWA strove not to lose its neutral image by 
carrying out its mandate without political involvement. Yet, in a totally politicized 
environment, it has been impossible for it to be apolitical, especially since the start of the 
Intifada. 
Relations between UNRWA and the Israeli authorities are based on an agreement of 
1967, between the Commissioner-General and the Israeli political advisor to the Foreign 
Minister Michael Comay, that UNRWA would operate in the OTs in the same manner as when 
the areas were under Egyptian and Jordanian rule (Viorst,1989:40;UNRWA,1990:39-40). 
However, in the particular situation of the OTs, UNRWA has been presented with new 
long-term challenges. This was best described by Schiff, who wrote: 
The requirement for coordination, given the adversarial relationship between 
Israeli authorities and the refugees, means that almost any UNRWA initiative 
can be expected to stimulate criticism from partisans of either side of the 
conflict. Because it is under the control of neither the refugees nor the Israelis, 
it is also a convenient target for venting frustrations by critics on both sides 
(Schiff, 1989:64). 
He continued to say , "UNRWA treads a thin line between collaboration and advocacy 
because the interests of its clients and of the occupation authorities are in conflict" (Ibid. :67). 
7 The conflict between UNRWA and the authorities has intensified since the Intifada. The 
General-Commissioner annual reports for the past four years reveal the heightened tensions on 
the ground between the two sides. The Palestinian Intifada has affected the Agency's ability 
to complete its programmes; and in addition, UNRWA area staff have been subjected to arrest, 
deportation and maltreatment by the authorities. Israeli forces have occupied UNRWA's 
installations for long periods: 555 intrusions into Agency premises were recorded in the GS and 
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191 in the WB in the period from 1 July, 1989 to 30 June, 1990 (UN,1990:29). Moreover, 
Israel retaliated against UNRWA's efforts to help refugees by no longer paying port and 
transportation costs for commodities destined for UNRWA use in the OTs. According to 
UNRWA estimates, this signified additional costs to them of $800,000 a year, which came at 
a time of tight budget restrictions (UNRWA Reports 6,1988:2). 
UNRWA's existence has always been an embarrassment to the Israelis, as one employee 
in UNRWA/Gaza stated. "They hate that word "refugee" because people ask, "a refugee from 
where?" "They also hate seeing UNRWA reports being discussed in the UN and UNRWA's 
mandate being extended year by year. They are trying to see UNRWA's services run down by 
encouraging and forcing resettlement" (Cossali and Robson, 1986: 120-121). 
That was Israel's wish in the immediate period after the 1967 war, when the Israeli 
government sought to end UNRWA's mandate as Israel established a top level committee, in 
the hope that it would be able on its own initiative to resettle many of the refugees under its 
control (Khoury, 1969:203). Israel hoped that by doing away ~ith the camps, they would 
remove the ugly evidence which exposed as a lie the Zionist slogan that Palestine was "a land 
without people for a people without land. " 
The Israeli officials expressed their wishes on different occasions that UNRWA should 
invest more in improving conditions in camps, and co-operate with the Israelis. That was a 
petition also proposed by George Shultz, - former US Secretary of State, who advocated that 
to improve "the quality of life" in the OTs, would lead to a decrease in "terror" 
(Viorst, 1989: Ill) 
Israel has criticized UNRWA for not stopping distribution of rations to the refugees (on 
the grounds that they gain good wages in Israel), and for spending the money instead on 
housing construction inside and outside the camps, as a spokesman for the territories stated 
(Ma'ariv,28 November,1976). UNRWA has replied that the Israelis have not been helpful in 
providing information, nor in giving precise numbers of Gazans employed in Israel, in order 
to help them to screen ineligibles (NYI',24 November,1976). 
Recent Israeli criticism is that UNRWA pours funds into the camps, thus inhibiting the 
outward movement of refugees (JP,6 July, 1989). While trying to terminate UNRWA's 
mandate, Israel has always sought the cooperation of UNRWA in resettling refugees. Israel's 
explanation for seeking co-operation is that it lacks the means for such a big project (US $1.5 
billion). Accordingly, Ben-Porath stated in a press conference that his proposal would be 
implemented in co-ordination with specialized UN organizations and mainly UNRWA (al-Quds, 
al-Fajr,22 November, 1983). UNRWA's position towards Ben-Porath's proposal is that it wants 
182 
no association with it, and no involvement in its execution is envisaged, as General-
Commissioner stated (MEl, 1984: 11). 
Moreover, UNRWA has always been against forced relocation to the projects (as 
mentioned earlier). The Israeli authorities deny the forceful relocation of refugees and claim 
it is voluntary; but, some official Israeli statements have emerged to reveal the truth. Major 
Cheshin, the former liason officer for Gaza, in response to Davidson's accusations admitted 
the facts of forced relocation and demolition of shelters (NIT,24November,1976;NLG 
Report, 1978:25). 
UNRWA has not been allowed to instal any of its services in the projects, so refugees 
are increasingly dependent on the government. They are still eligible for UNRWA schools and 
clinics, but often their distance precludes their using them. One more criticism from the 
Israelis is UNRWA "perpetuates the Palestinians' refugee- consciousness, preventing positive 
change, ... and it is carrying out counter-productive activities." At the same time Palestinian 
critique is that, "UNRWA undermines efforts to mobilize the refugees politically;" an argument 
which has been refuted by the major role of the refugees in the Intifada 
(Schiff, 1989:69;Marx, 1992:292). Accordingly, calls have been made by some Palestinian 
thinkers that UNRWA "must cease if the Palestinian community is to mature both politically 
and socially" (McDowall,1981:11). Since "camp residence, poverty and dependence on 
UNRWA rations had a ghettoising effect" in Lebanese camps, as Sayigh argues, 
(Sayigh,1988:28), the same is true for camps on the WBGS, isolated from the urban areas. 
Mary Khas - an outstanding Palestinian figure and Director of The Early Childhood 
Programmes at the Quakers Office in the Strip - stated in an interview with the author on 30 
July, 1991 that in her discussions with UNRWA directors in Gaza, she always denounced the 
dependency of refugees on UNRWA and recommended a shift of UNRWA's policy towards 
developmental projects. 
But it could be argued that the refugees' stance is one of inconsistency in their 
relationship with UNRWA. This inconsistency is very much related to external circumstances 
which have an effect on the refugees living conditions, particularly in the economic sphere. 
Variables such as, labour market, the increase in unemployment, devaluation of the dinar, 
curfews, arrests and heavy fines, affect the refugees' dependence on UNRWA, despite its very 
minimal assistance. As John Davis, former UNRWA director put it, 
.... the maturing refugee boy has been and is at a serious disadvantage. This is 
not, however, because he is being held as a hostage, or because he does not 
want to work, but to a serious degree he, too, is unemployable in the existing 
labour market ..... and it is for this reason, above others, that they continue to 
be forced to live the life of dependent refugees (Davis,1968:64). 
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In this context, the PRs have an ambivalent view of UNRWA - on the one hand they 
are seeking help from it and on the other, they know that the major contributor to UNRWA is 
the USA, which does not support their political rights. This put them in a dilemma, but they 
have no alternative for assistance offered. 
GS refugees are a particularly interesting case, the harsh economic restraints imposed 
on them making their dependency on UNRWA a unique phenomenon compared to other 
refugees in other areas. 
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NOTES: 
1. The Arab states saw in UNRWA's decision to end the basic rations programme, a first step 
to abdicate its responsibility towards PRs, see: Viorst, 1989:56-58. 
2. As provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on economic, Social & Cultural Rights, and as reaffirmed by the Economic and Social Council 
in its GA Resolution 1986/41 of 23 May 1986, see: UN, The Economic and Social Council, 
1987:31. 
3. The Executive Director was called upon "to devise a national housing development strategy 
for the year 2000 for the Palestinian people based on the Global Strategy for Shelter to the year 
2000 in co-operation with the PLO, including the housing requirements of a future independent 
Palestinian State and to submit this report to the Commision at or before its thirteenth session 
(UN,1989:26). 
4. The legality of plans for construction in the West Bank is based on procedures set out in the 
Jordanian Town and Village Planning Law of 1966. After 1967 the Israeli military authorities 
have amended certain laws by issuing various military orders to exert control and regulate 
planning and building in the West Bank. Those military orders are said to lack legal basis. 
5. For more details on the critic's charges against UNRWA by both sides Israelis and 
Palestinians, see: Benjamin Schiff, 1989:60-75; NYI',24 November, 1976. 
1. The Arab states saw in UNRWA's decision to end the basic rations programme a first step 
to abdicate its responsibility towards the PRs, see: Viorst,1989:56-58. 
2. As provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic,Social & Cultural Rights, and as reaffirmed by the Economic and Social Council 
in its GA Resolution 1986/41 of 23 May 1986, see: UN, The Economic and Social Council, 
1987:31. 
3. The Executive Director was called upon "to devise a national housing development strategy 
for the year 2000 for the Palestinian people based on the Global Strategy for Shelter to the year 
2000 in co-operation with the PLO, including the housing requirements of a future independent 
Palestinian State" and to submit this report to the Commision at or before its thirteenth session 
(UN,1989:26). 
4. For more details on the distribution of expenditures in the three-year programme for 
reintegration of refugees, $10 million being allocated to urban housing, see: Special Report of 
the Director and Advisory Commission of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 
GA, OR: Sixth Session, Supplement No.16 A/1905IAdd.l), Paris: UN, 1951:4-6. 
5. For more information on UNRWA's education programme see: "Education 
Programme", in UNRWA: A Brief History, 1950-1982. Vienna: UNRWA Headquarters, 
1986: 113-144; and Saba Arafat, "Formal Education in UNRWA", Journal of Refugee 
Studies, volume 2, number 1, 1989:108-112. 
6. The legality of plans for construction in the West Bank is based on procedures set out in the 
Jordanian Town and Village Planning Law of 1966. After 1967, the Israeli military authorities 
amended certain laws by issuing various military orders to exert control and regulate planning 
and building in the West Bank. Those military orders are said to lack legal basis. 
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7. For more details on the critic's charges against UNRWA from both sides, Israelis and 
Palestinians, see: Benjamin Schiff,1989:60-75; NYI',24 November,1976. 
Pari Four: 
The Socioeconomic and PoUtical Impact of 
Refugee Resettlement in the Gam Strip 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT AND IMPACT 
OF RESETILEMENT 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having discussed in the previous chapters the issue of resettlement in the GS, and 
examined some of its procedures together with the PRs' and Israelis' perspective of it, our focus 
in this chapter, is on the socioeconomic impact of resettlement on refugees. The impact on 
refugees in this sphere cannot be dealt with in a vacuum, but has to be linked with Israeli 
policies and measures in the OTs during the 27 years of occupation. 
The purpose of examining the socioeconomic impact is to create an empirical foundation 
for the examination of changes which occur in the life of relocated refugees compared with 
those who remain in the SC. It is also to monitor the critical components of social and 
economic life as they appeared at one point in time. 
The Chapter begins by examining the working conditions and household income of 
refugees in the sample survey in both locations. The aim is to examine whether the stated 
Israeli policy of "economic development" has any credibility. It is argued that there is an 
inconsistency in the policies undertaken by the Israelis towards the population in the OTs, 
economic measures being used to control the population political I y and not to promote 
development. Political control forms the skeleton of the Israeli policies in the OTs. 
In this context, the question is raised as to whether the Israeli authorities are genuine 
in improving the living conditions of the Palestinians. The sample survey data illustrates that 
both the camp and the housing project in Gaza are characterized by a massive refugee 
population and very high population density, there being very little difference between the two 
locations. Gaza is also distinguished by severe labour market problems and few migration 
possibilities. These peculiar features of the as leave their marks on the living conditions of 
refugees and it is shown that the relocated refugees are particularly affected, since mortgages 
and bills make work a necessity. 
This Chapter demonstrates that political control by the authorities is not only 
manifested in the dispersal of refugees through resettlement, but is also combined with other 
spheres of everyday life in the OTs namely health and education. During the Intifada access 
to health and education have been used as a collective punishment to quell resistance to 
occupation. 
The Chapter also draws out from the field data the importance of having a large family. 
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Evidence suggests that motherhood is being used to reproduce political cadres rather than for 
economic or religious reasons. Motherhood in this sense has become a public duty as well as 
heroic one; this is, to meet the requirements of the national struggle and the increasing number 
of new Jewish immigrants, the latter factor being a threat to Palestinian existence on the land, 
and is seen as part of Israel's expansionist policies. 
A range of data were collected on the patterns, processes and conditions of resettlement, 
including the interaction among refugees in SR and between SR and SC; and refugee 
perceptions of the similarities and differences between life in SR and their previous camp life 
in se. 
The indicators demonstrate that little improvement has occurred in the life of SR 
residents. Indeed, data from the empirical research in SR reveal that new problems have been 
experienced, such as feelings of alienation, especially by the older generation. 
The final section of the chapter examines the willingness of refugees to return to the 
camp. 
7.2 EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL: ANOTHER FORM OF CONTROL 
As discussed in chapter four, the road widening operations to reduce the Jedayeen (Lit., 
"self-sacrifice") activities were one technique used by the Israeli authorities to tranquillize the 
GS. These operations fostered the implementation of the resettlement schemes for refugees, 
as made clear in the Israeli Ministry of Defence Report: "The slackening of terrorist activities 
in 1971 made possible the implementation of Israel's refugee rehabilitation programmes" 
(Ministry of Defence, 1983:56). According to Israeli claims, resettlement or rehabilitation of 
Gaza refugees has been designed to raise the standard of living of the population in the GS, 
within the framework of "economic development" or improving the "quality of life." Providing 
work opportunities for Palestinians in Israel has to be seen alongside these claims. 
Dayan's call, in the aftermath of 1967 occupation, for the complete economic 
integration of the OTs with Israel, was favoured over other trends of thought at the time. 
Dayan saw the implementation of integration, as Tamari noted, 
.. through three institutional mechanisms - infrastructure, labour and markets. 
These three central control mechanisms were the foundation on which Israel 
constructed its political hegemony over the region, undergirded of course by 
Israel's monopoly of coercive force and a pervasive intelligence network 
(famari, 1988:24). 
In pursuing its economic interests, Israel's economic relationship with the OTs began 
188 
to develop, and as Tamari and Zureik noted it " ... was very similar to that developing 'between 
the metropolitan economy and its colonial satellite'" (famari,1980:96; Zureik,1980:61). 
These three mechanisms - infrastructure, labour and markets - must be seen as the 
institutional building blocks for Israel's political control of the territories. Ultimately, Israel's 
control over the territories is political and military, and not socioeconomic (Ibid.). 
Political control of the territories was emphasised by Shlomo Gazit when he wrote in 
1985 summarizing the Israeli economic policy at the beginning of the occupation: 
'Political and security' considerations should be placed above economic 
considerations; while planning for economic activity in the territories, priority 
should be given to the needs of the Israeli economy; there should be no Israeli 
investments in the economy of the OTs; the Palestinian economy should have 
safety valves (open bridges, work in Israel, etc.) (Bishara, 1990:225). 
The net effect of those features has been to render authority or control over the 
population in the O.T's. Keehn sees a close alliance between the concept of authority and the 
concepts of compliance and support. He wrote: 
Since authority is based upon consent, reciprocal exchange helps create the 
consent that facilitates governing. The capacity to confer benefits, especially 
economic welfare benefits is playing an important source of legitimacy .... So 
long as resources are limited, the potential for exercising control is 
concomitantly limited. Power is an essential element of authority 
(Keehn, 1974:337-8). 
As a result of the exercise of authority over the OTs population, Zureik observes: 
"Israel's occupation of the WB and Gaza has created a different system of relationship to the 
Palestinians. To all intents and purposes, the OTs are Zionism's 'Bantustan' regions" 
(Zureik, 1980:61). 
7.2.1 Replication of Claims 
By drawing the refugee population into wage labour in Israel, the Israelis expected to 
achieve two aims: first, to weaken the sense of identity among refugees - the only identity that 
enhanced their collectiveness and cohesiveness - and second, as one Israeli official stated: "If 
they're picking strawberries in Israel, they're not throwing grenades in Gaza" (Graham-
Brown,1986:230; O'Neill,1978:92). Thus the real motives behind the authorities' claims of 
improving the standard of living of the population in the OTs become clear, and resemble those 
behind setting up the housing projects in GS. 
An examination of Israeli measures to quell the Intifada through economic as well as 
military means belies their mission of improving the standard of living for the population in the 
OTs. They mobilized every means at their disposal to hurt Palestinian residents in the WBGS 
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in their stomachs and pockets (Awartani, 1991: 18); a situation which was aggravated further by 
the consequences of the Gulf War. What can be perceived is an implementation of Gazit and 
Dayan's 'carrot' and 'stick' policy in the OTs. By depriving the population of economic 
facilities, the authorities sought to pacify Palestinian resistance to occupation 
(Gazit,1986:228,232). Given that the authorities must have known that no alternative work was 
available, an element of economic punishment at a collective level is obvious here. The 
question remains, has the occupation succeeded through economic means to crush resistance? 
A recent survey by F AFO in the OTs shows Gaza refugees to be the most deprived 
socio-economic group in terms of employment (Ovensen,1993: 194). Employment in Israel has 
been especially important to Gazans. By the end of 1987, 46 percent of the GS labour force 
had their main employment in Israel, a large increase from the 4% in 1968. By 1991 this 
proportion had dropped somewhat to 38% (Ovensen,1993:201;ai-Fair,February 19,1988). 
In 1991, the unemployment rate had reached an all-time-high of around 30% in the WB 
and 35% in GS. Gaza workers have been more affected by Israeli measures during the Intifada, 
attributed to the 'magnetic card' policy, by which a tangible number of workers have been 
deprived of entry across the Green Line (Awartani,1991:21). 
The present socioeconomic conditions of GS refugees have roots in the pre-1967 period. 
Due to the paucity of the local economy (mainly agricultural), GS refugees, unlike those on the 
WB, were not absorbed into productive employment, thus, their living standards witnessed very 
limited improvement (Van Arkadie,1977:30).1 Evidence from the field data indicates that the 
poverty of GS refugees has been maintained. 
7.2.2 Gaza Refugees in the Labour Force 
Table 7.1 below shows the numbers and percentages of workers employed in Israel 
compared to other places of work. 
TABLE 7.1 Gaza Refugee Workers by Main Place of Work, SC & SR 
Place of Work SC SR 
No. % No. % 
TheWB 
TheGS 42 29.6 26 28.9 
In Israel 8 5.6 6 6.6 
Abroad 
Total 50 35.2 32 35.5 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey. 
It is commonly assumed that Israel is the main employer of Gaza refugees, yet Table 
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7.1 refutes this. There are two main reasons for this: the timing of the sample survey (a month 
after the Gulf War when an UNRWA study estimated that 40% of the Palestinian labour-force 
in the OTs became unemployed) (UNRWA, 1991: 13); the inclusion of a large number of 
housewives, and a smaller number of students, retired and disabled residents, as shown in Table 
7.2 below. 
TABLE 7.2 Occupational Distribution of Employed Refugees, both locations 
Occupation 
Scientific 
Administrative 
Clerical 
Sales 
Services 
Agriculture 
Production 
Transport 
Unemployed 
Housewife 
Student 
Retired 
Disabled 
Total 
Source: Sample Survey, 1991. 
No. 
S 
3 
8 
12 
9 
11 
2 
12 
63 
3 
4 
10 
142 
SC 
% 
3.5 
2.1 
5.6 
8.5 
6.3 
7.7 
1.4 
8.5 
44.4 
2.1 
2.8 
7.0 
100.0 
SR 
No. % 
2 2.2 
2 2.2 
1 1.1 
9 10.0 
7 7.8 
1 1.1 
8 8.9 
2 2.2 
4 4.4 
46 51.1 
2 2.2 
2 2.2 
4 4.4 
90 100.0 
The bulk of refugees in SC are employed in the public services sector (60% compared 
to 24% in the SR). Irrespective of location, however, the real issues are those of income and 
working conditions and their effect on the living conditions of the refugees in GS. 
7.2.3 The Issue of Income 
For Gaza refugees, wage income is the major source of family income. Changes 
brought about by the Gulf War and Israeli restrictions on Arab labour mobility to Israel caused 
a decline in household income mainly in the GS and refugee camps. This was further 
aggravated by the lack of remittances from family members abroad, and the cut-off of Arab aid 
to the PLO. The restrictions imposed on Gaza labour in Israel have, as the FAFO survey 
showed, resulted in the GS having a lower share of households receiving income from labour 
activity than in the WB and Arab Jerusalem (Ovensen,1993:177). As the field data showed, 
household incomes have been declining in GS since the Intifada began. This finding 
corresponds with FAFO findings that two out of three households in the OT's reported a decline 
in income while only one out of twenty households experienced an increase, with the highest 
decline in Gaza and refugee camps (Ovensen, 1993: 166-7). 
In my sample survey the question raised to measure differences in household economic 
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resources was 'to what extent does household income covers the essential needs of the 
household'? The results are shown in Table 7.3. The use of an indirect approach to income 
relates to respondents' fear of taxation and their concomitant suspicion of strangers asking direct 
questions about economic affairs. 
TABLE 7.3 Income Sufficiency by Household in Both Locations 
Rate of Coverage sc SR 
No. % No. % 
Enough 9 6.3 8 8.9 
Most 26 18.3 30 33.3 
Some 85 59.9 43 47.8 
No income 22 15.5 9 10.0 
Total 142 100.0 90 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
The Table indicates that less than 10% of all the households sampled reported sufficient 
income for essential needs. About 48% of households sampled in the SR and 60% in the SC 
reported incomes covering only some of their essential needs, while 33.3% in SR and 18.3% 
SC said that their income covers nearly all essential needs. By the end of the first year of the 
Intifada, income losses for the 1 ()() 000 Arabs workers in Israel were estimated at US$ 158 
million (Shunar, 1989:53). Indeed, data collected at-the end of 1989 show that personal income 
for many families in the GS had dropped by as much as 75% from its 1987 level 
(Roy, 1991 :61). 
The alarming drop in living conditions in GS camps since 1985 contrasts sharply with 
the generally agreed increase in such conditions in the 1970s. Van Arkadie attributed 50% of 
WBGS income-growth since 1967 to increased wages in Israel (Van Arkadie, 1977: 144). 
During the periods 1970-1973 and 1982-1985, Israeli statistics indicated that Gazans' GNP per 
capita increased from an average of US$450 to one of $649, compared with an increase from 
an average of $519 to one of $919 on the WB for the same period. Despite such increases, 
however, it must be stressed that these figures are well below the GNP per capita applying to 
Israel in 1986 ($4,950) and to neighbouring Jordan in 1984 ($1,119.7) (Abdullah, 1988:49-50). 
In 1985 the standard of living of the Palestinians in the WB remained lower than the Israeli 
standard of living by a ratio of 1:4 (Benvenisti, 1986: 17). 
The rise in income on WBGS from the 1970s was clearly evidenced by a number of 
indicators related to private consumption, housing conditions, and ownership of private cars and 
household durable goods. Benvenisti argues that these improvements in living standards 
continued until 1981, and since then there have been decreases. Awartani has argued, 
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meanwhile, that private consumption per capita continued to rise until 1986 at an overall rate 
of 5% per annum (Awartani,1991:17). Yet, it should be noted that the rise in living standards 
following the onset of Israeli occupation, 
.... was not founded on a genuine growth in the domestic economic base, rather, 
it has been precipitated as a consequence of parasitic subordination to the Israeli 
economy ..... and there is a clear indication that consumption has considerably 
outstripped domestic production' (Awartani, 1991: 17). 
During the Intifada there has been a drop in personal consumption. For example, in the 
month of September 1992 it was estimated at US$ 888 for a Palestinian family of four 
members, or about half of the per capita private consumption for a comparable family in Israel 
($1,683). This rate has to be understood in relation to an average wage for Palestinians of 
$228-323 only, and the absence of the kind of income support which an Israeli worker can 
obtain if he/she earns less than $513 (Quds Press,28 November,1992). And also in relation to 
the poverty line in the OTs in February 1992, of $500 compared to about $1000 in Israel, 
which indicates that almost most workers in the OTs are under the poverty line (al-Quds-al-
Arabi,24 February, 1992). 
Initially it was the consumption of luxury goods and services that was cut, but, as 
economic pressures mounted, consumers have had to reduce their consumption even of some 
basic goods. Israeli authorities estimate the decline in the standard of living at a minimum of 
30 percent (Roy,1991:61). For the first time in two decades, malnutrition and poverty are 
observed in wide sectors of the Palestinian population, particularly among GS refugees. 
Indicators of deterioration include, as Roy observed: increases in child labourers, 75 % of whom 
come from the as; refugee and non-refugee demands for emergency food relief; increases in 
the number of children in UNRWA supplementary feeding programmes (Roy,1991,62). It is 
clear that any increases in living standards since the territories were occupied have not been 
maintained. 
7.2.3.1 Detrimental Influences Over Income 
The lack of or decline in income relates to other factors which affect the living 
conditions of as refugees. The high prevalence of part-time work in Israel is one such factor, 
especially detrimental for workers relocated to the housing projects who need long hours in 
order to pay mortgages and municipality electricity and water bills. Many such workers 
mentioned that the necessity to raise money had compelled them to sell their wives gold 
jewellery. The FAFO survey showed that the as region has a lower percentage of married 
women in possession of saleable jewellery (37 %) than the WB (55 %) and Arab Jerusalem (71 % ) 
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(Hammami,1993:297). 
The wealth of households is very much related to the number of workers per household, 
the subject of the following table. 
TABLE 7.4 Workers Per Household in Both Locations 
Variable SC SR 
No. % No. % 
One 89 62.7 37 41.1 
Two 25 17.6 23 25.6 
Three 4 2.8 12 13.3 
Four 2 1.4 8 8.9 
None 22 15.5 10 11.1 
Total 142 100.0 90 100.0 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey. 
The majority of households in the SC (62.7%) and 41.1 % in the SR have onIy one 
worker in the family. Reasons explaining this are, in addition to Israeli restrictions on 
employment in Israel: the lack of work opportunities in the Strip; the high density of population 
combined with very little natural resources; the high dependency ratio in the Strip; and the low 
female participation in the labor force. Figures for 1989 showed that from a total of 379,360 
people aged 16 and over 217,180 are not in the labour force; thereof, 48,670 thousands were 
males and 168,510 were females (Labour,1990:32). 
The other relevant factor influencing the low level of participation in the active labour 
force is the high proportion of young people attending schools and universities both within the 
WBGS and abroad. Labour's figures for 1989 show that 47.11 percent of GS population are 
under 16 year of age (Ibid.:23); and 21.53 percent of the GS population aged sixteen and over 
were involved in education in 1989 (Ibid. :50). These features would lead a worker in Gaza to 
seek any work in Israel to earn a living for his large family, despite his awareness of the 
inequitable work conditions. Political measures also have a detrimental influence on the living 
conditions of refugees. The number of working days was estimated to average onI y 18 per 
month in 1991 in the GS refugee camps (Awartani,1991:21), as a result of the imposition of 
curfews and strikes, disrupted transportation facilities, and administrative detention. An 
UNRW A estimate - based on interviews with workers about their wage levels prior to the Gulf 
war - showed that wages of US$ 47,600,000 were lost during January, February and March 
1991 (UNRWA,1991:3), as a result of the war curfew which prohibited workers from entering 
Israel between January 16 and late February. 
The problem which Gaza refugees face in terms of employment in Israel is further 
compounded by increasing competition from the new Soviet migrants and other foreign workers. 
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As Lifshitz has commented: 
When an immigrant from Russia or Ethiopia competes for a job with a worker 
from Gaza, not only the Israeli Right, but the humane, stuttering Zionist Left 
as well, will prefer the immigrant and the Israeli unemployed over the Gazan 
(Lifshitz, 1991 :37). 
This has further increased unemployment problems for Arab workers, and in the early 
1990s, "overqualified Palestinians - the products of the expanding educational system - and 
overqualified Soviet Jews eyed the same low-level jobs" (Migdal and Kimmerling,1993:259). 
7.2.3.2 Loss of Remittances 
In addition to the aforementioned direct influences on Palestinians' household income, 
indirect factors have also had a role, such as the decline - and the cessation - of remittances 
coming from family members working in Kuwait and other Gulf countries. 
Before the Gulf war remittances from abroad helped to pull household wealth upwards, 
enabling investments in housing and the education of children. According to the F AFO survey, 
remittances constitute up to 113 of private disposable income in the OTs, the northern and 
central parts of the WB rating higher than other regions (Ovens en: 1993: 173). In 1987, as Roy 
reported, total remittances from the Gulf countries reached $250 million, or 10% of the 
territories' GNP (1991:62). Refugees abroad sought to maintain an exile culture through 
obligations to aid their relatives in dire straits in the homeland. 
The loss of remittances since the Gulf War was aggravated by a decision of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council to cut off aid to the PLO. The losses of $480 million in direct aid and 
$62.5 million in revenue from the "liberation tax" formerly levied on Palestinians working in 
the region and turned over to the PLO, have been affecting the Palestinians' living conditions, 
since some funds were funnelled to the territories (al-Tali'a,19 April, 1991). 
At the end of 1989 residents of GS living temporarily abroad to study or work reached 
about 86,000 (Labour,1990:29), compared with the 27,697 measured by the Israeli Census of 
population in 1967 (Van Arkadie,1977:58). The sample survey in both locations shows the 
following figures (fable 7.5). 
195 
TABLE 7.5 No. & Percentage of Households With Family Members Living Abroad 
No. of Persons SC 
1 - 2 
3-4 
5-6 
7-8 
9 - 10 
None 
Total 
No. 
24 
7 
111 
142 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
% 
16.9 
4.9 
78.2 
100.0 
SR 
No. % 
24 26.7 
1 1.1 
1 1.1 
64 71.1 
90 100.0 
Nearly one-fifth (16.9%) of the 142 households in the SC have 1 or 2 members of their 
families living abroad, and over one-quarter (26.7%) in the SR. The majority of households 
in both locations have no family member living abroad. Unlike the WB, GS refugees - other 
than those who immigrated at the time of the 1967 war and its aftermath - have exercised more 
residential stability, because of a lack of means and skills. 
Only 17 (12%) of households in the SC project get remittances from abroad; 125 (88%) 
receiving no remittances, comparable figures for SR being 10 (11.1 %) and 80 (88.9%) 
respectively. This paucity of remittances could be attributed to the new dispersion of the 
Palestinian communities living in the Gulf during the period following the invasion of Kuwait 
and the Gulf war and the harsh treatment of Palestinian migrant workers. 
The direct and indirect measures imposed on the Palestinian refugees in the OTs leave 
them with no alternative other than complete dependency on the Israeli economy to maintain 
their living. Yet, the asymmetrical interdependency between the two has been creating new 
contradictions. As the disparity between them has expanded it has formed the basis for the 
nationalist fervor which culminated in the eruption of the Intifada in December 1987. 
7.3 CREATING NEW CONTRADICTIONS 
7.3.1 Forms of Socioeconomic Oppression 
By opening its doors to Arab workers, under the pretext of "economic development", 
Israel has in fact been creating new contradictions. Israel's full awareness of these 
contradictions became evident with the losses incurred on its economy during the Intifada. 
Palestinian workers in Israel are vulnerable to economic and political fluctuations, as 
they are the "last hired, first fired" (Ovensen,1993:207) due to a lack of job protection. The 
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consequences of this vulnerability have to be understood against several discrepancies between 
the Arab worker and the Israeli one. 
A man from Gaza working in Israel knows he is treated much worse than an 
Israel.i worker, that he does not earn enough to support his family on (sic) a 
reasonable standard and the conditions in which he must work are inhuman 
(Ryan, 1974: 17). 
Israeli officials and economists argue that the wage level of Palestinians working in 
Israel is higher in real terms than before 1967, resulting in the noticeably expanded purchasing 
power of a significant section of the population in the OTs (Budeiri,1982:57). But, as Van 
Arkadie argues, commuting labourers are either enjoying the benefits of a high income or they 
are underprivileged by being relegated to the bottom of the economic ladder (Van Arkadie, 
1977:41-42). The fact is that WBGS Palestinians are the lowest-paid group in the Israeli wage 
structure. Bregman's Bank of Israel study emphasized that when reporting: 
Gross data indicate that a sizeable gap exists between average wages paid to 
Israelis and the average paid to area residents working in Israel; it stood at 50 
percent in 1972. In 1972 the average gross monthly wage of a WB or GS 
resident was about 500 Israeli pounds compared with 918 pounds for an Israeli 
(Van Arkadie, 1977:65) 
Besides the undeniable gap in wages between Palestinian workers from the WBGS and 
Israeli workers, other differences also exist. These include: the deductions (30-40%) of 
Palestinians' wages to labour contractors; 2 income tax payments at the same level as Israeli 
workers; and social security payments and pension contributions. Yet, Palestinian workers -
with the exception of workers from Jerusalem are denied welfare services of the kind enjoyed 
by Israeli workers. In addition, their working-day lasts for twelve hours as they have to 
commute daily to and from work, incurring transport costs (Budeiri,1982:57). Moreover, the 
Palestinian workers in Israel have been serving the capitalist interests of the Israeli economy. 
The OTs can be seen to be the periphery of a "developed" Israeli core, the former subjected to 
the latter. Tamari argues that the purpose of the integration of Arab labour was dual. It reduced 
the level of unemployment among the Arab population and it also allowed Israel to develop 
capital intensive industry and to restructure Jewish labour (Tamari,1988:245). 
According to a Bank of Israel report, "unskilled jobs have come to be considered the 
preserve of workers from the Administered Areas" (Cited in Budeiri,1982:62). Palestinian 
workers, cheap and mobile, provided "a free labour force in the classical economic sense" 
(Farjoun, 1980: 110). Between 1968 and 1973 the highly elastic and relatively cheap labour 
force from the OTs played an important role in the expansion of the Israeli economy (Van 
Arkadie,1977:61-63). Davar of May 18,1976 expressed the flexibility which the Arab workers 
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lend to the Israeli economy: 
... an Arab worker is exceptionally mobile, can be dismissed without notice and 
moved from place to place, does not strike and does not present demands. 
From many economic considerations, workers from the territories are a bargain 
for the Israeli economy ... responding in an economically healthy manner to the 
demand of the Israeli economy. They exist when and where required and make 
a full contribution to the production cycle. 
7.3.2 Controversy Over Interdependency 
Israel's dependency on this "reserve army of labour" has been a source of controversy 
among the Israelis - especially during the Intifada - as well as the Palestinians. Tactics used 
by the Palestinians during the Intifada - strikes, boycotts, refusal to pay taxes - have aimed at 
mobilizing as many people as possible in the struggle and have transformed the occupation into 
an economic burden for Israel. 
7.3.2.1 The Zionist/Israeli Argument 
From the Zionist/Israeli Orthodox point of view , relying on cheap Arab labour including 
children "... threatened to undermine the pioneering ethos of Zionism and gave credence to 
Arab propaganda concerning Israeli 'colonialism'" (O'Neill, 1978:70). Pragmatic Israelis see 
in the Arab workers cheap labour that should be exploited for Israeli domestic demands, thus, 
emphasizing the colonial aspect of Israeli occupation (S hunar , 1989:21-23). However, by 
modelling itself along the apartheid structures of South Africa or the old Rhodesia, Israel is, 
according to some, increasingly making a mockery of the Zionist claim of 'normalisation' of 
Jewish social structure. As one Israeli social scientist argues, Israel is becoming a 'nation of 
bosses' (Zureik, 1980:60-1). 
However, the hardship faced by Israelis as a result of the Intifada and the boycott of 
work in Israel, in addition to the Palestinian boycott of Israeli products in the first four years 
of the Intifada, has alerted some to the urgent need for restructuring of the Israeli economy to 
lessen dependence on the neighbouring territories, whether as a source of cheap labour or as 
hostage backyard markets (Awartani, 1991: 19;5hunar, 1989:28-35). 
According to the Governor of the Bank of Israel report in March 1988, Bruno stated 
that 20% decrease was witnessed in the number of Arab workers in Israel, affecting mainly the 
agricultural and construction sectors but generally not at the macroeconomic level (Ha 'aretz, 
March 11,1988). The Arab labour shortage is much higher according to other Israeli officials, 
being estimated at 42 % by the Likud's former Minister of Labor Moshe Katsav (JP,March 
1,1988); and 40% by Ariel Sharon, Minister of Trade and Industry (al-Quds,March 11,1988). 
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Israeli economic losses as a result of work absences by Arab workers in the first year 
of the Intifada were estimated at US$600 million; indeed if all Arab workers boycotted work 
they would be $1.5 billion (Shunar,1989:53). Thus "Palestinian workers in Israel save about 
$500 million for Israeli employers in lower labor costs", in addition to unpaid social security 
benefits which are deducted from their paychecks, by which total net revenue for Israel reached 
more than $1 billion (Cited in Bishara,1990:226). Added to this the taxes collected from the 
OTs by Israel every year which, being $383 million, well exceed the $240 million allocated for 
expenditures (Bishara,1990:225). According to Benvenisti, Israel had made $600 million profit 
from taxes in 19 years of occupation of the WBGS (Cited in Sabella, 1990:92). 
To compensate for its economic losses, Israel called for the importation of workers from 
other foreign sources, mainly to prevent the construction and agricultural sectors from 
collapsing.3 During the first months of the Inti/ada, losses in construction reached $200 
million and in agriculture $1.5 million (Ha'aretz, July 27, 1988;JP, January 1,1988). In May 
1988 Rabin supported the idea of importing 3-8,000 workers from abroad for the construction 
sector. He commented that "[the Palestinians should] understand that work in Israel is an 
advantage that we provide, not a favor that they extend to us" (Cited inBishara,1990:227). 
Gaza workers were the first to be punished by Israel's counter-reaction to the boycott 
of work in Israel. In May 1989 Israel decided to prevent Gazans from working in Israel for 
the first time since the 1967 occupation. This decision had far-reaching consequences since the 
income of such workers formed 54% of the GNP in the GS, compared to 18% in the WB (al-
Quds,16 June, 1989). Political and security aspects were also involved, the aim being to tame 
the Gazans through economic control and to disrupt the plans of the organizers of the Intifada. 
The consequences of such a decision was mainly seen on the Gazan workers, one of whom said: 
"You are killing us without guns, killing us with regulations, forms, and orders" 
(Lifshitz, 1991:38). Ultimately, Gazans repetition of the phrase that they are going through a 
slow death - as reported by Edward Said during his visit to GS - is valid (Said,1992:54). 
Lifshitz noted that with the massive unemployment in the GS it is rapidly turning" .. into a 
disaster area on the brink of hunger and beyond". He continued: 
The thousand arms of the (Israeli) government perform a thousand actions, 
innocent or less innocent, with blind indifference. The result is the systematic 
starvation of the residents of the GS (Lifshitz,1991:37-8). 
A brief review of Israel's losses due to the boycott of products would further clarify the 
extent of dependency on the OTs as main importing markets, and there is enough evidence to 
suggest the magnitude of this cost is probably greater than that incurred by the Palestinians. 
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For example, in 1987 Israel's exports to the OT's were valued at $900 million; by the end of 
the first year of the Intifada the figure decreased to $600 million (Ma'ariv,December 16,1988). 
The same year, the OTs exports to Israel which had amounted to $304 million decreased to 
$170 million. Two sectors were especially hard hit: textiles and food products which decreased 
between 10% to 25% (Abdullah,1990:6-7). 
However, for Israel, disrupted economic relations with the two territories are less likely 
to impart long term adverse consequences, given the aid granted to Israel from the US and 
world Jewry. This is not the case for the Palestinians in the O.T's. 
7.3.2.2 The Palestinian Argument 
For the Palestinians, controversy over work in Israel was first raised by the Gaza 
Jedayeen in the second year of occupation. Their argument was that every Arab working in 
Israel released an Israeli for the front and workers going to Israel were attacked by the 
guerrillas to prevent them from work, as well as collaborators with the authorities (JP,6 
October, 1969). Despite awareness of economic need, as one Palestinian official put it, the 
"economic opportunities provided the Palestinians gave them something to lose if they supported 
theJedayeen, a fact not lost on the guerrillas" (Free Paiestine,July 1971:5). 
The Palestinians' economic resistance to Israel reached its peak during the Intifada 
campaign of civil disobedience, which took the form of boycotting Israeli work, products and 
taxes. 
In Communique no. 3 of January 18, 1988 the Unified National Leadership (UNL) 
called upon workers to stop working in Zionist projects: 
... By our uprising we will not lose anything but the chains of oppression and 
exploitation imposed upon us. Let the Israeli wheel of production be paralysed, 
injuring the Israeli economy. Deepening the Israeli economic crisis is one of 
the measures we use in order to regain our rights to repatriation, self-
determination and an independent national state (lbal,1989:20). 
In order to examine the extent to which the UNL communique was heeded, worker 
respondents in both locations were asked whether they commute to work on strike days. Their 
responses are shown in Table 7.7. 
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TABLE 7.7 
Variable 
Workers Commuting to Work on Strike Days by Location 
Yes 
No 
No. 
22 
43 
77 No answer 
Total 142 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
SC 
% 
15.5 
30.3 
54.2 
100.0 
SR 
No. % 
10 11.1 
24 26.7 
56 62.2 
90 100.0 
As indicated above, the majority of workers who replied do not work on strike days, 
whether in Israel or in the GS. This result reflects the collective stand of refugees in response 
to the UNL of the Intifada calls, irrespective of their location. The high rate of non-response 
is attributed to categories of the sample survey who are out of the labor force, as explained 
above. 
Communique no. 6 of February 2, 1988, called the Palestinian masses to promote the 
national economy and reduce consumption, in support of the uprising and as a step toward 
finding substitutes for Israeli products, which must be boycotted in order to bolster sumud 
(steadfastness) (Ibal,1989:32) The responses of the sample survey in the two case study areas 
regarding boycott of Israeli goods showed that 86 (95.6%) in the SR and 128 (90.1 %) in the 
SC boycotted Israeli products, compared to 4 (4.4%) in the SR and 14 (9.9%) in the SC who 
did not. The degree of boycotting is shown in Table 7.8. 
TABLE 7.8 Nature of Boycott of Israel i Goods by Persons in Both Locations 
Nature of Boycott SC SR 
No. % No. % 
Complete 35 24.7 15 16.7 
Partial 93 65.4 71 78.9 
No answer 14 9.9 4 4.4 
Total 142 100.0 90 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
The survey data show that the majority of respondents partially boycott Israeli products. 
The partiality of the boycott relates to the unavailability of alternative local products, as a result 
of an Israeli policy to keep the OTs in a subordinate position economically and simultaneously 
facilitate political control. In this context, the issue of the economic development which Israel 
talks about for the OTs could be seen as superficial or false and not real. The workers' role in 
boycotting work in Israel was an effective political weapon which affected the Israeli economy 
heavily. Yet, the loss incurred on the Palestinian workers income was also high. It amounted 
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to at least $238 million in the first year of the Intifada (Shunar,1989:53). This loss, and the 
partiality of the boycott, may be attributed to the lack of a local alternative, which the Intifada 
had failed to provide for several reasons beyond the scope of this study. 
At the same time, the boycott policy has defeated the notion that the physical, economic 
and infrastructural integration of the WBGS into the body of the state of Israel creates 
irreversible facts. Indeed, the concept of separation along the lines of Palestinian sovereignty 
is becoming a very clear-cut option for the future (famari,1988:27). On Israel's side, the 
economic losses incurred as a result of these forms of boycott have transformed the occupation 
from an economic asset into a liability. Yet the following questions must be raised. Could 
Israel afford to stop employing Palestinian workers in Israel? And could Palestinian workers 
afford to quit work in Israel? 
Israel's preoccupation with security and public order in the territories makes such a 
decision unapplicable in the short run. Even though its capacity to import foreign labour and 
introduce high technology could be an exit from dependence on Palestinian labour, it would 
create new socioeconomic problems and losses. 
There is a thin line between economy and security as far as the Civil Administration 
and the Israeli authorities' policy in the OTs goes. The hiring and firing of Arab labour is 
linked to Israel's policy to maintain colonial rule and dependency. They want the population 
in the OTs to know that Israel is the only source of living for them, and those who resist 
occupation have to pay a high price. On the other hand, they know that if a very high rate of 
unemployment in the territories emerges, Palestinian resistance to occupation will escalate, as 
was the case during the Mandate period, when poor unemployed Palestinian peasants 
contributed to urban unrest and the discontent which fed the fires of nationalism and xenophobia 
leading up to the 1936-9 revolt (Ward,1977:6-7). Israeli policies towards Palestinian labour 
also relate, however, to their needs in the construction and agricultural sectors, and Israel 
continued to hire labour to meet its economic interests even during the Intifada. It is this 
combination of conflicting economic, political and security factors which helps explain the 
graduated restriction of Arabs' work in Israel. 
As a result of the economic control over the refugees in particular, refugee camps have 
became centres of service rather than production, which explains why camp refugees are found 
in the lower categories of socioeconomic status. The refugees in this case fit the definition of 
a proletariat depending for living on wage labour - either in Israel or at home - a status which 
has been aggravated by their separation from the means of production through dispossession, 
rather than by economic and market forces (Graham-Brown,1986:241). 
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7.4 PALESTINE: UNIQUE ASPECTS IN ITS PROCESS OF CHANGE 
In the context of the economic crisis which the Palestinians encounter in the OTs, three 
questions can be raised. Is the economic crisis which the refugees encounter a new 
phenomenon in the socioeconomic history of Palestine? Has this crisis led to structural 
transformation of Palestine's economic situation and why? What consequences have this 
transformation brought, with regard to the social fabric and conditions of refugees? There is 
also a fourth question relating to the political and nationalistic impact, the answer to which will 
be dealt with in the last chapter of this study. 
7.4.1 The Repeat of Palestinian History? 
The dispossession of their land and their dependency on work in Israel is not a new 
phenomenon in the socioeconomic history of Palestinians. The transformation of peasants to 
wage labour has to be seen in a broader context. Zureik's observation in this respect is that: 
The peculiar process of rural proletarianisation, became a distinguishing feature 
of Palestinian social structure, and was further aggravated during the British 
mandate and the Zionist colonisation of Palestine (1980:51) 
The Palestinian peasants' dispossession from the land goes back to the 1850s, as Zureik 
argued. Since then there has been an increase in the size of Palestine's rural proletariat as was 
the case in the Levant region as a whole (Ibid.:49). The increase in the rural proletariat, 
according to Smilianskaya, resulted from European penetration in the Levant and their 
incorporation into the orbit of international capitalism (Cited inIbid.:50). 
The external penetration by British and Zionist forces in Palestine under Mandate was 
at the expense of the local Palestinian socioeconomic structure; similar to the present situation 
in the OTs which creates a Palestinian economy dependent on foreign forces (Migdal, 1977:342-
3}. 
It could be noticed from the discussion above, that the interaction between the internal 
and the external structures and forces in the Palestinian experience have placed the Palestinian 
labour force since the Ottomans, British, Zionism/Israel under the mercy of foreign enterprises. 
Moreover, these external forces have impeded the emergence of a sound Palestinian economic 
infrastructure, thus, emphasising a state of dependency /subordination rather than independence. 
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7.4.2 Structural Transformation of Economy 
The major dispersal of the peasantry in Palestine took place in 1948, when most of 
the refugees who fled and sought relief were peasants. The sudden separation of a whole class 
of people from their land and consequently from their sources of livelihood created a new 
landless proletariat within the Palestinian society; and refugees in particular became dependent 
on relief for their physical survival (Smith, 1984: 145). 
The common saying that "he who has no land, has no honour" clarifies the importance 
of land and the family farm for the worker peasant, not merely as an expression of patriotic 
attachment, but because it, as Tamari argues, 
Constitutes the worker's physical and symbolic link with his immediate 
community, and hence with peasant culture in general .... his relationship with 
his brothers, sisters, parents and cousins, as well as his family's visible source 
of livelihood, revolve (Tamari, 1981: 11). 
In the GS, the high population growth resulted in the transfer of large areas of 
agricultural land into building areas or housing areas. Moreover, the confiscation of land by 
the Israeli authoriti~s for Jewish settlements, and the issue of military orders related to 
agricultural activities, had led to a decline in the peasantry working on the land (Abu 
Amru, 1987: 13), pushing them into wage labour in Israel. The shift of labour from agriculture 
to wage labour has meant "the land ... has shifted from being a source of income through 
agricultural production to being a source of value as real estate" (Tamari, 1981: 11). 
A brief reading in statistics over the drop in agricultural workers and agricultural land 
clarifies the scale of the problem. A report by the US Congress has estimated that the amount 
of land which has gone out of production is in excess of 100,000 acres on the WB (Cited in 
Budeiri,1982:54); whereas, statistics from the Agricultural Department on the WB show a 
decrease of 43% in agricultural land on the WB (Cited in Alawaneh: 1991: 117). The number 
of those employed in agriculture has fallen substantially, dropping from over 40% in 1970 to 
only 17% in 1987 on the WB (Coon,1992:30). This shortage of agricultural labour on the 
WB under occupation has made even more acute a problem in the agricultural sector before 
1967. The drop in land and workers in agriculture is reflected by the national income in the 
OT's. In the GS income from agriculture dropped from 28% in 1968 to 20% in 1974 and to 
12% in 1986; while the drop on the WB was from 53.5% in 1968 to 17% in 1986 (Statistical 
Abstract of Israel, different issues). 
Certain social strata - unskilled labour - benefited from the integration of the Israeli 
economy with the OTs, whereas other groups have experienced an erosion of employment 
possibilities. As a result of "depeasantization" of the Palestinian workers there has been an 
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increased marginalization of the family farm - mainly in the rural areas of the WB. Although 
wage labor was not the only determinant, it was a major factor (famari,1981:7-8). 
The other factors which influenced the transformation of the labor force in the OT's 
could be seen in the immigration and loss of skilled migrants (See Chapter one), which has had 
a conservative effect on village society as a whole since it removed the most innovative and 
educated segments that might otherwise have been a force for change in rural society 
(Moors,1990:8). This phenomenon is obvious where whole village communities, as well as 
residents of refugee camps, became completely dependent for their survival on employment in 
Israel as unskilled labour. 
Tamari notes that remittances could have a negative effect and that they become the 
most crucial variable in alienating family members from their agricultural land, since the sums 
sent allow the remaining members to become village entrepreneurs, or in some cases, to engage 
in businesses in the district centre (famari,1981:24). 
Given the aforementioned debate, the question that emanates is whether this 
transformation had a negative or positive influence on the standard of living of the PRs in the 
GS. 
7.5 RESEITLEMENT VS. CONTROL 
For a better understanding of the Israeli resettlement policy in the GS, it has to be 
perceived within the scope of the Israeli "economic development" policy for the population in 
the OTs. As we discussed above, the Israeli policy tends to keep the OTs in a subordinate 
position economically and simultaneously facilitates political control. In this context, the 
"economic development" which Israel talks about for the OTs could be seen as superficial or 
false and not real. 
There is a thin line, between economy and security as far as the Civil Administration 
and the Israeli authorities' policy in the OTs goes. The hiring and firing of Arab labour is 
linked to Israel's policy to maintain colonial rule and dependency. This policy is obvious in 
almost every aspect of the socioeconomic fabric of Palestinian society. The authorities want 
the population in the OTs to know that Israel is the only source of living for them, and those 
who resist occupation have to pay a high price. At the same time, however, the authorities 
know that if a very high rate of unemployment in the territories emerges, Palestinian resistance 
to occupation will escalate, as was the case during the Mandate period, when poor unemployed 
Palestinian peasants contributed to urban unrest and the discontent which fed the fires of 
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nationalism and xenophobia leading up to the 1936-1939 revolt (Ward, 1977:6-7). 
Work, income and consumption were discussed above in some detail, since work and 
income form the core of socioeconomic mobility. In the context of human development, 
measurement of the level of living conditions in full has to combine "the dimensions necessary 
for human physical and psychological welfare and those required for a sense of human 
empowerment, productivity and self-respect" (Heiberg, 1993: 13). Living standards, as 
internationall y understood today, do not rely only on material goods as an 
indicator, but are: 
Concerned with human capabilities and how such capabilities are used. They 
try to examine the degree to which people can participate in social, political and 
economic decision-making and can work creatively and productively to shape 
their own futures (Heiberg, 1993: 13). 
Our concern in this study is housing, since it is relevant to the issue of resettlement as 
undertaken in the as. Yet an examination of other socioeconomic indicators are also vital to 
gauge living standards; these cover: demographics; health; and education. The importance of 
examining these indicators is that they enable us to understand the issue of resettlement in a 
wider context, and to judge whether resettlement serves the Israeli claims of "economic 
development" in the OTs, or meets other objectives of control and collective punishment. 
On the demographic level, one of the reasons compelling the Israel to carry out its 
resettlement policy in the as is the high growth rate among camp refugees (See Chapter 1). 
One of the Israeli aims for resettlement has been to reduce the growth and density of the refugee 
population in the as (Jordan Data Base Project for the West Bank, 1976:44). The question 
that emanates is what impact relocation has on refugees in terms of growth, compared to 
refugees in the SC. 
7.5.1 GS Refugees: Demographically - Politicized 
The questionnaire raised three questions regarding the preferred size of the family, so 
as to gauge whether imprOVed living conditions have led families to have less children (see 
Appendix 6, and 7). What is increasingly revealed is not only the oft-cited economic reason 
for large families, in terms of the assistance that children might provide, but the crucial 
dimension amongst political refugees of the importance of supplying political cadres. The 
responses given to the question on the preferred size of the family are given in Table 7.9 below 
for both locations. 
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TABLE 7.9 Preferred Size of Family in Both Locations 
Number of No. % 
children SC SR SC SR 
1 - 2 2 1 1.4 1.1 
3 - 4 13 11 9.2 12.2 
5 - 6 36 15 25.6 16.7 
7 - 8 9 6 6.3 6.7 
9 - 10 28 21 19.7 23.3 
11-+ 54 36 38.0 40.0 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
As Table 7.9 indicates, respondents in both locations have a preference for a large 
family ( 11 + children), 38 % in SC and 40% in SR Housing Project expressing a preference 
for such a family size. The second most common preference lies in the category 9 - 10 children 
(19.7% in SC and 23.3% in SR). The refugees who moved to the SR comprise the third 
generation of refugees who have started a nuclear family pattern compared to the extended 
family pattern which prevails in the camp. Yet, a patriarchal pattern is still a main feature. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that there are not some extended families living in 
the housing project. These findings contrast sharply with the Israeli assumption that the 
relocation of refugees would reduce refugee population growth. 
The reasons given by the sample surveyed for their choice of the number of children 
are illustrated in Table 7.10 below. The variables given indicate the impact of the socio-
economic, religious, and political factors upon the preference for a large family. 
TABLE 7.10 Reasons for Preference of a Large Family, in Both Locations 
Reasons No. % 
sc SR sc SR 
Social 13 6 9.2 6.7 
Economic 41 31 28.9 34.4 
Political 79 51 55.6 56.7 
All 3 above 1 2 0.7 2.2 
Others 8 5.6 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey. 
The relationship between political reasons and desire for a large family gained the 
highest response from respondents. The explanation for this might be the impact of the 
Intifada's slogans and ideology on the camp population, together with the nationalistic call to 
reproduce to meet the increasing numbers of new Jewish immigrants and the expansionist policy 
on land of the occupier. 
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Economic and religious reasons have always been of priority for large families in the 
Middle East, the Arab or Middle East culture in general giving a high value to having children, 
especially sons. Both Islam and Christianity encourage the adage to "be fruitful and multiply". 
To refuse to have children because of economic considerations is to express a lack of faith in 
God, who would always provide (Goode,1970:111). 
In the sample survey conducted in SC and SR for this thesis, the political reason for 
large families was given priority. The refugees interviewed were asked why they had chosen 
this factor as a reason for their desire for a big family. Their responses are shown in Table 
7.11 below, which emphasizes the strong relationship between political reasons and women's 
reproduction. The controversy on this issue among Palestinian intellectuals has been of 
paramount importance recently, and some have rejected the idea that the Palestinian woman's 
role is through motherhood, which has become a public duty as well as a heroic one, in 
reproducing children for the continuation of the struggle. One argument is that "just making 
more babies is not enough," as stated by the Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh. "No one 
in Israel will be concerned by that alone. We have to put Israel on the spot. The demographic 
bomb will never explode without a fuse. The fuse will be our demand for equal rights" 
(NYT,19 October,1987). 
TABLE 7.11 Reasons for Choosing the Political Variable 
Reason No. % 
SC SR SC SR 
Continue the struggle 32 24 22.5 26.7 
Excell demographically 27 4 19.0 4.4 
Compensation for 
Intifada martyrs 29 18 20.4 20.0 
Support future state 4 12 2.8 13.3 
Others 1 0.7 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Table 7.11 indicates that 26.7% of respondents in SR and 22.5% in SC believe that 
continuation of the struggle is the first reason for having a large number of children. SR 
relocated refugees give this variable apriority. This could be attributed to various elements. 
Firstly, the age structure of the population in the project, which consists of the second 
generation of refugees, who are more militant and politically mobilized, and more educated; 
secondly, the influence of the Intifada on those living at the project, whose resistance to the 
occupation was negligible before the Intifada compared to the camps, indeed the SR project, 
as mentioned by some of the interviewees, was called "the peace camp". Compensation for 
those killed in the Intifada rates second in both locations, 20.4% in SC and 20.0% in SR; 
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giving this reason. For the SC respondents, to excel demographically comes third (19.0%), 
while for the SR respondents, the support of the future state comes third (13.3%). 
The link between the four most common responses indicates a high standard of political 
awareness among respondents, irrespective of their of location or level of educational 
attainment. 
7.5.2 Constraints on Health Development 
Household income is normally considered to be significantly related to health status 
indicators, since it is likely to be associated with various other factors which influence health, 
such as water supply, crowding, sanitation and education. It could be presumed that within the 
refugee community in the GS, fluctuations in income would lead to fluctuations in health status. 
Although the survey did not deal with the health conditions of refugees directly, certain data 
were collected in both locations concerned with infrastructural amenities and their impact on the 
health status of the refugees. This and the other aspects of the health situation in GS will be 
elaborated upon below, in the hope that they would add to the argument about the standard of 
living of GS refugees; and demonstrate that even the health sector does not escape the restricted 
and repressive policies of the occupiers. 
UNRWA health services are particularly important for camp refugees in the GS. 
UNRWA is the main providers of other services for the refugee community, who have the least 
resources. The other provider for the GS population is the government sector. 
The military government spends US$30 per capita per year on refugee health care in 
the GS, while UNRWA spends an estimated $16 (Roy, 1986: 112;UNRWA,1986:26). These 
figures are well below the estimated $350 per capita per year that the Israeli government spends 
on health care for its citizens (Roy, 1986: 112). 
The military government expenditure on the health sector in the GS could be viewed 
within the context of the overall policy for public expenditure in Gaza (Table 7.12). 
209 
Table 7.12 Estimated Public Expenditure Versus Income from 
Taxation of Gazans: 1985 
Total Public Expenditures 
Revenue from direct taxation 
Revenue from Social Security 
and Health Insurance payments 
of Gazans working in Israel 
Income from Value Added Tax 
TOTAL INCOME 
Source: Estimated from Roy, 1986:77. 
$ 52.5 million 
$ 35 million 
$ 30 million 
$ 50 million 
$ 115 million 
The figures above suggest that less than half of the income raised through direct and 
indirect taxation of the people of Gaza is returned to the as in the form of service provision 
through public expenditure. This implies that the main constraint on the development of the 
public sector in the Strip, rather than being strictly financial, is the result of a policy on the part 
of the authorities not to use locally raised funds, in order to keep the health sector as well as 
other economic sectors in full dependency on Israel. 
This constraint on health services caused by the Israeli authorities is exercised despite 
the bad health status of the refugees in as, where the infant mortality rate had reached 26 per 
thousand live births in 1990 according to Israeli statistics (WHO and the Gaza Health Services 
Research Centre,1990:3), and 42 in GS refugee camps, according to UNRWA (al-Quds,3 & 
4 September,1991). Deaths of this kind are poverty related and can be prevented by better 
housing and environmental sanitation, health education programmes and access to appropriate 
health facilities. Malnutrition has the highest reported rate among the refugee population in the 
GS compared to refugee camps in Jordan, the WB, Syria and Lebanon, as an UNRWA-WHO 
1984 nutrition survey showed, a and has not decreased over the past 10 years 
(UNRWA, 1986:21;Jabra, 1984). Presumably it is being aggravated today by the poor economic 
situation in the GS. Moreover, preventable blindness is common in the Strip, caused by poor 
hygiene but readily treated at an early stage if facilities are available (Thomson & 
Chumley, 1984:598-602). 
Refugees in the SR are entitled to UNRWA health services, but the distance of some 
refugees from UNRWA dispensaries makes them use the government clinic and they are 
covered by the government health insurance scheme. A clinic was established at the SR project 
in 1979. The head of the clinic reported that there has been a 50% drop in the number of 
people enroled in the scheme as refugees have gone back to UNRWA clinics (Interview, Dr. 
Abed,11 May,1991). A similar fall was emphasised by Roy (Roy, 1986: 107). 
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7.5.2.1 Other Health-related Aspects 
Having discussed the UNRWA and governmental health care programmes in the Strip, 
another health-related aspect that cannot be ignored is the symptoms of distress or the mental 
health of GS refugees. The importance of this aspect stems from the Palestinian experience of 
living in a "warlike situation" throughout the twenty-seven years of Israeli occupation. 
In this respect, F AFO survey findings are surprising, indicating that the people in GS 
reported fewer symptoms of distress compared to the WB and Arab Jerusalem 
(Giacaman, 1993: 124). The explanation given by the researchers is that the population of GS 
has a: 
clearer sense of collective meaning and common purpose. A greater sense of 
cohesiveness, originating in a more traditional family structure, as a protective 
factor. The population of Gaza may enjoy greater protection against distress as 
the perception of an external enemy becomes exceedingly strong (Ibid.) 
Alternatively, it may be that Gaza residents are less prone to recognize and express 
symptoms of psychological distress. Researchers further explain that it is the geographical area 
that influences the degree of distress and not the refugee status, so living in camps does not 
make a difference in itself. However, people in rural camps in the WB report higher degrees 
of distress than others do (Giacaman,1993: 124-5). The question remains, if social cohesiveness 
results in a lesser degree of distress among the GS population - irrespective of whether they are 
refugees or non-refugees -, could distress be explained within a socioeconomic context rather 
than a political one? 
A study done by Sarraj, the head of the Gaza Community Mental Health Centre, 
supports the FAFO survey's notion that social cohesiveness reduces stress. As Lazarus and 
Follkeman wrote: "The meaning of the event - and the sense of social cohesiveness - is crucial 
in determining how stressful a situation is to each individual (Cited in Giacaman, 1993: 119). 
The issue of social cohesiveness among refugees will be elaborated further in the section on 
social contacts and the sense of influence. 
Sarraj's unpublished study of 1980 compared the level of nervousness among children 
in the housing projects and the indigenous population in the GS, and showed the children in 
the housing projects to display a higher rate (Cited in Qutah,1985:148). These symptoms 
resulted, as Kuo explains, from social isolation, cultural shock, stress to reach the goal and 
cultural changes as a result of migration from one place to another (Ibi~. This might not 
apply fully to the SR population as a whole, but some symptoms given by Kuo do exist, mainly 
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pattern of life compared to camp life. 
Yet, the daily confrontations between the population in GS and the Israeli soldiers, 
together with the restrictions imposed, have been leaving scars on refugees, specifically 
children. The imposition of lengthy curfew for several days or weeks in a row, mainly in the 
camps, constitutes a major interference with the provision of medical care, feeding, education 
etc. The report of Physicians for Human Rights (an American organization) described 
exhaustively the consequences of repression on Palestinians in the WBGS, following a fact-
finding mission in February 1988 (See, New Outlook, June (1988):17-21) 
During the Intifada, refugees in particular were exposed to various forms of repression 
by Israeli soldiers. The use of tear gas in confined areas has exacerbated the bad health 
situation that refugees are living in. In the period between ·12 December 1987 and 2 August 
1988, 63 persons died from the inhalation of tear gas, 38 being residents of the Strip's camps. 
Moreover, the exposure of pregnant women to tear gas causes abortion or intra-uterine fetal 
death. A Dutch Human Rights Project investigation in GS on this issue found that following 
an Israeli raid on the refugee camps in GS during the night of7 to 8 March 1988, during which 
tear-gas was used on a large scale against the inhabitants (under curfew), 12 women who were 
in the third trimester of their pregnancy gave birth to dead babies (five were from the SC) 
(Alofs,1988:29). The Israelis seek to justify the use of tear gas, as demonstrated in the words 
of an army spokesman: 
The tear-gas used by the Israel Defence Force (lDF) meets the safety and health 
requirements necessary, so that if it is breathed in by an IDF soldier, as it is in 
most cases, it will not be detrimental to his or anyone else's health ... But I 
believe that a tremendous amount of tear-gas, for someone with a heart 
problem, might have a poor effect (Cited in Alofs,1988:28). 
Children's exposure to repression by the Israeli soldiers has led to a rise in the degree 
of stress. A survey conducted by the Gaza Community Mental Health Centre, among 1,600 
children aged 8 to 15, indicated that 60% were hyperactive, 60% bed-wetters, 50% violently 
act out their aggressive tendencies, and 46% suffer night fears. Many cannot go to sleep 
without their mothers by their side (The Toronto Star, March 1,1992). 
To sum up, it is clear that the two major health care institutions - the military 
government and UNRWA - do not provide adequate services, the former being part of the 
apparatus of occupation and the latter being a relief rather than a development agency. 
Moreover, the six non-governmental organizations who are working in health-related fields in 
the Strip, are closely controlled by the military authorities, who have placed restrictions on the 
development of a wide variety of activities, and try to interfere in their everyday management 
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(Roy, 1986: 106). 
Moreover, since the beginning of the Intifada, according to the Association of Israeli 
and Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights (AIPPHR): 
The Civil Administration and the Israeli Government (the ministries of Defence, 
Finance and Health) joined together in order to punish the Territories' 
population, by collective punishment, in order to try and suppress the uprising. 
In contradiction of medical ethics and the codes of human morality, denial of 
medical treatment was used as a whip against the population (AIPPHR, 1989:30) 
7.5.3 Obstruction of Education 
The collective punishment policy as exercised by the Israeli authorities in the OTs has 
been leaving its scars also in the educational sphere. The Israeli occupation authorities have 
been particularly severe on educational and cultural institutions and activities. This practice, 
which has been carried out since the early years of Israeli occupation, became even more severe 
with the advent of the Intifada. The Israeli authorities deny Palestinians the right to learn. 
Schools, universities and even kindergartens have been shut down for extended periods and even 
popular education was forbidden. Yet the closure of academic institutions constitutes collective 
punishment and is forbidden by laws which Israel has endorsed. Proper learning was made 
impossible even when education institutions have been permitted to open, as a result of lengthy 
curfews and new travel restrictions. Since the Intifada began in 1987, Israel has combined 
military action with the systematic disruption of education. Israel's aim in using these policies 
is to pressure the Palestinians into giving up their resistance and struggle to occupation. The 
UNICEF report of July 1992 describes the school closures, as follows: 
TABLE 7.19 The Estimates of Average Percentages of School Loss (1987-1991) 
Area 
Gaza 
WB 
1987/88 1988/89 1989/1990 
35% 46% 
75% 50% 
35% 
50% 
1990/91 
43% 
35% 
The fact is, after four years of continuous disruption, Palestinian education is in deep 
crisis, with consequent dangerous repercussions for the future development of Palestinian 
society. All this should be understood against the great value which Palestinians place on 
education as a universal solution, and as a means of survival- a method of sustaining social and 
cultural values and of providing a sense of coherence and security, for a people who possess 
little else. The pursuit of education by the Palestinians is an important feature of the complex 
inner struggle to continue to exist as a people with a particular message and responsibility. "In 
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inner struggle to continue to exist as a people with a particular message and responsibility. "In 
the camps the experience of landlessness, poverty, and impotence has been a powerful incentive 
to use education as means of escape" (Graham-Brown, 1986:245). 
Households in the sample survey in the SC were asked to place in priority the variables 
shown in Table 7.20, that could guarantee a better future for their children. 
TABLE 7.20 Future Security as Seen by Refugees in the SC (by priority) 
Variable Priority Priority Priority 
one two three 
No. % No. % No. % 
Employment 16 11.2 25 17.6 101 71.1 
Education 63 44.4 63 44.4 16 11.3 
House ownership 63 44.4 54 38.0 25 17.6 
Total 142 100.0 142 100.0 142 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
It is obvious from the Table above that education was given priority by the majority of 
respondents, 126 (88.8%); while house ownership rates comes second with 117 (82.4%) 
responses, and employment was given a third priority by the majority of households, 101 
(71.1 %). 
The stress on education by refugee families will let them go sometimes to extraordinary 
lengths to send their children, especially their sons, through school and university or 
professional training. The remittance economy has played a very important part in making this 
possible. As a result education has engendered great social mobility in the refugee community. 
Education has also been viewed as an investment in human resources for the future. 
Such an approach has meant that, until recently, Palestinians formed one of the world's most 
highly qualified communities, with high levels of literacy and particularly impressive levels 
of post-secondary qualifications; 18/1000 compared to 1411000 in Israel as reported in the 1993 
UNESCO report (Bala'awi,1994:20; The Guardian,15 May, 1976; Zahlan,1977:103-112; 
Shaat,1972:80-95). 
Harassment of Palestinian educational institutions, restrictions on research activities (see 
introduction), and cultural strangulation by the military authorities are enormous and beyond 
the scope of this section. In this context, I think: UNESCO was correct in concluding that "the 
Israeli authorities are adopting policies in the WB and GS designed to paralyse Palestinian 
culture" (see, Graham-Brown, 1984: 88-92;Shehadah and Kuttab,1980:89-95). 
These measures and many others in the cultural field, inflict severe difficulties on 
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fundamental human right, but also a vital tool for development and future prosperity, as Article 
26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights entails: 
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(Buergenthal & Tomey, 1976:48). 
Restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities are not only confined to education and 
cultural life in the OT's, but the critical sectors of health, economy and social services face the 
same fate. 
However, the level of education of Palestinians has to be looked at within the context 
of the economic infrastructure in the OT's. The correlation between level of education, 
employment and income is not strong in the Palestinian society, because of a high rate of 
unemployment and the lack of a sound economic infrastructure due to Israeli measures to curtail 
development in every sector. The effect of these conditions impedes the socioeconomic mobility 
of Palestinians in general and GS refugees in particular. 
The above debate on the living conditions of Palestinians and GS refugees specifically 
leads to the question as to what kind of development needs to be encouraged in the GS? In the 
OT's some change has already started with the Palestinian grassroots organizations (agricultural, 
medical, women etc.) having the potential to create alternatives and produce changes to meet 
the needs of the community (Barghouti, 1989: 125-130). This is despite the overwhelming and 
increasingly systematic measures taken by the Israeli authorities that to render the development 
of every socioeconomic sector almost impossible, and the manipulation of economic decisions 
in the context of a broad 'carrot and stick' policy aimed at sealing control over the OT's. 
Addressing the UN International NGO meeting in Vienna in September 1989, the head 
of the Medical Relief Committee stated the kind of development the Palestinians need. He said: 
Palestinians are not in need of any kind of development. They are in need of 
the development that would facilitate and support their resilience and resistance 
to the occupation, and which tends to further Palestinian self-reliance and 
independence (Bargouthi, 1989:3). 
To achieve this goal, the future state will be faced with a major handicap in building 
a sound national economy, which the people have been deprived of for a long time. It is 
necessary both to allow development of the economy and to satisfy the immediate needs of this 
deprived population, an effort that will require capital, effort, and time (see, Abed, 1989:55-63) 
This examination of the socioeconomic conditions of Palestinians has suggested that 
political motives have been at the heart of Israel's implementation of resettlement schemes in 
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the GS and its proposed "economic development" of the OTs. The question that now remains 
to be answered following this discussion is how the physical environment of the Strip and 
mainly the refugee camps influences the population, especially the overcrowding and the 
inadequate infrastructural amenities. The 1991 sample survey examined these aspects in 
relation to housing conditions in the two case study areas, in order to gauge improvements in 
this sector. 
7.5.4 What Changes in the Housing Conditions ? 
The forms and procedures for the relocation of refugees to the Israeli sponsored housing 
projects were discussed in Chapter five of this study. Our concern in this section is to gauge 
any changes that have occurred in the SR project regarding housing conditions compared to 
former habitation in the SC. Table 7.13 below makes a comparison between new and former 
habitation in terms of the number of rooms for those who received built houses. 
TABLE 7.13 SR Residents' Present Shelter Compared to their previous One in Camp 
No. of Rooms 
One room 
Two rooms 
Three rooms 
Four rooms 
Five rooms 
Six rooms 
Seven + 
Total 
In Camp 
No. % 
16 
23 
25 
20 
2 
1 
3 
90 
17.8 
25.6 
27.8 
22.2 
2.2 
1.1 
3.3 
100.0 
Source: The 1991 sample survey. 
In Project 
No. % 
32 
4 
-2 
36 
35.6 
4.4 
40.0 
Table 7.13 indicates that 26 (28.8%) of the relocated refugees left behind a bigger house 
in the camp; furthermore, those who received three rooms in the project were less than those 
who owned three rooms in the camp. The explanation that could be given for this is that, 
refugees with economic means look for better, healthier housing conditions, e.g. the availability 
of sewage system, compared to those in the camp, rather than more space. 
A major problem for the refugees stemmed from the density of the population in the 
refugee camps which reflects the overcrowding of its residents. UNRWA figures as at 30 June 
1985 showed that there were 236,486 refugees living in the eight refugee camps in the Strip 
(UNRWA, 1985). The average density was 14,799 persons per sq.km., SC rating second 
overall with 20,180 persons per sq.km. after Nuseirat camp with 26,400 per sq.km. and the 
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overall with 20,180 persons per sq.km. after Nuseirat camp with 26,400 per sq.km. and the 
lowest being in Mughazi camp with 8,541 persons per sq.km. While this may be attributed to 
the high birth rate among the refugee population, rather than inward movement into the camp, 
the problems were not eased by the strategy imposed on the camps by the authorities. As seen 
in Chapter five, overcrowding in the camp was the main reason behind relocation 70 (77.8 % ). 
The question is, does relocation to the SR alleviate the problem of overcrowding? Tables 7.14 
and 7.15 make a comparison between households in the two case study areas in terms of 
density. 
TABLE 7.14 Number of Rooms, and Persons in Households of the SC (in numbers) 
Rooms in Household Total of Density:persons 
shelters No. % residents per room 
One 9 6.3 60 6.66 
Two 35 24.6 254 3.62 
Three 36 25.4 289 2.67 
Four 31 21.8 400 3.22 
Five 20 14.1 225 2.25 
Six 7 4.9 111 2.64 
Seven + 4 2.8 83 2.96 
Total 142 100.0 1,422 2.96 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
TABLE 7.15 Number of Rooms, and Persons in Households of the SR (in numbers) 
Rooms in Household Total of Density:persons 
shelters No. % residents per room 
One 
Two 2 2.2 8 2.00 
Three 17 18.9 168 3.29 
Four 19 21.1 220 2.89 
Five 9 10.0 95 2.11 
Six 15 16.7 232 2.57 
Seven + 28 31.1 S4S 2.78 
Total 90 100.0 1,268 2.74 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Most of the serious overcrowding was found in shelters consisting of two to four rooms 
in the SC; while overcrowding in the SR is found in households with six or seven rooms. The 
average housing density in SC was 2.96 persons per room, while it was 2.74 in the SR 
project. This indicates that overcrowding in the SR did not decrease much compared to SC, 
probably due to the patrilocal pattern which persists in the two or in multiple-storey houses in 
which the family builds a large number of rooms to accommodate themselves and their sons' 
families or future families. 
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The problem of overcrowding is best revealed by examining the number of families 
crowded into one shelter, being an extended family or a nuclear one (Table 7.16). 
TABLE 7.16 Families Per Household in the SC & SR 
No. of families No. % 
per household SC SR SC SR 
One 66 28 46.5 31.1 
Two 43 20 30.3 22.2 
Three 22 24 15.5 26.7 
Four 11 18 7.7 20.0 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Refugee satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their living conditions in the project was also 
surveyed. The reason for raising such questions was to assess the rate of improvement that took 
place in their lives on the socio-economic and cultural levels. Table 7.17 shows the rate of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction among the residents of the SR. 
TABLE 7.17 Level of Satisfaction with Life in the SR 
Level of satisfaction Frequency Percent 
Satisfied 38 42.2 
Satisfied to a degree 32 35.6 
Dissatisfied 18 20.0 
Dissatisfied totally 2 2.2 
Total 90 100.0 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
As can be seen from Table 7.17, 38 (42.2 %) are satisfied with their new living conditions 
in the project; 32 (35.6%) are satisfied to a certain degree; while, 18 (20%) are dissatisfied; and 
2 (2.2 %) are dissatisfied totally. The dissatisfaction of the last three categories, as indicated 
by the respondents, arose from the fact that their present housing had been imposed on them, 
given the overcrowding in the previous camp shelter on the one hand, and the lack of alternate 
housing on the other hand. 
Asked if they had the desire to return to the camp, their responses are shown in Table 7.18. 
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TABLE 7.18: Desire to Return to the Camp of SR Residents 
Response Frequency 
Yes 20 
No 53 
It depends 15 
Don't know 2 
Total 90 
Source: The 1991 sample survey 
Percent 
22.2 
58.9 
16.7 
2.2 
100.0 
As shown, the majority 53 (58.9 %) showed no desire to go back to the camp; they 
explained to the researcher that their return would be impractical, especially after all the money 
and effort spent on building their houses in the project; others complained about the unhealthy 
environment of the camp. However, 20 (22.2 %) showed willingness to go back to the camp 
if they were given the chance; while 15 (16.7%) showed a desire to go back if certain 
conditions were met. 
These conditions were elicited in a further question: 12 (13.3 %) said that they would return 
to the camp if provided with a big house; 1 (1.1 %) said: if a better environment was available; 
and 2 (2.2 %) said that they would return if their present accommodation became 
overcrowded. 
Given the aforementioned analysis, an important question should be raised as to what 
constitutes housing satisfaction. Several studies done on the subject have demonstrated that 
housing satisfaction is a product of the inter-relationship of many socio-cultural, political and 
environmental factors. It is, therefore, difficult to measure, for what is regarded as habitable 
shelter in one place may not be considered so in another. Indeed, even when these varied 
factors are enumerated and measured, it is difficult to know how to weight one factor against 
another to judge overall levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction objectively (Fraser, 1969:145; 
Western et.al.,1974:43). 
Moreover, housing standards are highly reliant upon an external infrastructure of electricity 
grids, sewage disposal systems, sanitation facilities and, in the modem world, 
telecommunications. The survey collected data on infrastructural amenities in order to measure 
the difference between the two case study areas on the one hand, and to look at the potential 
impact of these services on the health of the refugees on the other hand. 
Based on the 1991 sample survey in the SC, 88 (62 %) of all the sampled households were 
suffering from an acute problem of sewage disposal, waste water being disposed of into open 
alleys between shelters. The remaining 54 (38%) were satisfied with using cesspits as a 
temporary solution to the problem. (See Plate 7.1), although inadequate collections have led 
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to the discharge of raw sewage onto the roads and public areas, creating a sanitary nuisance 
and posing a very severe hazard to public health. Regarding the SR, 84 (93.3 % ) of the sampled 
households indicated that they do not suffer from a sewage problem. This finding could be 
seen to affirm an Israeli Defence Ministry report, which wrote that infrastructures constructed 
in the housing projects conformed with Israeli standards including a modern underground central 
sewage systems, water, earth-moving, roads, electricity, educational institutions, etc, 
investments divided between the residents and the Israeli administration (Ministry of Defence, 
1983:56). 
The question is, if a modern central sewage system was constructed in the SR, how can the 
Israelis explain the large pools which has formed over many years in the centre of the project, 
where the underground sewage networks flood into them, and which have become a significant 
mark of the project and a source of insects and disease for residents (especially those living 
nearby) and cause for complaint (a[-Talia'h,19 July,1991) (see Plate no. 7.2). 4 During the 
conduct of my survey in the SR, huge spots of smelly black waste were noticeable on various 
roads in the project, caused by leaking sewage pipes and unmaintained pits. Such evidence 
refutes the Israeli claims of a modem sewage system. 
UNRWA's limited efforts to reduce the effect of the sewage problem in the camps in 1983, 
by building open concrete channels and drains for waste water, were stopped by the Israeli 
authorities. Objections by the authorities to any improvement of life in the camps are 
commonplace. In 1980, plans by the Community Development Foundation, an American aid 
agency, to build sewers in Rafah camp were rejected by the Israelis (Locke and 
Stewart, 1985:54). 
These objections raise the question of a paradoxical policy by the authorities, and would 
further assert the political motives behind setting up the housing projects while depriving the 
camp community of any improvement in their living conditions. Economic development in this 
context should not be differentiated for camp refugees and 'project refugees. Another acute 
problem which causes a health hazard for refugees in both locations is the inadequate refuse 
collection, leaving perpetual piles of rubbish festering in the street. The 1991 sample survey 
indicates that 97 (68.3%) of all sampled households in SC, and 54 (60%) in SR were suffering 
from this problem. The households surveyed attributed the inadequate sanitary situation to an 
UNRWA and municipal shortage of public services and finance in this sector. 53 (58.9%) of 
households in the SR indicated that the municipal services in the project are less than that in the 
town, compared to 35 (38.9%) who saw no difference. The main complaint by the 51 
(56.7%) of households surveyed in the SR is about the slow collection of refuse. These Plate 
Plate 7.1: Shati camp: Waste water running in the open channels between shelters, which have 
been constructed by the refugees, either at their own expense or with materials provided by 
UNRWA 
Photo: The author, 1991 
Plate 7.2: Sheikh Radwan project: household sewage water is collected by underground sewage 
disposal system to the above shown open pool in the north of the project. 
Photo: The author, 1991 
222 
findings come in contrast to the Israeli Minister of Health report which claimed in 1988 that 
garbage disposal in GS was "vastly expanded and modernized ... and disposal sites have been 
increased in number with improved management practices" (Ministry of Health, 1988:37). 
Refugee awareness of the problems that might be caused by inadequate refuse collection 
in the SC, caused them (at the time I was conducting my survey) to take the initiative 
collectively to clean up the camp and improve the environmental health conditions. Hundreds 
of refugees joined in, and much was achieved over two consecutive days. Their work in the 
third day was stopped by the authorities, who claimed that the assembly of such a large number 
of people would bring about political disturbances. 
As regarding water supply in both locations, 140 (98.6%) in SC and 86 (95.6%) in SR 
have no problems with water supply; whereas, 2 (1.4%) in SC and 4 (4.4%) in SR were 
suffering from shortage of water. Refugees in the camp get free water from wells constructed 
by UNRWA when the camp was established; whereas, refugees in the SR have to pay high 
bills after they have been connected to the "Mekorot", the Israeli National Water Company 
since the 1970s, 95 % of households having piped connections. As a result, running water 
reaches 75% of homes in the Gaza area in 1985, as compared to 13.9% in 1974 (Ministry of 
Health, 1988:7) 
Yet the problem with water in the Strip in general lies in its high salinity, which exceeds 
the limit recommended by the World Health Organization of 200 mg., ranging between 100 and 
400 mg. chlorides per litre. The salinity of water is associated with problems of fluorosis and 
hypertension (Dahl an , 1985:328). 
In addition to the amenities already mentioned, electricity supply was considered by all 
refugees in the SC and SR to be sufficient. This corresponds with the Israeli Ministry of Health 
report for 1988, which shows that 92.8% of GS population have electricity for 24 hours/day 
compared to 63.1 % on the WB (Ministry of Health, 1988:7). 
Given the inadequate infrastructure in the GS in general, the findings above show that the 
health situation in SR compared to the SC has not improved completely, as Israel claims. 
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7.6 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT 
7.6.1 Rural vs. Urban 
Following the above discussion on the structural transformation of economy and its effect 
on the living standard of GS refugees, what changes did this transformation bring in relation 
to the social fabric of the refugee community in GS? 
The Israeli Ministry of Defence report of 1983 stated that one of the results that has been 
achieved through rehabilitation/resettlement of refugees in the GS was: "As a refugee changes 
his status, he becomes a local and urban resident, with equal rights" (Ministry of 
Defence, 1983:57). 
This statement has to be examined against some concrete facts about refugees :such as their 
distribution by social class, rural-urban origins, and social ties with their compatriots. In 1949, 
Thicknesse reported that the refugees may be roughly classified into four groups :(1) A 
relatively small group (about 8,000, Le., about one percent) of well-to-do capitalists, 
landowners, and professional families; (2) A much larger group (250,000, Le., 35 percent) of 
varied occupations from villages and towns and registered for the free refugee rations; (3) 
Refugees in caves who do not receive UN refugee supplies (30,000, Le., 4 percent); and finally 
(4) Refugees living in camps (430,000, Le., 60 percent) (Thicknesse,1949:32-33). 
As regarding GS refugees, most of them originated from the southern districts of Palestine, 
which was then considered rural. Thus, they formed a large part of Palestine's rural population 
which was 62.6% in 1947 (See Chapter one). Calculations from the Egyptian Administration 
statistics of 1958 on the origin of refugees in the GS showed that, 112,383 persons came from 
77 villages; whereas, 57,718 persons came from 16 towns in Palestine (Egyptian Official 
Statistics for GS,1959:7-11). 
The refugee population in the GS constitutes 2/3 of the total, and about one out of two 
refugees live in (mainly urban) refugee camp. In 1967, 80 percent of the Palestinian in GS were 
urban - one of the highest rates in Asia (Migdal and Kimmerling, 1993:198). Gaza's ratio of 
rural to urban population is about 1:5, whereas 62 % of West Bankers are rural. This indicates 
that Gaza is overwhelmingly urban, with 75 - 80% of the population living in the Gaza-Khan 
Yunis-Rafah conurbations (Tamari,1993:23-4;Abu Libdeh,1993:41). As Chapter one shows, 
the eight refugee camps of GS are located in towns, and are considered urban camps, or what 
might be characterized as "urban slum areas" or camp cities. Qutub argues that the average 
population per camp city varies from 30,005 in the GS to 4,856 in the WB, and an overall 
average of 12,698 persons per camps as in 1986, reveals that: 
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the camp cities, both small and large, can be considered as urban conglomerations in 
the demographic and ecological sense ... an consequently requires a special classification 
in the study of urban societies in the Middle East (Qutub, 1989:96, 107). 
On the basis of the above information, one could refute the Israeli claim of camp refugees 
becoming urban or local through relocation to the housing project. Moreover, the issue of 
equal rights is questionable here, especially since as the above sections revealed, the GS 
population in general - refugees and non-refugees - face the same economic and political 
restrictions and measures imposed on them by the Israeli authorities, as does the WB 
population, which have denied them civil and political rights. 
7.6.2 The GS Social Strata 
The lack of a productive base in the Strip to absorb the majority of the work force, similar 
to the period prior to 1967 occupation, has delayed the emergence of the social classes defined 
by classical analysis, and prevented new social forces from arising. Indeed, the scientific 
concept of class has limited applicability to the society in the Strip (Abu Amru, 1987: 1; Graham-
Brown, 1986:227). 
Refugee camps in GS - as mentioned earlier - have become centres of service rather than 
production, and the proletarianization of refugees has further led to "declassment" of this 
dispossessed population. Thus, "class consciousness" as understood in the West is lacking within 
the refugee community in GS (Graham-Brown, 1986:227,244). 
Camp residence, and not refugee status in itself, is the vital determining factor of deciding 
socioeconomic status. This explains why camp refugees of GS are found in the lower middle 
and low categories of the social strata, even though, prior to the Intifada, the rise in income 
among unskilled workers in Israel meant their earnings tended to be higher than schoolteachers 
- who are considered privileged members of the community. This situation created gaps 
between individual or family economic status and social standing in the community and as a 
result changes occurred in social status along wealth and stratification lines, which people 
perceive as forms of competition within a community (Ibid:244). 
With the new types of labour, new forms of social acquisition have been rising among 
refugee wage earners. Land as the primary indicator of economic wealth was replaced by the 
acquisition of consumer durables as a prime indicator of economic well-being; in addition, 
substantial resources were pooled into housing, which reflects the status of the family within 
the local community. Through Housing the Palestinians sought collective family security; 
moreover, it was considered a safe area of investments in an otherwise uncertain world (U gland 
& Tamari, 1993:224). 
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Education is another area in which the refugees sought social mobility . Yet, as indicated 
above, the demand for unskilled labour by the Israeli market and the lack of employment in 
. the local establishments or abroad, mean that education is not the vehicle it used to be, and the 
OTs became saturated with high school and graduates seeking employment. Moreover, in 
Palestinian society education seems so far to have done little to erode ascribed status as the 
prime determinant of authority. Men continue to have more influence than women, the middle 
aged more than the very old or the young (Heiberg, 1993: 145;Qutub,1989:99). 
Despite the economic transformation brought about by the Israeli occupation and its effect 
on the living conditions of the refugees, the instability of income due to unemployment - either 
in Israel or in GS -, leaving the Palestinian workers without security, social cohesiveness has 
been buttressed by two major aspects. First, it can be observed in camps that the decomposition 
or desocialization of the family which is frequently provoked by the poor living conditions has 
not affected the organic ties of solidarity among GS refugees. Second, new form of class 
structure have appeared which tend to be organized along the lines of national identity rather 
of class. 
The first aspect regarding the absence of desocialization among refugees has resulted from 
the special geographic circumstances which the Palestinian labourers have found themselves in. 
They commute daily to Israel and are not allowed to stay overnight inside the Green Line, 
therefore, this" has not had the same socially-destructive consequences witnessed in other parts 
of the world where adult male population migrated over greater distances " (Van 
Arkadie,1977:69) .. 
By living at home the refugee labourers maintain a normal family life, a situation which 
is in contrast with the general notion of proletarian classes of rural origin, whose integration 
into the market economy and wage-earning would provoke social decomposition along with 
degradation of the population, as is the case with South African migrant workers (see, 
Meillassoux, 1983:50-61). 
The maintenance of st~ong organic ties among refugees is seen also on another level, 
as Roy observed: 
Perhaps the most dramatic development in the social structure of the GS since 1967 
has been the formation of certain alliances across classes, who, before 1967, were 
totally isolated from each other. There alliances are political in nature, based almost 
exclusively on nationalist politics. Although they have not affected the isolation of 
Gaza's social classes on an economic level, alliances have brought together members 
of Gaza's elite, farmers, petit bourgeoisie and working classes in a common stand 
against the political consequences of the occupation (Roy, 1986:84). 
These alliances come in spite of the Israeli authorities' support for class divisions on 
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economic level (Roy,1986:86). And these same alliances could be seen behind the low rates 
of social conflict potential in the GS compared to WB and Arab Jerusalem, as the FAFO survey 
ascertained, and the low distress rates discussed in the health section above. The low social 
conflict potential in GS contradicts the hypothesis that deprived socioeconomic conditions may 
be expected to intensify perceptions of social conflicts. Three tentative explanations are given. 
First, that perceptions of conflict are re~ated strongly to locality and the conditions of life, which 
override other considerations of an occupational or hierarchal nature. Second, that potential 
internal conflicts between social groups may be externalized towards an external foe, and 
internal dissension can in fact be repressed, and hostility focused on collaborators or social 
outcasts. "This externalization may also enforce a consensual ideology, which underplays the 
magnitude of conflict (real and imagined) within the society, and focuses on differences with 
the outsider". A third explanation is that a system of patronage and kinship networks modifies 
the intensity and direction of status differences; these networks in the context of Palestinian 
society" ... are likely to make themselves felt in modes of political behaviour and political 
mobilization" (Ugland & Tamari,1993:241-3). 
7.6.3 Maintaining Social Cohesiveness 
The condition of exile, which has affected more than one half of the Palestinian, has made 
its mark on the collective consciousness, cultural trends as well as the political behaviour of 
Palestinians throughout the Middle East and in the diaspora. 
The PRs fall into the category of majority-identified refugees, who are firm in their 
conviction that their opposition to the events is shared by the majority of their compatriots, 
rather than that of events-alienated refugees and exiles or self-alienated persons. Moreover, 
their attitudes towards displacement place them in reactive fate-groups rather than purpose 
groups; refugees belonging to the former category are characteristically the refugees of wars, 
sudden revolutionary changes and expulsions, the nature of whose flight is reluctant, without 
a solution in sight; and in reaction to an intolerable situation (Kunz,1981:43-4). 
The continuing state of dispossession of PRs, their statelessness and lack of rights leaves 
them consequently insecure. Hannah Arendt explained the many problems faced by the 
stateless. The most significant is the loss of their homes, which means" the loss of the entire 
social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct 
place in the world." Moreover," even their acceptance by the indigenous populations of the 
countries they migrate to is problematic and poses problems for sociological, economic, and 
cultural reasons" (Arendt,1973:293). 
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Over the years, despite all the difficulties which the Palestinian refugees face, they have 
rejected permanent resettlement in the host countries, which has been seen as giving up their 
historical rights to their homeland - often seen as providing the enemy the moral victory it seeks 
(See Chapter three). And, as Chapter eight will demonstrate, with the passage of time their 
yearning to return becomes more stronger. 
As observed by Bruhns, the problem of the Palestinians is basically one of social 
uprootedness. They have experienced a shocking severance of their personal and traditional 
ties of home, family, relatives, and community which "constitute the primary relationships on 
which their society, so much more than Western society depends." So, the refugees "feel 
uprooted to a much greater extent socially then they do economically." To them, leaving their 
homes "is profoundly disturbing, even with the prospect of economic betterment" 
(Bruhns, 1955: 133). The question that emanates, is what mechanisms the Palestinian refugees 
rely on to reconstruct their community? 
The Palestinians who were exiled in 1948 were a highly family-oriented society that gave 
precedence to informal and personal ties. The family as an influential unit is seen as a critical 
part of the informal politics in the Middle East, and is considered the dominant group structure 
(Leiden and Bill,1984:77). It remains "at the centre of social organization in all three Arab 
patterns of living (Bedouin, rural and urban) (Barakat,1984:28). Palestinian family, as part of 
the Middle East culture, proved "impossible to rupture or break." This "invisible skeleton" 
has been the means and the motivator by which the Palestinians were able to respond to the 
conditions of their exile and crisis, and to maximize their chances for survival (Leiden and 
Bill, 1984:90). Through such a society, bound together, Palestinians, as Said observed, have 
been able to "survive the ravages of our history, its tragic mistakes, misfortunes, and the 
destructive course of Israel's policies" (Said,1992:54). 
The social ties of the peasants who fled from Palestine consisted almost entirely of links 
with their fellow villagers who had suffered a similar fate (Smith, 1984: 145). The interaction 
among them had eliminated any class boundaries, and under the pressures of camp life all 
become equal. This experience in turn reinforced their sense of solidarity and the traditional 
familial and village ties as means for continuity and identity and in response to insecurity. Giel 
notes how "the confined, prison-like space of the GS" imputes not only "suffering and sacrifice" 
but a territorial sense of identity (Cited in Usher, 1991:4). 
In refugee camps in the GS, with the absence of a structure of production, community 
solidarity and cohesiveness of traditional community is buttressed by a strong network of 
family connections based on the extended kinship group, where the individual is conspicuously 
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absent. The family-based Palestinian household constitutes a strong network of economic 
obligations and privileges. For Palestinians, the extended family "refers to a framework of 
continuity and support from all family members living in the same proximity" 
(Habash, 1989: 16). This system of relationships is seen as the vehicle of social mobility, by 
which investment in housing and educating of children are major duties. In Gaza, particularly, 
extended families sometimes build small apartment blocks, in which several nuclear families can 
live, so reinforcing these ties. 
This type of social network was reinforced through various channels: by GS being cut off 
from the influences of other national cultures during the 19 years of Egyptian rule, they 
developed their own distinctive subculture which might be called a camp society; for unlike 
WB refugees who assimilated in Jordanian society, most Gaza refugees failed to accomplish a 
similar feat (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993: 198,243). Furthermore, community solidarity is 
strengthened by the common fate refugees face in terms of severe Israeli curfew and other 
measures; and the collective expressions of a common dilemma among Palestinian camp 
refugees were made possible by a reconstructed community which reflected former 
agglomeration according to town or village of origin in the camp. In GS in particular, this 
trend was materialized by three parties: the Palestinians themselves, who made every effort to 
reinvigorate the old social institutions of family, clan and town/village in their life in camp; 
the Egyptian officials; and the Quaker relief workers, who, following the refugee influx, 
"struggled to re-establish village groupings and administer programmes through the old village 
leadership. The very process focused attention on the life that had been lost" (Migdal and 
Kimmerling, 1993:202). 
The field data in both locations mirrored this reality, 22 (15.5%) of the households 
surveyed 'coming from Hamammeh village; 20 (14.1 %) from Majdal town; 13 (9.2 %) from 
Jaffa; town; 11 (7.7%) from Harbia village; 10 (7.0%) from Jorah village; 8 (5.6%) from 
Asdud village; 6 (4.2%) from Yabna village; 6 (4.2%) from Barbarah village; 5 (3.5%) from 
Jirja village; 4 (2.8%) from Falloujah village; 4 (2.8%) from Kirtyah village; 4 (2.8%) from 
Zarnoukah village; while of the remaining number of households (28), 22 come from 16 
different villages; and 6 come from 4 towns in Palestine. In the SR, concentration of refugees 
from the same village/town is not as high as in the camp. The findings showed that 15 (16.7%) 
of households come from Hamammeh village; 14 (15.6%) from Majdal town; 14 (16.7%) from 
Jaffa town; 6 (6.7%) from Barbarah village; and 4 (4.4%) from Herbiyah village; while of the 
remaining 37 households surveyed, 36 come from 21 different villages, and 1 household comes 
from Ramleh town. 
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The agglomeration of refugees in the camps has kept their memory of the homeland and 
Palestinian heritage alive, and thus fostered their resistance to assimilation. This memory 
becomes the Palestinians' only condolence during their statelessness. In short, their life has 
been a replication of another time and place in the miserable environment of the camp, with the 
notion prevailing that as the group survives, so the culture continues. 
The correlation between crisis and challenge faced by Palestinians and the cohesiveness of 
camp community tends to be high, as indicated in the findings of the F AFO survey above. In 
the Palestinian context it is only the family who remain intact, in times of intense measures of 
repression and institutional destruction. 
As survivors, it is not only the social dimension which stateless Palestinian families 
managed to bridge - through the creation of new social networks - but, the family has also 
provided the means by which Palestinian nationalism is protected and preserved. This was 
important especially in the absence of self-determination and statehood, and, as Fanon put it, 
it is part of social psychology that the oppressed - through communal practice - "develop in 
themselves a sense of conscious self-determination that is based on the discovery of their social 
needs - food, shelter, work" (Bhabha,1987:84). 
Political education becomes the responsibility of the family, which is considered the 
"foremost among agencies of socialization into politics" (Hyman,1959:69;Jennings & 
Niemi, 1968: 169-184). This is mainly evident among refugee children (and even among 
Palestinian children living abroad) who identify themselves with their parent's former villages 
and towns. Thus, identification with Palestine, and the growing of Palestine-consciousness has 
been a cyclical reaction to the post-1948 era, where new Palestinism was created and by which 
the Intifada became a watershed of the new meaning of Palestinism, led by the young leadership 
and the children (Sayigh, 1979: 124-8;Turki, 1972:39;Farah, 1977:90-102). 
The Israeli writer, Amos Elon, has described the astonishment Israeli soldiers felt on 
discovering the strength of social ties among refugees after they overran several refugee camps 
in the WB in June 1967: 
Upon entering a refugee camp one young soldier discovered that the inmates were still 
organized into and dwelled as small clans or neighbourhood units according to the 
town, and even the street they had lived in prior to their dispersion in 
1948 .... Beersheba, Zaraga, Ramlah, Lod, Jaffa (Elon,1972:339). 
Given the complex of factors resulting in the creation and preservation of a distinctive 
consciousness and collectiveness among Palestinians, it is reasonable to assume that people 
within any community differ in their sense of identification with their surroundings and in the 
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degree of intensity with which they share prevalent majority beliefs. Our question is, did the 
process of resettlement of GS refugees to the SR sustain/maintain their social cohesiveness and 
familial links, or did relocation or the dispersion strategy by the Israelis give rise to new social 
trends? The extent to which existing social ties are maintained in both locations are what the 
field data reveals below. 
7.6.4 Dispersal vs. Concentration 
To gauge the change in terms of agglomeration of refugees from the same town/village in 
Palestine in SC compared with the SR, two questions were asked. Tables 7.21 and 7.22 reveal 
differences between the two locations. 
TABLE 7.21 Refugees from Same Village/Town of Origin in SC & SR 
Variable No. % 
SC SR SC SR 
Yes 136 43 95.8 47.8 
No 6 45 4.2 50.0 
Don't know 2 2.2 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
As Table 7.21 indicates, 136 (95.8%) of the households surveyed in SC compared to 43 
(47.8%) in SR have people from their towns/villages of origin in the same place. Only 6 
(4.2 %) in the SC said they haven't, but in SR a much higher 45 (50.0%) of households said 
that no one from their towns/villages of origin resides in the project. This latter fact emphasises 
one element of resettlement policies, which explicitly aimed at achieving a scattered distribution 
of the refugee population (Desbarats,1987:310). 
In the GS refugee context, what is more important is how social ties between people from 
same towns/villages were substantiated. Visiting is considered another activity that recharges 
the Palestinian family network, mirrored in the visiting patterns of the Middle Eastern family 
in general (Geertz,1979:335). The tradition of visiting, be it associated with death, marriage 
or another occasion, strengthens the network of relationships that contribute to family unity, 
solidarity, and cohesiveness. Was this effected by relocation to SR? (See Table 7.22). 
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TABLE 7.22 Interaction With People From Same TownlVillage of Origin 
Variable No. % 
sc SR sc SR 
Everyday 45 13 31.7 14.4 
Once a week 25 18 17.6 20.0 
Once a month 26 17 18.3 18.9 
Sometimes in a year 30 31 21.1 34.4 
Once a year 1 2 0.7 2.2 
Less 15 9 10.6 10.0 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
The results indicate that interaction with those from origin villages/towns in the SC occurs 
daily for 45 (31.7%) compared to only 13 (14.4%) in the SR, which is a consequence of 
dispersal as shown in Table 7.21 above. While 25 (17.6%) in SC and 18 (20%)in SR visit 
weekly; 26 (18.3%) in SC and 17 (18.9%) in SR visit monthly. However, strikingly, both 
locations showed similar responses in terms of visits sometime in a year, 30 (21.1 %) in SC and 
31 (34.4%) in SR. This latter result could be attributed to the prevailing circumstances in the 
Strip, economically and politically, by which the lack of general mobility as indicated by many 
respondents has a negative influence on the traditional fabric of society and its cohesiveness 
since it affects social visits, recreational activity and ritual social duties (prayer, attendance of 
seasonal festivities, and pilgrimage). 
Fragmentation of extended families through relocation, brought about by the initial dispersal 
strategy, raised concern of family reunification among SR refugees, who seek others of the 
same village/t?wn in order to form new patterns of concentration. Respondents were asked if 
they prefer people from same tOWn/village to live in the project, and the overwhelming majority 
of households 71 (78.9%) gave a yes answer, while 19 (21.1 %) answered no. (Table 7.23). 
TABLE 7.23 Preference to Live with Refugees from Same Village/Town in SR 
Variable No. % 
Yes 71 78.9 
No 19 21.1 
Total 90 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
The reasons for this preference are given in Table 7.24 below. 
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TABLE 7.24 Reasons for Preference to Live with Refugees from Same 
VillagelTown 
Variable No. % 
Know them (not strangers) 22 24.4 
Better coherence 49 54.5 
Total 71 78.9 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
In the Palestinian context, Sayigh observed that : 
It is important to realize that the splitting up of families was not a once and for all 
explosion, but an ongoing process of 'redistribution' set up by Zionist domination in 
Palestine. This centrifugal pressure, which is both political and economic, splits up 
nuclear families as well as larger clans (Sayigh, 1979: 128). 
7.6.5 Adjustment 
One of the most important factors for satisfactory resettlement of refugees is the cultural 
compatibility between the refugees' background and the society which is confronted. Lack of 
compatibility in terms of language, values, traditions, etc., means that refugees will become 
isolated and that could cause psychomatic illnesses and withdrawal from human contacts 
(KuDZ,1981:46-47). Our question is, did the refugees in the sample survey of SR face 
compatibility problems? The initial strategy of dispersion was carried out by the Israeli 
authorities for a variety of political and logistical reasons, and the break up of extended families 
were justified on such grounds, but the refugees remained within the big Palestinian family, 
and shared langq.age, values, traditions, religion, political views and solidarity are factors which 
accelerated the integration process. This is in contrast to resettlement processes experienced, 
for example, by Lithuanian and Vietnamese refugees in the USA 
(Haines, 1981 :310,313;Baskaukas, 1981 :282-3). 
It could be argued here that the Palestinian refugee experience with resettlement in the GS 
does not fall in the same category as resettlement of refugees in other countries, their 
experience being consi~ered unique. The difficulties faced by other refugees have been due to 
resettlement in an alien environment to their past, while the Palestinian refugees' case of 
relocation happened on the same Palestinian soil and with the same people, a factor which has 
been given by the refugees to explain their acceptance of resettlement, though such attempts 
were completely rejected in the past. 
Yet, the field data illustrated a different kind of problem encountered by refugees in the SR. 
Respondents were asked about similarities and differences between their life in the project 
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compared to their former life in the camp. (Tables 7.25; Table 7.26; Table 7.27) 
TABLE 7.25 Life in SR Compared to Life in SC 
Variable No. % 
The same 11 12.2 
Differs 79 87.8 
Total 90 100.0 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey 
TABLE 7.26 Similarities Between SR and SC 
Variable No. % 
Same social traditions 8 8.9 
Same life under occupation 3 3.3 
Missing cases 79 87.8 
Total 90 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
TABLE 7.27 Differences Between SR and SC 
Variable No. % 
Better services 28 31.1 
Beller living standards 6 6.7 
A1ienstion feelings 26 28.9 
More secure 5 5.6 
Unaccepted buildings 5 5.6 
More finsncial burdens 4 4.4 
Others 5 5.6 
Total 79 87.9 
Source: The 1991 Sampl: Survey 
As indicated in the three above tables, 79 (87.9%) of households surveyed in the project 
saw a difference between camp life and the one in the project. 39 (43.4 %) of respondents gave 
positive differences - better services, better living standards, and more security -; whereas, 40 
(44.5%) gave negative differences, the most striking of all being the feeling of alienation among 
refugees given by 26 (28.9%). This could be attributed to two factors: the type of architecture 
in the project, which does not allow the same mixing between refugees as in the camp; and the 
fragmentation of refugees along town/village of origin. Those who mentioned that the building 
type is unaccepted complained about the multi-storey buildings with one entrance, which is 
against the segregation of sexes; and the way multi-storey houses are adjacent to others with one 
storey, which interferes with the privacy of residents in the latter, and with residents also living 
in multi-storey houses opposite to each other. This problem has been partially reduced by 
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people using big sheets of cloth to maintain privacy. 
In response to direct questions on difficulties encountered regarding assimilation and 
adjustment in the SR, 61 (67%) of refugees gave a no answer, compared to 29 (32.2%) who 
gave a yes answer. The sort of difficulties encountered are shown in Table 7.28. 
TABLE 7.28 Type of Difficulties Encountered by SR Residents 
Variable 
Social isolation 
Financial 
Transportation 
Others 
Total 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
No. 
19 
4 
4 
2 
29 
% 
21.1 
4.4 
.4 
2.2 
32.1 
The majority of refugees 19 (21.1 %) showed that alienation is the major difficulty faced. 
This result corresponds with the fmdings in Table 7.27. As a result, one could assume that if 
relocation continued on a large scale, the acceleration of this phenomenon would raise some 
apprehensions regarding the political solidarity of GS refugees. An examination of the reason-
effect relationship between relocation and political solidarity is given in Chapter eight. Th i s 
complex interaction between forces of dispersal and forces of concentration is seen to shed 
some light on the resettlement policies of the Israeli authorities, illustrating the spatial 
antagonism between a constrained resettlement process designed to foster population dispersal 
and voluntary individual decisions generating population concentration. Further, it clarifies 
the spatial consequences of the contradictions that have developed between the principles of 
resettlement policies and the realities of resettlement practices. 
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NOTES: 
1. On employment and production in agriculture in GS between 1948 and 1967, see: Van 
Arkadie,1977:30. 
2. Arab workers in Israel are employed through two methods; legally and illegally, for more 
details, see: Budeiri,April(1982). 
3. Prior to the Intifada, Arab workers' accounted for 52.8% of employees in construction; 
17.7% in agriculture; 16.7% in services; and 12.8% in industry (Abdullah, 1990: 10). 
4. Similar pools for collecting waste water are found in the Beit Lahiya (Gaza) and Tal el-Sultan 
(Rafah) Israeli sponsored Housing projects. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous Chapters have laid the ground for the political analysis dealt with here. 
Since the flight of PRs in 1948, their rejection of resettlement was based on a belief that 
permanent settlement outside Palestine would desecrate their RRC, as endorsed in UN 
Resolution 194(111) of December 11, 1948. Clinging to the return, PRs developed a unique 
solidarity and character which reinforced their political consciousness. 
The fieldwork data collected on the relationship between resettlement and the RR, are 
the first available on this sensitive issue. They reflect a unanimous commitment to the RRC by 
refugees, despite the years of dispossession and all the forces of oppression which fashioned the 
collective experience of the PRs in general, and GS refugees in particular, with special 
elaboration of the period following the Israeli occupation of the WBGS in 1967. The central 
question is how these forces (especially in the context of the Israeli authorities' counter-
insurgency measures in the OTs) , coalesced to influence the political consciousness and 
resistance of refugees in the housing projects in GS? 
The analysis in the previous Chapter confirmed the fact that the Israeli strategy behind 
the setting-up of the refugee resettlement schemes in the GS has failed. It reflects a belief that 
most political problems can be reduced to social problems. However, data from the sample 
survey in the SR have refuted this Israeli assumption. It is demonstrated that refugees in both 
locations have a high (ate of political mobility, location in this respect being unimportant. If 
some slight differences appear, these are as a result of environmental variables rather than a 
decline in political commitment. 
Several indicators were used to show the magnitude of Israeli repressive measures, such 
as the arrests, house raids, injuries and demolitions that the survey population had experienced. 
These illustrate that Israeli repression remains unchanged, as does the continuity of the PRs 
national struggle. 
The comparison held between the two case study areas offers, in the light of the 
discussion given in the last four Chapters, a new insight of PRs collectivity and national struggle 
in GS. Drawing on empirical survey data, - other than the aforementioned issues raised - an 
attempt was also made to understand refugee perception of a solution to their "problem". 
Findings suggest adherence to their RRC and at the same time the right to independence and 
sovereignty. That position reflects a dual commitment by PRs, one, to the international 
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legitimacy represented by the UN resolutions and the other to the PLO programmes. This 
indivisibility between the two rights, however, reveals the dynamics of PRs struggle and their 
continuous rejection to be resettled outside Palestine. Elaboration on these issues is given 
hereafter. 
8.2 THE EVOLUTION OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
The political process that facilitated the birth of the Intifada, the consolidation of the 
Palestinian national movement and the crystallization of Palestinian national consciousness, has 
to be perceived within the framework of political mobilization of the Palestinian people and the 
development of a distinctive national identity (as opposed to Arab or Jordanian), since the 
beginning of the century. 
In the case of the PRs, despite the profound changes generated by a continuous state of 
exile and statelessness, a sense of common Palestinian identity has remained throughout their 
diaspora, and they have succeeded in forming what Ghabra has called a cross-national identity 
(Cited in Kimmerling & Migdal, 1993:206). That could be attributed to a strong sense of shared 
cultural identity, which as Sayigh observed, provides a community that shares a situation of 
oppression and discrimination with protection against alienation and societal inequality; thus 
allowing it to restrain its internal differentiation, and to enhance cohesion among its members, 
which usually increases in proportion to a sense of shared identity (Sayigh,1977:18-20). Smith 
has further argued that national identity is multi-dimentional, it includes: ethnic, cultural, 
territorial, economic an~ legal-political components; or as Sayigh put it, it is a result of a 
combination of adverse external factors - war, expulsion, etc. and internal factors - a rich inner 
'ethno' history (Smith, 1991: 15;Sayigh,1977:76). 
The question remains, to what extent did developments on the Palestinian scene disrupt 
the collectivity and distinctive culture of Palestinians? And what components or features helped 
shape Palestinian nationalism and mass character - which in a later stage helped provide a 
programme of action and an ideology as an answer to the disaster of 1948 ? 
Any analysis of the growth of the Palestine national movement and Palestinian identity 
has to be traced or examined in relation to three distinct periods in Palestine's political history: 
the first, from the beginning of the century to 1948; the second, from 1948 to 1967; and the 
last from 1967 to the present. 
The focus will be on the third period, because the remaining areas of Mandate Palestine 
- WBGS - constituted an important arena for the development of the political struggle waged 
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by the national movement. Recently, these developments have found expression through a 
number of concrete organizations, institutions and activities. Yet, it is of importance to point 
out that the early and spontaneous forms of resistance, compared to the more organized forms 
which developed at a later stage, were a result of several interrelated processes which changed 
the forms of resistance through the course of struggle, thus shaping Palestinian national 
consciousness, and consequently, intensifying their ongoing struggle for independence and self-
determination. Edward Said's words offer an explanation in this respect, "Our truest reality, " 
he writes, "(that we are) a nation in exile and constantly on the move," provides, "the deepest 
continuity of our lives" and thus reminds us that "movement need not always be either flight 
or exile" (Said, 1986: 164-5). Thus, the change and continuity in Palestinian lives are two sides 
of the same coin, aimed at finding a place for themselves under the sun. 
8.2.1 The Roots of Palestinian Nationalism: 1900-1948 
The development of Palestinian political consciousness can be traced back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. It was then that Zionist intentions to convert Palestine into 
a Jewish state were manifested in a large influx of Jewish immigration under the British 
Mandate of Palestine, together with the conquest of labour and land. Fear of Zionist 
immigration was expressed as early as the 1880s, when there were outbursts of Palestinian 
Fellahin (peasantry) militancy against it (Sayigh,1977:28). The Mayor of Jerusalem in 1899 
wrote to the Chief Rabbi of France saying; "in the name of God, leave Palestine in peace." 
In principle, the stand of the Palestinian Arabs stemmed from their opposition to any 
foreign domination over them. As Maxime Rodinson concluded: 
... the Palestinian Arabs desired domination neither by the British nor by the 
Zionists. They wished neither to become Englishmen nor Israelis, ... They 
wanted to keep their Arab identity ... and they consequently hoped to see an 
Arab state in Palestine (Rodinson,1968:217t). 
In the centre of the struggle against Zionism were the landless proletarianized peasants, 
who were living in urban poverty having been dispossessed or displaced by Zionist colonization 
activity in Galilee involving land purchases and the Arab labour exclusion policies of the Jewish 
National Fund (Khalidi,1988:228). This sector of the Palestine population were the first recruits 
to the Palestinian guerrilla groups and organized armed struggle (1933), a forerunner of Fatah. 
The latter was started and led by Sheikh Izz al-Din-Qassam, who has since been glorified as 
the founder of Palestinian Arab resistance. As a symbol of national identity, the native headcloth 
or Kafiya was adopted by the guerrillas (and is still used by present day Palestinian 
commandos). AI-Qassam's death (in combat with British troops) "electrified the Palestinian 
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people" whose message under the slogans of militant pan-Arabism, anti-Westernism and anti-
Zionism was spread in every town and village in Palestine (Khalidi, 1988:228;Ward, 1977: 16-
18). The 1936-1939 revolt in Palestine marked the peak of the Palestinian national struggle 
under Mandate, and was preceded by strikes' and riots during the period from 1920-1935. 
The traditional social distance between Muslims and Christians was considerably 
lessened, by a common opposition to the two non-Arab foes - the British rulers and the Zionist 
establishment (Ward,1977:6-9,13). Weinstock attributed the failure of the Palestine national 
movement under Mandate to: "Palestinians lacking dynamic bourgeoisie and a powerful working 
class, either of which would have been able to provide a genuine leadership for the struggle" 
(Weinstock, 1963 :6O). 
By the end of the 1936-1939 revolt, the Palestinian national movement witnessed an 
absence of national leadership, which lasted until the Partition Plan of 1947. The British 
restrictions on Palestinian political activities were embodied in the (Emergency) Defence 
Regulations of 1945 which were implemented differently on Arabs and Jews. 
8.2.2 Post-1948: Forces of Consolidation vs Forces of Oppression 
With 1948, the Palestinian people were dubbed Arab refugees. Their society was 
fragmented and its people scattered. Since then they have been deprived not only of statehood, 
but also (and concomitantly) of the physical and moral resources which come with formal 
authority. As a result of these events new developments in the Palestinian struggle and national 
identity were inaugurated.. These were further crystallized and consolidated after the 1967 
Israeli occupation of the WBGS, which was indeed a turning point in the history of the yet 
novice Palestine national movement. The complex interaction between the forces of 
consolidation and the forces of oppression, two dialectical forms of each other, can be seen to 
have affected the evolution of a distinctive Palestinian political consciousness. The refugees' 
experience of economic exploitation and discrimination helped in radicalizing them, and thus 
strengthened their determination to find for themselves a survival strategy which could enhance 
their identity in the face of attack (Sayigh, 1979: 113-124). 1 
In the period from 1948 to 1967, as we discussed in Chapter three, the refugees 
collectively opposed any type of permanent resettlement outside Palestine, for fear of loss of 
political rights and in particular their right for repatriation. This collectivity resulted from a 
combination of cultural and political factors - internal and external - that shaped PRs political 
identity, hence forcing them to anticipate events rather than reacting to them. 
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8.2.2.1 Does Resettlement Precludes Return? 
A number of internal factors, which Sayigh above referred to as 'ethno' or cultural, 
together with external political influences, played a role in reinforcing the PRs identity which 
has enhanced their solidarity from 1948 to the present day. 
During the "middle trip", a term used by Turki to refer to the transitional period 
between 1948 and the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or the decades of 'burial' and 'non-
existence' as camp Palestinians called it - refugees were robbed of their national identity. 
During this period, the sense of suffering a common fate and injustice helped preserve and 
reshape a solidarity evident even on the level of constraining social conflicts (See Chapter 7). 
Identifying with the land of Palestine has been building up in refugees' spirit since 1948. 
The Ghourba (exile) in this sense meant to the refugee communities not necessarily an exile 
from the country, but displacement from their original homes, villages, neighborhoods, and 
lands a social uprootedness as observed by Bruhns (Migdal and 
Kimmerling, 1993: 187;Bruhns, 1955: 133). The state of expectation and impermanence which 
refugees of all ages experienced has developed among the Palestinian a diaspora mentality which 
centres around the vision of return (Ward,1977:26). 
The refugees resistance - individually and collectively - to their exile and insistence on 
return based on UN Resolution 194(111) was evident throughout the period, as they vehemently 
opposed the construction of permanent shelters in refugee camps. It took UNRWA officials a 
long time to persuade them that "construction of weather proof shelters did not mean 
abandonment of 'the right of return' ... [since] mere mention of resettlement has been sufficient 
to undermine any of the numerous refugee rehabilitation projects" (Ibid.:26). 
In general, the desire to return to Palestine precluded willingness to resettle elsewhere. 
It may reasonably be asked whether there is a relationship between resettlement of GS refugees 
and their desire to return. Since the establishment of the Israeli sponsored housing projects in 
GS, the general perception among the camp population has been that resettlement precludes 
RRC in the long run. The attitudes of refugees in both locations were sought during the field 
research by raising several questions concerning these issues. The questions deal with whether 
refugees see any link between their RRC and resettlement; if resettlement precludes Return; and 
SR respondents were further asked about their entitlement to RRC (fables 8.1; 8.2; 8.3). 
241 
TABLE 8.1: Perceived Relationship Between Resettlement & the RRC, SC & SR 
Variable 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
sc 
54 
51 
37 
142 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
No. 
SR 
10 
70 
10 
90 
% 
sc SR 
38.0 11.1 
35.9 77.8 
26.1 11.1 
100.0 100.0 
Table 8.1 shows a sharp difference in the 'yes' response between the two samples. It 
suggests that a higher percentage of respondents in SC (38%) thought that a relationship did 
exist compared to only 11.1 % in SR; while 77.8 % in SR said that no link exists between the 
two. It may be that this response by the SR residents can be seen as justification for their 
relocation. However, it is noticeable that quite a number in the SC gave a 'don't know' answer 
(26.1 %), which reflects confusion among refugees of a possible loss of their RRC because of 
relocation to the SR project. 
In this respect, another question was asked pertaining to refugee opinion as to whether 
they agree or disagree that resettlement precludes Return or Compensation (fable 8.2). 
TABLE 8.2: Perceived Threat of Resettlement to RRC, SC & SR 
Variable No. % 
sc SR sc SR 
Agree 38 , 5 26.8 5.6 
Disagree 72 75 50.7 83.3 
Not sure 31 10 21.8 11.1 
No answer 1 0.7 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey 
In Table 8.2, disagree responses by SR residents were as high as in Table 8.1 above; 
83.3% and over half the sample in SC (50.7%) gave the same response. Only 5.6% said they 
agreed, compared with 26.8% in SC. Furthermore, a larger number of respondents in the SC 
31 (21.8%) than in the SR 10 (11.1 %) said they are not sure. 
Moreover, the findings of the sample survey in both locations indicate that there is a 
strong correlation between cancellation of the RR and resettlement by educational level, 
disagreement rising as the level of education increases (fable 8.3). 
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TABLE 8.3: Resettlement and Cancellation of the RRC by Educational Level, SC & SR 
(percentages ) 
Can. of Return! Agree Disagree Not sure No answer 
Educational level SC SR SC SR SC SR SC SR 
D1iterate 32.4 5.0 44.1 70.0 20.6 25.0 2.9 
Elementary 20.7 4.8 48.3 85.7 31.0 9.5 
Preparatory 12.1 7.7 69.7 84.6 18.2 7.7 
Secondary 29.0 8.3 51.6 87.5 19.4 4.2 
Tech. College 55.6 22.2 100.0 22.2 
University 50.0 33.3 87.5 16.7 12.5 
Total 26.8 5.6 50.7 83.3 21.8 11.1 0.7 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Over half (50.7%) in SC and a very high percentage in SR (83.3%) disagree with the 
notion that resettlement cancels the RRC; this disagreement was obvious among illiterates as 
well as those who have attained preparatory and secondary education. 
In addition to the indirect questions asked on the link between Return or Compensation 
and resettlement, the SR refugees being the segment of refugees who moved out from the camp, 
were asked a more direct question as shown in Table 8.4. 
TABLE 8.4: Perceived Entitlement to the RRC, in the event of a Solution to the Palestine-
Israeli Conflict 
Variable 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
No answer 
Total 
No. % 
90 100.0 
90 100.0 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey. 
The SR answers show a very pessimistic outlook and a strong belief in their RRC 
without any reservations. In short, refugees attitudes in both locations and especially in SR, 
contrast with the Israeli assumption that through the resettlement of refugees in the GS a 
normalization of the dream of Return will take place. This assumption was clear in Dayan's 
statement of June 1973, which identified the refugees continuous demand to return to their 
original homeland as a major goal of the "alternative housing" policy. He said: 
As long as the refugees remain in their camps ... their children will say they 
come from Jaffa or Haifa; if they move out of the camps, the hope is they will 
feel an attachment to their new land (JP,13 June,1973). 
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Dayan's statement denotes two contradictory assumptions. On the one hand, he was 
right in assuming that Palestinian children will long for return as much as their parents, as 
shown by the refugee youngsters of today, who proved to be the leading forces of the Intifada 
despite the fact that they had never lived in Palestine before 1948 (See Chapter 7). On the 
other hand, Dayan's assumption that moving out of camps would allow the refugees to forget 
their original homeland and a desire to return to it is a false assumption, as the findings from 
the SR revealed. 
Israeli attempts to normalize the Return among OTs' refugees could be seen to date 
from the first year of Israeli occupation. Old refugees showed me their Israeli IDs, pointing 
that their town/village of origin was not been mentioned under place of birth, despite such 
information being provided by them when the 1967 Israeli Census was conducted. Instead, two 
terms were used to replace the town/village of origin: Israel or, in Hebrew, 'Lorashom' 
meaning not registered. By eliminating the original place of birth from the identity card the 
authorities thought that the refugees would forget their attachment to their towns/villages. One 
respondent also told how the authorities gave new titles to the camp Mukhtars. The name of 
the village (in Palestine 1948) which a Mukhtar represents was replaced by the name of the 
block in camp. It is not surprising, then, to see the Israeli censors also banning the word ouda 
(Return) in the Arab press. Kapeliouk commented on this when he said: 
The Arabic word 'ouda' means 'return'. It signifies the return of the PRs to 
their homeland and it is a word that terrifies many Israelis ... This word does not 
threaten Israel's existence, but rather [that it] makes Israelis feel guilty 
(Kapeliouk, 1981 :6). 
The question therefore remains of how in the context of a final solution to the conflict, 
Return is to be exercised, and under what limitations; this is one area which will demand a great 
deal of exploration in the negotiation stage. 
One can now begin to appreciate the importance which Palestine refugees place on their 
UNRWA refugee card. The card for them carries a symbolic meaning; it has become the 
emblem of a political identity, rather than refugee alone. 
According to my sample, 135 (95.1 %) in the SC and 85 (94.4%) in SR hold a refugee 
card. Refugees were asked what the card means to them and over half in both locations 55.6 % 
in SC and 58.9% in SR consider that the card asserts their identity and their rights as refugees, 
reinforcing their collectivity. The high percentage of SR respondents who answered in this way 
affirm the argument which Emanual Marx raised. He argued that by setting up the Israeli 
sponsored housing projects in GS, a new incentive was given to revive the value of being a 
refugee (Marx,1992:292). Rights, as mentioned by a large number of refugees, have both a 
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short-term and a long-term rights dimension. For the refugees the short-term rights are 
services offered to them by UNRWA, especially the provision of a shelter after they lost all 
their properties; "this shelter is all what [sic] we have in this world after our dispossession" 
said one refugee. Obtaining free UNRWA services was explicit in the responses given by 
33.9% in SC and 30% in SR. For other refugees, the long-term rights are those of RRC, 
which they hope to achieve through maintaining the collectivity in the camp life; "the camp 
will be our grave, until we can go back to Palestine 1948, I want the sand in my town. The 
air. It is enough," said a refugee from the SR. 
Given this background, it is useful to consider the fear of the refugees when UNRWA 
introduced a new refugee card (single Registration card) in GS in 1982 (in addition to the 
ration card). This new card was cancelled in 1983, because refugees in other UNRWA areas 
refused to take it, yet was reissued for all refugees in the five UNRWA areas of operation in 
1992.2 Refugee fear stemmed from them seeing a connection between the issue of new cards 
and attempts to resettle them against their will. However, these fears have no grounds, as 
explained by the UNRWA director in Amman and by the Accommodation officer in UNRWA 
Gaza (AI ayan , 1992:23-4). 
8.2.2.2 The Right to Return vs Self-Determination 
Let us now turn to another argument by Kimmerling and Migdal, which reinforces my 
view regarding the political mobilization of PRs. They argue that the culture which the 
refugees generated in the camps: 
Laid the basis for a major change; from the right of return to the development 
of a true Palestinian nationalism. The rights of an aggrieved group to a 
national movement asserting the broad collective will of an entire people 
(Migdal and Kimmerling, 1993:278,187). 
This argument asserts the fact that the high level of politicization and militancy among 
camp refugees transforms their role to one of producing events rather than simply and always 
reacting to them. This is evident among GS refugees in particular, and further explains the 
Israeli authorities' resettlement schemes being operated in GS only, rather than on the WB, 
under a triple pretext of security, geography and demography. 
However, Kimmerling and Migdal seem to separate Palestinian nationalism and the RR, 
whereas, as will be debated below, the latter forms an integral part of the former. An 
examination of this argument would be better verified against the responses given by the 
refugees in the sample survey. Refugees in both locations were asked about their perception 
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of a solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The questions (direct and indirect) meant to cross-
question the strong desire to Return or Compensation against the refugees attachment to and 
acceptance of the new developments undertaken by the PLO in its 19th PNC session of 1988, 
discussed below (fables 8.5; 8.6; 8.7; 8.8). 
TABLE 8.5: Perception of a Solution to the Palestine-Israeli Conflict, SC & SR 
No. % 
Variables SC SR SC SR 
Implementation of 88 50 62.0 55.6 
PNC 19th Session 
Resolutions 
Liberation of all 43 39 30.3 43.3 
Palestine 
Other solutions 9 6.3 1.1 
No answer 2 1.4 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Table 8.5 shows that the majority of refugees in both locations support the resolutions 
undertaken by the 19th PNC session, which has its roots in the Phased Programme adopted by 
the PLO in 1974 (See below). However, those who believe in the liberation of all Palestine still 
constitute a fairly high percentage of the sample surveyed. The responses given in the 
following Tables, 8.6 and 8.7, shed more light on the refugees' position in relation to this 
issue. 
TABLE 8.6 Do You Support a Palestinian State in the WBGS, SC & SR 
Variable 
Yes 
No 
Total 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey 
SC 
138 
4 
142 
No. 
SR 
87 
3 
90 
SC 
97.2 
2.8 
100.0 
SR 
96.7 
3.3 
100.0 
A further question in relation to the above was asked because it has a specific and direct 
relation to the refugees' desire to return to their homeland (fable 8.7). 
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TABLE 8.7: Support for an alternative state even if it Excludes 1948 Land?, SC & SR 
Variable 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
Total 
sc 
102 
40 
142 
No. 
SR 
65 
23 
2 
90 
% 
sc SR 
71.8 72.2 
28.2 25.6 
2.2 
100.0 100.0 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey 
The responses given in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show, surprisingly, overwhelming support 
for a Palestinian state in the WBGS, even if it excludes refugees' land in 1948 Palestine. On 
the one hand these findings assert the refugee attachment to the PLO programmes of 1974 and 
1988; and on the other hand they reflect a dual commitment on the refugees side: one to their 
desire to return as expressed above and two to their desire to a state and independence, these 
being indivisible according to UN resolutions and statements on the question of Palestinians as 
refugees, their RR and their claims to just compensation. In the case of the Palestinian people, 
The individual or personal right of return assumes a special significance for, without 
its restoration, the exercise of the collective or national right of self-determination, itself 
guaranteed by a variety of international instruments, becomes impossible (UN, 1978: 1). 
The most recent position of the Israeli government towards the refugee problem has 
to be read through the negotiations held in the Refugees' Committee in the multilateral talks. 
Israel refused to attend the first talks held, but attended the subsequent two meetings. In the 
second multilateral talks on refugees, on 11 November 1992 in Ottawa, the head of the Israeli 
delegation, Schlomo Ben-Ami, stressed that the talks should concentrate on improving the living 
conditions of refugees in the camps or resettling them in places near their camps; he pointed 
to the housing projects that Israel set up in the GS to resettle refugees (al-Quds al-Arabi,14 
November, 1992). 
8.3 POST-1967: RESISTANCE OF GAZA STRIP REFUGEES 
Our discussion in Chapter three revealed that the GS camp community experiences were 
unique compared to other concentrations of Palestinians. Their experiences sharpened their 
sense of identity and political consciousness and they developed a sub-culture of their own. 
The preservation of refugees in the GS could be understood in relation to the conditions of 
refugees under the Egyptian administration. Restrictions on out-migration until 1962; the strict 
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separation between refugees and locals encouraged by the Egyptian authorities; lack of 
employment and limited income resources; their isolation from outside national and cultural 
influences; the effect of refugee school, 3 and other factors helped to fashion their unique 
character (See Chapter 3). Added to the above factors, the Egyptian government did not make 
any move to annex Gaza (Brand, 1988:50), unlike the situation on the WB, which was annexed 
to Jordan in 1950 and its inhabitants granted Jordanian citizenship including camp refugees 
becoming the only refugees to obtain a citizenship (Brand,1988:231). 
The foundation of Fedayeen strength was in the refugee camps. Refugees formed the 
skeleton of the resistance movement. Armed struggle on the WB took the form of" 'hit-and-
run' raids across the cease-fire lines as their main mode of operation" (Jabber,1973:189). The 
limited scale of armed struggle on the WB was a result of a number of factors. The WB 
refugees are more settled than GS refugees. Generally, they have been better-off economically, 
and were concerned not to jeopardize their homes and livelihood; additionally, the harsh 
measures of the Israeli authorities, especially in 1971, deterred them from giving support to the 
Fedayeen. 
The years 1967-71 were the peak of armed struggle in the GS. Armed struggle went 
hand-in-hand with political mobilization against the Israeli occupation. The huge arms cashes 
left by the Egyptian army when it was driven out of Sinai and the GS provided the Fedayeen 
with a bountiful source of arms, ammunition and explosives. The Palestinian army units which 
were created in 1964 (See Chapter 3) were broken up after the 1967 defeat, but the cadres 
remained, together with the veterans of 1955 Fedayeen in the GS. These provided the nucleus 
for resistance and the natural basis for the formation of clandestine organizations opposed to the 
Israeli occupation after 1967. Added to these elements, the effect of the Nasserist revolutionary 
ethics, the accumulative experience of oppression by the Israeli forces over Gazans during the 
first Israeli occupation of the GS in 195611957 (See Chapter 3), and Israeli calls to annex the 
Strip (See Chapter 4), all came together and enabled the Fedayeen to act. The Fedayeen 
blended into the population and sought refuge in the refugee camp and poor areas or hid in the 
thick orange groves. Just three months after the occupation of the GS (on 2 November 1967), 
a civil disobedience campaign of demonstrations, strikes, and the boycott of Israeli products was 
launched (Yassin,1991:37-39;Lesch,1985:55). 
Resistance in the GS between 1967-1971 took the form of grenade attacks on Israeli 
targets. During this period, the GS was controlled by the Fedayeen, as Ha 'aretz of 8 August, 
1969 reported, and it became the centre of Palestinian resistance. The number of Fedayeen 
operations during this period amounted to 1,364, with casualties totalling 370 Israelis (45 being 
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killed in action) and 131 Fedayeen (77 killed), as calculated from O'Neill (1978:237-242). It 
was reported that from June 1967 to May 1969, Israeli military courts in the GS tried about 
7,000 Fedayeen; 200 of this number being tried in the first two months of occupation 
(Yassin,1991:38-39). Collaborators and workers in Israel were also targets of the Palestinian 
Fedayeen in the GS during the first four years of occupation. The case of Theeb al-Harbity -
a refugee from the SC - who was executed by the Fedayeen on 11 February 1973, was 
mentioned by a number of respondents in the sample survey, who spoke of his collaboration 
with the authorities to annex the SC to Gaza municipality and his attempts to convince refugees 
to move out to the housing projects (O'Neill,1978:92;al-Husseini,1974:71; Palestine Affairs, 
April(1973):221-2). 
The Israeli response to the armed struggle in the GS reached its peak in 1971, when it 
carried out the road-widening operations in the largest camps as steps to counter subversion and 
to pacify GS refugees. "To win the heart and mind" of refugees, the authorities embarked on 
a new strategy, planning and constructing new housing projects adjacent to the refugee camps. 
The authorities believed that overcrowding in the camps and the low standard of living lay 
behind the high militancy among refugees (See Chapter 4). Thus, urbanization of the camps 
and the provision of work in Israel would, they believed, help to dismantle the unity between 
the Fedayeen -mainly from refugee camps - and the rest of the population who provided 
protection for them. Kapeliouk explained: "the Fedayeen are controlling the population, while 
the Israeli forces have control on land" ( in al-Husseini,1974:68). 
However, on the Palestinian level, the crushing of the armed struggle in the GS at the 
end of 1971 brought about a new stage in the Palestinian national struggle in the OTs, in which 
the "political struggle began to challenge armed struggle as a tactical approach for dealing with 
the realities of the occupation" (Roy,1989:259). This was enhanced through the geographical 
unity - under occupation - of the WBGS, enabling Palestinians to resume contacts for the frrst 
time after 19 years of isolation. 
8.3.1 The Occupied Territories: The Growth of the National Struggle 
In the aftermath .of the crackdown on GS camps in 1971, a number of internal and 
external factors came into play. Their impact on the development of the PNM was felt on 
every level. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover in detail all these factors, but a brief 
picture of these would provide an answer as to why the PNM had embarked on an independent 
political agenda .. 
Two kinds of external factors have had an influence on the growth of the PNM in the OTs 
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and the crystallization of political consciousness: the first has to do with the PLO leadership 
outside the OTs and its influence on Palestinians inside the OTs; the second relates to the threats 
and defeats of the PNM and armed struggle in the diaspora at the hands of the Arab regimes. 
With regard to the internal and external Palestinian relations, it was the year of 1973, 
which witnessed the first joint political effort between the PLO and the political forces in the 
OTs, following the Palestinian National Council (PNC) session of August 1973. Its programme 
included support for political and cultural activities as tools to strengthen the struggle against 
occupation. It announced that: 
The PNF (is) an integral part of the Palestinian national movement as represented by 
the Palestine Liberation Organization. (to support) Mass organizations, such 
as trade unions, students' and womens' federations, religious and social clubs 
and associations, in their efforts to defend the interests of the groups they 
represent, and (to mobilize) their energies for the struggle against the 
occupation. (Culturally), to protect (palestinian) culture and history from 
Zionist manipulation and distortion ... to revivify popular heritage and the 
literature of the Resistance as being an embodiment of (the Palestinians ') 
attachment to their land and their heroic struggle to defend it (International 
Documents on Palestine, 1975:459-60). 
Emphasis on their political means of struggle against Israeli occupation was adopted in 
the 12th session of the PNC in 1974. The new political programme identified the political 
objective of Palestinian nationalism as the establishment of a Palestinian state in a part of 
Palestine. It called for the establishment of a Palestinian "authority" in any part of Palestine 
"liberated" from Israel; which explicitly meant a commitment to the two-state solution, and 
showed the importance of the people's role in the OTs to attain this goal. It has been known 
since then as the "phased programme". 
In the same year (1974), several other events helped reinforce the Palestinian will to 
resist. Firstly, the Rabat Arab Summit Conference in October 1974 resolved that the PLO is 
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with the right to establish an 
independent national authority in any Palestinian territory that is liberated (International 
documents on Palestine 1974,1977:525). This declaration elevated the role of the PLO in the 
diplomatic configurations of the Middle East. Secondly, "The Question of Palestine" was 
included in the General Assembly agenda for the first time since 1952, and the PLO was invited 
to participate as an observer in the Assembly's work, a status later extended to all other UN 
organs (UN,1979:26). Third, that same year the General Assembly gave full and formal 
recognition to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and 
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sovereignty and return to their homes (UN,1979:26). Fourthly this recognition was followed 
by Arafat's address in the Assembly on 13 November 1974 -the first leader of a national 
liberation movement to receive such an honour - (Hirst,1977:334-338; UN,1979:27). The 
cumulative effect of all these factors helped to affirm the Palestinian identity and deepened their 
struggle against occupation. On the other hand, the occupiers also began to intensify their 
suppressive policies in the OTs. 
The PNC's 19th session in Algeria on November 12-15, 1988, was entitled "The 
Intifada meeting" and declared independence or statehood on the basis of Resolution 181. It 
resolved: the implementation of resolutions 338 and 242, rejection of terrorism, and willingness 
to negotiate direct! y with Israel (Said, 1990: 17-18). 
The positive effects of these developments on the PNM helped enhance the crystallization of 
a distinctive Palestinian identity. 
The consolidation of the PNM and the crystallization of political consciousness in the 
OTs has been further enhanced by two major aspects: the threats from the Israeli authorities to 
destroy Palestinian nationalism by every means; and the qualitative changes within the PNM 
itself. The organizational and political changes which the PNM adopted since 1975 were 
reflected in the path of struggle within every sector and segment of the society. On the 
organizational level, the PNM started to incorporate all sectors of the society into Palestinian 
institutional life. Open frameworks for political, social and cultural action became the 
amplification of mass participation in political activities. The emergence of mass organizations 
and the expansion of the universities were the most significant developments (faraki,1990:60). 
The emergence of young nationalist leadership was also witnessed in the erosion of the 
traditional leadership represented by the Mukhtars (village president) in the camps, in particular 
those the Israeli authorities were manipulating against the new nationalists, an issue which we 
will discuss in some detail below. The emergence of mass organizations which proved to be 
the most resilient - those of women, workers, students, etc.- contributed to the crystallization 
of the Palestinian consciousness in the OTs. 4 Their effectiveness was seen in their ability to 
recruit and mobilize progressive and young people who were more capable of a flexible 
response to the challenges faced by Palestinians under occupation. One of their distinctive 
feature is the class character of both their leadership and constituency: the vast majority are 
from peasant, refugee, and lower-middle-class urban backgrounds. 5 
The overlap of internal and external factors and their impact on the PNM have all 
played a significant role in the process of political mobilization of the Palestinian community 
at large. To complete the picture, a closer examination of the Israeli system of political and 
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juridical control in the OTs, and especially in the GS, is necessary. This is because the Israeli 
focus of control permeates the tempo of daily life for every individual in the territories, 
especially the refugee community whose high contribution to the struggle has made them the 
particular target of Israeli repressive measures. 
8.4 THE ISRAELI SYSTEM OF POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL CONTROL 
The Israeli Military Government (MG), and since 1981 the Civil Administration (CA), 
acquired immense powers over the lives of residents in the OTs, beginning with the first week 
of occupation in 1967. Military order No. 2 (June 7, 1967) concentrated these powers in the 
hands of the Military Governor: 
All powers of government, legislation, appointment and administration in relation to the 
Area or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me alone and shall be exercised 
by me or whoever shall be appointed by me to that end or acting on my behalf (Article 
3 (A) (peretz, 1986:80). 
Since 1981 the bulk of these powers have been transferred to the head of the Civil 
Administration in the WBGS. These powers are based on three sets of laws which the Israeli 
authorities are applying over the OTs. The various legal systems include the following: (1) 
Regulations issued on a day-to-day basis by the military commander of the occupied areas. 
There have been over 1500 military orders promulgated since 1967, affecting every aspect of 
Palestinian life including how deep wells may be dug, and if a well may be dug at all, and what 
crops may be grown, where they may be sold, whether a building may be constructed, what an 
individual may read, where a person may live, what associations or organizations he/she may 
belong to, and much more. (2) British Mandatory Defence (Emergency) Regulations. These 
were imposed in Mandated Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab revolt in 1936-39, but were 
later used against Jews in Palestine. When they were invoked against Jews, Zionist leaders 
condemned them as violations of the "basic principles of law, justice, and jurisprudence". (3) 
Jordanian and Egyptian law is invoked when its purpose suits the Israeli authorities. 6 
None of these laws give the Palestinians the legal rights that Israeli Jews enjoy, the issue 
of family reunification discussed in Chapter two being a case in point. While, settlers residing 
in the OTs enjoy preferential rights, Palestinians on their own land are denied rights and have 
"a second-class status ... not only during sojourns into Israel" (Migdal & Kimmerling,1993:253-
4;Coon,1992:203;Drori,1982:44-80). The presence of Jewish settlers in the midst of Arab 
towns and villages threatens the very existence of Palestinians and make them insecure on their 
own land, especially since the Jewish religious settlers are armed, and believe that to settle and 
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defend the land they are fulfilling God's commandments, such that everything has become a 
divine manifestation (Gorry and Auerbach, 1979:27;Levenberg, 1976: 12). The massacre in 
Abraham Mosque in Hebron on 25 February 1994 - when about 60 Palestinians were killed by 
a settler from Kiryat-Arba (a nearby Israeli settlement) -is strong evidence of the increase in 
violence carried out by Jewish fundamentalists in the OTs, whose desire, as Baruch Merzel, a 
Kach activist said is, " [to] pursue their 'dreams' until one day the mosques will not be there" 
(Palestine 1imes,1993:3). The presence of settlements and settlers in the OTs has to be 
perceived as being political in nature and as serving a political role (Coon, 1992: 174). 7 A 
leading Israeli civil rights lawyer, Avigdor Feldman, stated that: 
there is no doubt at all that an apartheid regime already exists in the OTs. There is a 
total and sophisticated separation between the system applied to Jewish and Palestinian 
residents ( in Bindman,1992:525). 
The problem, as Evron noted, is that the "Judical system (in Israel) itself has become 
an appendage of the machinery of oppression" (Evron,1988:8-9). B'tselem (Israeli Information 
Centre for Human Rights in the OTs) has been reporting discrepancies in sentencing between 
Arabs and Jews for comparable offenses (Ibid.) 
The failure to challenge racial discrimination and extend the rule of law fully 
to the WB and the GS undermines the integrity of the legal system, just as in 
South Africa skilful and often humane judges lost credibility by their failure (or 
inability) to challenge barbarous security laws, so in Israel, a legal system 
which does not protect a large segment of the population against serious abuses 
(including torture) is drastically compromised (Bindman,1992:525). 
Given the juridical forms of Israeli control over the Palestinians in the OTs, one needs 
to address more fundamental questions still, which will enable us to comprehend the 
multifaceted channels of Israeli politico-military control in the OTs. A fundamental question 
is, could refugee resettlement be seen as a strategy of control? What kind of systematic patterns 
have been used by Israel to combat Palestinian resistance? Who are the patrons and the agents 
in this process? Why has Israel been launching this battle or campaign against the Palestinians? 
Simply to state these questions is to indicate the difficulty of answering them in full. However, 
one simple conclusion is that the only way out of the repressive conditions of life under Israeli 
occupation is the Palestinian right to exercise their full national sovereignty on their land, as 
endorsed in UN resolutions, and as a basic right to all nations. 
8.5 RESETTLEMENT: AS A COUNTER-INSURGENGY MEASURE 
It has become clear that the impetus of settlement and resettlement schemes comes from 
outside - e.g. a foreign rule - and even if 'voluntary' it is rarely initiated from within the group 
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involved. Yet, irrespective of the objectives given behind establishing such schemes - whether 
developmental for national planning, e.g. dam or farming resettlement schemes, or for counter-
insurgency purposes - an element of coercion is involved (Sutton, 1978:60). Our discussion 
above and in Chapter seven revealed that the cultural and social identity of Palestinians in 
general and of Gaza refugees in particular has been maintained despite all sorts of repression. 
The authorities have embarked on a new technique to thwart GS refugee militancy, in the form 
constructing new housing projects, in the hope that through dispersion of the camp population, 
they would be able to quell their resistance to occupiers. This technique is best understood in 
a context of a guerrilla insurgency comparable to those set up for national development. To 
better understand why the Israeli authorities embarked on creating resettlement schemes in the 
GS, it is necessary to look to the military-political aspects of resettlement, which the remainder 
of this section will address. 
The Malayan "New Villages"; the "Strategic Hamlets" in Vietnam; the "aldeamentos" 
in Angola; and the "douars" in Algeria, are just a few examples in resettlement history, carried 
out by Britain, the United States, Portugal and France respectively. All of them were carried 
out within the framework of a counter-insurgency strategy. 8 It could be argued that the 
Israeli policy of refugee resettlement in the GS has modelled itself along these lines in response 
to the escalation of Palestinian resistance. 
The roots of modern counter-insurgency date to the period from 1900 and 1945. 9 This 
is considered a transitional period which laid the foundations for a more politically motivated 
insurgency after WWII, in which counter-insurgency became a recognized doctrine and "an 
integral part of the training and practical service experience of armies" (Beckett, 1988:8, 15). 
It is no accident to learn that the beginnings of a more modern counter-insurgency technique 
before WWI were found and practised by the British authorities in Palestine during the 1936-
1939 revolt. It was officer Wingate who pioneered the concept of "counter gangs", while 
combining these techniques with the principles of colonial policy, which became "a feature of 
post-1945 counter-insurgency, and also provided invaluable military experience to a number of 
future Israeli military leaders" (Ibid.: 8,31 ,37). Yet, these British techniques, as Beckett 
observed, failed to respond to Jewish insurgency in Palestine after 1946 (Ibid.: 1988: 13). In 
principle, the ultimate objective of the counter-revolutionary strategist is "control of the 
population through counter-organization ... to suppress the revolutionary threat to the extent that 
counter-organization can be accomplished "(McCuen, 1966: 128). Accomplishment on the level 
of the governing power entails the annihilation of the rebels and the "preservation of its own 
bases, populations, and forces" (Ibid. :51). 
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From the revolutionary point of view, the primary objective is "not only annihilating 
the enemy, but more important, of preserving the existence of the revolutionary forces", by 
which this "allows (them) to consolidate their control of the people and make the government 
bases not only useless but a liability" (Ibid. :51-2). The outcome of such a situation is that the 
governing forces and the insurgents get involved in an unfinished battle. One way used by the 
security forces to alter the situation of confrontation has been the separation of the civilian 
population from the insurgents. To ensure such separation, two methods have become 
customary since 1945: 
either by erecting a physical barrier against guerrilla infiltration in the manner of the 
French 'Morice Line' in Algeria, the American 'McNamara Line' in Vietnam, or by 
resettlement of the civilian population (Beckett and Pimlott,1985: 11,59). 
Resettlement as a concept was known in the 1890s as reconcentration - "the gathering 
of a population in guarded locations to deny guerrillas in the field ready access to food and 
support. " The Spanish campaign in Cuba, the policies that the British used against the Boers 
in South Africa between 1900 and 1902; and the actions of the USA in 1900 in the Philippines 
are examples of a strategy which was revived by the British in Malaya (1948-60) 
(Beckett, 1988:9-10). 
In the context of counter-insurgency strategy, resettlement is perceived as being part of 
a "civic-action" to counter-organize the population after destruction of guerrilla organization 
(McCuen, 1966: 152-166). It is a policy that follows the French concept, which emphasizes that 
"destruction must be followed by construction" (Ibid.: 128). The aim of initiating resettlement 
programmes is to regain the confidence of the population through developing a convincing 
"hearts and minds" policy. To achieve such a goal, 'civic-action' projects designed to improve 
the material condition are a requirement which imply pacification policies (Beckett, 1988: 10). 
O'Neill commented on the importance of "civic-action" during resettlement: 
Resettlement of sections of the population is another form sought by colonial regimes 
or government to sever the links between the insurgents and the populace ... particularly 
when terror and/or guerrilla attacks persist and are attributed, at least partially, to 
support rendered the insurgents by portions of the population. Civic action and political 
organization are extremely important during resettlement; indeed, they are often viewed 
as concomitant of that technique (O'Neill, 1978:31). 
Disadvantages of resettlement as emanated from experiences of the British in Malaya 
and the French in Algeria included the initial alienation of the population and the substantial 
expenses involved. Advantages overweighed disadvantages in these countries and included: 
maintaining security; curfews; isolating the guerrillas from the population; and offering better 
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living condition for the population (McCuen, 1966:231-34). However, the British resettlement 
in Malaya aimed at achieving a combination of goals: control of communities in centralized, 
defensible areas, and the reclamation of land by using improved agricultural methods 
(McCuen, 1966: 155). 
The use of resettlement as a counter-revolutionary technique has not been without its 
critics: "it is a policy fraught with potential danger for the government (Britain in Malaya), 
which may be accused of oppression", unless it is carried out humanely (Beckett and 
Pimlott,1985:22). The 410 "New Villages" which the British set up in Malaya in 18 months 
to combat the Chinese communists; "were little more than well-organized shanty-towns" 
according to McCuen. Another angle of criticism was raised against the stringent measures 
of control over the population, and the collective punishment policies which made this 
experience a success compared to others elsewhere which proved failures (McCuen, 1966: 162-
6;Beckett and Pimlott,1985: II,Clutterbuck,1977:39). 
By contrast, the 12,000 "Strategic Hamlets" set up by the Americans in two years in 
Vietnam (1960-1962) had failed by the end of 1963, because the peasants resented being 
removed from their ancestral lands (Beckett and Pimlott,1985:94; Clutterbuck,1977:45). 
Resettlement in Angola by the Portuguese was a failure also, the 150 aldeamentos first 
established in August 1961 were resented by the Angola tribes as "disrupting tribal society;" 
additionally, the divisions among the Portuguese authorities between those viewing resettlement 
primarily as a measure of population control and those regarding it as an opportunity to 
stimulate native development caused this failure (Beckett and Pimlott, 1985: 147). 
In Algeria, observers from inside and outside France criticized the French regroupment 
policies where "a million and a half men, women, and children have been torn from their 
houses by force of their own fear", and displaced "around the cities and towns (in) clusters old 
sheet-metal shacks" (McCuen,1966:232-3). 
This kind of analysis highlights the real motives of the Israeli refugee resettlement in 
the GS. These resettlement schemes - as discussed in Chapter four - came after the crackdown 
on the Fedayeen in 1971 through Sharon's road-widening operations in the large camps. The 
Israeli authorities' plan for improving the living conditions of refugees through economic 
development and resettlement - the carrot of their policies - aimed at isolating "the Fedayeen 
from the rest of the citizenry" (O'Neill.1978:96). Without the security of the population, the 
authorities believed that Fedayeen could never be counter-organized or controlled. But the 
authorities did not recognize then that the strength of the Fedayeen came from among the local 
population - refugees and non-refugees - a fact which led the Israeli press to question the 
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effectiveness of the Israeli policy in GS camps: "It is impossible to separate the Fedayeen from 
the locals, for the locals themselves are potential Fedayeen" (Ha 'olom Hazeh, 3 August,1971; 
Ha'aretz,1 October, 1971), in contrast to the WB where the insurgents were infiltrators rather 
than part of the local populace (O'Neill,1978:94). 
While it can be argued that the Israeli authorities successfully adopted the military 
requirements of counter-insurgency, they were less able to develop a convincing "heart and 
minds" policy to win the support of the Gazan refugees as a whole. The security measures 
adopted by the authorities did not deter refugees from giving support to the struggle, as the 
survey findings will show below. Nor did these schemes fulfil an Israeli wishto depopulate the 
camps, for those who move out constitute only 18.4% of the total refugee community in the 
Strip (al-Ittihad,9 December, 1988). Moreover, the number of relocated refugees hardly exceeds 
the number by which the refugee population grows every year through natural increase. 
Critique of the resettlement schemes in the GS, as discussed earlier, focused on both the 
political and physical level; they offered poor quality housing (especially in the first stage of 
resettlement) and have been co~tributing to the revival of refugee political identity. 
8.6 OTHER VARIABLES OF CONTROL 
Control of insurgents is not only limited to repressive security measures undertaken by 
the governing authorities, and other environmental elements have to be considered. O'Neill 
identifies nine aspects which have an impact on insurgency. These are: "terrain, climate, the 
road and communication network, ethnicity, religion and culture, size of the country, and the 
size and distribution of the population" (O'Neill,1978:25). The nature of the terrain or 
geography affects the movement of insurgents from their main base. Vast and rugged terrain 
works in favour of the guerrillas, providing hideouts and expanding their area of operation. 
Severe climate could favour the guerrillas by preventing government attacks, but it does not 
have a direct effect on insurgent success. Communication networks, if highly developed, 
work in favour of the authorities, enabling them to "move about expeditiously and make better 
use of their technological superiority". In contrast, poor roads favour the guerrillas, e.g. 
narrow alleys in GS refugee camps help the Fedayeen side. The size and distribution of the 
population affects the level of insurgency: "where the number of people is small and 
concentrated, it will facilitate government efforts to control the population and sever their links 
with the guerrillas." Similarly, "if a society is mostly urban, it is easier for a government to 
control the people and to prevent the establishment of guerrilla bases." In the case of GS, it 
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is the popular support for the Fedayeen that made their protracted warfare a success, regardless 
of their being urban or rural, although, as discussed in Chapter seven, one of the authorities aim 
to resettle refugee was in order to make them urban. Lastly, if the population if from a 
different ethnic, religious and/or language group differing than the authorities, this helps 
guerrilla elements to clique together and support each other (O'Neill,1978:25-28). 
Although these variables of control may become disadvantageous for the guerrillas if 
the authorities manifest strength and counter-insurgency policies, e.g. collective punishment, 
a highly organized and politically mobilized population could offset these handicaps and carry 
on the struggle effectively. This begs the question, as to what extent these variables have a 
bearing upon the insurgency of SR refugees compared to the SC refugees? 
SC refugees assessed the rate of political mobilization of SR refugees. The survey 
posed the questions in Table 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10. For the purpose of cross-examination, attitudes 
of the SR refugees in this respect were also sought. 
TABLE 8.8 
Variable 
Very high 
Above average 
Average 
Below average 
Don't know 
No answer 
Total 
Evaluation of Political Activities of SR Refugees? SR Residents Only 
Frequency Percentage 
63 70.0 
15 16.7 
9 10.0 
1 1.1 
2 2.2 
90 100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
TABLE 8.9 
Variable 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
Evaluation of Refugee Participatione in Political Activities With SC Refugees? SC 
Residents 
Frequency 
138 
2 
2 
142 
Percentage 
97.2 
1.4 
1.4 
100.0 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
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TABLE 8.10 Level of Political Participation, SC Residents 
Variable 
Very high 
Above average 
Average 
Below average 
Don't know 
No answer 
Total 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Frequency 
88 
10 
31 
4 
8 
1 
142 
Percentage 
62.0 
7.0 
21.8 
2.8 
5.6 
0.7 
100.0 
As the Tables above indicate, a very high percentage of the respondents in both 
locations consider the participation of SR refugees in political activities to be very high, some 
70 % in SR and 62 % in SC. However, however, what is notable is that in SC 21.8% gave 
average as an answer compared to only 10% in SR. Table 8.9 shows that nearly all SC 
respondents (97.2 %) affirm that SR refugees are as politically active as SC refugees. These 
findings support further the Palestinian view that relocation does not reduce political mobility, 
as stated by all the leadership interviewed, some of whom pointed to the poor quarters in Gaza 
town as being more active than camp refugees. A number of respondents in the SC labelled 
the SR as: "the new camp by contrast to the old camp (SC)"; "a family which has been divided 
into two" ; "SR son/daughter of the SC". Some refugees in the SR further asserted that "the 
feeling of belonging and political struggle does not change whether we live in a hut or in a 
palace. " 
The Israeli strategy for setting-up the refugee resettlement schemes in the GS is self-
serving. It reflects a belief that most political problems can be reduced to social problems. 
Hence their shock over the resettled refugees' role during the Intifada: "it is a real change in 
attitude," said a Defence Ministry official (JP, 19 October, 1988). A couple of refugees in the 
SR described how the Civil Administration officer (Arieh Ramot) in GS, in a meeting with 
notables from the SR, expressed his anger and disappointment over the participation of SR 
refugees in the Intifada. Both refugees further explained that the SR was the second place after 
J abalaya camp - the camp where the Intifada began - in terms of the number of confrontations 
with the authorities, even though the SR was called "the village of peace" (Kfar Shalom) for 
its quietness prior to the Intifada. 
Respondents in both locations explained the reasons for the high level of participation 
of SR refugees in political activities. Surprisingly, refugees in both locations listed almost 
similar reasons, of two types. The first related to the socio-political orientation - same 
struggle, strong ties - and the second related to outside factors. Surprisingly, some of the 
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answers in relation to the latter set of reasons correspond to some of the environmental variables 
mentioned earlier designed to curtail resistance, such as smaller population, wide roads 
compared with the narrow alleys in the camps (See Plates: 8.1 & 8.2). These findings further 
confirm that these schemes were designed with a counter-insurgency strategy in mind (See 
Tables 8.11 & 8.12). 
TABLE 8.11 Explanation for Level of Political Participation 
Variable 
Same struggle 
Strong tics 
Wide roads 
Less population 
Same harassments by 
the authorities 
Don't know 
Others 
Source: The 1991 Sample survey 
Frequency 
90 
11 
14 
6 
6 
3 
Percentage 
100.0 
12.2 
15.6 
6.7 
6.7 
3.3 
TABLE 8.12 Explanations for Level of Political Participation. SC Residents 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Same struggle 89 62.7 
Strong ties 9 6.3 
Wide roads 21 14.8 
Better control over 2 1.4 
children 
Less population 4 2.8 
Same harassments by 11 7.7 
the authorities 
Better living conditions 12 8.5 
Don't know 2 1.4 
~: The 1991 Sample Survey 
Given this background, it is of significance to view the practical side of the Israeli 
political-military control, by which the refugees in general, and GS refugees in particular have 
been seen as the main contributors to the struggle and hence the target of the Israeli measures. 
8.7 GS REFUGEES' MILITANCY AND ISRAELI REACTION 
With the rebi~ of Palestinian nationalism, the Palestinian identity changed from 
refugee to revolutionary (Sayigh,1977:34). In challenging their designations in the face of all 
hardships in the host countries and under Israeli control, they emphasized their role in the 
struggle in various ways, thus enhancing their political identity rather than refugee identity and 
leading the PNM from one of armed struggle to calls for independence and sovereignty (See 
· I 
Plates no. 8.1 & 8.2: The narrow alleys in the Shati camp are in marked contrast to the wide roads 
in the Sheikh Radwan project, the latter facilitating the movement of Israeli military vehicles. 
Photo: The author, 1991 
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above discussion). Throughout this long path of defeats and triumphs, the Palestinians 
developed three heroic images, as Kimmerling and Migdal wrote: 
The Feday (Lit.: "one who sacrifices himself') was a modem metamorphosis of the 
holy warrior .... The image of the survivor ... a more passive hero, demonstrating sumud 
or steadfastness ... he confirmed his sumud by staying on the land at all costs -a bitter 
lesson learned from 1948 ... the survivor's counterpart was "the child of the stone," 
often exemplified through portraits of the shahid, or martyr, offering his life for the 
national cause by fighting against all odds ... (Kimmerling & Migdal,1993:211-2). 
The particular aspects of life under occupation in the WBGS and the Israeli violations 
of Palestinian human rights in the OTs have been the vehicles towards the development and thus 
affirmation of these three images. These facts were confirmed by the Minister of Economics 
and Finance in Israel, who stated: " ... the coming of age of the first generation born under 
occupation and the "iron fist" policy launched in August 1985 all contributed to the Palestinians 
growing militancy" (Johnson, 1990:32). 
The politics of camp refugees, even though it is an echo of Palestinian nationalism in 
general, "have their own characteristics: intensity, radicalism, violence and dedication" 
(yahya,1990:93). These characteristics have been a distinctive feature of refugees struggle 
against occupation since the early months of the Israeli occupation. 
In dealing with Israeli measures in the GS, our concentration will be on camps and 
refugees, especially in both locations in the sample surveyed. Several indicators were chosen 
to measure the political involvement of refugees in SC and SR and the Israeli response to them, 
e.g. arrested, and injured members in the household and others (See Tables below). For the 
purpose of our study, a valid question is whether refugees in the housing projects are as 
involved in the struggle as to their counterparts in the camps, or have their new living 
conditions stemmed their militancy? The data above, on the level of political mobility, asserted 
that SR refugees are as active as their counterparts in SC. In practical terms it is the results 
of the field data below, which speak for themselves, which provide an answer to the Israeli 
officials' assumptions that during the Intifada resettled refugees" were less involved in the 
rioting" (Israel Yearbook 1988: 145). This statement is based on a general Israeli assumption 
that, as Brigadier General FredY Zach, former deputy co-ordinator for Judea-Samaria and the 
Gaza District, put it: "When the Palestinians have something to lose, they will think twice about 
terror. The army's policy is to try to decrease terror by improving services" (Cited in 
Viorst,1989:111). It is those twin policies of Dayan - the carrot and the stick - which the 
authorities believed would reduce resistance and enable Israel to sustain its control indefinitely. 
Israeli violations are multifaceted and extend to a number of areas, and all are carried 
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out in the name of security, whether collectively or individually. The range and scope of 
violations of human rights in the OTs as direct means to control the population are enormous, 
and beyond the limit of this thesis. 10 But a brief picture of the kind of suppressive measures 
and restrictions that Palestinians face in everyday life - with the emphasis on refugees - is of 
significance here, especially during the Intifada period. Dealing with such manifestations or 
indicators will throw some light on the actualities of the conflict, and thus provide an answer 
to the question of the effectiveness or futility of Israel's strategy to meet force by counter-force. 
8.7.1 Political Imprisonment and Administrative Detention 
Israeli soldiers have the right to detain any person if they have "grounds of suspicion" 
that the person in question may have committed an offense. In practice, this means that anyone 
can be arbitrarily taken into custody at any time. Another form of detention is what is known 
as the "administrative detention", where persons may be held in detention for a period of six 
months without trial, this repeatedly extended at the end of six month period, merely at the 
whim of the military authorities. Dedi Zucker, an Israeli Knesset member noted that one "out 
of every 200 men over the age of 18 from OTs were imprisoned without charge or trial" (Cited 
in al-Haq, 1988: 151). During the period of detention individuals are subjected to a punitive 
and humiliating regime, often including torture, the methods of which are too numerous to cite 
here. 
According to the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights (B'Tselem), in its report 
of 1991, there were 75,000 Palestinians who were held in prisons for various terms during the 
first three years of the Intifada. In GS alone the number of detainees during the first year of 
the Intifada ranges between 25 - 30,000, of which 4000 were administrative detainees; and this 
increased to around 46,000 by the end of December 1990, with about 7000 in administrative 
detention (al-Ittihad, 8 December, 1989; 10 January, 1991). Respondents from Block H in the 
SC reported that at one point during the Intifada all the men in the Block were under arrest. 
Those who are detained are young people, who constitute a unique demographic 
indicator: one out of five young Palestinians in the OTs has been arrested at least once since 
1967 (Sabella,1991:10). It is difficult to determine the percentage of refugees detained in GS 
in general, but the survey findings reported that the percentage of households with a memberls 
who have experienced arrest are higher in the SR (54.4%) than in the SC (47.9%). This is 
despite the difference in population size in the two locations (Table 8.13). 
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TABLE 8.13 Arrested Members in the Household, SC & SR 
Variable No. 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
se 
68 
74 
142 
SR 
49 
41 
90 
se 
47.9 
52.1 
100.0 
SR 
54.4 
45.6 
100.0 
Over the three-year period of the Intifada, SR residents reported a higher percentage 
of detainees per household (47.7%) than the (42.3%) in the SC (Table 8.14). It is to be noted 
that a member of a household might be subjected to arrest more than once, similarly, one or 
more members in a household could be arrested, as was reported by refugees. 
TABLE 8.14 Number and Percentage of Arrested Members in the Household, SC & SR 
Period 
1967-1987 
1974-1987 
1987-1990 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
No. 
se 
17 
60 
SR 
14 
43 
se 
11.9 
42.3 
SR 
15.5 
47.7 
The actual arrest of household members by the Israeli forces takes place during house 
raids, search operations and curfews. On November 13,1992, for example, UNRWA reported 
that one hundred people were detained in Khan Yunis camp during a search operation by Israeli 
soldiers (UNRWA News, 26 November,1992) "Town Arrest" is another form of arrest that is 
carried out by the Israeli authorities, involving an individual's physical mo~ement being 
restricted by administrative fiat, usually of six months but able to be extended indefinitely. 
8.7.2 Curfews, Area Closures, Travel Restrictions 
The GS camps have been the most affected by the imposition of lengthy curfew. 
Curfews are imposed on camps so as to isolate them and prevent them from affecting 
neighbouring regions. Refugee camps, in many respects, have "borne the brunt of Israeli 
curfew policy" (JMCC, 1991: 11). The number of people affected ranges from a few thousand 
to several hundred thousand. Though the Israeli authorities have constructed an image of 
curfew as a humane alternative to other more overtly violent means of quelling activities thought 
to threaten Israeli security, they have been ignoring international legal standards. The use of 
curfews as a form of collective punishment was admitted by the Israeli justice minister: 
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It is not desirable but sometimes there is no choice. In normal society, criminal 
punishment is only inflicted on people at the margins. During a period of war, 
however, you need greater deterrence (Ibid:5). 
Curfews are frequently used by the Israeli authorities for "re-asserting their control 
over and subjugating the rebelling Palestinian population" (Ibid. :6). Every day between 9 
December 1987 and 31 December 1990, an average of 134,431 Palestinians in the OTs were 
confined to their homes by curfew (Ibid.: 1). The hardships faced by camp refugees in the GS 
due to curfews are much more harsh than in any other areas. This is because of the 
overcrowding - the density per household when entire families are confined to their homes, in 
many cases no more than a single room. The GS refugee camp population (36 % of the total 
Strip's population) was subject to 75% of the curfew incidents and 65% of the person-days 
recorded, while on the WB the refugee camp population (8 % of the total WB population) was 
subject to 43 % of the curfew incidents and 30% of person-days recorded (Ibid. :2). (See Figure: 
8.1). 
Figure 8.1 Gam Strip Curfews (Dec 1987-Dec 1990) 
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Figure 8.2 below shows the number of days spent under curfew in the SC during the 
first three years of the Intifada, and indicates that over three months of each of the three years, 
Figure 8.2: Shati Camp Curfews (Dec 1987 - ~ec 1990) 
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TABLE 8.15 The Frequency of House Raids During the Intifada, SC & SR 
No. % 
No. of Times SC SR SC SR 
1 - 5 19 26 13.4 28.9 
6 - 10 45 23 31.7 25.6 
11 - 15 15 9 10.6 10.0 
16 - 20 10 8 7.0 8.8 
21 & more 53 24 37.3 26.7 
Total 142 90 100.0 100.0 
~: the 1991 Sample Survey 
8.7.4 Injuries in the Camps 
UNRWA figures on the injuries of GS refugees are relatively accurate, although they 
only report those cases which have been treated by UNRWA medical staff in the Agency's 
health centres (UNRW A,PIO, Gaza, March 1988). Underestimation in the number of injuries 
is also caused by the suspicion and fear of the refugees to give personal details, leading them 
to seek treatment outside 'official' channels; and by the restrictions imposed by the Military 
Governor on 13 December 1987 to staff at government hospitals prohibiting them from 
releasing information to outside agencies regarding patients (UNRWA, PIO, Gaza, March 
1988). 
Israeli military sources revealed that from the beginning of the Intifada until September 
3,1990, injuries reached 13,104 (al-Quds, 6 September 1990); while the al-Ittihad report of 
10 January, 1991 gives a figure of 63,785 injuries; and UNRWA figures up to March 1990 
reached 40,170 injuries (UNRWA, PIO,Gaza,April 1990). In GS itself, UNRWA documented 
44,738 cases of injuries among refugees between 9 December 1987 and 28 February 1991; 
6,499 of them in the SC and 2,592 in the SR, 19,715 involving children of 15 years and under. 
Many of the injuries were caused by live rounds 8,449; tear-gas caused 8,422; plastic-coated 
metal bullet 4,814; rubber bullets 1,431; and over 28,000 injuries were caused by beatings, 
using hands, clubs, rocks, and firearms (UNRWA,Operations Section, Gaza, March 1991). 12 
The practice of beating was intensified in response to Rabin's 'new-old policy of January 
19,1988. He stated that: " the first priority is to use force, might and beatings". The 
authorities considered the policy of beatings more effective than detention. JP of January 20, 
1988 reported that, A detainee will be freed after eighteen days; he may then resume stoning 
soldiers. But if troops break his hand, he won't be able to throw stones for a month and a half. 
The survey popUlation in the two case study areas told about incidents of beatings 
during house raids by Israeli soldiers. In one typical incident, the head of the household told 
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how soldiers locked the whole family in one room, while keeping his only teenage son outside. 
They then started beating him in brutal way, his family left watching from the window and 
unable to protect him. According to the survey findings, 112 out of 142 households in the SC 
reported that one or more members of the household were injured during the Intifada, compared 
to 69 households out of 90 in the SR. The number of persons injured in SC and SR households 
are shown in Table 8.16, the findings of which indicate that households in both locations have 
almost equal percentages of injured members in the family. 
TABLE 8.16 No. of Injured Members in the Household, SC & SR 
Period 
1967-1987 
1974-1987 
1987-1990 
Source: The 1991 Sample Survey 
8.7.5 Deportation 
SC 
2 
110 
No. 
SR 
2 
69 
SC 
2.0 
77.5 
SR 
2.2 
76.7 
Deportation and expulsion is another measure used by the authorities since 1967 and 
which remains controversial. Deportation is banned under Article 49 of the Geneva 
Conventions, but Israel has usually given as reasons for deportation incitement, subversion and 
membership of illegal organizations (Le. the PLO). 
In addition to the mass eviction which took place during and in the aftermath of the 
1967 war, Israel has continued to expel Palestinians from the OTs, in an attempt to evacuate 
the area of its active and young leadership. Some 1,156 Palestinians were deported from the 
OTs between 1967 and 1977. There was a decrease in deportees between 1978 and 1985, but 
with the "iron fist" policy in the OTs introduced by Rabin in 1985, 42 persons were deported 
between August 1985 and December 1987 (al-Haq,1991-143-4) and a further 78 have been 
deported since the Intifada began in December 1987. The mass deportation of 415 alleged 
members of Ham as (the Islamic Resistance Movement), in December 1992 to southeast Lebanon 
was considered one of the largest campaigns, after the expulsion of villagers from the three 
villages in Latrun in 1967 and the expulsion of all refugees from Aqbat Jaber camp in Jericho 
and GS refugee displacement in 1971 (Hallaj,1982:96). Some 250 deportees of Hamas were 
returned, but, Palestinians insist on the return of all deportees since 1967 to date, linked to the 
right to return of the PRs of 1948 enshrined in UN Resolution 194 and that of the PRs of 1967 
detailed in UN Resolution 337. 
Of the 59 deported during the first year of the Intifada, twelve were camp residents, 
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over 20% and an indication that refugees have been providing a leadership on the national level 
(al-Haq, 1988: 144) 13 
8.7.6 Demolition of Houses and Sealings 
This is used as a frequent punishment for suspected acts of resistance to the occupation. 
A family whose home is demolished is not permitted to rebuild it. Within ten years of the 
occupation, "upwards of 15,000 houses have been destroyed (in the OTs) since June 1967" 
(Adams, 1977:37). During the first eighteen months of the Uprising, 199 houses were 
demolished by the Israeli authorities, and as a result 8,000 people in the OTs lost their homes, 
considered one of the harshest measures to end the Intifada. The demolition of camp shelters 
in the GS, for a variety of reasons shown in Table 5.9, has been a precedent compared to other 
occupied areas. 14 
The sealing of houses, shops, and streets is also a standard policy of the Israeli 
authorities. During the three years of the Intifada, the authorities in GS closed off 34 mosques, 
146 schools, 160 streets and alleys and 42 workshops and shops (Sarah,1991:65). The scope 
of measures in this field could be scrutinized from a report made on Israeli violations of human 
rights in GS by the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law (GCRL), which is an affiliate of the 
International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, covering a period of six months of the second 
year of the Intifada (See Table 8.17). 
TABLE 8.17 Demolished and/or Sealed off Places in GS by the Israeli Occupying 
Authorities, During the period 9 June-8 December 1989 
Description Total Number 
Business stores sealed off 
Market places (vegetables) sealed off 
Houses totally demolished 
Houses partially demolished 
Houses totally sealed off 
Houses Partially sealed off 
Walls of residential and/or buildings of 
public and or/private educational, business 
and/or social institutions, associations demolished 
Entrances, streets and/or lanes sealed off 
Mosques sealed off 
Schools, UNRWA and/or Government sealed off 
Workshops and/or supermarket sealed off 
Source: GCRL, Gaza, 1991 
24 
5 
57 
12 
13 
9 
36 
16 
6 
12 
9 
The residents of the refugee camps suffer when entrances of the camp are sealed off by 
the security forces as a counter-insurgency measure to control their movement. The sealing 
takes the form of blocking the way by the use of barrels (See Plates: 8.3 & 8.4). Figures on 
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the sealing off of houses in SC and SR are unavailable, yet, according to one interviewee in 
the SR, the second and third storey of her house was sealed off by the authorities after the 
detention of her brother-in-law, and as a result three families of 23 persons were cramped into 
three rooms only. 
8.7.7 Martyrs or Wilful Killing of Civilians 
The killing of civilians is another measure which the Israelis have been carrying out 
since 1967. The latest method used is by special forces, often dressed as local Arabs, who 
attempt either to arrest or kill the wanted Palestinians. These undercover units use live 
ammunition in "fatal fire only", a clear breach of directives to explore other, less lethal, 
methods to apprehend "wanted suspects", as reported by the Israeli Human Rights Organization 
(B'Tselem). According to the report, 86 people have been deliberately killed by such units 
since the Intifada began. The military authorities justification for methods used by the 
undercover units is that there is a war in the territories, and therefore the IDF functions as on 
the battlefield. 
According to a report by al-Haq (The Law in the Service of Man), a WB affiliate of 
the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, 1070 Palestinians were killed in the OTs 
from the beginning of the Intifada in December 1987 to mid-1992 by Israeli soldiers and the 
special units. Moreover, in an UNRWA report of the GS casualties since the beginning of 
the Intifada in December 1987 to the end of February 1991, a total of 291 were killed, 246 
of them refugees and 56 of those killed children 15 years and under (UNRWA, Operations 
Section, Gaza, March 1991). By the end of the third year of the Intifada the number of martyrs 
in GS reached 338, the refugee camps, 30 from the SC and 18 from SR (al-Itiihad, 10 
January, 1991). In the survey sampled five households reported having five martyrs during the 
Intifada, compared to three households in the SR. 
The Israeli army's actions reflect its impatience and its lack of respect for Palestinian 
life and property. One of the reasons for the rise in casualties among Palestinian children is 
the fact that many of these children's brothers are likely to be in jail. But the danger to Israeli 
soldiers from stones thrown by children is almost negligible. They need only shields-not live 
ammunition- to protect themselves. 
' .. 
Plates no. 8.3 & 8.4: 1\vo Shati camp entrances which have been sealed off by the Israeli authorities 
to restrict the movement of refugees & thus exercise better control over them. 
Photo: The author, 1991 
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8.8 THE LEGAL AND POLmCAL CONTEXT OF ISRAEL'S COUNTER-
INSURGENCY STRATEGY 
8.8.1 The Legal Aspect 
Violations like the above would not have been enough to precipitate political 
Palestinianism, despite Israelis claims that its practices in the OTs are implemented according 
to the "rule of law" , as required by the Universal Declaration, and not the Geneva Conventions, 
which are concerned with the protection of civilians during wartime conditions. Israel has 
claimed that the Geneva Conventions are not applicable to the WBGS, based on her declaration 
of those territories as "administered territories" or "liberated territories" as called by the 
Orthodox Jews, and not "enemy territories" (Efrat,1970:1;Morrow,1988:17). The reluctance 
of the occupying forces to use the term "occupation" relates to two reasons, as Roberts 
observed: Firstly, "fear of having to apply the full range of the law on occupations"; and 
secondly, the fact that "occupation" is almost synonymous with aggression and oppression" 
(Roberts,1984:301). Despite the early and continuous assertions made by UN Resolution 2443 
in 1968; and repeated assertions made by the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) 
that the Convention is applicable, Israel has refused to accede to this view (UN, 1968; 
ICRC, 1970:427-8). 
At this stage one might well ask: what is the purpose of having Conventions for Human 
Rights? What machinery do these Conventions establish for preventing breaches? Is the 
machinery adequate? Actually, the Hague Regulations do not contain any preventive measures. 
The Geneva Conventions, on the other hand, envisage a system of supervision in which a 
"protecting power" oversees the application of the Conventions in an occupied territory (Fourth 
Geneva Convention, Article 9). In the case of the OTs, the absence of a "protecting power", 
in the form of a state working on behalf of the Palestinians and represented in the UN on equal 
grounds with other member states, has made it impossible to ensure compliance with the Geneva 
Convention. 
It should, however, be noted that the Geneva Conventions apply to "all" situations of 
partial or total occupation of territory. They thus apply to the facts of an international conflict 
and not to its merits as interpreted by Israel. Professor Mallison observed that: 
The negotiating history makes it clear, since the application of the Conventions is 
mandatory, that questions as to de jure titles to territory are not involved and that the 
Convention must be applied in occupied territory whatever the claims concerning the 
de jure status of that territory (Cited in Tillman,1978:77). 15 
In order to be able to deal effectively with violations of human rights in OTs, it has 
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been said that: 
The issue of Palestinian rights cannot be properly addressed by cataloguing an 
endless series of violations: a deeper understanding of the nature of the State 
of Israel is necessary (Moleah,1981:16). 
The question to be answered is 'why does Israel behave in a manner that is an "affront 
to humanity"? (UN,1980:24-25). It was thus categorized by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights when describing Israeli violations of human rights in the OTs. Israel's persistent 
disregard for world opinion and the international community, and its continuous harassment of 
the Palestinians at home, cannot be seen as sporadic violations of a despotic regime, but as 
systematic attempts to destroy a human society and the demolition of the material and moral 
foundations of Palestinian nationhood. It is the aim of the final section of this chapter to discuss 
the Israeli position with regard to acknowledging the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism 
within the framework of its own legitimacy. 
8.9 THE POLITICAL GROUNDS OF ISRAEL'S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY 
8.9.1 The Intifada: Losses vs. Gains 
In an attempt to maintain its control over the Palestinians in the OTs, Israel combined 
its military measures with other political actions. The growing support for the PLO inside the 
OTs, and its recognition as a legitimate movement of national liberation and self-determination 
at the international level, has become a source of worry for Israel. 16 Inside the OTs, the 
various national and mass organizations organized along the political factions of the PLO reflect 
the high degree of coordination between the inside (OTs) and the outside (PLO). The support 
for the PLO can be elicited from various opinion polls conducted in the OTs. The joint opinion 
poll conducted in the WB in September 1986 by the Jerusalem daily al-Fajr and the U.S. daily 
Newsday, on a number of political issues, showed almost universal (93.5 %) support for the 
PLO (al-Fajr,12 September, 1986). The Communiques of the UNL of the Intifada made it clear 
that they consider themselves part and parcel of the PLO. An independent opinion poll 
conducted in the OTs prior to the signing of the deal between Israel and the PLO on 13 
September 1993 indicated that 65% of Palestinians supported the agreement (The 
Independent,13 September, 1993). 
This political weight inside the OTs has been of crucial importance for the evolution of 
Palestinian nationalism, especially after the 1982 war in Lebanon, when the PLO's 
infrastructure was destroyed for the second time, the first being the crackdown in Jordan in 
1970. The Intifada, the climax of Palestinian struggle inside OTs with its new character and 
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scale, surprised the Israelis, who thought it was the PLO which was instigating it - which 
would be considered an attestation of the PLO capability to mobilize the whole population. Yet, 
as Rabin said, the Intifada was spontaneous, and it couldn't be viewed within the context of past 
waves of 'disturbances' (Israel Yearbook 1988,1989:150). It was "the work of long years of 
frustration and festering wounds of unresolved Palestinian nationalism" (famari,1990:132). 
Israeli official statements that it would be crushed within a few days ignored the new attributes 
of the UNL of the Intifada. Although secretive and underground, the major attribute of the 
UNL lie in its grassroots nature. It represented the political unification of PLO factions, and 
the unity among the various sectors of the Palestinian society adapted and followed UNL 
decisions (in the communiques). 17 Recognizing the political weight inside the OTs, the 
Intifada shifted the direction of the inside-outside relationship: 
Where the external PLO leadership once led the internal movement under 
occupation, today the internal movement sets the tone for the formulation of 
Palestinian politics outside" (famari, 1990: 133). 
The Intifada's political gains for the PNM were the strengthening of the political 
bargaining cards of the PLO, which led the US to start searching for a political solution. The 
Palestinian problem for the first time" headed the world political agenda", as Shalev in Israel 
Yearbook of 1988 noted (Shalev,1989:155), and further weakened King Hussein's standing in 
the OTs. It put an end to a long-history of Jordan's representation of the Palestinians and, more 
significantly, it led the PLO to embark on what Daqqaq called "a peaceful attack", by 
announcing the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in the November 1988 PNC session. 
Edward Said observed that: 
The PNC meeting (of 1988) was considered as a beginning that signals a 
distinct break with the past, as an assertion of the willingness to make sacrifices 
in the interests of peace, as a definitive statement of the Palestinian acceptance 
of the international consensus (Said, 1990: 19). 
On the Israeli side, the Intifada "proved harmful to Israel." While the Intifada scored 
a major media success for the Palestinians, Israel's image in world public opinion continued 
to suffer and do political damage (Shalev,1989:153,159). Inside Israel, the effect of the 
Intifada was that it generated public debate heightening polarization among the various 
political parties regarding the OTs, and for the first time the main issue in the Israeli elections 
of 1988 was the Palestinian question (Ibid.: 155; Bishara,1988:20 & 1990:222).18 
The political losses incurred by Israel during the Intifada were compounded by 
economic losses, and also by losses on the moral level, particularly among the Israeli army and 
civilians. "The Palestinian uprising dealt the final blow to Israelis who believed in an 
275 
"enlightened" occupation" (Spiro, 1988: 19). The Israeli soldiers found themselves in a moral 
dilemma, compelled to start questioning the policy they were carrying out in the OTs. The 
same discontent was found among the Israeli reserve soldiers, based on the gradual loss of their 
sanctity as a societal institution. This sanctity has been shaken after the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 and with the brutal and unabashed aggression toward the inhabitants of the 
OTs during the Intifada. 19 As a result of this awakening consciousness among Israeli soldiers, 
they organized themselves into several movements. One such is Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit), 
the objective of which is to end all violations of human rights in the OTs, for these actions 
violate basic norms and values of democratic societies and entirely contradict their human 
consciences. Their voices of opposition, however, like those before them, have not been strong 
enough to tip the scale against state policy (Spiro,1988:18-20). 20 Warnings concerning the 
cost of the occupation to Israel on the moral and social levels has been heard since 1967 by 
Jews and Israelis inside and outside Israel. One of those warnings was that of Professor Amitai 
Etzioni during the early years of the occupation (1968), who said: 
The Israelis are getting accustomed to dominating another people and to 
ignoring their national rights and aspirations for the sake of security or even for 
the taste of domination and the possible material advantages. Is Israel on the 
way to becoming neo-colonialist? (Nahumi,1972:33). 
Meron Benvenisti, who served for a time after 1967 as deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, 
wrote about the clear decline in moral standards in Israel when he said in the Israel newspaper 
Ha'aretz of June 27, 1979: 
Occupation by its very nature corrupts the occupier. The harm that twelve 
years of occupation has caused the Israel's moral fabric is nothing to the 
damage it will cause in the coming period when protest and its suppression, 
violence and counter-violence, are intensified in the occupied territories and the 
situation deteriorates to the point of civil rebellion which will be answered by 
severe repression. By this the Military Government and the Defence 
Establishment will have to pay the price of the annexationist policy. 
Benvenisti's prophecy of a 'civil rebellion' came true with the Intifada in December 
1987. The Intifada's long-term objective is to put an end to Israeli occupation and establish 
an independent state in the WBGS. In doing so its aim is to translate achievements on the 
ground into political gains (Shalev, 1989: 147-8). 
The Israeli authorities' counter-measures to quell the Intifada "only poured oil on the 
flames", as Shalev noted (Ibid., 1989: 153). Israel, "the greatest military power in the 
Mediterranean, ultimately, can no longer subdue the spontaneous defiance of a civilian 
population whose only armament is street stones and lack of fear" (famari, 1990: 133). Shalev 
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wrote about the 'irregularities' of the soldiers, which only expanded the struggle 
(Shalev,1989:153). During the past 44 years Israel has been advocating "fighting rather than 
talking" or, in Churba's words, it has been "grappling with the effect rather than the cause 
of the problem" (Cited in Nassar, 1991:210). Indeed, there is one lesson which Israel learned 
from the Intifada, that, it cannot continue to rule over more than 1.5 million people without 
reaching a political solution. The question is thus, what political approaches has Israel resorted 
to, to maintain its "sanity" between 1948 to 1987? And who are the sponsors and the agents 
in this process? 
8.10 Israel's "Self-Serving Delusions" 
Since the beginning of the century - as demonstrated throughout the thesis -
Zionist/Israeli policies to dehumanize Palestine Arab, deny their existence and thus, their 
political and civil rights as a people, who are entitled to independence and self-determination, 
were and still are the basis by which the Israeli state has been trying to consolidate its existence. 
Certainly, these attempts to crush the Palestinian national identity are not found in a 
vacuum, but, are interlinked to a systematic pattern of negation of the "other" (the Palestinians), 
through various means - political as well as military -. This had continued in the post-1967 
occupation of the WBGS, where Israel persuaded itself that the benefits of occupation since 
1967 - cheap labour and economic integration - would continue. Similarly, Israel believed that 
its repressive measures to destroy the growing PNM would maintain its "sanity" as Benvenisti 
noted, which have been based on "self-delusion" (Benvenisti,1989:78). This is because as 
Rodinson observed, Zionist nationalism is distinguished from all others. Choosing the land of 
Arab Palestine to establish their homeland and thus disperse its people "led the Zionist form of 
nationalism in the direction of oppressive nationalism," its final result being "practices of 
subjection and expulsion (of Palestinians)" (Rodinson,1984:19). Rodinson concluded that: 
It should be obvious to every mind free of ideological camouflage--that Zionist 
nationalism whatever opinion one may have of the legitimacy of a plan for a 
Jewish state purely as a plan, took concrete and practical form in the oppression 
of another people. Consequently, it must be admitted that the Palestinians' 
resistance to this process falls into the category of nationalist movements of 
oppressed peoples who deserve support (Ibid.) 
Attempting to find about the elements that reinforced Israel's self-serving delusions, 
which found expression in two forms: militarism vs. victimization; and their adverse 
connotations of moral dilemma vs. lack of structural harmony within the Israeli society. 
Tackling these two forms would enable us to comprehend Rodinson's observation above in more 
277 
depth, and thus see in a new light, the Israeli policy towards PRs of "no return", and why the 
refugee camps in the OTs, - which remain the only witness to the tragedy inflicted on Palestine 
Arabs - have been the target of Israel's repressive measures, in a more intense way than any 
other locations. 
8.10.1 The Nature of Zionist/Israeli Nationalism 
Rodinson argued that nationalism is a particular example of a militant ideology. 
Zionist/Israeli and Palestinian nationalism are militant ideological movements. "Every militant 
ideological movement idealizes its cause, and 'demonizes' the enemy ... and throws suspicion 
on every effort to understand the other ... " (Rodinson, 1984: 17). 
Bearing in mind that Zionist nationalism is also the nationalism of an oppressed people, 
does not justify the subjection of other nations (Ibid.:18). At the same time, by dominating 
other people Israelis are betraying their Jewish heritage; for, as Shimon Peres put it, "the aim 
in Jewish philosophy is to dominate ourselves ... whoever tries to subjugate somebody else is 
endangering himself. All the empires that ruled over us have disappeared" (Servan-
Schreiber, 1988:45). Similarly, Rabbi David Hartman emphasized that by controlling the 
Palestinians the Israelis feed this destructive urge (the Intifada), "There is a vicious dialectic 
that must be broken: in trying to control them, we lose ourselves" (Ibid.:203). 
When there is injustice, there are two groups, the oppressor and oppressed, and the 
former is not more free than the latter. The truth of the matter is that with the PLO embarking 
on "the peace attack" it sought true justice for Palestinians and Israelis on an equal footing, 
rather than submission to injustice. By so doing, it attacked further the Israeli consciousness 
and exposed injustice to a new light. 
The PRs' plight represents the roots of injustice caused by the Zionist/Israel nationalism. 
Yet, other ongoing patterns of injustice have been confronting Palestinians. Prejudices against 
the Palestine Arabs in the early stage of Jewish colonization in Palestine are rooted, as we have 
discussed, in Zionist ideology which promotes "racial distinctiveness" or "racial superiority" 
and thus permits discrimination by the Jews/Israelis against the non-Jews, irrespective of its 
grounds, biological or cultural. These prejudices have since then been developed along 
systematic lines and have been made permanent by their embodiment in the fundamental laws 
of the Israeli state, which in turn justify any form of racism against the non-Jews. This 
discrimination has been working against Jewish heritage as Peres said above, emphasizing the 
colonial nature of the state. 
Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg said that "the people of Israel must rise and declare publicly 
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that a Jew and a non-Jew are not equal, God forbid .... " He asserted that considering them 
equal "is a total travesty of justice" (Cited in Greenstein, 1990: 18). In this context, let us 
consider the findings of a recent survey conducted among 2,399 Israelis by the Louis Gotmann 
Research Institute. Some 68 % of the sample surveyed are convinced and believe that Jews are 
'the chosen people'; while 31 % have doubts about this issue; moreover, 59% have a 'negative' 
attitude towards Arabs (Ashraq al-Awsat,5 January, 1994). The reasoning behind such a position 
towards Palestinians could be attributed to a combination of biblical, ideological and political 
elements which have shaped the Jewish character for ages. 
The process of dehumanizing non-Jews (palestinians) is leading to a process which 
Israel Shahak describes as "a process of N azification of the Israeli-Jewish society" and Professor 
Leibowitz, "the conscious of Israel" has spoken of the development of a Judaeo-Nazi mentality 
(Shahak, 1990:21;1he Guardian, 20 January, 1993). As Los Angeles Times survey (conducted 
for the Knesset) shows, 60% indicated that the Israelis are no less hostile towards Palestinians 
than the New Nazis in Europe (al-Quds al-Arabi,14 December, 1992). 
Thus, Israel militarism provides the contextual ground for its violations of human and 
political rights for Palestinians in the OTs. The foundation of Israel's militarism lies in the 
state's preoccupation with security (See Chapter 2). 
8.10.2 Israel: A "Nation-in Arms" 
By occupying the WBGS, Israel is considered "the most long-lived instance of 
belligerent occupation since WWII" (Coon,1992:37). 21 Israel's continuous ambition to stay 
in the OTs and to stay the most powerful military state in the Middle East has reflected itself 
in two ways. First, that Israel, as Ben Halpern wrote, is really a "nation-in-arms" (Cited in 
Johnson, 1972:347). The role of the military is an integral part of the economic, social and 
educational aspects of life in Israel, and most important in defense and foreign policy. Israel, 
if fully mobilized, has more than 500,000 armed forces (Sadowski, 1992:3). The high prestige 
acquired by the army, for its role in the creation of the state together with its success in 
different wars, make the army's influence in Israel a powerful one. Israel was a nation created 
by force and still depends upon its army for protection. The destruction of the army means the 
destruction of the state (permutter,1969:70). Thus, everything in Israel is military. This is 
made more conspicuous at a time of war when domestic cars, houses, property and possessions 
become dedicated to war. In this regard, civilians have become militarized. Second, Israel's 
defence expenditures reflect the other side of militarism in Israel. Israeli military expenditure 
from 1972-1988 amounted to 19.6% of GDP, the second highest in the Middle East after 
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Oman (23.2%). It was also responsible for the second highest arms sales in the Middle East, 
from US in the year 1991, spending US $ 2,956,340 compared with 16,021,204 Saudi 
Arabia's (Sadowski,1992:7,13). Militarism and occupation are two sides of the same coin. 
Roberts notes that: 
At the heart of almost all treaty provisions and legal writings about occupations is the 
image of the armed forces of a State exercising some kind of coercive control or 
authority over inhabited territory outside the accepted international frontiers of their 
State (Roberts, 1984:255). 
Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have talked of security as being the reason for their 
intransigent measures; for retaining the OT's; and said that the establishment of a Palestinian 
state in the WBGS would be tantamount to the destruction of Israel (Israel Yearbook 1990:270-
288). Yet, Israel's equation of territory with security is illusory, as Sahliyeh observed. He 
continued; "security through occupation cannot and will never solve Israel's strategic-
needs .... [and] Israel alone cannot have a monopoly on security needs and ignore the security 
fears of others" (Sahliyeh,1981:18). 
8.10.3 Victimization: The Reverse or Militarism 
However the Israeli conscience has not been dormant, as we discussed in Chapter two. 
Support for the Zionist scheme and ideas of expUlsion of Palestinians are not unanimous among 
the Jewish masses. Rodinson observed that "For a very long time, the principle enemies which 
the Zionists had to overcome were Jews" (Rodinson,1984:20). As we discussed above, the 
Israeli authorities' policy in the OTs after 1967 gave fresh impetus to conscious Israelis. 
Throughout their historical experience, the Jew IZionistlIsraeli response to feelings of 
helplessness or powerlessness could be seen in number of definable patterns, which as 
Katzenstein argued, are extending "from Biblical times to modern Israel." He talked about the 
"invisible" response to helplessness, which role led to a condition of victimization. Living in 
ghetto-like conditions, non-assimilation with the surrounding culture, and the rise of anti-
Semitism against Jews in Eastern Europe enhanced this feeling. In response to the Holocaust, 
the invisible-victim role was replace with one of the aggressor, the powerful, "one who can 
win wars (1948 war), expand borders and defend territory against the enemy, from whatever 
side that enemy might arise" (Katzenstein, 1979:31-32). To be a strong nation, military means 
have been used, as Katzenstein argues as a way out of the feeling of helplessness: 
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... the use of force is required to constantly reassure himself (the Israeli) by the 
acquisition of more power through the displacement of his "enemy". No 
matter how far this is pushed, the core feeling of powerlessness signals the 
necessity of ever more use of power. In short, one can be an absolute victim, 
but never an ultimate aggressor. There will always be another potential enemy 
(lbid.:33). 
The following statement by Peres is one repeated by many Israeli leaders to perpetuate 
the "victim" image: "We are too small to be dangerous ... we cannot endanger any other 
country" (Servan-Schreiber,1988:45). The danger always come from the other "enemy", being 
Arab the state or Palestinian. The Palestinian if not a refugee but a "terrorist", whose demand 
for return is seen destructive to the Israel. The "terrorism" in the Middle East, as President 
Bush stated, revolves "around the issues of a Palestinian homeland, Israel's existence and 
policies .. and religious extremism" (Cited in Ruwayha,1990:299). Yet, Edward Said and 
Noam Chomsky question the Israeli claims of "purity of arms" and Simha Flapan writes that 
"Zionists in the pre-state period established the pattern of terrorism adopted 30 years later by 
Fatah" (Said, 1988: 1-19;Chomsky, 1983:73-4). 
After all, resolutions of the General Assembly provide the legal permissibility for 
Palestinian "terror." GA Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, provides the basic rights 
and principles to self-determination to all peoples under colonial countries. Subsequent 
applications of this resolution to Algeria, Angola, and Namibia confirmed that this right is 
established in law. Methods to achieve this right are provided in GA resolution 3070 of 30 
November 1973. The Resolution, after reaffirming the inalienable right to self-determination 
of all people under alien subjugation, reaffirms "the legitimacy of the peoples struggle for 
liberation from ... alien subjugation by all means including armed struggle" (UN, 1979:43-6). 
The American Revolution which relied upon armed struggle to achieve self-determination, made 
this method permissible (Ibid. :46). In the Palestinian situation, where the right to self-
determination is denied to its people by armed force, " the right to regain it by armed struggle 
is considered permissible under article 51 of the Charter concerning self-defence" (lbid.:46). 
As Palestinian "terror" had banished now, after it was renounced by the PLO in 1988. 
Israel's new approach to maintain sympathy for its scheme has been going in other directions,-
which the last section of this chapter will tackle with some detail. With the phasing out of anti-
Semitism at the universal level, the Zionist movement and Israel, realizing the crucial 
relationship between the survival of the Zionist enterprise and anti-Semitism, have been 
concentrating on two elements to maintain its support and sympathy. First, a focus on the guilt 
of all Germans for the Holocaust, and the West's silence towards that; second combating the 
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assimilation of Jews in their communities abroad, by regenerating their sense of loyalty to 
Israel. Addressing American Jews, Golda Meir stated that immigration to Israel would rescue 
Jews from the danger of assimilation (Israel Today,21 January,1970). Earlier statements by 
Ben-Gurion showed that he considered immigration as a religious movement and a criteria of 
Jews' loyalty to Zionism and Judaism (Barakat,1982:42) (See Plate Chapter 2). 
A critical survey of Jewish conditions in the West will show that anti-Zionism has 
replaced anti-Semitism as a factor to enhance the 'distinctive' characteristic of Jews. It is not 
anti-Semitism which makes a Jew a Jew but hislher loyalty to the state of Israel. As Toynbee 
noted: 
Zionism and anti-Semitism are expressions of an identical point of view. The 
assumption underlying both ideologies is that it is impossible for Jews and non-
Jews to grow together into a single community and that therefore a physical 
separation is the only practical way out (Cited in Hadawi,1976:49). 
,That phenomenon is aimed at unifying the Israeli 'society' where friction exists between 
two political camps (the religious and secular). It is these divisions which make Israel a 
'unique' phenomenon, as Michael Jansen stated: 
Because the two cultures bisect the society and because the members of the two 
cultures retain their ethnic pasts, because they remain at heart Russians and 
Poles and Ukrainians or Yemenis and Moroccans and Kurds (Jansen, 1987: 14). 
Chaim Herzog, former President of Israel, expressed his distress about this situation in 
his inaugural address in May 1983. He said: 
Physical and verbal violence, intolerance, fanaticism and the repudiation of 
democratic values may prove more dangerous than the threat from Israel's Arab 
enemies. (He continued): This real enemy ... is within us. It exists within every 
one of us citizens of Israel-Jews and Arabs, religious and secular, right-wing 
and left-wing, Sephardim and Ashkenazim (Jansen, 1987:15). 
The election campaign in Israel of May 1990 witnessed severe clashes between the 
Likud and the Labour Party (which are divided along ethnic lines as well as political 
programmes). This has been criticized by Herzog who accused "the country's politicians 'of 
making an absolute mockery' of Israeli democracy" (The Guardian,May 1,1990). 
The alliance in Israel between the various forms of militarism and victimization has not 
been serving its function, but creating more and more self-serving delusions, in a way which 
affects its structural harmony. The cohesivity of the organizational, ideological and political 
foundations of Israel have been shaken. 
282 
8.11 EXTENSIONS OF POWER 
The "Masada complex," a besieged mentality, preferring collective suicide to surrender, 
is still running deep among the Israelis according to Ullman (1975:288). Prime Minister Golda 
Meir admitted this fact by saying: "It is true. We do have a Masada complex. We have a 
pogrom complex. We have a Hitler complex" (Morrow,1988:18). 
Ullman went further to question the effect of these complexes on Israel's behaviour 
towards its "enemies": 
who knows what the Israelis might do if they feel they are being, or will be 
overwhelmed? .. they would not, in extremis, hesitate to destroy targets such as 
the Aswan Dam, oil facilities, ... and the great Arab cities of Beirut and 
Baghdad .. .if they felt threatened with destruction themselves? 
(Ullman, 1975:288) 
In fact, the question which is relevant and needs to be asked here is how Israel behaved 
in response to the threats to its power and control in the OTs, challenged by the escalation of 
resistance especially during the Intifada? The military measures discussed above have been 
combined with political measures to form the other arm of control. Israel's attempts to combat 
support for the PLO in the OTs are seen in the establishment of the Village Leagues; and its 
support for the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS-IRM), as alternatives to the PLO 
leadership, but have proved fruitless. Chomsky wrote about the head of the Village Leagues 
(Mustafa Dudin), one of whose demands to the Israeli authorities was the return of PRs, mainly 
from Lebanon. However, Israel's position on this issue is well known: "no return" 
(Chomsky, 1983:61). The power which HAMAS acquires now in the OTs has been initially 
nurtured by Israel; indeed, there were cases in GS and inside Israel where the Israeli security 
establishment collaborated with the Muslim current to fight Palestinian nationalist leadership 
and institutions (Tamari,1990: 137;Legrain,1990: 175-189). In so doing, the Strip with the most 
political-religious fundamentalism has become "polarized by secular and religious trends to an 
extent that has not been witnessed before" (FAFO,1993:29). 
To stem the tide of resistance when the Intifada broke out, the authorities used many 
means. These included reliance on local collaborators and informants about Palestinian 
activists. Although this' method had borne fruit before the Intifada, it lost its effectiveness 
during the Intifada as a result of Palestinian counter-measure to put an end to this phenomenon 
which had plagued the resistance movement for long. The authorities turned to the village 
Mukhtars and the old leadership to help it quell resistance (Aronson, 1987:324). Some of these 
Mukhtars were appointed by the military government, and institutionally they became "the hub 
of an informer system run by the occupation authorities who used it skilfully in the interests of 
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the status quo" (Viorst,1989:24); As the Egyptian Administration had done in the GS pre-1967, 
the Mukhtars in the camp were given the power to maintain order and security and hinder 
refugee infiltration across the borders (Budeiri,1990:47). An explanation of the Mukhtars' 
vulnerability to collaboration with the authorities was given by a refugee, who said: "it is not 
because they are unnationalistic, but because they fear the new revolutionary generation which 
is threatening their influence ... they work together against the new current" (Sayigh, 1979: 168). 
The cultural war waged by the young leadership against Mukhtars (traditional 
leadership) is what Smith called the war of the "sons against the fathers" (SmithI991:67-8). 
The Mukhtars' role, whose legitimacy dates back to the Palestine villages from which they fled 
in 1948, was maintained in the refugee camps along village and hamula (clan) lines. The 
decline in their authority, came as young militants assumed a political and military role, 
especially during the Intifada. The young saw the Mukhtars "as part of the system of control, 
imposed on them by the authorities" (Viorst,1989:24). 
The decline of the Mukhtars' authority was evident in the findings of the sample 
survey, which showed that not a single respondent from either location refers to the Mukhtar 
for political advice, which inevitably confirms the decline in their political influence. Some 
75.4% in SC and 72.2% in SR reported that they refer to Mukhtars only for the ratification of 
official documents, e.g. travel permits. 
The Israelis also use traditional values as a weapon against us. This is seen in the area 
of women's role in the national struggle. They aim at undermining women's role by 
generating conflict between fatherslbrotherslhusbands and their daughters/sisters/wives. For 
example, a fatherlbrotherlhusband would be called to the military government offices to pay a 
fine or take his daughter/sister/wife who was caught during a riot by the soldiers, during which 
he will be scolded for allowing her to participate in the riot, by focusing on womens' honour 
and rightful role as a housewife only. 
The Israelis could hardly believe that the Palestinians in the OTs were leading a mass 
rebellion. In an attempt to weaken the Intifada, the Israeli intelligence (Shin Bet) published 
forged leaflets signed by the UNL, to disrupt the genuine instructions given by the UNL 
Communiques and confuse the Palestinians over strike days; one Israeli leaflet called for a 
continuous seven-day strike, an unusually long shutdown, "in the hope that Arabs would be 
unwilling to give up their livelihood for an entire week [and] would lose their faith in the 
uprising's organizers" (Melman & Raviv,1990:35-7)~ Yehuda Litani, in the JP of 17 June, 
1988 wrote of the tens of thousands of leaflets distributed by the Israeli Defence Forces in the 
OTs, of which one read" 1936 equals 1988" referring to the 1936-1939 revolt which was 
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crushed by the British and the Jewish underground organization (Haganah). 
The formation of special units of Israeli soldiers in civilian dress, assigned to mingle 
with the local Palestinians, was another tactic to combat resistance. The "death squads" as they 
were called, were responsible for the killing of a big number of Palestinians in OTs (Melman 
& Raviv, 1990:38-9). 
On the economic level, to counter-measure its losses in tax. revenues and military costs, 22 
the authorities resorted to new procedures to obtain new revenues. A variety of measures 
undertaken by the authorities secured a substitute for economic losses. These included: issuance 
of new Israeli ID-Cards, for which people had to pay NIS 23 (one NIS = 0.25 Pence); re-
issuance of licence plates for some 25 000 vehicles, where each driver had to pay NIS 100 or 
NIS 500 depending on the model of car; issuance of "entry or magnetic cards" for Israel, at 
a cost of NIS 20. By the end of June 1988, about 15000 cards were issued for GS workers, 
according to The JP, the revenues to be used for funding protective shields for the settlers' cars 
in the GS. Fines paid by parents whose children had been arrested for throwing stones range 
from NIS 500 and 2000, and as reported by the Israeli Defence Ministry, fines collected during 
the first three and-a-half years of the Intifada amounted to NIS 23,348,760 (al-Darb,28 
June,1991; UNRWA,10 July,1989). US backing and financial aid to Israel, have tightened 
further the grip of the Israeli occupation. This backing has its roots in the pre- 1948 period, 
as noted by Adams in Chapter one. Chomsky calls those supporters "supporters of the moral 
degeneration and ultimate destruction of Israel" (Chomsky,1983:3). Yet, the Americans began 
to shift their attitude against Israel during the 1982 war in Lebanon, and again since the Intifada 
began. A survey of Americans conducted in April 1988 showed an erosion of pro-Israel 
sympathy among the public (Moughrabi,1988:3). 
The official American position and support for Israel is based on American interests in 
the area, Israel being a "strategic asset" for the U.S. (Chomsky,1883:20-23). American vetoes 
in the Security Council and the General Assembly in relation to any resolution condemning 
Israeli violations in the O.T's are just one case in point, confirming the duality in resolution-
making, whereby in the end decisions are made according to the interests of the various blocs. 
This position and support to Israel by the American office-holders since 1950, comes in contrast 
to its stand towards the Palestinians, who they have referred to as "not as possessing "rights" -
which connotes entitlement - but rather as having only "interests" - which might or might not 
be legitimate" (fillman,1978:71). 
The counter-measures undertaken by the Israeli authorities have had some success in 
substituting for economic losses and indicate that the authorities are committed to maintaining 
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control over the Palestinians in the OTs. However, the challenge of the Intifada has made it 
clear to Israel that the Palestinians cannot be contained through the use of force. In both the 
political and military spheres, Israel's awakening has come. The polarization in the Israeli 
society is seen in a drift towards the right on one hand; and on the other what Peres called a 
"New Zionism", a more far-seeing form of "Zionism offering peace, making peace, structuring 
a peace that should be as meaningful to our neighbours as it is to ourselves. " Peres continued: 
"we have to see the Promised Land in a different light" (Servan-Schreiber,1988:77-8). Does 
this entail the beginning of the end of Zionist/Israeli oppression and aggression toward 
Palestinians? Or is it the end of the beginning of the Palestinians' right to statehood? 
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NOTES: 
1. The policies of the Arab regimes and the treatment of the PRs' and their national movement 
pre-1967 and after have been a crucial element in reinforcing the distinctive identity of PRs. 
For more details on this issue, see: Sayigh, 1977 and 1979; Ward, 1977:30-43; Turki,1976; 
Brand,1988; and Quandt,1973. 
2. The aims of issuing this new refugee card were given by the UNRWA Director of Relief and 
Social Services in UNRWA News, No.260. 
3. Revival of Palestinian consciousness was enhanced by UNRWA refugee schools explicitly 
socialized refugee students into Palestinianism. The UNRW AIUNESCO education programme's 
contribution to the preservation of the Palestinian refugee identity was one of the programme's 
by-products, which has been taking place within the wider context of Arab culture 
(Dickerson, 1983: 128). Emanuel Marx sees that a dual responsibility lies behind the 
preservation of the refugee identity: that of UNRWA and the that of the Israeli authorities which 
are "allowing UNRWA to run its own affairs" (Marx,1992:292). For an overview about this 
issue, see: Tibawi,1963; Ward,1977:27-28. 
4. For details on mass labour organizations in the O.Ts as vehicles to political mobilization, see: 
Joost Hilterman, "Mass Mobilization and the Uprising:The Labour Movement". in Michael 
Hudson(ed.). The Palestinians: New Directions. Washington,D.C: Center for Contemporary 
Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990. 
5. For an overview of the features, agendas and their importance for the national movement, 
see; Liza Taraki,1988. 
6. For a detailed overview of laws implemented in the O.Ts, see: Raja Shehadah. Occupier's 
Law: Israel and the West Bank. 2nd ed. Washington,D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies,1988. 
7. On Jewish fundamentalism, see: Ehud Sprinzak. The Ascendance of Israel's radical Right. 
Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1991. 
8. See: John McCuen, 1966; Ian Beckett and John Pimlott(eds.),1985. 
9. For a detailed discussion on the subject during this period, see: Ian Beckett, 1988. 
10. For a full discussion of the legal and administrative aspects of the various areas of Israeli 
violations of human rights in the O.Ts, see:AI-Haq,1988. 
11. For a full analysis on Israel's curfew policy and the international legal framework, see: 
JMCC, 1991. 
12. On the GS childrens' role in the Intifada and the traumatic effects of Israeli repression on 
them, see: Caroline Moorehead, "Territory where fear starts from birth ", The Independent,20 
November, 1989. 
13.See: A. Lesch, "Israeli Deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, 1967-1978," JPS,8(Winter 1979): 101-31;(Spring 1979):81-112; and al-Haq, 1988: 143-
146. . 
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14. For a detailed account on this issue, see: Emma Playfair, Demolition and 
Sealing of Houses, as a Punitive Measure in the Israeli-Occupied West Bank. 
Ramallah: AI-Haq, 1987. 
15. For an overview of the concept of military occupation and Israel's arguments regarding the 
applicability of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV to the O.Ts, see: Roberts, 1984:249 -305. 
16. For an overview about the international recognition of the PLO, see: Nassar,1991:40-44. 
17. On the chief attributes of the UNL of the Intifada, see: Kuttab, 1988:17-18; and for an 
Israeli analysis, see: Shalev,1989:143-163. 
18. On the Intifada's impact on Israel, see: Bishara, 1990:217-229). 
19. Refusal to serve in the O.Ts by Israeli soldiers, along with those who are committing 
suicide, and other phenomenons have been on the increase, see: The JP Magazine,16 
September,1988; ai-Sharq ai-Awsat,10 January, 1990; Yediot Ahronot,8 April,1989 translated 
in ai-Quds,10 April, 1989. 
20. On the protest movement in Israel, see: Reuven Kaminer, "The protest Movement in 
Israel", in Zachary Lockman & Joel Beinin (eds.), 1990:231-245. 
21. For more detail on the concept of belligerent occupation and the other types of occupation, 
see: Roberts,1984:261-2. 
22. Tax revenues from the O.Ts reached a total of $393 million in 1987, of which only $240 
was spent on services there. 
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CONCLUSION 
The resettlement of refugees in the GS did not emerge in isolation from the 
historical and political developments in Palestine and between Palestinians and the state of 
Israel. Israel's policies in the camps have been shaped by a number of factors, not least the 
split and divisions within the Zionist movement and the political parties in Israel since 1948. 
Yet, the thesis has demonstrated that a major factor in shaping Israeli policy has been the 
emergence of a specific cultural and political identity generated in the refugee camps by 
Palestinian struggle after 1948. Individually and collectively, the refugees insistence on return 
laid the basis for a major change: from the RR to the development of a Palestinian nationalism. 
In so doing, the PRs could be seen to have fulfilled early Palestinian and Israeli 
prophecies. As early as 1949, Ben Gurion was warned by his colleagues of the ramifications 
ofthe PRs' exile. The Minister of Agriculture, Aharon Cizling advised: 
We still do not properly appreciate what kind of enemy we are now nurturing 
outside the borders of our state. Our enemies, the Arab states, are a mere 
nothing compared with those hundreds of thousands of Arabs who will be 
moved by hatred and helplessness and infinite hostility to wage war on us, 
regardless of any agreement that might be reached (Cited in Segev, 1986:31n). 
Yet, the official Israeli speculations about the future of PRs were that they would 
"manage. " As they put it: 
The most adaptable and best survivors would manage by a process of natural 
selection, and the others will waste away. Some will die but most will tum into 
human debris and social outcast and probably join the poorest classes in the 
Arab countries (Cited in Segev,1986:30). 
The content of this latter quote transgresses the basic human and political rights of PRs. 
It is this speculation which Israel apparently based its decree of "no return" policy on. Yet, 
at the same time ignoring the unifying power of exile and homesickness that would nurture and 
strengthen the PRs national consciousness, and hence diminish the chances of resettling them 
in the Arab countries (Segev,1986:37-8). 
It was, al-Tha'ar (The Revenge), the first Palestinian independent voice, which 
recognized this unifying power of exile, as published in its 1955 issues. It foresaw in the PRs: 
an effective force which would determine their fate and that of usurped 
Palestine, if led by dedicated youth; and which could impose its will and 
partake in drawing the future of the Palestinian people (Sakhnini, 1973: 125). 
Since 1948, resettling of PRs in the Arab countries has been the favourite solution as 
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far as Israel and the Western states are concerned. Resettlement in the classic sense means 
integration and full participation in the social and economic life of the host society, and is one 
of three durable solutions to refugee problems. The other two are: repatriation to original 
homeland; and resettlement which "involves moving refugees from their country of first asylum 
to some other country (a third country) after their homeland and land of first asylum" 
(Stein, 1983: 190). In this sense, Israel calls to resettle PRs have been in advocacy of two forms 
of resettlement only as a durable solution. The first form applies to PRs in the host countries 
since 1948 to date; the second, relates to PRs in the WBGS after 1967, whom Israel wished 
to see them outside the borders of Palestine (in a third country) (See Chapter 2). Adoption of 
these two solutions by Israel highlights a long-rooted Zionist/Israeli strategy to disperse 
Palestinians, based on the Herzelian original notion to expel the local population outside the 
borders (See Chapter 1). This materialized in the 1948 exodus, when the minority (Jews) 
uprooted the majority (palestinians) from their country by force and occupied their lands, 
homes, towns and cities (Weinstock, 1973:50). The removal of a nation to be replaced by 
another lends the PRs' experience and struggle its unique character 
(Glubb, 1967:41;Flapan, 1979: 169). 
To better understand the history of Palestine and the fate of its people, the multiplicity 
of internal and external variables that shaped and determined the course of Palestine and PRs 
have to be taken into account. Three periods could be distinguished throughout Palestine's 
course, the common denominator of which has been the attempt to destroy the socio-political 
fabric of the Palestinian society. Palestine's course was different to that of Arab and Third 
World countries, where colonial domination, nationalism and decolonization, and the subsequent 
colonial legacy, constitute a classical pattern of colonization. The Palestinians' misfortune is 
that they lost their country at the time when everyone else was getting their own. Since 1948, 
Palestinians have been building other people's homes but not their own. 
Under the mandate, political Zionism used propaganda and links with imperialism to 
prepare the scene for the 1948 dispossession of the Palestinians. Distortion of facts with regard 
to the people and land of Palestine; conflicting statements in respect of a Jewish homeland or 
a Jewish state; the Hebrew labour policy; Jewish immigration - legal and illegal -, were just 
some of several policies and plans leading up to the exodus of 1948. Add to this Britain's 
nurturing of the Zionist movement and the effect of its colonial policies on the Arabs of 
Palestine which shaped the outcome of Palestinian politics and society during the mandate 
period. 
The second period, from 1948-1967, saw Israeli policies designed to enhance the 
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dispersal of PRs. Israel sought to block their return and advocate resettlement in the Arab 
countries. They hoped by this to normalize the refugees longing for return, and help in 
developing the economies of the Arab states. During this early period, an Israeli-Western 
collusion began and the economic approach to the PRs problem was promoted. It was Robert 
McGhee (the advisor on refugee problems in the State Department) who suggested a "Marshall 
Plan" for the Middle East; the resettlement of PRs in the Arab states was to be an integral part 
of the Plan; in addition, it was intended to achieve a high standard of living in the area and 
combat Communism's infiltration (pappe, 1988: 124-5). It is as early as 1949 that the economic 
rather than the political solution to the PRs problem began to emerge, though it did not 
crystallize until the mid 1950s. 
This was further associated with other claims and measures undertaken inside Israel 
to create new demographical and physical facts on the land, especially evident in the 
destruction of 385 Arab villages. Israel Shahak decried the Israeli government's action which 
intended to "authenticate the Zionist propaganda that Palestine was a "desert land" before the 
creation of the State of Israel," which he brands as a grave falsification of the facts, "repeated 
to visitors" and "taught at Israeli schools" (Cited in Cattan,1982:44). Israel maintained this 
stand and was successful because it had no direct contact with the dispersed refugees, a situation 
that changed after 1967 war when it found itself face to face with thousands of refugees in the 
WBGS. 
Israel's Western partners supported the resettlement policy. They were the main 
contributors to UNRWA and thus dictated its policy. By so doing, they are seen to have 
politicized the humanitarian aid provided. UNRWA's role in this period towards integrating 
refugees should not be undermined; the shift to education in the late 1950's had indirectly 
served the original calls for integration. By the same token, UNRWA's neutral position towards 
the Israeli resettlement schemes in GS, and its policy towards camp improvement of camp 
shelters' could be seen to be in compliance with the Israeli and Western trend. While Britain 
and the US foreign policy towards the PRs had merged since the mid-1950s, unlike the early 
years after the exodus, they differed in their position over contributions to UNRWA. Britain's 
precondition for donation was that funds would have to be used for resettlement and not relief; 
this was in contrast to the initial American stand which favoured return, seen by Israelis to 
have intensified the refugees' hopes of return. ,Thus, the Americans were labelled as adopting 
the Arab view, whereas the British supported the Israeli concept (pappe,1988:157,161). 
During this period (1948-1967) the Arab states stand towards refugees was characterized 
as pragmatic, monopolizing them economically, especially in Jordan, and at the same time 
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fearing them politically as a threat to their regimes. Only Jordan was in favour of PRs 
resettlement on its land. Two combined factors supported this stand: one economical and the 
other political (See Chapter 8), despite apprehensions that resettlement could lead either to 
"Jordanization of the Palestinians" or "the Palestinization of Jordan." Jordan cooperated with 
the West - Britain and US - in implementing some resettlement projects for PRs, yet these were 
very limited in conception and qUality. More importantly, the unified stand by refugees towards 
all resettlement schemes outside Palestine proved the futility of such a solution, irrespective of 
who was proposing them, UNRWA, the Arab states, the US or British. 
In GS, the situation of PRs contrasted with other PRs elsewhere. It is not surprising 
that the first Intifada (1955) erupted in GS, and that the second Intifada (1987) also began 
there. A combination of the weight of PRs numbers in the GS; the destitution of the economy; 
the unifying power ofhelplessnes and exile, and the Israeli occupation of the Strip (195611957); 
in addition to the military training and the revolutionary ideology under Nasser's regime, were 
the forces which shaped the militant character of GS refugees in a way which led to the 
emergence of a sub-culture of their own. The first Intifada of 1955 was a watershed, GS 
refugees rejecting resettlement in Sinai. The accumulation of these experiences helped sharpen 
their political consciousness to a degree where "Gaza became one of the most revolutionary 
parts of the diaspora, breeding successively an enthusiastic Nasserism, then Palestinianism" 
(Sayigh, 1979: 100). 
During the early 50s, with the influence of internal and external factors, the PRs' 
cultural and political identity began to crystallize. The collective consciousness they developed 
evolved around their diaspora and longing for return to their homeland. 
In the misery of the camps - in the permanance of temporariness - refugees 
developed a powerful new nationalism. Its fuel was longing and injustice, 
humiliation and degradation - bitterness and hatred towards Jews, the West, 
other Arabs, and the cosmic order itself. In the camps, refugees formed the 
foundation of the new Palestinianism, the 1967 war returned the focus to the 
reunited territory of the old Palestine Mandate (Migdal & 
Kimmerling, 1933 :279). 
Frustrated over the Arab regimes' policies and the host population's treatment of them, 
PRs in the mid-60s embarked on a distinctive path of Palestinianism which found ground in 
Gamal Abdel-Nasser's comment to the Palestinians in 1967. He told them: "Don't ever believe 
that any Arab leader, including myself has any plan to liberate Palestine" (Cited in 
Shiblak, 1991: 122). Nasser's honesty contrasted with Saddam's manipulation in the 1990s, 
which marked the peak of Arab regime's "championing" of the Palestinian cause. It was not 
surprising to hear refugees - when conducting my pilot survey before the Gulf war - building 
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hopes that Saddam would liberate Palestine and defeat Israel. Saddam was seen as bringing 
al-Faraj al- 'Arabi (the Arab salvation), as Emile Habibi - an outstanding Palestinian writer and 
activist- put it (Maldya,1993:269). 
Moshe Arenz, the Israeli Defence Minister at the time, in addressing a meeting with 
notables in GS expressed his protest over GS PRs behaviour during the Gulf War as reported 
by one of the interviewees who attended that meeting (interview,30/711991). Arenz complained 
that refugees used to rush up onto the rooftops rejoicing, whistling, zagharit (ululating), when 
Iraqi missiles were thrown on Israel. A Palestinian intellectual from the WB offered a good 
interpretation from her diary of 11 February, 1991: 
... some may feel this is unacceptable behaviour. However, if looked at within 
the proper context it is not. It wasn't an indication of wishing individual 
Israelis hurt - rather it was wishing them to feel in some tiny measure the 
massive pain and suffering they have been inflicting on Palestinians and 
Lebanese during the past 45 years or so. It was happiness that at last an Arab 
leader had managed to "attack" Israel when we have become used to being 
attacked (lbid.:268). 
The economic and political consequences of the Gulf War on the Palestinians inside the 
OTs have been and are too numerous to account here. Certainly the war aggravated the old 
hate-and-Iove relationship between the Arab states and the PLO. 
After occupying the WBGS in 1967, Israel found itself face to face with about 600,000 
refugees. This reality made Israel less able to continue to ignore the issue, as was the case pre-
1967. The Israeli authorities focussed attention on the GS refugees. The politico-military 
situation of the GS put the Israelis in a similar position to that of 1949, when the call for 
annexing Gaza with its refugees was repeated. The Israeli authorities offered the GS refugee 
population incentives to migrate, similar to those made by UNRWA in the 1950s, but these 
were fruitless. Nor did Israel's crackdown on the camps in 1971 meet the long-term strategy 
to destroy GS refugees' militancy; though it served an immediate goal of dispersing about 
25,000 refugees, and the demolition of 2,009 camp shelters, and causing a decline in armed 
struggle. The escalation of Israeli repressive policies brought resistance back to its pre 1971 
stage again with the resurrection of the Intifada. As a result, Israeli annexation calls shifted to 
those of withdrawal; the call of "Gaza First" began to make the round during the Intifada; this 
call had finally materialized into a plan of complete withdrawal according to the "Gaza-lericho 
First" deal of 13 September 1993. 
Israel's forms of control over the GS took two directions: the "stick" and the "carrot" 
policy. Both forms are devised to deny Palestinians the right to development, but to keep them 
in total dependency on Israel economically and under its control politically. The Intifada 
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unmasked the fallacy of the Israeli "economic development" policy in the OTs. This policy 
involved employing Palestinian workers in Israel, opening-bridges, funding governmental 
institutions, etc. and it was these areas which were hardest hit by the collective punishment 
policy of the Israeli authorities during the Intifada. GS refugees, who are the most destitute 
sector of the Palestinian society, have been the main group to suffer, given that no employment 
alternatives are available for them. On the Israeli level, the economic losses incurred by Israel 
by the Intifada revealed the interdependency between the two groups, and made of occupation 
a liability rather than an asset. Israel's military losses were also high, reaching NIS 460 million 
per year in the first three years of the Intifada, as military sources revealed (aZ-Quds, 6 
September, 1990). 
The Israeli authorities' efforts to maintain control over the OTs and make up for the 
losses in tax revenues and military costs of the Intifada led to to new procedures to obtain new 
revenues as we discussed in Chapter 8. The Israeli refugee resettlement schemes in the GS 
were set up in response to such aims, and under the pretext of "raising the standard of living" 
of refugees. That placed this type of resettlement in a different category from those which 
usually followed as a durable solution for refugee problems. The authorities' conflicting 
statements and inconsistency in identifying the aims of the resettlement schemes in GS indicate 
the hidden agenda for constructing them. Nevertheless, the majority of refugees in the sample 
survey identified Israel's aims as being political rather than humanitarian. Some Israeli officials 
did reveal the actual motive, which was to effect counter-insurgency regaining the exercise of 
control over the refugee population. Through resettlement they aimed at curtailing the 
relationship between the local population and the Fedayeen. 
The resettlement projects' infrastructure had been set up with a counter-insurgency 
strategy in mind. The wide roads compared to the narrow alleys in refugee camps, in 
particular, facilitate control by military forces. Yet, the significance of the resettled refugees' 
involvement in the national struggle on an equal footing with camp refugees, as the sample 
survey findings demonstrated, proved that the projects were not isolated from the camps. This 
is despite the Israeli soldiers ability to apprehend resettled demonstrators more easily than in 
camps, partly because refugees had been carefully screened before being admitted into the 
projects and partly because the militants would want to stay in the camps. 
Notwithstanding Israeli control policies over the resettled refugees, their role in the 
national struggle and their feeling of belonging has not been depreciated by having better 
housing conditions. On the contrary, political mobilization was sustained, thus, the Israeli 
counter-insurgency strategy has proved counterproductive. 
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The environmental components of the counter-insurgency strategy, as the findings of 
the sample survey showed were not of much effect on refugees' mobility in the SR. Only 15.6% 
of SR and 14.8% of SC respondents gave the variable of wide roads as an impediment to 
greater mobility. 
YusufFarah, the former Field Services Officer in Gaza UNRWA, emphasized that "GS 
as a whole is one single camp, irrespective of where a refugee lives, in an Israeli housing 
project, in an UNRWA camp or elsewhere. " The national struggle, he continued, "has united 
all" (Interview,30/7/1991). The solidarity among the refugee community in GS, and the strong 
family ties, are attributes of the high political mobility among refugees. This is despite the high 
residential stability in GS camps and the economic immobility of refugees. The cultural aspects 
of the diaspora, combined with the revolutionary ethics after 1965 and the Israeli repressive 
measures in the OTs, had nurtured the political identity of refugees. The old town/village 
remained live in their memories; and in their quarters in the camps. The new generation, "the 
revolutionaries" and the "children of the stones" are the end-product of the synthesis between 
family socialization and the political ethics of Palestinianism. 
The low level of symptoms of distress and social conflict among Gazans compared to 
those Palestinians in the WB and East Jerusalem, are the· result of a strong sense of social 
cohesiveness (FAFO, 1993: 124). The assumption that poverty, overcrowding and high 
unemployment would create social conflict and distress proved fruitless in the GS context. Yet, 
with relocation some new social symptoms and disruption of social relations have emerged. 
Feelings of alienation among the old generation, the disintegration of village/town 
community/quarters - as in camps -, and the fragmentation of the extended family, are some 
symptoms that would precipitate apprehension of the situation on the social level in a 
generation's time. 
The situation of PRs in GS invites a new and unique aspect in the Israeli process of 
counter-insurgency and resettlement, for the circumstances of the Israeli resettlement process 
embarked upon by the authorities and different from those of Algeria and Malaya. First, the 
Israeli authorities did not recognize that the unity between refugees and non-refugees, between 
Fedayeen and non-Fedayeen, was inseparable in GS. Second, resettlement experiences in other 
countries show that it was undertaken by isolating the "New Villages", the" Strategic Hamlets" , 
from the locals through defensible borders. Yet, the scarcity of land in GS did not permit 
resettling refugees in promoted areas. Instead, the housing projects were constructed adjacent 
to the camps (See Appendix 1), which has maintained to a high degree the link between camps 
and projects. Third, one more shortcoming of the Israeli resettlement schemes is that 
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"improving housing conditions" has never been an alternative to a political solution; nor a 
means to thwart resistance, for as the historical experience of PRs shows, repression escalates 
resistance, regardless of residential location. Gaza leadership interviewed emphasized the fact 
that improving living conditions for refugees in GS will serve the national struggle better, 
especially because as one interviewee said: "living in a tent or in inhuman conditions or a 
palace, do not enhance or lessen national struggle and political consciousness; political 
consciousness has different components than type of housing" (Interview, 27/7/1991). This 
theory is affirmed by SR refugees, 95.6% of whom believed that their conception of and 
contribution to the national struggle is as strong as prior to relocation. 
The GS refugees who rejected all previous resettlement proposals outside Palestine did 
not, however, resent resettlement on the Palestinian soil. Howeveer, they did not support it as 
a long-term solution to their political situation, as indicated by the majority in the sample 
surveyed: 70.4% in SC and 47.8% in SR. Their adherence to their political rights embedded 
in the RRC and for an independent state and self-determination confirm this stand. By staying 
on the land, the GS refugees believed that they are achieving a number of goals. These are: 
enhancing sumud (steadfastness) of the refugee community and maintaining collectivity, as 
confirmed by 94.4 % of SR respondents; especially in the face of the authorities' policies of land 
confiscation and Israeli settlement policy in the OTs. 
Given the various restrictions - Israeli and UNRWA - on expansion of camp shelters; 
the element of coercion involved, with the authorities' imposing new economic burdens on 
refugees; the limited choice that remains for them, is between living in adequate housing or 
not living adequately. Nonetheless, as the findings of the sample survey showed, the density of 
persons per room in SR remained high (2.74), compared to 2.96 in SC. The Israeli 
authorities' aspiration, that through relocation "urbanization" or "depeasantization" of refugees, 
their numbers - which have been a "threat" to Israel - will decline has been challenged. The 
authorities ignored the fact that refugee population growth in the Strip has become 
demo graphicall y-politicized. 
Based on this analysis, the case of GS refugee resettlement may help indicate a new set 
of conceptual lenses for understanding some of the specific circumstances of resettlement other 
than similar experiences in other parts of the world. It is the unique character of GS refugees, 
who felt the burden of occupation more than any other areas in the OTs, and the role the Israeli 
control in sharpening and consolidating their collective cultural and political identity which 
enables them to hold their ground in the face of attacks during the Intifada. This resistance has 
been generated in mukhayam al-ouda (the camp of return) - a name given to labalia camp -, to 
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mark the climax of the Palestinian struggle since the beginning of the century. 
In this sense, the prophecy of al-Tha'ar above, could be seen to have been partially 
fulfilled. In the long history of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, it was the fellaheen (peasants) of 
Palestine who were dubbed camp-refugees after 1948, who were and still are the fuel of the 
Palestinian national struggle. 
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EPILOGUE 
Following the Israeli state recognition of the PLO in 1993, preceded by the PLO 
recognition of the existence of Israel in 1988, Palestinians optimism centred on their ability to 
restitute their rights for a state, return and self-determination, after decades of confrontation and 
conflict. The PRs - particularly those in the diaspora - perceived this new development as the 
beginning of the end to forty-five years of dispossesion. With the "Gaza-Jericho First" deal of 
13 September 1993, the PRs remained sceptical, doubting that Israel would actually allow the 
repatriation of old (1948) and new (1967) refugees, and withdrawal from the OTs. Their 
scepticism found roots in a long history of Israel denying them the Right to Return, and 
adequate economic and social rights. They are critical of the absence of an explicit stipulation 
in the first deal regarding their situation. In contrast, to the frrm official Palestinian stand 
towards PRs Right to Return and independence evident came in the Palestine Declaration of 
Independence of November 1988, and the stand of the Palestinian delegation to the Refugees' 
Committee in the Peace Talks; in the deal, the future of the PRs, the heart of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict, was left to a later stage of the five-year transitional period negotiations (in the third 
year), as stipulated in Article V, with focus on 1967 refugees only. 
The PRs dissent stems from the PLO's failure to satisfactorily address their issue. 
Marches of protest in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza refugee camps reflected a dismay over the deal, 
which, as far as refugees' speculations go, entails resettlement and not repatriation. The "sign 
of goodwill" by Israel is seen in its approval to accept return of tens of thousands of 1967 
refugees to the WBGS, but it looks as though this right is to be denied to 1948 refugees. Yet 
at the same time, Israel is allowing the return of thousands of Soviet immigrants. 
As a result, the PRs recognize that neither Lebanon nor Syria want them to stay; while 
Jordan wants only a proportion of them so as to maintain a delicate balance between PRs and 
Jordanians. For the PRs who have been fueling the Palestinian national struggle, making 
sacrifices in every sphere of their life, the deal may be, as E. Said wrote in The Guardian of 
9 September,1993: 
The final dispossession (for PRs). Their national rights as people made 
refugees in 1948, solemnly confirmed and reconfirmed for years by the UN, 
the PLO, the Arab governments, indeed most of the world, now seem to have 
been annulled. 
One might argue that it is impossible to implement Resolution 194(111) en masse, a 
reality recognized by the PLO in its Declaration of Independence, predicated on UN Security 
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Council Resolution 181 of 1947, which called for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and 
an Arab state, and acceptance of the existence of the former logically precludes the 
implementation of the "return" element of Resolution 194. Moreover, some PRs may not want 
to return, either to a Palestinian state or to Israel proper, for having established themselves in 
the host countries. Yet, this should not mean that they have ceded their rights to compensation 
as a second choice, as endorsed in UN Resolution 194(111). Many do want to return, however, 
despite Israeli claims (official and non-official), that PRs have no desire to do so. Making such 
claims corresponds with the policies and plans that Israel has been carrying out to prevent 
return; which, as stated in The Israel Yearbook of 1990, will be "the future nightmare for 
Israel." Thus, Israel has argues that as Jewish "refugees" were resettled in Israel, a fair and 
equitable solution to the Arab refugee problem will necessarily require relocation in nearby 
Arab countries. 
In historical and political terms, these new developments on the Palestinian-Israeli scene 
with regard to PRs simply mean that the issue has been brought back to the 1950s; when the 
issue was dealt with as being one of economics rather than politics. This is evident in the 
economic plans and aid stipulated in the deal, the end result of which would be to fulfill an old 
Israeli dream of dominating not only the political scene, controlling land, water, overall security 
and foreign affairs in the areas of Palestinian autonomy, but also, being the leading nation in 
the "knowledge economy" in the Middle East as stated by Shimon Peres, through the creation 
of the "Middle East Market." 
It has become clear that Israeli policy in respect of the PRs has been and continues to 
be defined by what it does not allow rather than by what it does. Although these above points 
might be arguable, they beg a number of question. Would the PRs accept resettlement in the 
Arab countries? This also works in the other direction, would the Arab states assume 
responsibility to resettle them on their land? How can one prevent PRs from returning if they 
wish to return, in view of the Israeli stand on this issue? Who will return, how many, from 
where and to where? What are the economic needs for their absorption in the WBGS? An 
answer to these questions is difficult to provide. But, it is vital that the refugees should be 
heard, and they should h~ve an active participation and representation in any negotiations to be 
conducted. In the last analysis the only ones really interested in a just solution are the refugees 
themselves. Since the economic solution and resettlement is not the answer to their aspirations, 
one might then question whether the deal represents, as Mouin Rabbani put it, "the first 
. 
strategic retreat by Zionism on the road to Palestinian self-determination, or rather the final nail 
in the coffin of the Palestinian struggle"? Time will tell. 
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Appendix 1· Gaza Strip Palestinian refugee camps, resettlement 
projects, and Jewish settlements 
SEnLEMENTS 
I Afa, 5 ,n3' 
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" Erell 
5 Tel Manlal 
6 Nella/om 
7 Klal Oa/am 
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9 Nelzer Hazan, 
100al,' 
11 Gam!, TOll 
12 Neve Oekahm 
13 Gad,d 
14 Gan 01 
15 Beoolan 
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17 Mollpe Allmona 
18 MOIag 
RErUGEE CAMPS 
A JJba'ya 
B Shall (Bnenl 
C NU$C'fal 
o BUfI" 
E Mughaz. 
FOe" a'·Balan 
G Khan 'run,s 
H Aalan 
Oal,' Bloc 
REFUGEE RESETIlEMENT 
PROJECTS 
M HJ' St\e;kh Radwan 
BB Nazla 
CC Amal 
DO Sweo,sn Village 
EE Tul al·Sunan 
FF Canaoa Camp 
GG Bru,: Camp 
HH Oehan;ya (bedoulill 
/:: ::::;:.: •... 
Key: 
Old roao 
ISIaeli buill 01 
Improved roau 
In","alion;!1 boroer 
AlmisliCI line 
Israe~ sanlement zone 
N 
••••• 
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, No.57, Autumn 1985:50 
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Appendix 2: Shati Camp, divided into 12 residential blocks 
~: UNRWA Gaza, 1991. 
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Appendix 3: Sheikh Radwan Israeli sponsored housing project, 
divided into 5 residential block 
Source: Gaza Municipality, 1991. 
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Appendix 4: UN GA Resolution 194 (Ill) of 11 December 1948, 
on Right to Return or Compensation of PRs 
Text o'f Resolution 194 (III) 
The Palestine Question 
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
On 11 December 1948 
The Gtn~ral Auembly, 
Ha,,;nv con.ntkred further the situation In PI.· 
~ulille, 
1. E.rpre!Ju its deep appreciation of the pro· 
,reas achieved throurh the rood offices of the late Uni· 
ted Nationl MedIator in promotin, a peaceful adjust. 
ment of the future situation of Palestine. for which eau· 
se he sacrificed his life: and 
EzttftcLt its thanks to the Actin, ~edlator and his 
stattToriiieir continued efforts &nd devotion to duty 
in Palestine: 
2. EJtabliJne.t a Conciliation Commis.sion conslat· 
inr ot three States Memben ot the United NaUons 
which shall have the foUowine functions: 
a) 'To ~~sume. iii ~tar '&1- it 'conslders necessu)' 
:n uistinr clrcumstaiices;' the' (UDction; riven to the 
United Nations Mediator on ·Palestine by resolution 188 
(5.2) of the General Assembly ot U May 1948; 
b) To urry out the specific functions and dlrert· 
iVes' (iven to it by the preseat resolutton and luch ad· 
dltional functions and directives as may be rtven tCl it 
by the General Assembly or by the Security Council: 
C) To undertalle. upon the requeat of the Security 
Council. any ot the {unctions now aslimed to the Uni· 
ted Nations Media:or on Palestine or to the United Na· 
Uons Truce Coca::ssion by resolutionl of the Security 
Council : upon s:.lC:h request to the Conciliation Com· 
mission by the S!'=".Irity Council with respect to all the 
remalninr funC:l0ns of the United Nationl Mediator on 
Palestine under SI!~:Jrity Council resolutions. the oCnce 
of the Mediator shall be tennlnated: 
3. DtC'icU! that a Committe1! of the Assembly, con-
sisting ot China, France. the Union of Sovtet Socialist 
Republics. the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America, shall present. before the end of the Ci"t 
part of the present session of the General Allembly. Cor 
the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerniog the 
Dames of the three States which will constitute the Con-
ciliation Commission: 
4. Rtque.st~ the Commission to begin its funclions 
at once, wUh a vtew to the establishment of contact t:e-
tween the parties themselves and the Commission at the 
earliest possible date: 
5. CGllI upon the Go\'ernment alld authorities con 
cerned to extend the scope of the ne;otiations pro vi dec 
for in the Security Council's resolution of 18 ~ovea\bel 
1948 and to seek acree~'!nt by nerollatlons conductec 
either with the Concmatlon Commission or directl'\" 
with a view to the final settlement of aU questions ou't' 
su.ncUne between them: 
e. lrutnu:t, the Concmatlon Commission to take 
steps to asilit the Governments and authorities concer· 
ned to achieve I. final settlement of aU questions out· 
standlnr bttweell them: 
1. ~ that the Holy Places - Including t'\a· 
zareth - reUgious buUdlnrs and sites in P~estlne should 
be protected and free access to them assured, in accor' 
dance. with existlne rirhu and hlstorica" practice : that 
I rraniementi :to~thli 'end :,iliould.:be 'under effective Unl-
ted"Natioiiir,~~rvrsion~:\':th"f:-thi "Urifti(i Nations Con· 
cillation: C6mmlsslon!lin presentinc' to: the fourth reCU' 
lu session' of \h.'" a.i1eraFMsembly its detailed propo-
sals for I. permanent International rec;me for the terri· 
tory of Jerusalem. should Include recommendations con· 
cernine the Holy PlaCH In that territory: that with reo 
rard to the Holy Places In the rest of Palestine the Com· 
misalon should call upon the political authorities of the 
areas concerned to rive appropriate formal ruarantees 
as to the protection of th .... Holy Placel and aceesa to 
t~em : and that these undertaklnrs should be presen-
ted to the Ceneral.Assembly for approval : 
8. Ruolvu that, In view of Its usociatloa with 
three world reU(ions, the Jerusalem area. IllcludIng the 
present municipality of Jerusalem pllLl the surrounding 
¥tHares IUld towns. the most eutfrn uf which shall be 
Abu Dil: the most southern, Bethlehem: the most west-
ern. Eln Karim (including also the built-up area of 
Motsa): and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be ac· 
corded special and separate treatment from the rest of 
Palestine and should be placed under effective t.:nited 
~aUo:\s control: 
Requut.t the S~urity Councl1 to take further steps 
to ensure the demilita.rization of Jerusalem at the ear-
liest possible date: 
lrutrau:t.J the Conciliation Commission to present to 
lhe fourth reruIar session of the General Assembly de-
tailed proposals for a permanent international regime 
rot" the Jeruaalem area which WIll prOVIde (or the maxI-
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Resolution 194 (III) -- continued 
mum \oc&l ~utonomy Cor dist\nctlve rroups consistent 
·",,'th lhe specIal interr.~tional status of the Jerusalem 
uea: 
The Conciliation Commission is &uthorized to ap-
point a UDlted Nations npr-esent&tive, who sha.l1 coop-
erate with the loc&l authorities with respect to the in-
terim administration ot the Jerusalem area: 
9. Ruoh:u that. pendinr arreement on more de-
tailed ananceratDU unonc lhe Covtrnments and au-
thoriUes conctrlleci. the Creest possible access to Jeru-
ulel'D by road, rall or &ir should.~ accordfd to all In-
habitants ot Palestine: 
IfUtructl the ConCIliation Cocnmission to report 
immearawy to the Security Council, tor appropriate 
action that orran, any altecnpt by any party to Impede 
such acceSl; . 
,10. '4/fUtrudl the Co"lcill&tion' Commission to auk 
arraace'ments -amoni 'U,e CovernmentS ,and authorities 
concerned which will t&Cmute the economic develop-
ment of the area, indud!nr arranremeDts tor access to 
ports and ainlelds and the use at transportation and 
communication CacillUu; 
11. Ruolvt!1 that the returees wishlne to return 
to their hocn~ and ltve in peace with their Deieh'boun 
should 'be permitted to do so at the earnest pnctlcable 
date. and that compensation should 'be paid tor the pro-
perty ot those ch'='Osinr not to return &.Dd tor loss of 
or dam&ce to pr.:;:erty which, under principles of IDter-
nationa! law or .n equity. should h. ma.de cood 'by the 
Covernm.:n:s or J.lJthontiu responsible: 
~: ',~! Cor.c:t:ation Commission to facilitate 
the "patliallon, resettlement and t<:oaomic lnd loclal 
renabilitation ot the returees a~ei the ~,ymtat of coen· 
pensaUon, and to maintain close relallons with the Dl-
rector ot tbe Uniteei Nalions. Relie! tor Palestine ltetu· 
eces and. throuch him. with the appropriate orrans and 
acencin ot the United NaUons: 
, ,12. AldAori" .. the Conciliation Coenmiuioft to ap-
po"'t suctl subsidiary bodies and to employ luch technl-
cal expertl. actine under its authority. u it may nnei 
11ecenary Cor the r.tteclive discharCt of Its fUllcUorl. and 
rtsponsibltiUu under the present resolution: 
The ConclllaUoft Commission will haYe It.l official 
headquarten at .1erusalem. Th' authorttttl respolulbt. 
tor ma.intalninc order In Jerusalem will 'be "sponslbl. lor 
takine 111 mtuuru Decenary, to elUure the securtty of 
the CommissloD.-~n'.ISecretary~(itCl.ra1. will provide a 
limited number of cuucis (or the prot~t1oD of the stalf 
and premis": of'ih~:~o~mls~lon: ' .. 
13. '~f",d .. the Conciliation Commission to reDder 
prorrelS reports periodically to the Secretary·c.nenl 
tor tra.nlDaluion to the Security CouncU anei to lb, Mem-
ben of the United Nationl; 
U. C4Ilt Upot! all CovunmeDts and autbortH .. 
concerned to eo·operate with the CoaciUatlon Com-
mission aad to take aU possible steps to 'auiat In the Im-
plementation of th. preseDt resolution: 
1'. R,qvub the Secretary-~ner.l to provide the 
necessary st.atf and facilities and to make appropriate 
arranreruents to provide the Decesnry tuncis required 
In cart'y1nr out the terms of the present ",olutlon. 
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Appendix 5: Israeli Building Regulations in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip 
The Civil Adn:irdstration of the Gaza Strip 
-Announcement for thE: Public-
To: 
Add,"ess: 
In execution of the competence authorizE!d to me as th1~ Director of 
Welfare Affairs and Refugees, in accordance with ordinance No.4 of 1960. 
It has to be made known to the public the substance of resolutions 
relating to organizing the constructions and building affairs in the 
refugee camps; and according to what has been provided in the minutes 
issued by the officials for refugee affairs on the 3rd May 1958 and the 
1st June 1960, we issue the below mentioned regulations:-
One: If anyone may try to sell, buy, rent, mortgage, or transfer his place 
of living to another person in the camps area, shelter should be withdrawn 
completely from the two parties without having the right to claim any 
compensation. 
Two: It is forbidden to construct any buildings or constructions, and to 
add to or extend the existing shelters, or to demolish the existing 
shelters so as to set up a new one, or to make any other construction in 
the refugee camps area wi thout obtai ni n9 a penni t from the 01 rector of 
Welfare Affairs and Refugees or ft~ona his authorized deputy. 
Three: Whoever has the desire to relinquish his sheltel~ in the refugee 
camps area must submit an appl ication form to the roefugee rehabil itation 
office in order to implement the procedures. 
Four: It is forbidden to move from one camp to another without a 
pre-permit granted by the authorities in accordance with legal 
requirements. ". 
Five: Whoever may violate these orders is required to remove the building 
at his own expense, otherwise the building is taken from him, or he \',ill 
pay a fine in cash or be inlprisoned, or he mily be subject to both 
penalties. Besides, the building should be removed at the expense of the 
violators (completely and administratively). 
Rav; Sadeeh 
Head of Refugee Rehabilitation Branch 
Dit'ector of ~~elfal"e f,ffairs and Refugees 
Date: 29/12/1982 Original copy in Ar"abic 
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Appendix Six: 
Questionnaire For Gazan Refugees 
Case Study: Shati Camp 
1-3 Interview number ______ _ 
Date of interview ______ _ 
Time interview started ____ Ended ____ _ 
4. Person interviewed 
1. Head of household 
2. Housewife 
3. Eldest son 
5. Sex 
1. Male 
2. Female 
6. Age 
1. 16-19 
2. 20-29 
3. 30-39 
4. 40-49 
5. 50-59 
6. 60 and over 
7. Marital Status 
1. Single 
2. Married 
3. Widowed 
4. Divorced 
5. Separated 
8. Number of families in the shelter? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. Over four 
9. Number of persons? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
10. Number of immigrant family members? 
1. 1 - 2 
2. 3 - 4 
3. 5 - 6 
4. 7 - 8 
5. 9 - 10 
6. No one 
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11. Number of years living in the camp? 
1. Less than 5 years 
2. 5 - 9 
3. 10 - 14 
4. 15 - 19 
5. 20 - 24 
6. 25 - 29 
7. 30 - 34 
8. 35 - 39 
12. Town/village of origin in Palestine? 
13. Shelter ownership? 
1. UNRWA 
2. Private 
3. Others 
14. Number of rooms in shelter? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. 4 
5. 5 
6. 6 
7. 7 and more 
15. Did you add, any rooms to the shelter? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
16. If yes, how many rooms? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. over 3 
17. Do you suffer from: 
1. Shortage of water supply 
2. Inadequate electricity 
3. Sewerage problem 
4. Bad sanitation 
5. Others 
18. Level of education: 
1. Illiterate 
2. Elementary 
3. Preparatory 
4. Secondary 
5. Vocational and teachers institutes 
6. University 
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19. Occupation: 
I. Scientific workers 
2. Administrators 
3. Clerical workers 
4. Sales workers 
5. Service workers 
6. Agricultural workers 
7. Production workers 
8. Transport workers 
9. Other unskilled workers 
10. Unemployed 
II. Housewife 
12. Student 
13. Retired 
14. Disabled 
20. Place of work 
1. In the Wes t Bank 
2. In the Gaza Strip 
3. In Israel 
4. Abroad (specify) 
5. Others 
21. Number of employed persons in the family: 
1. One 
2. Two 
3. Three 
4. Four and more 
5. No one 
22. Does income cover essential needs? 
1. Enough 
2. Most 
3. Some 
4. No income 
23. Do you receive any remittances? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
24. Do people from your town/village of origin live in this camp? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
25. How often do you meet people from the same town/village of origin? 
1 Everyday 
2. Once a week 
3. Once a month 
4. Sometime in a year 
5. Once a year 
6. Less than once a year 
26. When do you refer to the Mukhtar? 
1. Never refer 
2. For family affairs 
3. For ratification of documents 
4. Political affairs 
5. Others 
27. Do you hold a refugee card? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
28. What does this card mean to you? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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29. Future security for children (by priority) 
1. Employment 
2. Education 
3. House ownership 
30. Would you like to move out of the camp? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
31. Where would you want to move to? 
1. -----------------------
2. -----------------------
3. -----------------------
32. Why do you want to move out? 
1. -----------------------
2. -----------------------
3. -----------------------
4. -----------------------
5. -----------------------
33. Why do you want to stay put in the camp? 
1. Stay close to family and relatives 
2. Maintain refugee identity 
3. Lack of means 
4. All above reasons 
34. Do you support the resettlement of refugees? 
1. Support Strongly 
2. Support 
3 Don't support (go to 35). 
4. No answer 
35. Why don't you support resettlement? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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36. In general, do you think refugees support resettlement? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
37. When would you accept resettlement? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
38. What are the aims of resettlement? 
1. Humanitarian 
2. Economical 
3. Political 
4. Don't know 
39. Do you think that the resettlement schemes were a success? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
40. What is UNRWA's role in resettlement? 
1. Major role 
2. Minor role 
3. No role 
4. Don't know 
5. No response 
41. Do you see any relationship between resettlement and the 
Right to Return or Compensation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
42. Do you agree or disagree that resettlement might cancel the Right of Return or 
Compensation? 
1. Agree __ 
2. Disagree 
3. Not sure 
4. No response 
43. What reasons do you think caused refugees to move out? 
1. -----------------------------
2. -----------------------------
3. -----------------------------
4. -----------------------------
44. Do refugees in the housing project (SR) participate in the 
political activities you undertake? 
1. Yes (go to 45) 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
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45. What is the level of their participation? 
1. Very High 
2. Above average 
3. Average (go to 68) 
4. Below average (go to 68) 
5. Don't know 
6. No answer 
46. Why do you think they rate such? 
1. ----------------------------
2. ----------------------------
3. ----------------------------
47. Are there martyrs in the household? 
1. Yes (go to 48) 
2. No 
48. How many? 
1. From 1967 - 1987 
2. From 1974 - 1987 
3. From 1987 - 1990 
49. Are there arrested persons in the household? 
1. Yes (go to 50) 
2. No 
50. How Many? 
1. From 1967 - 1987 
2. From 1974 - 1987 
3. From 1987 - 1990 
51. Are there injured persons in the household? 
1. Yes (go to 52) 
2. No 
52. How many? 
1. From 1967 - 1987 
2. From 1974 - 1987 
3. From 1987 - 1990 
53. Have you experienced house raids by Israeli soldiers during the Intifada? 
1. Yes (go to 54) 
2. No 
54. How many times has your house been raided? 
1. 1-5 
2. 6 - 10 
3. 11 -15 
4. 16 - 20 
5. 21 and more 
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55. What solution do you favour for the Palestine - Israeli conflict? 
1. Implementation of PNC resolutions (19th session) 
2. Liberation of all Palestine 
3. Other solutions 
4. No answer 
56. Do you support a Palestinian State in the WBOS? 
1. Yes (go to 57) 
2. No 
57. Do you support it even if it excludes 1948 land? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
58. What type of leadership do you want to see for the future state? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
59. What is your preferred size of family? 
1. 1 - 2 
2. 3 - 4 
3. 5 - 6 
4. 7 - 8 
5. 9 - 10 
6. 11 and more 
60. What are your reasons for preferring a large family? 
1. Social 
1. Social 
2. Economic 
3. Political (go to 61) 
4. All three above 
5. Others 
61. Why have you chosen the political variable? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
87. Do you think your conditions are well known and written about? __ 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Appendix Seven : 
1-3 
4. 
s. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Questionnaire For Gazan Refugees In The Housing Projects 
Case Study: Sheikh Radwan Project 
Interview number 
Date of interview 
Time interview started Ended 
Person interviewed 
1. Head of household 
2. Housewife 
3. Eldest son 
Sex 
1. Male 
2. Female 
Age 
1. 16-19 
--2. 20-29 
--3. 30-39 
--4. 40-49 
--5. 50-59 
--6. 60 and over __ 
Marital Status 
--
1. Single __ 
2. Married 
--
3. Widowed __ 
4. Divorced 
--s. Separated __ 
Number of families in the shelter? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. Over four 
Number of persons? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
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10. Number of immigrant family members? 
1. 1 - 2 
2. 3 - 4 
3. 5 - 6 
4. 7 - 8 
5. 9 - 10 
6. No one 
11. Number of years living in the project 
1. From 6 - 11 months 
2. From 1 - 3 years 
3. From 4 - 7 years 
4. From 8 - 11 years 
5. From 12 - 15 years 
6. From 15 - 18 years 
12. Previous residence 
1. City. Camp (go to 13) 
2. Camp (go t013) 
3. Others (specify) 
. 13. Name of camp 
1. Jabalya 
2. Shati (Beach) 
3. Bureij 
4. Nusirat 
5. Maghazi 
6. Deir el Balah 
7. Khan Yunis 
8. Rafah 
14. Town/village of origin in Palestine 
15. House ownership 
1. Private 
2. Rent 
3. Don't know 
16. Number of rooms in shelter 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. 4 
5. 5 
6. 6 
7. 7 and more 
17. Did you receive: 
1. A built house (go to 18) 
2. A plot of land (go to 22) 
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18. How many rooms did you receive? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. 4 and more 
19. Did you make alternations to the new house? 
1. Yes (go to 20) 
2. No 
20. If yes, how many rooms? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. 4 and more 
5. Demolishing the house, and rebuilding as multi-storey 
6. Others 
21. How many rooms were there in the previous house? 
1 1 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 
4. 4 
5. 5 
6. 6 
7. 7 and more 
22. What area of land have you received? 
1. 250 sq. m. 
2. 125 sq. m. 
3. Others (specify) 
23. Do you suffer from:Yes No 
1. Shortage of water supply 
2. Inadequate electricity 
3. Sewerage problem 
4. Bad sanitation 
5. Others 
24. Level of education: 
1. Illiterate 
2. Elementary 
3. Preparatory 
4. Secondary 
5. Vocational and teachers institutes 
6. University 
25. Place of work 
1. In the West Bank 
2. In the Gaza Strip 
3. In Israel 
4. Abroad (specify) 
5. Others 
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26. Occupation: 
1. Scientific workers 
2. Adminis tra tors 
3. Clerical workers 
4. Sales workers 
5. Service workers 
6. Agricultural workers 
7. Production workers 
8. Transport workers 
9. Other unskilled workers 
10. Unemployed 
11. Housewife 
12. Student 
13. Retired 
14. Disabled 
27. Number of employed persons in the family: 
1. One 
2. Two 
3. Three 
4. Four and more 
28. Does income cover essential needs? 
1. Enough 
2. Most 
3. Some 
4. No income 
29. Do you receive any remittances from family 
members employed abroad? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
30. Form of relocation 
1. Voluntarily 
2. Compulsory 
3. Others 
31. Why did you move out to the housing project? 
1. Security demolition 
2. Road widening 
3. Town planning 
4. 1967 War demolition 
5. Narrowness of camp's shelter 
6. Improvement in income 
7. To improve social status 
8. Political considerations 
9. Others 
32. Did you receive compensation for your previous camp shelter? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
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33. How satisfied were you with the compensation received? 
1. Very Satisfied 
2. Satisfied 
3. Fairly satisfied (go to 34) 
4. Dissatisfied (go to 34) 
34. Why are you not satisfied? 
1. Because percentage of compensation was below 
5% of house value 
2. 10 - 19% 
3. 20 - 29% 
4. 30 - 39% 
5. Over 40% 
35. Did you sign a contract when you moved to the project? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
36. What is the duration of the contract? 
37. Did you know the provisions of the contract? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
38. Do you think that this contract deprives you of your 
rights as a refugee? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not sure 
4. Don't know 
39. Do people from your town/village of origin live in this project? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't Know 
40. How often do you meet people from the same 
town/Village of origin? 
1. Everyday 
2. Once a week 
3. Once a month 
4. Sometime in a year 
5. Once a year 
6. Less than once a year 
41. When do you refer to the Mukhtar? 
1. N ever refer 
2. For family affairs 
3. For ratification of documents 
4. Political affairs 
5. Others 
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42. Is living in the project similar or different than camp life? 
1. The same (go to 443) 
2. Differs (go to 44) 
3. Don't know 
43. What are the similarities? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
44. What differences? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
45. Are you satisfied with your life in the project? 
1. Sa tisfied 
2. Satisfied to adequate 
3. Dissatisfied 
4. Dissatisfied completely 
. 46. Do your prefer to live in the project with people from 
the same town/village of origin? 
1. Yes (go to 47) 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
47. Why do you have that preference? 
1. _______ _ 
2. _______ _ 
3. _______ _ 
48. Did you find any difficulties? 
1. Yes (go to 49) 
2. No 
49. What difficulties? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
50. Would you like to return to the camp? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. It depends (go to 51) 
4. Don't know 
51. What does it depend on? 
1. 
2. 
52. Do you receive similar services as the indigenous population? 
1. Yes 
2. No .. 
3. How do they differ? 
54. Do you hold a refugee card? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
55. What does this card mean to you? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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56. Do you support the resettlement of refugees? 
1. Support strongly 
2. Support 
3. Don't support (go to 57) 
4. No answer 
57. Why don't you support resettlement? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
58. In general, do you think refugees support resettlement? 
1. Yes 
2. No (go to 59) 
3. Don't know 
59. Why do you think they do not support it? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
60. What are the aims of resettlement? 
1. Humanitarian 
2. Economical 
3. Political 
4. Don't know 
61. Do you think that the resettlement schemes were a success? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
62. What is UNRWA's role in resettlement? 
1. Major role 
2. Minor role 
3. No role 
4. Don't know 
5. No response 
63. Do you see any relationship between resettlement and the 
Right to Return or Compensation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't know 
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64. Do you agree or disagree that resettlement might cancel the Right of Return or 
Compensation? 
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. Not sure 
4. No response 
65. Do you see yourself entitled to the Right of Return or 
Compensation when a solution comes up? 
1. Yes 
2. No (go to 66) 
3. Not sure (go to 66) 
4. No response 
66. Why do you think you are not entitled to it? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
67. What level of pOlitical activities do refugees in the housing projects have? 
1. Very High 
2. Above average 
3. Average (go to 68) 
4. Below average (go to 68) 
5. Don't know 
6. No answer 
68. Why do you think that their activities are decreasing? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
69. Does national struggle mean less to you? 
70. Do you feel that Israeli soldier harassment 
of you is less in the project? 
AgreeDisagree Don't Know 
71. Do you believe that resettlement in the projects 
reinforces the steadfastness on Palestinian land? 
72. Are there martyrs in the household? 
1. Yes (go to 73) 
2. No 
73. How many? 
1. From 1974 - 1987 
2. From 1987 - 1990 
74. Are there arrested persons in the household? 
1. Yes (go to 75) 
2. No 
75. How many? 
1. From 1974 - 1987 
2. From 1987 - 1990 
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76. Are there injured persons in the household? 
1. Yes (go to 77) 
2. No 
77. How many? 
1. From 1974 - 1987 
2. From 1987 - 1990 
78. Have you experienced house raids by Israeli soldiers during the Intifada? 
1. Yes (go to 79) 
2. No 
79. How many times has your house been raided? 
1. 1-2 
2. 3 - 4 
3. 5 - 6 
4. 7 or more 
80. What solution do you favour for the Palestine - Israeli conflict? 
i. Implementation of PNC resolutions (19th session) 
2. Liberation of all Palestine 
3. Other solutions 
4. No answer 
81. Do you support a Palestinian State in the WBGS? 
1. Yes (go to 82) 
2. No 
82. Do you support it even if it excludes 1948 land? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
83. What type of leadership do you want to see for the future state? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
84. What is your preferred size of family? 
1. 1 - 2 
2. 3 - 4 
3. 5 - 6 
4. 7 - 8 
5. 9 - 10 
6. 11 and more 
85. What are your reasons for preferring a large family? 
1. Social 
2. Economic 
3. Political (Go to 86) 
4. All three abov~ 
5. Others 
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86. Why have you chosen the political variable? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
87. Do you think your conditions are well known and written about? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
